Afghanistan (C)

This National Security Study Directive establishes the terms of reference for an interagency review of our strategy toward the Afghanistan problem, in light of recent developments in the war and the forthcoming new round of diplomatic activity. (C)

Our objective remains as outlined in my address to the United Nations General Assembly in 1985: a political solution that ensures Afghan self-determination, genuine national reconciliation, and rapid withdrawal of Soviet troops. (U)

The interagency review should, first, assess the present situation in terms of such questions as the following:

-- the present course of the war; the objectives and effectiveness of Soviet political and military strategy; and the performance and prospects of the Mujahidin;

-- prospects for the Geneva talks and the Pak-Soviet talks; implications for the U.S. and Pakistan of a breakdown of Geneva;

-- the likely Soviet diplomatic/political strategy in the coming weeks -- in advance of the resumption of Geneva -- and beyond; specifically, do recent Soviet "peace" feelers reflect a real change of priorities in favor of withdrawing even at the cost of collapsing the Kabul regime; or are they largely deceptive, aimed at inducing further Pak concessions and/or influencing political opinion in countries supporting the Mujahidin?

-- what strains in the Soviet system are exacerbated by the war and how great are the pressures on Gorbachev to find a solution;

-- the role of Iran and of India; and

-- the potential impact on Afghanistan of developments in the Sino-Soviet-U.S. triangular relationship, and vice versa.

Declassify on: OADR

[Handwritten notes: Mass. release on 10-8-94. Classified provisions of Ex. Sec. and Nat. Security.]
Second, the study should briefly assess the external and internal pressures upon Pakistan which could affect either its political stability or its policies toward Afghanistan, the United States, and the USSR. This should cover such topics as the economic situation (including foreign assistance levels and the debt burden); drug and non-proliferation problems, particularly as they relate to U.S. Congressional attitudes and actions; internal political tensions (including refugee and ethnic problems, opposition political challenges, etc.); and inducements (negotiating offers) and direct threats or covert pressures from the USSR.

Third, in preparation for the contingency of rapid movement in the negotiations, the review should examine such issues as the following and present options for U.S. policy:

-- what role we should take in seeking to maximize our influence on the current negotiations (including Pak-Soviet negotiations);

-- strategy and tactics in response to Soviet "peace" feelers; advantages and disadvantages of expanded contacts with the Soviets on this issue;

-- what we should be communicating to the UN Secretary-General and Cordovez, and whether or not we should try to line up other governments to join in pressing the UN;

-- steps we can realistically take to strengthen the role, voice, and unity of the Afghan resistance alliance in the current diplomacy;

-- dialogue and possible cooperation (especially on Soviet strategy) with other key governments (e.g., China, Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, West Europe);

-- the criteria by which the U.S. should judge a negotiated outcome in order to decide whether we will, or will not, guarantee it; in particular, what conditions (e.g., withdrawal timetable, inadequate verification, "reconciliation" maneuvers in Kabul) would place the Afghan resistance in unacceptable jeopardy; the costs of not guaranteeing a document that the Paks and Soviets are prepared to sign versus the costs of guaranteeing an inadequate document;

-- what we should be communicating to the Paks now about our position; advantages and disadvantages of using separate channels into the GOP (e.g., the military, foreign ministry, intelligence); and
the content and timing of consultations with the U.S. Congress on what kinds of negotiated outcome are, or are not, likely to receive bipartisan support. 

This overall review should be undertaken by the Interdepartmental Group chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and should be completed as soon as possible, no later than February 20, 1987. The assessments requested with respect to the first category of issues above should be provided by the intelligence community, but any comments or disagreements by other participants in the Interdepartmental Group should also be provided. Portions of the study dealing with especially sensitive information and activities should be addressed separately and in the policy review forums that exist for that purpose.

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