

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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FOIA ID: F1997-066/6, D. Cohen

Date: 08/10/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. scheduling memo (91187)	re meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, 2p R 5/24/11 F97-066/6 #161	10/29/87	B1
2. memo	George Shultz to Reagan re Shevardnadze visit, 4p R 2/26/08 NLR F97-066/6 #162	10/29/87	B1
3. memo	Shultz to Reagan re Dubinin meeting, 1p R u " #163	10/29/87	B1
4. talking points	for meeting with Shevardnadze, 5p R 5/24/11 F97-066/6 #164	n.d.	B1
5. memo (90942)	Carlucci to Reagan re arms reduction framework agreements, 2p R " " #165	9/14/87	B1
6. memo (8731388)	Shultz to Reagan re Gorbachev's letter, 2p R 2/26/08 NLR F97-066/6 #166	10/30/87	B1
7. letter	Gorbachev to Reagan (unofficial translation), 7p R 5/24/11 F97-066/6 #167	10/28/87	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
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- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11/4/87

NOTE TO HHB

FROM: Ken D.

FYI -- Shultz raised with RR
the possibility, if necessary, of
Shultz meeting with Shevardnadze
in Geneva on day after Thanksgiving
to complete INF agreement.

Ken D.

KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON October 29, 1987

MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE

DATE: October 30, 1987
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 1:00 p.m. - 2:00 p.m.
FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI *FC*

I. PURPOSE

To meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and reach acceptable agreement on summit substance, venue, and dates.

II. BACKGROUND

In effect, the Soviets have asked for overtime on the Moscow ministerial because it went badly for them. Gorbachev attempted to exploit your eagerness for progress on START and perceived eagerness for a US summit to promote a binding "key provisions" agreement to be signed with INF this fall, a mechanism by which he seeks to impose crippling constraints on SDI. At Tab D is an earlier memo from me detailing the pitfalls of this. We were prepared and rebuffed this attempt. Gorbachev saw our disappointment bordering on anger, which could jeopardize any summit at all and his continued ability to lobby you against SDI. Moreover, his maneuver was criticized widely in the West as blundering or "too clever by half", not an image he wants to endure.

The Soviets appear ready to close rapidly on the remaining INF details in Geneva, although there may yet be end-game ploys. Gorbachev has some inhibitions about coming to a US summit, perhaps for internal political reasons, and he is still reluctant to come for INF alone. In Moscow, even after our differences over SDI and the ABM Treaty were starkly portrayed, he insisted that those differences must be overcome in a "key provisions" pact of some kind that addresses both 50% reductions in START and Defense and Space. The prospect and then occurrence of a summit with you is his best leverage for continuing to pursue that goal. Shevardnadze's sudden visit keeps the game going. Our task is to force it to closure on terms acceptable to you.

George has sent you his view of the meeting and how he plans to handle Shevardnadze (Tabs A and B). I agree with it in all essentials.

Shevardnadze will arrive in Washington at 1:00 a.m.; we are trying to get the letter from Gorbachev at that early point. He will meet with George and me on Friday morning for several hours. I shall try to give you advance notice through General Powell on how things are going. George and

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President

Chief of Staff(2)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F97-0666 #161

BY RW NARA DATE 5/24/11

I shall brief you around 1230, following which Shevardnadze will come in to meet with you. George has told the Soviets that your departure in early afternoon requires key decisions to be reached by around mid-day and to be promptly announced. We have several press scenarios in mind depending on the outcome, with you announcing success.

My recommendation is that, unless we've already reached agreement, you force Shevardnadze to fish or cut bait with respect to the substance, timing, and venue of the next summit. You should insist that we shall commit to no more substance than a) signing INF, b) a full review of the agenda, including c) as much progress as possible on START and Space negotiations to be recorded in a communique or other document as instructions to negotiators in pursuing final treaties, NOT in a "key provisions" or "framework agreement" which could be seen as a free standing political commitment that constrains SDI without delivering START reductions. The timing is, of course, late fall, as previously agreed. And the venue is, of course, the United States, including a Washington signing of INF.

These important bottom lines are in your talking points at Tab A, which may have to be adjusted on the basis of what Shevardnadze brings and our morning meeting. Time permitting, I believe a word or two on Iran-Iraq and Afghanistan would be in order; they are provided.

Continued Soviet maneuvering about this combination of summit venue, timing, and substance erode your image of being in control of the dialogue, could damage our ability to ratify INF, and could undermine our ability to pursue START sensibly. This ministerial round robin must now end.

III. PARTICIPANTS (See Tab E)

IV. PRESS PLAN

Pool photo op in the Oval Office. Post-meeting press plan depends on outcome.

V. SEQUENCE

12:30 - 1:00 p.m. Secretary's pre-brief. 1:00 - 1:05 p.m. Secretary greets Shevardnadze West Wing. 1:00 - 1:05 p.m. welcome photo op. 1:10 - 2:00 p.m. meeting with Shevardnadze in Cabinet Room.

Attachments

Tab A Secretary Shultz's Memo on Shevardnadze
Tab B Secretary Shultz's Memo on Dubinin
Tab C Talking Points
Tab D My Memo of mid-September
Tab E List of Participants

Prepared by:
Fritz W. Ermarth

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 29, 1987

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: Shevardnadze's Visit

Gorbachev's dramatic decision to send Shevardnadze here this week suggests the Soviets may now be ready to fill in the blank on summit dates. But as we have seen, there are no guarantees, so we should maintain the stance that has served us well over the past few months and especially in the last few days: If Gorbachev is ready to come here, fine; if not, the U.S. is ready to keep working on the issues.

We covered arms control, human rights, regional and bilateral matters exhaustively in Washington last month and in Moscow last week. Thus, I see no reason why Shevardnadze's visit this week need go beyond a single day of intense discussions. We will seek to:

- Extract essential Soviet compromises on remaining INF issues, particularly regarding inspection.
- Turn Gorbachev's proposal on START sublimits to our advantage by placing the proposed Soviet numbers into the sublimit structure we prefer.
- Reiterate our willingness to address the concerns they have expressed on the need for greater predictability on strategic defense, without limiting our freedom to conduct a vigorous SDI program now and in the future.
- Depending on what Shevardnadze brings, set dates for Gorbachev's visit to the United States, and discuss in general terms programmatic options for the visit.

The Agenda Beyond Arms Control

We do not need to repeat our in-depth discussions in Moscow on human rights, regional and bilateral issues, but we can use Shevardnadze's visit to tie up a few loose ends.

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DECL: OADR

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NLRR F97-006/6 #162
BY AV NARA DATE 2/26/08

-- I would like to set dates for Under Secretary Armacost and Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov to review regional issues. This would pave the way for your own treatment of such issues as Afghanistan at a summit.

-- I will also try to firm up Shevardnadze's commitment to resolve additional cases on our human rights representation lists and to permit expanded emigration. I will press for resolution of the four remaining cases on your "short list" and the remaining separated spouses cases -- especially by the time of a summit.

-- The Soviets appear ready to wrap up arrangements for the operation of our Embassy in Moscow in the wake of the withdrawal last fall of Soviet local employees. These understandings would guarantee our Embassy's access to essential services and ensure our ability to get technical personnel in and out of Moscow.

Arms Control

Despite the productive sessions this fall in Washington, Geneva and Moscow, much remains to be done. Shevardnadze will be accompanied by Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and Ambassador Karpov, who are competent to deal with the full range of issues being addressed in the Nuclear and Space Talks. I would welcome Frank Carlucci's active participation in my meetings with Shevardnadze.

On INF, our Geneva delegation has been working intensively on the remaining areas, largely in verification, where Soviet movement is necessary. Key outstanding issues are procedures for conducting inspections, and the extent to which the Soviets could destroy their systems by launching them. Ambassador Glitman will update us regularly on developments in Geneva. We will make clear to Shevardnadze that we are not interested in the INF deployment moratorium that Gorbachev proposed in Moscow.

On START, the prospect finally exists for engaging on sublimits and a major goal during Shevardnadze's visit will be to turn the Soviet proposals to our advantage. Gorbachev's sublimits suggest the Soviets could live with a force structure that is compatible with the U.S. proposed sublimits. In their current form, however, the Soviet sublimits package would unacceptably reduce and limit our SLBM force, and thus would do to us precisely what the Soviets have complained we are trying to do them, i.e., restructure our deterrent. We will make the case to Shevardnadze that, on the basis of Gorbachev's proposals, a sublimit regime such as we have proposed should be acceptable to them.

On Defense and Space (D&S), I stressed to Gorbachev that this was an issue which ultimately you and he would have to settle. Frank Carlucci succinctly summed up the issue when he told Gorbachev that the question to be faced was: Is it possible to find a formulation which would give the Soviets the assurances they needed while preserving the strength and thrust of your SDI program?

Shevardnadze's mission may be more to assess our seriousness about looking for such a formulation than to identify now what that formula might be, although he almost certainly will press for a response to the proposals they presented here in September. In his talks this week with Jack Matlock, Shevardnadze also suggested that Gorbachev is softening his demand for a commitment that a summit achieve a framework agreement on START and D&S. We won't know for sure until we see the letter Shevardnadze is bringing.

We should underscore to Shevardnadze that we are interested in a comprehensive agreement at Geneva that encompasses both offense and defense, and which thus gets at the question Frank posed to Gorbachev in Moscow. I hope you will also emphasize to Shevardnadze that you want to take up these issues with Gorbachev personally -- that your summit objective is not just to sign an INF agreement, but to use the event to find the way forward on strategic issues as well.

Shevardnadze may repeat Gorbachev's moratorium on Krasnoyarsk construction. We should acknowledge that halting construction is a constructive first step, and that they should now go on to remove this violation by destroying the structure. We should continue rejecting any linkage to our own radars in Greenland and the UK.

Scenario

We have suggested that the Soviets provide us with a copy of Gorbachev's letter upon Shevardnadze's arrival late Thursday evening, so that we can get as much as possible done the next day. I will open my own discussions at 9:00 Friday morning to get the talks off to a running start.

If all goes well, your own meeting would be the occasion for resolving any outstanding issues, agreeing on summit dates, and getting a discussion going on arrangements and advance work. You and Shevardnadze would then be able to make an announcement on the summit at the conclusion of the meeting. I could wrap up any loose ends that afternoon, working as necessary into the evening. Discussions with Shevardnadze could continue over into Saturday if absolutely required.

If it seems useful, Shevardnadze and I could meet in Geneva before a summit here.

Documentation

Experience indicates that Shevardnadze may suggest -- or even present -- a draft summit communique, and that it will contain loose formulations or declarations of principles. If he does, our response should be that we can look as we go along this fall at ways to record the results of a summit, but there is no need for communique drafting at this point. We can also lay down a marker that we have little interest in ambiguous declarations of principles but would be willing to consider documents that describe concrete agreements and aim at guiding the two governments to tackle practical problems in the months ahead.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 29, 1987

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: Dubinin Meeting

Ambassador Dubinin came by Wednesday morning to share impressions on the eve of Shevardnadze's visit. He had little to add to what we have already received through Jack Matlock, but did convey what he portrayed as Gorbachev's personal expression of willingness to redouble efforts to move things ahead.

I used the occasion to outline our concept of the Shevardnadze visit: that in view of your 2:00 pm Friday departure from Washington, we should try to break loose any key decisions by the end of your meeting with Shevardnadze. I told Dubinin that both sides should be prepared to go public with the results of the meeting immediately thereafter, with the afternoon reserved for wrapping up loose ends. Given such an approach, I said I thought there would be no need for additional discussions on Saturday.

Dubinin's only question had to do with attendance at your meeting with Shevardnadze. I told him I thought you would want to keep the session small, perhaps limiting our participants to myself, Howard, Frank, Rozanne Ridgway and Jack Matlock.

I also put down a few markers on summit planning in the event we are able to set dates. I made the point that we would want to budget adequate time for three kinds of activities: extended and meaty substantive sessions between you and Gorbachev; social and other activities here to expose Gorbachev to Congressional and other leaders; and a chance to see some of the country outside Washington. I also stressed the importance of getting our advance people together with theirs to enable detailed planning to get underway. Dubinin took careful notes, but said he had no authorization to comment.

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NLRR 197-064/6 #163

BY AW NARS 70 2/26/08

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SYSTEM II
91187

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE

- Welcome back to Washington again. Your familiarity with our city will prove valuable if the General Secretary comes. In the meantime, you and Secretary Shultz are making me and the General Secretary look like tennis players trying to keep two balls in play at the same time.
- Secretary Shultz and Mr. Carlucci have briefed me on your meeting and the letter you brought. We shall review the letter carefully and give you responses promptly.
- I am ready to set dates for our long-planned Washington summit. We have plenty to assure a fruitful meeting. We should sign the historic INF agreement. We should thoroughly discuss the entire agenda of issues, including START, Defense and Space, regional conflicts, human rights and other matters.
- As I've said often, summit meetings are not indispensable to resolving our problems. I shall not let maneuvering over summit meetings obstruct or distract real negotiations. But summits can make a positive contribution. I believe it would be valuable for General Secretary Gorbachev to be seen in the United States by the American and the Soviet peoples.
- Let me speak briefly to the issues that caused the resumption of your meetings with Secretary Shultz.

Arms Reductions

- I agree with General Secretary Gorbachev that the discussions at Reykjavik were useful; but that we shouldn't simply repeat that meeting again. We are in a position to achieve more, and we should strive for more.

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DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F47-06666 #164
BY RW NARA DATE 5/24/11

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- It goes without saying that we need a meeting that is more balanced. One that deals with the full relationship, more on the Geneva summit model.
- I also agree with the General Secretary that the root problem is reducing the size of the existing strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, and doing so in a manner that adds to mutual security and world stability.
- For that reason our primary emphasis must remain on concluding an equitable and verifiable START Treaty which provides for 50% reductions in those arsenals as we agreed at the Geneva summit.
- We are not reluctant to address the subject of Defense & Space. Quite to the contrary, I have offered a number of proposals in this area. But there should be no misunderstanding, I will not surrender the promise of a safer world offered by SDI.
- In this regard, we also agreed that we must discuss the future interrelationship of offense and defense; and that the full interrelationship must be addressed as we pursue the START Treaty we both committed to seek.
- It is my firm view that we understand enough about that interrelationship to use a summit as a tool to give greater impetus to our negotiators to conclude treaties in both these areas.
- I am prepared to work towards agreements about what these treaties should contain and to record areas of agreement at a summit in a manner that provides clear guidance to our

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CONFIDENTIAL

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negotiators, so that these areas of agreement can be incorporated into equitable and verifiable treaties as quickly as possible.

- On the other hand, I am not interested in recording such areas of agreement in documents that may appear to substitute for, and thus move us away from, the prompt achievement of such treaties.
- On this basis, I am prepared for a full discussion of both START and Defense & Space which results in concrete, documented progress at a summit.
- The General Secretary has also expressed an interest in some additional agreement on nuclear testing.
- Our negotiators will begin addressing this area in earnest, according to the mandate we have mutually reached, on November 9. Therefore, it seems to me that it is unreasonable to expect sufficient progress to be made to provide for additional documented agreement in this area before the end of this year. But this area may yield fruit early next year.

The Iran-Iraq War

- We had agreed with you to give the Secretary-General time to let diplomacy work in the wake of passing Resolution 598. He's used that time. Iran is intransigent. We must now move quickly to a second resolution with sanctions, preferably an arms embargo.
- The USSR knows that Iran is the source of tension, yet it lays the blame on the U.S. which has had a fleet in the area for 40 years.

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CONFIDENTIAL

- The Soviet Union appears to be courting and shielding Iran while Iranian provocations against us and others increase. We also see that Warsaw Pact military equipment, including perhaps sophisticated mines, continues to arrive in Iran. If this equipment is used against us, it will become a serious matter in U.S.-Soviet relations.
- Positive Soviet action on a second resolution, and use of its influence to stop Iranian provocations and arms supplies, would mean a real commitment to cooperation in the area.

And on Afghanistan

- The key to an Afghan settlement remains the early and rapid withdrawal of Soviet troops. You should face up to the realities, as difficult as they are.
- The Kabul regime is thoroughly discredited. Any political proposal built around its continuation will be unacceptable to the Resistance and therefore get nowhere. So long as the Resistance continues the fight, we and others will continue our support.
- We remain interested in a genuinely independent, non-aligned Afghanistan free from external interference and whose future government should be worked out by the Afghans themselves. An interim, neutral regime for a transitional period would allow you to withdraw while such a political settlement is worked out.
- Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan would greatly improve our bilateral relationship. I would like to repeat our prior assurances to you of our willingness to be helpful in the withdrawal process.

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Conclusion

-- I'm eager to hear your views and hope you and my colleagues continue useful discussions.

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SYSTEM II 9/15
President has 0942
follow-on

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Receive 183

1987 SEP 14 PM 3:10

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September 14, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: *fr* FRANK C. CARLUCCI *cl*

SUBJECT: Avoiding Arms Reduction "Framework Agreements"

Last week, as part of the paper which addressed arms reduction strategy options, I strongly recommended that you should avoid any commitment to develop a "framework agreement" covering the START and Defense & Space areas. However, in our subsequent discussions, we really didn't spend enough time on this critical point. Shevardnadze may attempt to make a US commitment to a "framework agreement" a precondition for a summit. Additionally, in reviewing our options with George Shultz, my recommendation against making such a commitment seemed to give him some concern.

By a "framework agreement" I mean something that could have the political effect of binding the US to some course of action. It most likely would take the form of a free-standing document, like the "Statement of General Principles" Gorbachev proposed to you in Reykjavik. It would most likely commit the US and USSR to conclude a START Treaty and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for some period of time.

We can record progress at a summit without signing a framework agreement. For example, a summit communique could record agreement to instruct negotiators to pursue Treaties incorporating the same outcomes. What we must avoid is any statement, announcement or agreement that can be used by the Soviets politically to bind our hands with respect to the SDI program while not legally binding the Soviets to begin START reductions because:

First, a framework agreement could block SDI while not getting reductions. Such agreements are basically political instruments. As such, they can politically block new options (like moving to the deployment of SDI); but neither side would begin reducing existing forces until there is a signed and ratified treaty.

Second, a framework agreement at this time could also remove Soviet incentive to conclude a START Treaty. If the Soviets can block SDI without having to begin the reductions of strategic forces until a START Treaty is signed, what is their incentive to conclude such a treaty on US terms? They could haggle as long as it takes to get a START Treaty on their terms, and simply wait for the next Administration to give them a better START deal.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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BY *RUS* NLR# 697-0610 #165
DATE 5/24/11

Finally, a framework agreement could allow the Soviets to manipulate the US domestic political scene. As long as there is the prospect of concluding a START Treaty, the political opposition must be responsible in handling arms reduction issues. The Soviets understand this. The Soviets could feed the idea that a framework agreement is all that can be achieved during the remainder of your Administration. This would open you to criticism for not getting a START Treaty, for the terms of the framework agreement, and for signing such an agreement in the first place. This would then increase pressure to conclude a START Treaty on Soviet terms during your Administration.

Our primary concerns should be the first two listed above. We should not risk blocking SDI or reducing Soviet incentives to negotiate a good START agreement. The third reason is relevant because it could provide Soviet leverage to force you into a bad START agreement.

The Soviets understand that if the meetings with Shevardnadze end without the announcement of a fall summit, the US press will term the meeting a failure. They will use this to get things they want including:

(1) a US agreement to include in the INF Treaty text, or in a document that could be associated with that Treaty, some provision covering the US warheads for German Pershing IA missiles; and

(2) US agreement that we will conclude both an INF Treaty and a "framework agreement" covering START and Defense & Space at a fall summit.

We must be prepared for the Shevardnadze meetings to come down to the Soviets giving us a choice on Thursday of either accepting these terms or not getting an agreed announcement of a summit. While a summit announcement would be useful, accepting either of the above terms as the price for obtaining such an announcement would be disastrous over the long run.

List of Participants

Pre-brief - Oval Office (12:30 -1:00 p.m.)

The President
Secretary Shultz
Howard Baker
Kenneth Duberstein
Frank Carlucci
Thomas Griscom
Marlin Fitzwater
General Powell
Assistant Secretary Ridgway
Ambassador Jack Matlock
Fritz Ermarth
Robert Linhard

Shevardnadze Meeting - Oval Office (1:00 - 2:00 p.m.)

US

The President
Secretary Shultz
Howard Baker
Kenneth Duberstein
Frank Carlucci
Assistant Secretary Ridgway
Ambassador Jack Matlock
Robert Linhard
Fritz Ermarth (Notetaker)

Soviet (The complete list of Soviet participants will not be made available until Friday morning. NSC expects at least the following to attend):

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Ambassador Dubinin
Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh
Shevardnadze personal aide

Interpreters

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 30, 1987

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: Gorbachev's letter

As expected, FM Shevardnadze provided us an advance copy of General Secretary Gorbachev's letter to you upon his arrival in Washington early this morning. It is a long letter, but fairly positive, and offers a December window for a summit. He has asked that we keep a tight lid on the contents until he hands the letter to you at one today.

In the letter, Gorbachev has proposed a summit meeting in the first ten days of December. Shevardnadze is empowered to work out all details today. At the summit the INF Treaty would be signed and START and Defense and Space would be discussed. Additionally, the letter notes that if the President's visit to the Soviet Union next year is to be "crowned" with a treaty on strategic arms, it will be necessary to reach "agreement in principle" on this score at the summit. Thus, a Moscow Summit is not explicitly conditioned to agreements in principle on START/D&S at the Washington Summit. What form this "agreement in principle" would take is "not too important." Key elements of a future treaty is cited as one possible way to go, but instructions to delegations would also be acceptable.

The letter also sees an INF Treaty finalized within 2-3 weeks, citing progress made in last week's Ministerial, and on START refers to Gorbachev's Moscow proposal on sublimits, hinting at a slight freedom to mix. On D&S, Gorbachev appears to be backing away from previous Soviet insistence that the ABM Treaty be "strengthened," insisting only that it be "observed." As to linkage with START, the letter asserts they want "nothing more" than a ten-year commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Gorbachev proposes establishment of a channel to support and facilitate the negotiations, suggesting Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors "could be" used for this purpose.

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NLRR F97-066/b #166

BY CW NARA DATE 2/26/08

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We are working with the Soviets this morning on a Joint Statement, which will be ready for possible release at the White House immediately following your meeting with Shevardnadze this afternoon. He also visualizes a second statement to the press at the end of the day's events. Shevardnadze is aware of your plans to depart Washington after his meeting with you and shares our desire to make this a one day affair. He seems confident we can work through matters by this evening.

I will brief you on this morning's sessions at 12:30, just prior to Shevardnadze's one o'clock meeting with you. We can go over the Joint Statement then if you like, and make any last minute changes.

ATTACHMENTS: Letter From General Secretary Gorbachev

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Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I am sure that you have already been informed about the negotiations that our foreign ministers had in Moscow and about my rather lengthy talk with Secretary of State George Shultz and your Assistant for National Security Frank Carlucci.

Let me say frankly that all of us here are of the same view--those discussions were businesslike, constructive and, what is most important, productive. I think you would agree that the Washington and Moscow stages in the dialogue evolving between us have moved us substantially closer to the concluding phase in the preparation of the Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. We are gratified by the fact that together with your emissaries we were able to surmount what seemed to be the major obstacles and to find compromise language and understandings, which, given continued political will on both sides, enable our delegations in Geneva to finalize the treaty text within the next two or three weeks.

You must have noted that on the last day of the talks the Soviet side made an additional effort on, among others, the question of inspections and verification. We hope that the U.S. side will respond with appropriate reciprocal efforts.

As I see it, the Moscow talks give fresh evidence that our relations are in the process of dynamization, for which

His Excellency Ronald W. REAGAN,
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F97-0166/6#167

BY RW NARA DATE 5/24/11

the meetings at Geneva and Reykjavik provided the point of departure. I am referring not only to the increasing pace of contacts between our countries but also to the fact that we have really come to grips with the question that both of us believe is the key to ending the nuclear arms race and stabilizing Soviet-US relations. The task of a deep, 50 per cent cut in the strategic offensive arms took center stage in our discussions in Moscow.

And this was by no mere chance, since both you and I are now equally attuned to putting the negotiations on strategic offensive arms onto a track of practical solutions. As I have already written to you, it is necessary to speed up the rhythm of the negotiations in order to make it possible within the next few months to reach full-scale agreements in that area.

With this in mind, on the eve of the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State we in the Soviet leadership once again carefully considered the possibility of imparting additional impulses to the strategic offensive arms negotiations. I set forth in detail to Mr. Shultz the concrete conclusions that we had reached.

Specifically, we took into account that the US side, as it had repeatedly stated, including statements at a political level, attached particular importance to setting specific limits for the distribution of warheads between the various legs of the strategic triad. We carefully assessed the various options of the evolution of the situation, as well as the prevailing trends of a technological and military-strategic nature, and concluded that we could accommodate your position. It is easy to see that

certain combinations of the numerical parameters that we proposed produce a picture that is close to the one that US officials at various levels have recently been outlining to us.

Let me add that the new formula that we have proposed has inherent flexibility in it, namely, each side would be able to compensate for a lack in the number of delivery vehicles of one kind by increasing the number of delivery vehicles of another kind within the aggregate limit.

I hope that our proposals will be considered with due attention by your experts and that both sides will now have a broader base for reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.

Of course, work on an agreement reducing strategic offensive arms should be accompanied by efforts to assure continued compliance with the ABM Treaty. Here again, we want nothing more than what was said in Washington, namely, for ten years not to use our right to withdraw from the Treaty.

I recall the words that particularly struck me in one of your letters to me, that our negotiators have to "concentrate on measures which prevent the erosion of the ABM Treaty and strengthen the role that treaty can play in preserving stability as we move toward a world without nuclear weapons". In the same letter you added: "Proceeding in this fashion might avoid a fruitless debate on generalities and open the way to concrete, practical solutions which meet the concerns of both sides".

In that regard we were also encouraged by the exchange of views in Washington last September, in which your side noted as a point of agreement that in the context of an accord on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms a period

would emerge in which certain rights, including the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, would have to be given up, and the obligations under that Treaty strictly observed.

We have therefore a common basis in that matter too. What remains is, in effect, to agree on the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Is that an unreachable goal? So this is what the matter comes down to right now. It is here that we have to look for a solution. We are ready to do so.

Let me repeat: what is involved here is observance of the ABM Treaty. As to how we view this, we have explained this to you, notably quite recently in Washington.

In order to keep the discussion of those issues within such reasonable bounds and not to allow it to get bogged down in over-complicated technicalities, or, conversely, in generalized concepts, I propose that along with the Geneva negotiations we might use a channel for constantly checking the course of the negotiations and expressing more freely both our concerns and proposed options. Such a channel could be set up through contacts, specially dedicated to this subject, between the Soviet Foreign Minister and the US Ambassador in Moscow and the US Secretary of State and the Soviet Ambassador in Washington. Of course, some other option could also be considered.

In this regard it is important to act taking into account the fact that the time we have for working out a START Treaty is limited and that it would be desirable to complete it in the first half of the next year and to sign the treaty during your return visit to Moscow.

Of course, we have to clear the path toward such a treaty, removing from it both the natural difficulties, such as the questions of verification--and here I agree with the suggestion Secretary Shultz made, on your behalf, to focus even now on that area--and the complications artificially injected into the negotiations, such as the inclusion of our Backfire medium-bomber among strategic arms, the demand for a total ban on mobile ICBMs and the unwillingness to resolve the issue of SLCM limitation.

I am convinced that reaching agreement on strategic offensive arms in the context of compliance with the ABM Treaty is a realistic possibility. In addition, the experience gained in the negotiations on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles can to a substantial degree be useful for us in this area too.

We were, after all, able to agree on starting fullscale negotiations on nuclear testing, although just a few months before this had seemed something beyond our reach.

I believe it is necessary to exert a joint, persistent effort to resolve the problem of banning chemical weapons (although let me say honestly that I am profoundly disappointed by your position on binary weapons). The same applies to conventional arms reductions, in which not only our two countries but also our allies and other European countries are interested.

As early as last April, in my conversation with Mr. Shultz I set forth my concept of our next meeting with you. I continue to be of the view that in addition to signing the treaty

on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, we should also seriously discuss the START - ABM Treaty problem. I want our ministers and our Geneva delegations not to stand on the sidelines in this matter, so that they could do everything to facilitate to the utmost the work you and I are to do.

If we are to crown your visit to the USSR with a strategic arms treaty, we cannot avoid the need to reach at least an agreement in principle on that matter at our next meeting. The form in which such an agreement would be couched is after all not too important. It might be key elements of a future treaty, if we follow the suggestion you personally made in the spring of 1985. Or, perhaps, instructions or directives that we could give to the delegations to speed up work on such a document.

As I understand, in Moscow the Secretary of State favored working out instructions for the delegations. The important thing is to have a common understanding at the summit level of the goals that we seek to achieve and of the ways of reaching them within the short time available.

If we have a sufficient degree of agreement as to our intentions on that score, we shall be able to enrich our forthcoming discussions in Washington with a meaningful agenda.

I am conveying this letter to you through Eduard Shevardnadze, who is fully aware of my thinking concerning the further evolution of Soviet-U.S. relations and the specific plans for giving it effect. He has all necessary authority to reach agreement with you on all the main aspects of the forthcoming summit meeting, including its agenda, the duration

of my stay in the United States and the precise dates of the visit. I would ask you to note, if this coincides with your possibilities, that based on my calendar of activities before the end of this year, the preferable time for my visit to Washington would be in the first ten days of December.

I hope that you will take advantage of our Minister's visit to discuss and resolve the relevant issues, as they say, on the spot.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV

October 28, 1987

10:30
4TH DRAFT

Joint Announcement

Building on progress in U.S.-Soviet relations, including high-level exchanges and the discussions between Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Shultz in Washington on October 30, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have agreed to meet in the United States on _____ 1987.

The President and General Secretary attach the highest importance to holding a substantive meeting which covers the full range of issues between the two countries -- arms reductions, human rights and humanitarian issues, settlement of regional conflicts, and bilateral relations -- and which makes significant headway over the full range of these issues.

The two sides have agreed on a plan of action for further development of the U.S.-Soviet dialogue, including the following.

They have agreed to complete as soon as possible the treaty on the total elimination of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.

At their meeting in the United States, the President and the General Secretary will, in addition to reviewing the full range of U.S.-Soviet relations, sign the treaty on the total elimination of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles; set the agenda for future contacts between the leaders of the two countries; and consider thoroughly the development of instructions to delegations on a future treaty on 50 per cent reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arms and on the observance of and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period [of 10 years].

The President and General Secretary envision a further meeting between them in the Soviet Union in the first half of 1988, where they would also seek progress across the entire range of U.S.-Soviet relations. Toward this end, both sides will work towards early achievement of a treaty implementing the agreement to reduce strategic offensive arms by 50 per cent, which could be signed during the President's visit to Moscow.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Shultz will coordinate closely to ensure thorough and expeditious preparations of the forthcoming summit in Washington.

Secretary Shultz's table:

Secretary Shultz
Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Soviet Interpreter
Senator Baker
Dick Redman (State Dept spokesman)
Rosanece Ridgeway (Asst Secretary for European Affairs)
Sergei Tarasenko (Head of General Secretariat with Ministry
of Foreign Affairs)
Ambassador Matlock
Paul Nitze
Soviet Ambassador to U. S.
State Department Interpreter

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Special Agent in Charge