REVIEW OF U.S. ARMS REDUCTIONS NEGOTIATING POSITIONS

In preparation for the April 13-15, 1987, meeting between the Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister, I have reviewed the current U.S. negotiating position on various arms reductions issues. This National Security Decision Directive documents the results of that review and provides guidance for the Secretary of State's use during that meeting. (U)

Our basic positions are sound and require no revision. The Secretary of State should vigorously press the Soviets on our arms reductions agenda, while recognizing that bilateral issues, regional issues and human rights are equally important components of our overall relationship with the Soviet Union. (U)

Based on both an interagency review and my personal review of our positions, I have concluded that no new Presidential guidance is necessary in the areas of chemical weapons, conventional arms or Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF). Our positions, as documented elsewhere, remain valid. The Secretary of State should press the Soviets to move forward on the prompt completion of an INF Treaty. (S)

After hearing the views of my senior advisors and reviewing the interagency examinations, I have concluded that modifications to current U.S. negotiating positions are appropriate with respect to strategic arms reductions (START), Defense and Space, and nuclear testing. (S)

START

Achieving broad, deep, equitable and effectively verifiable reductions in strategic offensive arms remains our highest arms reduction priority. Arms reductions, however, are a means to facilitate national security, not a substitute for it, and our proposals require constant reexamination to ensure the resulting

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forces will be militarily sufficient. In Reykjavik we proposed
50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms to be achieved
by the end of 1991. That proposal was sound and, if it had been
accepted, could have been implemented in a fashion that enhanced
our security and that of our Allies. With the passage of time,
however, it has become necessary to modify our approach.

Based on the advice of my senior advisors, particularly the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the United States will propose that the 50
percent reductions in strategic offensive arms be completed
within seven years of the time a START treaty enters into force.
The Secretary of State should use his discretion on the manner of
conveying this proposal to the Soviets. In so doing, however, he
should stress that this altered period for reductions should
eliminate any Soviet concern that our proposal -- including our
proposal for appropriate sublimits -- will require unacceptable
restructuring of Soviet strategic forces.

With respect to other elements of our START position, I am
unwilling to alter our position that mobile missiles must be
banned. Because of the need to limit the most threatening and
destabilizing Soviet systems, I also believe we must maintain our
current requirements for appropriate addressal of ballistic
missile throw-weight, reduction of Soviet heavy ICBMs, and a
system of sublimits providing for no more than 4800 warheads on
ballistic missiles, no more than 3300 warheads on ICBMs, and no
more than 1650 warheads on permitted ICBMs except those on
silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads.

While I am reluctant to alter our sound position on sublimits, I
wish to seize every opportunity to use the meetings in Moscow to
advance our agenda. The United States should not display any
flexibility with respect to the 4800 ballistic missile warhead
sublimit, appropriate reductions of ballistic missile throw-
weight, or a 50 percent cut in Soviet heavy ICBMs. If, however,
the Soviets show constructive movement toward our START position,
including accepting the elements just noted, and if the Secretary
of State believes it will facilitate further Soviet movement, he
may explore raising the ICBM warhead sublimit from 3300 to 3600.
Based on the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on the fact
that sublimits are designed to constrain the most destabilizing
systems, I am unwilling to accept applying this sublimit to
submarine launched ballistic missiles. The authority to raise
our proposed ICBM sublimit from 3300 to 3600 is valid for the
Moscow meeting only; I am not prepared to relax important con-
straints absent some constructive progress on the part of the
Soviet Union.
Defense and Space

Our principal goal in Defense and Space remains the preservation of our option to deploy, if we chose to do so, advanced strategic defenses which meet our criteria in a safe and stabilizing manner as soon as possible. I believe this represents our best hope for shifting the basis of deterrence in the direction of increased international stability and security. Because our past proposal was directly linked to a specific START reductions proposal which we have now altered, a revision of our Defense and Space proposal is also appropriate. I am, therefore, approving the following revision to our position, which the Secretary of State should convey to the Soviets in Moscow:

a. Non-Withdrawal. Both parties would commit through 1994 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy operational defensive systems whose unilateral deployment presently is not permitted under the ABM Treaty, provided certain other conditions are met (START reductions proceed to 50% as scheduled in accordance with the START Treaty).

b. Freedom to Deploy. After 1994, either side can deploy defensive systems of its choosing under the terms of this agreement and without further reference to the ABM Treaty, unless mutually agreed otherwise.

c. ABM Treaty Restrictions. If either side exercises its rights under the conditions of this new agreement to deploy defensive systems of its choosing, any remaining restrictions on both parties associated with the ABM Treaty will be considered terminated, unless mutually agreed otherwise.

d. Withdrawal/Termination. The U.S. rejects a blanket non-withdrawal commitment. Nothing above alters the sovereign rights of the sides under customary international law, including the right to withdraw were a side to decide that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Each side must maintain its rights to terminate (in case of a material breach) or to withdraw (in case a side decided its supreme interests were jeopardized).

e. Failure to Meet START Reductions. Any failure to meet the reductions schedule associated with the START Treaty would represent grounds for either side to terminate this agreement and all related commitments associated with the ABM Treaty.

f. Entry into Force. This agreement will be documented in the form of a treaty which will not enter into force before the associated treaty covering 50% reductions in strategic offensive forces enters into force.
In presenting this proposal, United States representatives must make it clear that (1) such a commitment would not alter our ability to withdraw from the treaty in response to a material breach or because of supreme national interest, and (2) we will continue to insist that the Soviets redress their violation of the ABM Treaty. (§)

In addition, to meet stated Soviet concerns with being able to predict the course of future research, the Secretary of State may propose a "predictability package," based on suggestions raised by Prime Minister Thatcher with me and subsequently with General Secretary Gorbachev. In addition to our previous "open laboratories" proposal and our proposal for reciprocal observation of testing, this package might include a formal annual exchange of programmatic data. It is not my intent that such a predictability package entail any additional restrictions on United States programs beyond those indicated above. (§)

I am not willing to alter current guidance with respect to the negotiation of permitted or prohibited activities under the ABM Treaty. Nor am I willing, pending further understanding of SDI testing requirements and non-SDI related potential future capabilities, to agree to any ban on testing weapons from space to earth. (§)

Nuclear Testing

My highest priority in the nuclear testing area remains obtaining the necessary verification improvements in the existing Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) so that these treaties are effectively verifiable. At Reykjavik, both sides agreed that, in the future, a single negotiating forum could cover TTBT verification improvements, intermediate testing limits, and the question of the eventual total elimination of testing. Our sequential approach would deal with the necessary TTBT/PNET verification improvements first. Only after our verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties ratified, and in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons, would we begin to negotiate ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program of reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear testing. I remain committed to that approach. (U)

Because of these priorities, I cannot accept the recent Soviet suggestion for simultaneous negotiations on verification improvements to the TTBT/PNET and intermediate limitations (such as reductions in yields or numbers of tests), especially since the Soviets persist in characterizing such negotiations as negotiations toward a comprehensive test ban (CTB). At the same time, I wish to build upon the positive elements of the Soviet offer. Therefore, at his discretion, the Secretary of State may
attempt to exploit the Soviet movement by repackaging our position with a counter proposal to begin sequential negotiations in which:

-- the first step would be TTBT/PNET verification improvements,
-- the second step would be negotiations on the step-by-step parallel program we have proposed, but
-- discussions on the agenda for the second step could occur in parallel with TTBT/PNET verification improvement negotiations. (§)

Previous Guidance

Previous guidance on U.S. negotiating positions, and previous U.S. offers to the Soviet Union remain in effect unless specifically superseded by this directive. (¥)