

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** BAKER, HOWARD: FILES

**Withdrawer**

CAS 1/4/2012

**File Folder** IRAN-CONTRA HEARINGS - JUNE [MAY-NOVEMBER  
1987] (5)

**FOIA**

M11-391

**Box Number** 3

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6

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
127224	MEMO	WILLIAM LYTTON TO ARTHUR CULVAHOUSE RE ANTICIPATED TESTIMONY OF STANLEY SPORKIN <b>R 10/28/2010 NLSF97-066/6 #52</b>	3	6/22/1987	B1
127225	MEMO	LYTTON TO CULVAHOUSE RE ANTICIPATED TESTIMONY OF HENRY GAFFNEY <b>R 10/28/2010 NLSF97-066/6 #53</b>	2	6/22/1987	B1
127226	NOTE	GAFFNEY NOTE FOR THE RECORD, PHOTOCOPIED ONTO FIRST PAGE OF TALKING POINTS <b>PAR 11/15/2012 M391/1</b>	1	12/12/1986	B1
127227	POINT PAPER	RE HAWK MISSILES <b>R 3/17/2006 NLSF97-066/6 #55</b>	2	ND	B1
127228	MEMO	LYTTON TO CULVAHOUSE RE ELLIOTT ABRAMS TESTIMONY <b>R 5/24/2011 NLSF97-066/6 #56</b>	3	6/2/1987	B1
127229	MEMO	LYTTON TO CULVAHOUSE RE EXPECTED TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH FERNANDEZ (AKA TOMAS CASTILLO) <b>R 10/28/2010 NLSF97-066/6 #57</b>	3	5/28/1987	B1
127230	MEMO	LYTTON TO CULVAHOUSE RE ANTICIPATED TESTIMONY OF ABRAMS	5	5/28/1987	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
127231	MEMO	LYTTON TO CULVAHOUSE RE AMB LEWIS TAMBS	3	5/28/1987	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files  
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 (5)

Archivist: kdb  
 FOIA ID: F1997-066/6, D. Cohen  
 Date: 08/18/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>1. memo</del>	<del>William Lytton to Arthur Culvahouse re anticipated testimony of Stanley Sporkin, 3p R 10/28/10 F97-066/6 #52</del>	<del>6/22/87</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>2. memo</del>	<del>Lytton to Culvahouse re anticipated testimony of Henry Gaffney, 2p R 10/28/10 F97-066/6 #53</del>	<del>6/22/87</del>	<del>B1</del>
3. note	Gaffney memo for the record, photocopied onto first page of talking points, 1p	12/12/86	B1
<del>4. point paper</del>	<del>re HAWK missiles, 2p R 3/17/06 F97-066/6 #55</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>5. memo</del>	<del>Lytton to Culvahouse re Elliott Abrams testimony, 3p R 5/24/11 F97-066/6 #56</del>	<del>6/2/87</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>6. memo</del>	<del>Lytton to Culvahouse re expected testimony of Joseph Fernandez (aka Tomas Castillo), 3p R 10/28/10 F97-066/6 #57</del>	<del>5/28/87</del>	<del>B1</del>
7. memo	Lytton to Culvahouse re anticipated testimony of Abrams, 5p	5/28/87	B1
8. memo	Lytton to Culvahouse re Amb. Lewis Tambs, 3p	5/28/87	B1

### RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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# PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** BAKER, HOWARD: FILES

**Withdrawer**

SMF 4/24/2002

**File Folder** IRAN-CONTRA HEARINGS-JUNE [MAY-NOVEMBER  
1987] (5)

**FOIA**

F97-066/6

**Box Number** 3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
4	PAPER	POINT PAPER RE HAWK MISSILES (F97-066/6 #55) <i>5/20/09 ejs</i>	2	ND

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 22, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.

FROM: WILLIAM B. LYTTON III *W*

SUBJECT: Anticipated Testimony of the Honorable  
Stanley J. Sporkin

Judge Stanley J. Sporkin (D.D.C.) served as General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency from May 1981 to February 1986. He is expected to testify before the Select Committee on Tuesday, June 22, 1987. We expect him to be questioned on requirements for findings under the so-called Hughes-Ryan Amendment (sec. 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. sec. 2422). In particular, issues on which we know he had personal involvement include:

-- whether a finding was required for the assistance tendered the Israelis for the November 1985 shipment of Hawks;

-- if so, whether a retroactive finding would satisfy statutory requirements;

-- the purpose of changes he proposed to the draft finding dated January 6, 1986, before a final copy was signed by the President on January 17, 1986; and

-- why the Congress was not notified of the January 17 finding.

He may also be asked to provide his views on whether a finding should have been made for efforts by the Drug Enforcement Agency to free the hostages in 1985-86. In the view of some, this plan was the equivalent of an "intelligence activity" and Congress should have been notified.

Finally, he may be asked to provide his views on the CIA's interpretation of and compliance with the applicable Boland Amendments.

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR F970106/6 #52  
BY RW NARA DATE 10/28/10

The Legal Framework. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment provides in part:

No funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the United States. Each such operation shall be considered a significant anticipated intelligence activity for the purpose of section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947.

Section 501(b) provides in part that where prior notice of covert actions is not given to the intelligence committees, the President

shall fully inform the intelligence activities in a timely fashion of intelligence operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, for which prior notice was not given under subsection (a) and shall provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.

E.O. 12333 renders these requirements applicable to any entity that conducts "special activities," a category of intelligence activities. NSDD 159 set forth procedures regarding implementation of these provisions, as well as for review of covert actions.

The draft November 1985 finding. In November 1985, the Israelis encountered difficulties in securing flight clearance from Portugal for a shipment of HAWKS intended for Tehran. At North's request, Richard Secord provided transportation using a CIA proprietary. Then Deputy Director John McMahon wrote on December 7, 1985 that he "went through the roof" because the mission was executed without a finding. Sporkin was directed to prepare a finding to "cover retroactively the use of the Agency's proprietary." Sporkin prepared a draft, never signed, which included the statement:

Because of the extreme sensitivity of these operations, in the exercise of the President's constitutional authorities, I direct the Director of Central Intelligence not to brief the Congress of the United States. . .until such time as I may direct otherwise. . .

The January 1986 findings. On January 3, Sporkin carried a draft finding to North. His draft offered a choice between prompt or postponed notification to Congress. The finding stated in part:

The USG will act to facilitate efforts by third parties and third countries to establish contact with moderate elements within and outside the Government of Iran by providing these elements in their effort to achieve a more pro-U.S. government in Iran by demonstrating their ability to obtain requisite resources to defend their country against Iraq and intervention by the Soviet Union.

The President inadvertently signed the draft, dated January 6, 1986. Sporkin again reviewed it, and made the one change underscored below:

DESCRIPTION (Assist selected friendly foreign liaison services, third countries, and third parties which have established relationships with Iranian elements, groups and individuals.)

The President signed it on January 17, 1986.

The DEA venture. As described in a memorandum of June 7, 1985 by North to McFarlane, North undertook a rescue operation involving two DEA agents, funds "normally available to the Nicaraguan resistance," \$2 million from Ross Perot, and -- according to Senator Paul Trible -- about \$60,000 in CIA funds. The efforts culminated in late May 1986, when Thomas Clines boarded a ship in Cyprus bound for Lebanon to receive the hostages who were supposed to have been rescued. If Trible is correct that CIA funding was involved, then Sporkin will be pressed on why no finding was made. We have no indication that Sporkin knew of the activity.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 22, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.

FROM: WILLIAM B. LYTTON III 

SUBJECT: ANTICIPATED TESTIMONY OF DR. HENRY H. GAFFNEY

Biographical Sketch:

Henry (Hank) Gaffney is expected to testify before the Select Committees as early as tomorrow. He is presently Director of the Plans Directorate of the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) and has held that position since August 1981. Before this, he was Director of the Near East/South Asia Region within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) and has been employed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense since 1962. Gaffney received his Ph.D. from Columbia University in Government and his A.B. from Harvard University.

Expected Testimony:

Gaffney will probably be questioned on a memo he prepared in November 1985 entitled, "HAWK Missiles for Iran" (copy attached). According to a Gaffney Memorandum for the Record (MFR) dated December 12, 1986, this memo was prepared by him, as then-Acting Director, DSAA, on or after November 19, 1985, at the request of Noel Koch (then-Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)) and General Collin Powell (then military assistant to the Secretary of Defense). According to his MFR, copies of his memo were provided Koch to deliver to General Powell.

In his memo, Gaffney identifies the number of HAWKS available for foreign sale, the expected cost and from which countries (South Korea, United Arab Emirates (UAE)) HAWKS must be diverted in order to supply HAWKS to Iran.

Gaffney also outlines legal problems associated with a sale of HAWKS to Iran. First, he states that Iran is not certified for sales pursuant to Section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act. Second, he notes that Congress must be notified of all sales of \$14 million or more. Third, he emphasizes that Congress must be notified even if the missiles are "laundered" (his term) through

THIS MEMORANDUM IS UNCLASSIFIED  
UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT.

87-TF-0065

Copy No. \_\_\_\_\_

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Israel. Gaffney also points out ways to evade Congressional notice though he cautions against taking such measures without consulting Senator Lugar, Congressman Fascal and their minority counterparts.

In addition, Gaffney outlines what he considers "formidable" political drawbacks, including the reaction of our European allies and other Middle Eastern nations. Of note, he predicts that a sale of this sort could very well prolong and intensify the Iran-Iraq war.

The Committees may place considerable weight on his testimony because, even though not an attorney, Gaffney has long experience with Near East/South Asia issues and with the Arms Export Control Act.

Attachment: As stated

87-TF-0065

12 Dec 86

Memo For Record

The attached talking points were prepared by me, as Acting Director, DSAA, on or after 19 November 1985, at the request of Noel Koch and Gen. Colin Powell (then Mil. Asst. to SecDef). They were furnished to Mr. Koch to take to Gen. Powell.

*[Handwritten Signature]*



13526  
E.O. 12958  
~~As Amended~~  
Sec. 3.3b(1)-(9)



DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR 111-391 #127224

BY RW NARA DATE 11/15/12

~~SECRET~~

87-TF-0065

Hawk Missiles for Iran

- Missiles are available right now, suitable for foreign sale. There are 164 missiles at Red River Arsenal - 77 intended for UAE and 87 for Korea. Seven of these are intended for tests, but the tests can be foregone.
- The missiles at Red River Arsenal cost \$300,000 apiece. This is not necessarily a firm price, and replacements could cost as much as \$437,700 apiece.
- Thus, the total bill for 120 missiles would be \$36-52.5 million. To this, applicable charges would have to be added (NRC cost, administration charge, packing and transport charges, plus storage).
- The missiles for Korea and UAE would have to be replaced, so DSAA will need the money to replace them.
- The modalities for sale to Iran present formidable difficulties:
  - Iran is not currently certified for sales, including indirectly as a third country, per Sec. 3 of the AECA.
  - Congress must be notified of all sales of \$14 million or more, whether it is a direct sale or indirect to a third country. The notice must be unclassified (except for some details), and the sale cannot take place until 30 days after the notice. The 30 days can be waived for direct sales, but the third country transfer has no such provision, and notice must still be given in any case.
  - Thus, even if the missiles were laundered through Israel, Congress would have to be notified.
- It is conceivable that the sale could be broken into 3 or 4 packages, in order to evade Congressional notice.
  - While there is no explicit injunction against splitting up such a sale (subject to check...), the spirit and the practice of the law is against that, and all Administration have observed this scrupulously.
  - It is conceivable that, upon satisfactory consultation with Chairmen Lugar and Fascell and their minority counterparts, they might agree to splitting the sale into smaller packages.
- The customer countries (UAE and Korea) would have to be told that their deliveries had been rescheduled, but we would not have to tell them why. We would not want to charge them more for later deliveries.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-066/6 #55

BY NOT

3/17/06

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87-TF-0065

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The political drawbacks are equally formidable:

- If Iraq ever found out, they would be greatly irritated. Their sources of supply are more readily accessible than Iran's, however, so there would be no effect in that respect.
- Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States would also be irritated and alarmed.
- If Israel were used as the laundering country, they would be greatly encouraged to continue selling to Iran, and to expand their sales.
- If the sale became known, all bars would be removed from sales by such countries as Spain, Portugal, Greece, UK, Italy, and FRG, countries who are only barely restrained from overt, large sales to Iran now.
- In short, the risk is that of prolonging and intensifying the Iran-Iraq war, while seriously compromising US influence over Israel and other countries to restrain sales to Iran.

87-TF-0065

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 5, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.  
RHETT B. DAWSON  
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN  
M. MARLIN FITZWATER  
THOMAS C. GRISCOM

FROM: ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR. *ABC*  
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Testimony of Albert Hakim - June 5, 1987

Attached is a summary prepared by Counsel's office of the testimony of Albert Hakim, during this morning's session of the Iran/Contra hearings.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 5, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.

FROM: WILLIAM B. LYTTON III *WL*

SUBJECT: TESTIMONY OF ALBERT HAKIM  
JUNE 5, 1987 (MORNING SESSION)

I. Overview

Senate Counsel Arthur Liman probed the business relationship between Richard Secord and Hakim. Secord benefitted financially from the enterprise, at one point withdrawing monies from the Korel account to purchase a Porsche automobile and a Piper Seneca plane. Secord also directed Hakim to invest the enterprise's funds in various business ventures, including timber and machine gun manufacturing.

Sen. McClure characterized as "incredible" Hakim's account of his efforts to transfer funds to the North family through Willard Zucker and concluded that Hakim intended to "compromise" LtCol North. Rep. DeWine suggested that Hakim wanted to have North "in his hip pocket." Hakim said such characterizations ignored his human attachment to North.

Hakim clarified for Sen. Sarbanes that he built up the reserves of the enterprise and created companies in anticipation of conducting further operations, including a possible operation in Africa. Hakim repeated earlier testimony that he felt under pressure by North to secure a release of the hostages before the November 1986 elections. Hakim suggested that North accepted a compromise provision on hostage release (one hostage with best efforts for a second rather than all the hostages) because of political concerns.

II. The President's Involvement

A. Diversion

Hakim clarified for Sen. McClure that he had no personal knowledge of the President's awareness or approval of his activities in the Contra operation.

B. Boland Amendment

Nothing to report.

C. Iran Operations

During an October 1986 meeting in Germany with a high-ranking Iranian official - the Second Channel - Secord boasted about the U.S. "fighting the Russians" in Iran and "cooperating to depose the leader of Iraq." Hakim said he did not question the legitimacy of these statements because it was his impression that the President was supporting the mission and it had been cleared by him. Hakim recalled it was the attitude of the entire U.S. delegation - Secord, LtCol North, Cave (CIA) - that the U.S. would cooperate to depose the leader of Iraq.

Rep. Jenkins dubbed the "9-Point" agreement negotiated by Hakim with the Second Channel as the "Hakim Accords, and was critical of Hakim, a private citizen without a security clearance and with a personal financial interest in the agreement, conducting foreign policy. Jenkins assumed that North sought approval of the "9-Point" agreement from Poindexter and the President.

D. Third Country Aid to Contras

Nothing to report.

E. Private Support to Contras

Nothing to report.

F. November 1986 Chronologies

Nothing to report.

III. Continuation of Hearing

Hakim will continue his testimony in the afternoon session. Fawn Hall is expected to testify on Monday, June 8, 1987.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 2, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.  
RHETT B. DAWSON  
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEJN  
M. MARLIN FITZWATER  
THOMAS C. GRISCOM

FROM: ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.   
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Testimony of Elliott Abrams  
June 2, 1987

Attached is a summary prepared by Counsel's office of the testimony of Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, at this morning's Iran/Contra Hearings.

Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By COB NARA, Date 8/24/01

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 28, 1987

*JMS*

MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.  
RHETT B. DAWSON  
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN  
M. MARLIN FITZWATER  
THOMAS C. GRISCOM

FROM: ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR. *ABC*  
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Testimony of Joseph Fernandez

Attached is a summary prepared by Counsel's office of the anticipated testimony of Joseph Fernandez, former CIA Chief of Station in Costa Rica (aka Thomas Castillo), who will testify tomorrow at the Iran/Contra hearings. ~~(TS)~~

Attachment

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 2, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.

FROM: WILLIAM B. LYTTON III *W*

SUBJECT: TESTIMONY OF ELLIOTT ABRAMS  
JUNE 2, 1987 (Morning Session)

Todd Buchwald and George Thigpen observed the testimony of Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and report as follows:

I. Overview

Shultz told Abrams in fall 1985 to monitor North's activities. Abrams satisfied himself that North's activities did not present problems because: (1) North told Abrams that all North's activities were legal (and that North had cleared his activities with White House Counsel), (2) McFarlane categorically assured Congress that North was abiding by the letter and spirit of the law, (3) Abrams met frequently with North, (4) Abrams saw no indication of illegal activity. (U)

Abrams downplayed the role of the RIG, characterizing it as a mechanism for disseminating and exchanging information, rather than policymaking. It included three or four persons from CIA, NSC, State, and DOD, and not--as Tambs testified--only Abrams, North and the Head of the Central American Task Force (CATF). Abrams did several times meet separately with North and CATF (though usually with at least one other person present). These three never discussed opening a "southern front," (though they did discuss generally the military situation in the south), and Abrams denied instructing Tambs to do so. (U)

Abrams said that he learned about the Santa Elena airstrip in fall 1985, but never asked about Tambs' role in it and assumed there was no USG involvement. In September 1986 (after the airstrip ceased operating), at North's request, Abrams instructed Tambs to pressure President Arias to call off a press conference that would reveal the existence of the airstrip by implying that an upcoming state visit hung in the balance. (U)

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Declassify on OADR  
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NLRR F97-0666 #56

BY RW

NARA DATE 5/24/11

Abrams recounted previous testimony on the solicitation of humanitarian assistance from Brunei. Asked about his previous testimony that no other countries had contributed funds to the Contras, Abrams stated that he had been surprised to learn after the disclosures of November 1986 that other countries had made contributions, and that he assumed he would have known about any such contributions because donors would ordinarily want credit from the USG. (U)

Abrams testified that the State Department fought against being assigned responsibility for running the \$27 million humanitarian assistance program because it lacked expertise in this type of operation. GAO criticism of NHAO's performance in running the program was "staggeringly unfair." Abrams knew no basis for believing that NHAO delivered any lethal aid. (U)

## II. President's Involvement

### A. Diversion

Nothing to report. (U)

### B. Boland

Abrams assumed that the Boland Amendment applied to the NSC, though Abrams never checked this. He testified that North claimed that the legality of his activities had been cleared by White House Counsel. (U)

### C. Iran Operation

Nothing to report. (U)

### D. Third Country Support

Abrams testified that solicitation of humanitarian assistance for the Contras, including the possibility of a direct appeal by the President, was discussed at the May 16, 1986, NSPG meeting, which the President attended. Senate Deputy Counsel Mark Belnick pointed out that Congress had authorized such solicitations during this period. (U)

In discussing possible donor countries with his State Department colleagues, Abrams was told by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Richard Murphy that Central America "was not on the map" as far as Middle Eastern countries were concerned. Murphy said that "while it was conceivable that a direct Presidential appeal would result in a response, that was the only conceivable way to do it." This exchange may be cited by those who contend that Saudi contributions to the Contras in 1984-85 were induced by solicitations from Administration officials, including solicitations from the President. (TS)

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E. Private Support

Nothing to report. (U)

F. November 1986 Chronologies

Nothing to report. (U)

87-TF-0042

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~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 28, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.

FROM: WILLIAM B. LYTTON III 

SUBJECT: EXPECTED TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH FERNANDEZ, FORMER COS  
COSTA RICA (AKA THOMAS CASTILLO)

Overview

Joseph Fernandez will testify before the Joint Committee on Thursday, May 28, 1987, in executive session. As the CIA Chief of Station in Costa Rica, Fernandez participated in an effort to build a clandestine airstrip in northwestern Costa Rica, at a site later known as "Point West." The airstrip project was abandoned after a new Costa Rican President decided that it was too grave a compromise of Costa Rican neutrality. In early 1986 Fernandez persuaded the Nicaraguan resistance fighters to form a unified command (which became UNO). On the premise that Congress would soon reauthorize aid, he persuaded the southern resistance forces to leave their sanctuaries in Costa Rica and carry the fight to Nicaraguan soil. After the aid was voted down, Fernandez began to work with Oliver North to assist the privately funded aerial resupply of the resistance. Specifically, Fernandez passed information about the resupply flights between North and Quintero and the southern resistance forces. (TS)

"Point West"

The purpose of the airstrip was to encourage the Nicaraguan resistance forces to leave Costa Rica by providing for their resupply and secondarily to provide for the resupply of friendly forces in Costa Rica in the event of Nicaraguan aggression. The formation of a Nicaraguan resistance southern front was Ambassador Tamb's highest priority, and resupply was essential to the creation of that front. In mid 1985, Costa Rican President Monge and Ambassador Tams cooperated in locating a suitable site for the airbase. President Monge designated Minister Piza (Minister of Public Security) as his representative in the effort. (TS)

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NLRR F97-066/6 #57

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BY RW NARA DATE 10/28/10

Minister Piza selected an isolated site in the northwest corner of Costa Rica. Ambassador Tambs and Minister Piza arranged for Fernandez and Rob Owen to inspect the site. Fernandez discussed the merits of the location with North. A representative of a private corporation negotiated the purchase or lease of the site, Rafael Quintero (an American citizen associated with the Secord operation) later arrived in San Jose to make arrangements for the construction of the airstrip, and work commenced. (TS)

In February 1986 President Arias was elected President of Costa Rica. Before the inauguration of Arias, Minister Piza wanted to make provisions for the airstrip. Through North, Fernandez had arranged a photo opportunity for Minister Piza with President Reagan in the White House. This took place on March 19, 1986. North, along with Fernandez, Donald Regan, and Admiral Poindexter, were also at the photo opportunity. After that event, Minister Piza and Fernandez met with Admiral Poindexter in Poindexter's office. There was no discussion of aerial resupply or the airstrip at that meeting. North found an opportunity to ask Minister Piza to meet with Secord at a hotel to discuss the airstrip. Minister Piza agreed, and that afternoon Piza met with Secord and Fernandez. Minister Piza insisted that all access to the property was to be ceded to the Costa Rica Civil Guard. He wanted the airstrip to have an official function. Later that day, a letter was delivered to Minister Piza from Robert Olmstead, representing the Udall Resources Corporation, in which Piza's conditions were met. In May 1986, President Arias decided that the airstrip would not be completed. (TS)

In June 1986, one of the Contra resupply planes made an emergency landing at the unfinished airstrip, and became stuck in the mud for a few days. (TS)

#### Aerial Resupply Operations

When Congress voted not to supply aid in 1986, Fernandez felt a moral obligation to the resistance forces he had encouraged to go into Nicaragua. At about the same time, North informed Fernandez that an L-100 aircraft was going to transport supplies from the Ilopango Air Base in El Salvador to the southern front forces. Fernandez informed his headquarters that the southern front forces were to receive airdropped supplies from private benefactors, and requested flight path information, hostile forces risk information, radar coverage information, the best flight path, time and altitude for the resupply flight into southern Nicaragua. This information was supplied, and Fernandez relayed it to Quintero. (TS)

Several months later, North told Fernandez that he had a warehouse full of supplies to send to the south, and planes to transport it. North wanted to begin aerial resupply, and

~~TOP SECRET~~

proposed that Fernandez supply drop zones and that North would give Fernandez the delivery times. On this basis, more flights were made. These flights were by C-7 Caribous, or C-123s, whose lack of range prevented them from taking a circuitous route to avoid radar. They had to fly right into radar coverage. The Hasenfus flight thus was shot down. (TS)

Fernandez was able to communicate with North either by secure phone lines, or by using a KL43 device which Quintero had delivered to Fernandez in late 1985. The reason why Quintero supplied a KL43 to Fernandez at that time has not yet been clarified; however, it appears that the timing corresponds to other measures taken to set up the private resupply network. (TS)

Fernandez never told Allan Fiers, Chief of the Central American Task Force, about his direct channel to North. Fernandez has stated that North never told him of the origin of the money going to the Contras. To Fernandez's knowledge, Ambassador Tams did not know the details of what he and North were doing. Further, Fernandez stated that he never told the DCI about his assistance to the Contras, and is not aware that anyone ever informed him. Fernandez was eligible for retirement from the CIA on April 24, 1987. (TS)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 28, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.  
RHETT B. DAWSON  
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN  
M. MARLIN FITZWATER  
THOMAS C. GRISCOM

FROM: ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR. *ABC*  
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Testimony of Elliott Abrams  
May 28, 1987

Attached is a summary prepared by Counsel's office of the anticipated testimony of Elliott Abrams who is expected to testify this afternoon at the Iran/Contra Hearings.

Attachment

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 28, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.  
RHETT B. DAWSON  
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN  
M. MARLIN FITZWATER  
THOMAS C. GRISCOM

FROM: ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.   
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Testimony of Ambassador Lewis A. Tambs

Attached is a summary prepared by Counsel's office of the anticipated testimony of Ambassador Lewis A. Tambs, former U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, who is testifying this afternoon at the Iran/Contra hearings.

Attachment

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 28, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.  
RHETT B. DAWSON  
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN  
M. MARLIN FITZWATER  
THOMAS C. GRISCOM

FROM: ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.   
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Testimony of Felix Rodriguez  
May 28, 1987

Attached is a summary prepared by Counsel's office of the remaining portion of testimony this morning by Felix Rodriguez at the Iran/Contra Hearings.

Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 28, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.

FROM: WILLIAM B. LYTTON III ✖

SUBJECT: TESTIMONY OF FELIX RODRIGUEZ  
MAY 28, 1987

Overview

The remainder of Felix Rodriguez's testimony was observed by David Stratton and Susan Disher on May 28, 1987. Rodriguez testified again that no time did he ever discuss the Contras or the resupply operation directly with Vice President Buush. Rodriguez did not discuss those subjects with the Vice President's staff until August 8, 1986. Rodriguez again described his conversation with North in North's office on June 25, 1986, in which North said that "the old man" loved him. Rodriguez was repeatedly questioned about his knowledge of the reputation and conduct of those in the Secord organization.

The President's Involvement

1. Diversion

Nothing to report.

2. Boland Amendment

Rodriguez stated that he did not believe that the resupply operation for the Southern Nicaraguan resistance was a U. S. Government operation, despite the involvement of North, Colonel Steele, and other employees of the government. Rodriguez believed that North was motivated by his personal interest in the freedom fighters, which Rodriguez shared. Rodriguez allowed that North might have had some guidelines in this matter. Rodriguez again described his conversation with North in North's office on June 25, 1985, which included North's statement that the "old man" loved him. Rodriguez understood that "old man" to be the President. Rodriguez testified that North's statement might have been overly dramatic.

3. Iran Operation

Nothing to report.

4. Third Country Aid to Contras

Nothing to report.

5. Private Support to Contras

Nothing to report.

6. November 1986 Chronologies

Nothing to report.

The Vice-President's Involvement

Rodriguez never discussed the Contra resupply operation with Vice President Bush, nor was Rodriguez present when anyone else discussed those subjects with the Vice President. No one ever told Rodriguez that the Vice President had been told about it. Rodriguez never spoke to anyone in the Office of the Vice President about the Contra resupply operation until his meeting with Don Gregg and Samuel Watson on August 8, 1986.

Rodriguez was shown Don Gregg's notes from the August 8 meeting. Rodriguez had no explanation of a portion of the notes which stated, "Swap of weapons for dollars arranged to get aid for Contras." Rodriguez denied ever saying such a thing to Gregg. Rodriguez stated that he was never aware of a swap of weapons for money, that he knew nothing of the Iran arms sale, and knew nothing about any swap of weapons for money to help the Nicaraguan resistance.

Rodriguez said he failed to discuss the problems with the Contra resupply operation with the Office of the Vice President before August 8, 1986, because he was afraid he would damage the resupply program.