U.S. NUCLEAR TESTING LIMITATIONS POLICY

Introduction

The United States requires a well-defined policy on nuclear testing limitations issues, including the trilateral (U.S., U.S.S.R., and U.K.) negotiations of a CTBT (recessed in October, 1980), the bilateral Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT, 150 kiloton-yield nuclear testing limitation), and the companion Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET). The latter agreements have been signed but not ratified, and although the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have stated their adherence to the 150 kiloton limit, questions of Soviet compliance have arisen a number of times.

Objective of Review

To produce options for a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) on U.S. Nuclear Testing Limitations Policy to be considered by the National Security Council.

Scope

The review will build upon the work already accomplished by the Interdepartmental Group (IG) on Nuclear Testing. As a minimum, it will address the following topics:

-- U.S. policy on a CTBT, including the issues of the trilateral negotiations and Alliance consultations.

-- U.S. policy on the TTBT and PNET, to include the possibility of reopening negotiations on several issues. The purpose of renegotiation could be assessment and improvement of verification and compliance provisions, allowance for a few tests annually above the 150 kiloton threshold, and/or elimination of the commitment in Article I, paragraph 3, to continue negotiations towards a CTBT.

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-- Rationale and strategy for presentation of U.S. policy to our Allies. A classified version of such a presentation should explain to our Allies the necessity of nuclear testing to maintain our nuclear deterrent, issues of verification, and the relationship of nuclear testing limitations to other arms control efforts.

-- Rationale and strategy for presentation of U.S. policy in international fora, such as the United Nations' Committee on Disarmament and the Second Special Session on Disarmament, and to the public. The rationale should relate nuclear testing limitations to our national security needs and programs and to our other arms control efforts.

Any approach or alternative approaches to nuclear testing limitations recommended to the National Security Council should, as a minimum, permit the U.S. to develop and possess sufficient military capability, relative to that allowed to the Soviet Union, to execute U.S. national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will submit their timely assessments of the approaches in terms of this criterion to the Interdepartmental Group for use in developing the proposed U.S. position, and will certify to the effect, upon military sufficiency, of any proposed limitations as part of the report submitted to the National Security Council.

Administration

Management of the NSSD 7-82 review will be the responsibility of the currently existing Nuclear Testing Interdepartmental Group, co-chaired by the Departments of State and Defense. The Group will submit its report not later than April 16, 1982 for National Security Council consideration.

All matters relating to this NSSD will be classified Secret. Dissemination of this NSSD, subsequent study material, and the resulting draft NSDD will be handled on a strict need-to-know basis.