

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
 OA/Box: Box 4
 File Folder: Ed Rowny 05/18/1987 [May 1987 – July 1987]

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 FOIA ID: F1997-066/6, D. Cohen
 Date: 08/10/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo (90665)	Linton Brooks, Bob Linhard, and Alison Fortier to Frank Carlucci, re attached Ed Rowny memo (w/notations), 1p R 5/24/11 F97-066/6 #140	7/6/87	B1
2. memo	Rowny to Carlucci re START, 1p R 2/26/08 DLRF97-066/6 #141	6/29/87	B1
3. memo (90468)	Carlucci to Chief of Staff re Rowny proposal (w/notations), 1p R 5/24/11 F97-066/6 #142	5/15/87	B1
4. memo (3768)	Rowny memo for the record (w/notations), 4p R 3/17/06 F97-066/6 #143	5/14/87	B1
5. memo (90468)	Rowny to Carlucci and Baker re arms control (w/notations), 3p R 2/26/08 " #144	5/8/87	B1
6. memo	original of item 5, w/additional notations, 3p K " " #145	5/8/87	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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SYSTEM II
90665

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

July 6, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: *Linton* LINTON BROOKS/*Bob* BOB LINHARD/*Alison* ALISON FORTIER

SUBJECT: Ed Rowny on Bipartisan Support for START

Ed Rowny has sent you (Tab A) his impressions, based on his recent trip to Geneva, that there is genuine bipartisan support for a 50 percent START deal. Ed suggests that you and Senator Baker talk up a 50 percent deal on both sides of the aisle and that Alison work up a game plan for coordinating these efforts.

We are continuing to stress START in all public diplomacy statements. While we would like to see more bipartisanship, we are not certain what else can be done. We also need to be careful not to undersell the importance of INF, which is of immense political significance for the NATO alliance.

Alison will discuss the subject with Ed and with Will Ball and Linton will discuss it at the next regular START IG. If specific ideas emerge from that discussion, we will forward them to you, otherwise we will drop the subject and continue our current practice of ensuring START is not forgotten. Although Ed mentions Senator Baker, we do not believe you need raise this topic with him unless and until such specific ideas emerge.

Recommendation

That you review Ed's memorandum at Tab A and approve our proceeding as outlined above (no formal response is required).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____ *JL*

Fritz Fritz Ermarth, *Steve* Steve Steiner, *Don* Don Mahley and *Bill* Bill Heiser concur. Sven Kraemer is on leave.

Attachment
Tab A Rowny Memorandum

*Send to HHS
FYF. A send to agree
with Ed that we need
to push start harder.*
JL

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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NLRR F97-0166#140
BY RW NARA DATE 5/24/11



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 ^{SYSTEM II} 90665

June 29, 1987

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM

TO: Frank C. Carlucci - National Security Adviser
FROM: E. Rowny - S/ART (R)
SUBJECT: Bipartisan Support for 50 Percent START Deal

In Geneva the week of 22 June I observed encouraging signs of bipartisanship from the Senate Observers visiting the NST Delegation. Senator Pell was joined by Senators Moynihan, Johnston and Specter in making public two key points. First, that the United States was firmly committed to aggressively pursuing a 50 percent deal in START. Second, that verification accords on INF would not be pro forma; the Soviets should not assume that we would gloss over the subject in our "zeal" for an agreement. They also told the Soviets that ratification will be difficult unless they agree to strict verification provisions.

I believe we may be witnessing the initial spark of some genuine bipartisanship in arms control. I can only surmise that Pell's remarks were not more newsworthy back home because they were in harmony with views of the Administration.

I should add that in my own conversations recently with Karpov, Bessmertnykh, Chervov and Vorontsov they indicated that the Soviets are interested in a START deal. They did, of course, link START to ten-year non-deployment of defenses in space; a demand I believe they can be talked into dropping. The Senators also talked to Vorontsov and got the same impression.

I know how strongly you feel about promoting good relations with the Hill. I submit that this display of bipartisanship may prove to be fertile ground for cultivation by the White House.

I recommend that you and Senator Baker talk up a 50 percent START deal with Senators on both sides of the aisle. Further, that Alison Fortier work up a game plan for coordinating these efforts. I am available to assist her in whatever way would be most helpful.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F97-006/6 #141

BY CN NARA DATE 2/26/08

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90468

May 15, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI 
SUBJECT: Rowny "Seizing the Offensive" Proposal 

Ed Rowny has written us asserting that:

- We are losing the public diplomacy high ground to the Soviets.
- The Soviets seek to use an INF agreement to split us from our allies.
- Our response must include a renewed stress on START.
- In INF we must avoid an unverifiable treaty (which requires eliminating the 100 Asian warheads) and should seek NATO consensus around a global SRINF ceiling of 80 systems.
- To make this work "the President needs to name someone with clout to lead a centrally planned and directed public diplomacy effort."

Ed's memorandum raises both procedural and substantive issues. On procedures, I disagree with his suggestion for a public diplomacy czar. If the appointee is of independent stature, we inflict pressure on ourselves to take actions during the negotiating end-game based on the perceived "needs" of the new czar. If he isn't of such independent stature, we gain no improvement over the existing arrangements whereby my staff chairs an Interagency Group which involves participation by Ed's staff.

On substance, while some of Ed's ideas are good, his suggestions are not sufficiently detailed to give us something we can implement. The one issue on which Ed does provide sufficient details is his persistent proposal that we reverse the decision made in Reykjavik to accept the retention of 100 LRINF warheads in Asia. Ed believes the Soviets will give way on this issue. He may be right, and we would certainly prefer such an outcome. Ed's memorandum, however, seems to argue for making such a step a precondition for a treaty. We have already been forced to modify several aspects of Reykjavik; I do not think we should try to alter any additional aspects unless essential.

I have written Ed discouraging further consideration of a public diplomacy czar.

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR F97-06666#142
BY RW DATE 5/24/11



United States Department of State

3768

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

May 14, 1987

FROM: S/ART - E. Rowny (e)
SUBJECT: Meeting with President Nixon

At his invitation, I met with President Nixon in New York on May 13th to brief him on Administration policy and the status of arms control.

After an exchange of pleasantries, President Nixon asked if he could set some ground rules. He said he was a "company man," trying to be helpful to President Reagan. I replied that for my part, I too was a "company man," and agree with and support Administration policies. "Both of us have the same goal," he said, "but we are working toward it in our own way."

President Nixon said he is convinced Gorbachev wants an arms control agreement, ~~and that we should not satisfy our national security needs.~~ He explained that Gorbachev wants to show the Soviets and the world that he can deal with the most important leader of the West on equal terms. He hopes thereby to demonstrate that the USSR is an equal partner of the United States and he is the one who can make it happen. He also wants an agreement that will further the long-term objectives of the USSR; namely to split us from our allies.

President Nixon said that Gorbachev "needs" an arms control agreement, not for economic reasons as some suggest, but because he realizes that President Reagan, even if his popularity should slip because of the Iran/Contra affair, will continue to be respected and listened to by the American people after he leaves office. Gorbachev, said Nixon, fears that Reagan could pin the blame on him if no agreement materialized.

President Nixon said he does not agree with those who feel President Reagan is seeking an arms control agreement in order to divert attention away from the Iran/Contra affair. He said that some around Reagan who would like to use an arms control agreement to help him out, but that he is convinced that President Reagan is not using arms control for this purpose and under no circumstances would sign a bad agreement.

cc Chief of Staff
Ken Duberstein

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NLS F97-0666 #143

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

BY MSJ NARA, DATE 3/17/06

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Turning to specifics, President Nixon said he firmly believes Gorbachev wants an INF deal. Therefore, we have leverage for getting a good deal -- "one better than the one the Soviets have offered us." In Moscow he came to several conclusions: 1) that Gorbachev is a charismatic leader, 2) that he wants to come to the US and address a joint session of our Congress, 3) that he wants President Reagan to visit the Kremlin before his term is up, and 4) that Gorbachev very much wants an arms control deal.

Nixon said verification is highly important. There is no reason, he said, why we should risk having an INF deal opposed by conservative Republican Senators who might oppose it on grounds it is not verifiable and by Democratic Senators who may be looking for campaign issues. He believes that eliminating the remaining 100 SS-20 warheads in Asia will materially enhance verification and help allay these concerns. Moreover, he added, our Asian allies, while publicly supporting us are privately unhappy by our unequal treatment of them concerning the residual 100. Nixon said Dobrynin told him the 100 remaining warheads are a tactic and that Gorbachev, if pressed, would fall off.

President Nixon said we should therefore push the Soviets hard for a global zero INF deal. Secretary Weinberger is right, Nixon said, "there is no way Gorbachev would walk away from an INF deal." Accordingly, he said, we have everything to gain and nothing to lose by insisting on a global zero INF deal.

Moving to shorter-range missiles, Nixon asked if we were pushing for zero SRINF in Europe. He said the Germans are nervous about decoupling and he hopes we are not pressuring them to accept zero SRINF. I said we were allowing our NATO allies (in reality, Germany) to make up their own minds. President Nixon said he has heard that Secretary Shultz is trying to talk the Germans into a zero SRINF solution on the basis that we have over 4000 weapons which can perform the coupling role. Nixon said the short range of our battlefield weapons prevents them from fulfilling a coupling role. Only our P-Ibs or the German P-Ias can perform this role, he said, because they can reach into Eastern Europe -- or at least beyond German soil.

I told President Nixon that the Soviet offer is zero SRINF for Europe only and that the Soviets have been reluctant to address SRINF missiles in Asia. The US criteria transmitted to Shevardnadze by Secretary Shultz is "globality and equality." President Nixon said he was happy to hear the US is firm on equal numbers of SRINF globally. If the NATO consensus favors zero, we should insist on zero in Asia. If NATO favors some

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number other than zero, we should match that number with P-Ibs deployed in Germany. Nixon said he personally favors the latter, and that if this is what NATO decides, we should get them to agree to take P-Ibs before we make the decision public.

President Nixon said he believes we should not pull out all our P-IIs until we have a Soviet commitment to correct conventional imbalances. He said he realizes it is US policy not to link, but that linkage is always a factor and we shouldn't

be afraid of it. He said we correctly linked the ABM Treaty to strategic arms reductions and then failed to follow through. walked away from it. I said we have reminded the Soviets in the past, and can do so again, at ABM Treaty review time, that we reserve the right to invoke the supreme national interest clause if they don't agree to reduce strategic offensive arms.

I explained that US policy is against linkage because we want to make progress wherever we can. Furthermore, the Soviets have linked reductions in strategic offensive arms to SDI. President Nixon said we should press for 50% reductions in START and no linkage to SDI. Nixon said we should be for "good linkage" and against "bad linkage:" "It's a fact of life." I told President Nixon we are indeed pushing for 50% reductions and have laid down a START Treaty to that effect in Geneva.

President Nixon said we must counter attempts by Congressional leaders to claim that reducing nuclear weapons will be cost-saving. Nixon said that if we reduce nuclear weapons in Europe we will have to spend more to beef up our conventional forces. We need to counter the type of euphoria that surrounded Congressman Wright's return from Moscow. It can only lead, he said, to cutbacks in our SDI and modernization programs. The Congress must be made to understand that when dealing with the Soviets, we are not dealing with philanthropists. The Soviets, he said, are not giving us SS-20s for nothing; they have big political stakes in mind. These include splitting us from our allies and denuclearizing Europe without giving up their strategic and conventional advantages.

President Nixon said he noted that Brzezinski told a Washington audience we should link an INF deal to Afghanistan. He said that while he agreed we need to push much harder on regional issues, we should not ask for the impossible. In contrast, linking INF to conventional improvements is possible, he said, and keeps it all in the arms control field. But a direct link to Afghanistan is not a tenable position.

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President Nixon closed by saying that we should not pride ourselves by believing that we have done all that is possible on INF. We should resist our tendency to be "pusillanimous," he said, since Gorbachev very much wants a deal and needs a deal. Therefore, he went on, "I'm trying to help President Reagan get a better deal than the one now being talked about. I am absolutely convinced that Gorbachev has more to give and that the President would not be jeopardizing an INF deal by taking a firmer stance on getting a better INF deal by taking a broader approach than INF alone."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11 MAY

SENATOR BALCH,

SEC NOTE FROM

FRANK,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'J. Colin', written over a rectangular stamp.

Colin

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT**

TIME STAMP

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

000 2/24/04

SYSTEM II
90468

87 MAY 8 3:50

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SYSTEM LOG NUMBER:

ACTION OFFICER: LINHARD

DUE: 11 MAY

- Prepare Memo For President
- Prepare Memo For Carlucci / Powell
- Prepare Memo _____
- Prepare Memo Green to Peterson / Murr
- Appropriate Action to _____

Frank

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5865

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- INFORMATION
- Green
 - Rodman
 - Carlucci (advance)
 - Pearson
 - Cockell
 - Powell (advance)
 - Secretariat
 - _____
 - CHIEF OF STAFF

COMMENTS

*Howard Baker
Cohen Powell
Good memos. We
should discuss
some of this.*

~~SECRET~~

Return to Secretariat

(H)



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II
90468

May 8, 1987

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. -- Chief of Staff
Frank C. Carlucci -- National Security Adviser

FROM: Ed Rowny -- S/ART (R)

SUBJECT: Seizing the Offensive in Arms Control

The Problem

We are marching to the Soviet drummer, and thereby placed on the horns of a dilemma: either signing up to an INF agreement which splits us from our allies, or failing to sign an INF agreement because it is unverifiable, and yet catching the blame. To escape this dilemma, we need to lay the groundwork for a summit which demonstrates strong American leadership. This requires us to seize the offensive and shift the agenda to our terms.

Soviet Strategy

The overarching Soviet objective is to disrupt the global US alliance structure. They want us to sign an INF agreement which splits us from our European Allies because zero LRINF/SRINF is seen as decoupling, and from our Asian Allies because they are not treated equally. They also seek to preserve their existing strategic nuclear advantage, stifle SDI, and hobble our strategic modernization programs.

Gorbachev has made a fundamental shift in Soviet political-military strategy. Rather than relying on theater nuclear superiority to intimidate the Europeans, he is returning the USSR to reliance on conventional superiority, backed by the "top cover" of their strategic nuclear forces.

Gorbachev's European agenda is "divide and denuclearize": erode the US nuclear guarantee, and confront Europe with Soviet conventional forces and the world's largest arsenal of nuclear weapons. His aim is the neutralization of Western Europe. The Soviets would then turn to Asia, in an attempt to magnify the tension between Japan's non-nuclear status and the US nuclear presence in the Pacific.

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NLRR F97-066/b #144

BY GN NARADATE 2/26/08

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DECL:OADR

US Objectives

To prevent this, we must also think strategically, and move deliberately and decisively. To seize the offensive we need to shift our emphasis to START and conventional forces. On INF, we need to take immediate steps to avoid being saddled with an albatross -- an INF Treaty that will not be ratified because the Senate will consider it unverifiable.

How to Proceed

Our first priority should be to turn up the burner for a 50% START deal. The President's statement at the opening of Round VIII is a good beginning. The President should now bring START to the fore in a major speech. He should state: (1) our draft represents an offer of historic dimensions by dramatically cutting our central forces, (2) the Soviet response to it will constitute the acid test of their sincerity on arms control, (3) 50% START -- not linked to SDI -- fulfills the commitment of the 1985 Summit, (4) it contains significant mutual military advantages (FYI: for us, it reduces significantly the Soviet ICBM first-strike capability; for them, it reduces our SLBM and ALCM capabilities), (5) we are willing to meet Soviet concerns about SDI through our comprehensive Defense & Space proposals, and (6) our objective is a Summit that would not only sign an INF Treaty, but a framework-type agreement on 50% reductions in strategic arms and a Soviet commitment to redressing conventional imbalances as well.

On INF, momentum is gathering and presenting us with two major problems. The first is to avoid an unverifiable treaty. This problem has two aspects. The first is the Soviet Swiss cheese verification provisions. Here we must cast our feet in concrete on our verification requirements. The second aspect is the 100 Soviet Asian warheads. If permitted to remain, these warheads will put the treaty below the threshold of acceptable verification. Further, they give the Soviets a ready capability for breakout. Last but by no means least, our Asian allies will be treated unequally. We should use the threat of Alaskan INF deployments as the stick to get global zero LRINF.

Gorbachev sees a heavy political payoff in signing a treaty with President Reagan and will therefore come through on the Asian 100 and verification provisions rather than risk losing the agreement. Gorbachev will deal. Further, my talks with a number of Senators reveal that they are acutely aware of the verification problem, and consider it quite serious. Getting global zero and our verification provisions could make the critical difference at ratification time.

The second major problem, SRINF, is a problem within NATO. The most important thing is to forge a NATO consensus. President Reagan, when he sees Chancellor Kohl, should take the lead in

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proposing a ceiling of 80 systems globally, with no geographical restrictions on deployment and the US right to convert P-II to P-Ibs to be stationed in Europe. German P-Is must be excluded.

On conventional forces, we need to recognize that in a Europe without US LRINF the focus shifts toward the conventional imbalance. Even though an all-out effort would not redress the conventional imbalance in the short term, we need to move rapidly to build leverage while the Europeans are focusing on the problem: follow-on Lance of just under 500 km, an ATBM, CDI, and nuclear modernization programs to meet the requirements identified in the IDD in 1979 and at Montebello in 1983.

As for chemical weapons, we should regain the high ground seized by Vice President Bush three years ago when he proposed a chemical weapons ban. The Soviet near-monopoly of chemical and biological capabilities and their refusal to agree to our verification provisions should be highlighted. Chemical warfare could be as horrendous as nuclear warfare -- a point we fail to exploit.

In Defense & Space, we have so far not gotten enough mileage out of our proposals. Our non-withdrawal and predictability proposals, and our offer to jointly manage the transition to an offense/defense relationship are further reasons -- the main one being mutual advantages -- why SDI should be de-linked from START.

Finally:

I cannot overstate my belief that we need to seize the offensive. The President should take the lead, pounding home his broad four pillar agenda. He has solid themes to stress: i.e., arms do not cause East-West mistrust but vice-versa; and arms control requires progress on a broad front -- reductions of strategic offensive arms, redressing the conventional imbalance and moving towards a chemical weapons ban, as well as an INF deal.

I am convinced the President needs to name someone with clout to lead a centrally planned and directed public diplomacy effort as was done during the European INF deployments. The President should provide the overall leadership. The National Security Advisor should orchestrate the efforts of the public diplomacy chief, the Cabinet, and the President's arms control advisors. These efforts would dove-tail with those of the Chief of Staff with the Congress. We must not drift into a summit. The plan I have suggested would move us deliberately to a summit and turn it into the crowning achievement of President Reagan's stewardship.

cc: Secretary Shultz

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 8, 1987

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. -- Chief of Staff
Frank C. Carlucci -- National Security Adviser

FROM: Ed Rowny -- S/ART 

SUBJECT: Seizing the Offensive in Arms Control

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DECL:OADR

NLRR 197-066/6 7445
BY CU NARA DATE 2/26/08

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US Objectives

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proposing a ceiling of 80 systems globally, with no geographical restrictions on deployment and the US right to convert P-II to P-Ibs to be stationed in Europe. German P-Is must be excluded.

On conventional forces, we need to recognize that in a Europe without US LRINF the focus shifts toward the conventional imbalance. Even though an all-out effort would not redress the conventional imbalance in the short term, we need to move rapidly to build leverage while the Europeans are focusing on the problem: follow-on Lance of just under 500 km, an ATBM, CDI, and nuclear modernization programs to meet the requirements identified in the IDD in 1979 and at Montebello in 1983.

As for chemical weapons, we should regain the high ground seized by Vice President Bush three years ago when he proposed a chemical weapons ban. The Soviet near-monopoly of chemical and biological capabilities and their refusal to agree to our verification provisions should be highlighted. Chemical warfare could be as horrendous as nuclear warfare -- a point we fail to exploit.

In Defense & Space, we have so far not gotten enough mileage out of our proposals. Our non-withdrawal and predictability proposals, and our offer to jointly manage the transition to an offense/defense relationship are further reasons -- the main one being mutual advantages -- why SDI should be de-linked from START.

Finally:

I cannot overstate my belief that we need to seize the offensive. The President should take the lead, pounding home his broad four pillar agenda. He has solid themes to stress: i.e., arms do not cause East-West mistrust but vice-versa; and arms control requires progress on a broad front -- reductions of strategic offensive arms, redressing the conventional imbalance and moving towards a chemical weapons ban, as well as an INF deal.

I am convinced the President needs to name someone with clout to lead a centrally planned and directed public diplomacy effort as was done during the European INF deployments. The President should provide the overall leadership. The National Security Advisor should orchestrate the efforts of the public diplomacy chief, the Cabinet, and the President's arms control advisors. These efforts would dove-tail with those of the Chief of Staff with the Congress. We must not drift into a summit. The plan I have suggested would move us deliberately to a summit and turn it into the crowning achievement of President Reagan's stewardship.

cc: Secretary Shultz

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