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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY

DIRECTIVE NO. 9-87

May 18, 1987

Southern Africa

U.S. Policy Toward the Front Line States (S)

This directive establishes the terms of reference for an interagency review, under the leadership of the Department of State, of U.S. policy toward Southern African states other than South Africa and Angola, which are covered in previous NSDDs (NSDD 273 and NSDD 274, respectively). The conclusions and policy recommendations of this review will be forwarded to me by May 30, 1987. As with the aforementioned documents, this review will be based on NSDD 272, U.S. Objectives in Southern Africa.

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The interagency group on Southern Africa should determine what specific policies are necessary to achieve U.S. objectives in the following areas:

Political Relations

What U.S. policies are most likely to promote political moderation and stability in the black-ruled states of Southern Africa? How can the U.S. encourage these states to play a constructive role in the search for a negotiated political solution in South Africa? How can the U.S. encourage a reduction of cross border violence and political polarization in Southern Africa? How can we build support for U.S. positions on international political questions in Southern Africa, while reducing the tendency of states in the region to identify themselves with Soviet or other anti-U.S. positions on international questions? (S)

Economic Relations

What role can/should the U.S. play in promoting regional stability, economic integration and development? What is the proper mixture between efforts to promote regional economic development and efforts to promote political stability through economic assistance in Southern Africa? Should U.S. policies in support of transport, intra-regional trade, and economic policy reform in the region be sustained? Should they be made more selective with regard to specific countries and contingencies?

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### Security Relations

What steps should the U.S. take to promote effective Western competition with the Soviet Union in regional security relationships? Given the historic role of specific Western nations in certain Southern African nations (e.g., the British in Zimbabwe), how should the U.S. relate to allied security efforts in the region? (S)

### Western Partnership

Given the limited resources available for use in Southern Africa, should the U.S. work to persuade our Western allies and friends to join with us in a partnership to promote peaceful change and preempt Soviet maneuvering? How best can the U.S. help promote effective burden-sharing on behalf of overall Western regional interests in Southern Africa? (S)

### Special Concerns

#### The Moderates

Moderate American friends in Southern Africa--Botswana, Malawi, Zaire, Zambia, and Swaziland--have come under increasing pressure as regional tensions have risen. The study should specifically assess how U.S. policy can support these governments and assist them in achieving the regional objectives that we share with them. The study should also identify the major current threats to the stability of these governments and recommend U.S. policies to help them deal with these threats. The internal problems faced by the leadership in Zambia, and Malawi's sensitive relations with its neighbors, should be included in this assessment. (S)

#### Mozambique

In 1985, I invited President Samora Machel to make an official visit to the United States, thus signalling a desire for normal relations with Mozambique and a belief that his government wanted to move toward genuine non-alignment. President Chissano has stated his intention to continue his predecessor's policies, and has taken important steps in this direction, especially in the economic area. On the other hand, intelligence assessments, including SNIE 72.3-85, make it clear that RENAMO continues to be a significant military force and a factor to be considered in any analysis of Mozambique's ability to distance itself from the Soviets. It is less clear what RENAMO's political platform is, although it associates itself with Western democratic values and a free market system.

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- Based on six months of experience with the Chissano regime, what policy course do we expect the Mozambican regime to pursue vis-a-vis the Soviets, the West, its neighbors, and the insurgency?
- In view of the most recent intelligence community assessment of the regime's prospects (SNIE 72.3-85), is it both feasible and desirable for the United States Government to increase cooperation with the Mozambican Government in an effort to bring it closer to the West?
- What should be our political stance toward RENAMO? How do we best define that movement?
- If Chissano is serious about economic reforms, reducing links to the Soviet Union, and cooperation with institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, should the United States Government seek the removal of current statutory limitations on aid to Mozambique?
- Given the sustained impact that RENAMO has had on the security situation, what are the implications for potential U.S. economic activities such as rehabilitation of transportation corridors? (S)

Zimbabwe

Relations reached a low point in 1986 when offensive public statements by a Zimbabwean official contributed to a U.S. decision not to undertake new bilateral aid commitments to Zimbabwe. Since then, both sides have expressed a desire in principle for improved relations. More recent developments in Zimbabwean policy are contradictory; they include a go-slow posture regarding South African sanctions, reluctance to provide safe-haven for the ANC, interest in an arms deal with the Soviets, and announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Kabul regime.

- What are U.S. interests in Zimbabwe?
- Can we prevent the development of a closer Soviet military and political relationship with Zimbabwe? If so, how?

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- Will Prime Minister Mugabe continue to succeed in his political "balancing act" internally? Do we have a stake in his political survival?
- What regional role can Zimbabwe be expected to play with regard to South Africa, the Mozambique war, Namibia? What role do we want Zimbabwe to play?
- Zimbabwe's private sector is a model for the region. What can/should we do to assure its preservation, even if our overall relations with Zimbabwe remain ambivalent? (S)

*Ronald Reagan*

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