

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: WHORM Alpha File
Folder Title: Buckley, James L. (2 of 2)

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

Last Updated: 09/20/2023

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Collections

This is not a presidential record. This marker is used as an administrative marker by the Ronald W. Reagan Presidential Library Staff. This marker identifies that this folder contains material that is not suitable for young ages.

RFE-RL

Date: Oct. 4, '85

To: Mr. Buchanan -

From: James L. Buckley

Pat -

~~Thought it worth~~
while to call your
suggestion to your
attention.

I have seen
"Harvard & Despair" & it
is impressive.

10/21
Anna - Can you
call Rod & have him
send a tape for your
review? Pat

~~Enclosures filed in~~
~~Over size Attachments # 12949~~



HARVARD UNIVERSITY
UKRAINIAN STUDIES FUND
1581-83 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

Tel. 617-495-4033

September 23, 1985

27. Sep. 1985

Mr. James L. Buckley
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc.
1775 Broadway
New York, New York 10019

Dear Mr. Buckley:

You will be interested to know that CBC in Canada just recently aired "Harvest of Despair" on nationwide television. The September 15 issue of the Boston Sunday Globe also carried an article on the subject. Materials on both are enclosed.

I am sure you have seen Time's (September 9) interview with Gorbachev. In it, he laments the "hundreds of millions of people going hungry." It occurs to me that in the course of President Reagan's upcoming meeting, Gorbachev (as have prior Soviet leaders) may well castigate "hunger in America." This, particularly if the subjects of Afghanistan and Ethiopia come up in the course of the meeting.

I would be keenly interested to hear from you about the possibility of the President viewing the film sometime prior to his Gorbachev meeting. Is there anything that you could do toward that end? Would you have any suggestions that could lead to this sorry example of Soviet policy being viewed by the President?

Could I ask you to write to me, directly at my new home address, as follows:

5 Deerfield Lane
Upper Saddle River, N. J.
07548

(201) 934-7906

I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely yours,

Victor Rud
Associate Director

Millions Die From Man-Made Famine

Ten million people died of starvation. Three million of them were children. They died not because they couldn't grow enough food, but because the food was taken from them. Fifty years ago the Soviet Union, in an attempt to eliminate opposition and independence, imposed a famine on the people of the Ukraine. This incredible story is told using rare archival footage and interviews with those who lived through this holocaust in the one-hour documentary Harvest of Despair, for telecast Thursday, September 5 at 9:00 p.m. on CBC Television.

Following the Bolshevik uprising of 1917 the people of the Ukraine, a rich and fertile area the size of France, reclaimed independence, ending 200 years of Russian domination. However, by the time Communist leader Lenin was succeeded by Josef Stalin this independence was seen as opposition. Stalin set about systematically to bring the Ukraine firmly under his control. Soviet troops were sent in. There were mass arrests, destruction of property, ruinous taxes and grain quotas impossible to fill. Finally in 1932-33 even the food was taken away.

In addition to footage taken during the time of the famine Harvest of Despair includes eye witness accounts of survivors as well as such noted individuals as Petro Grigorenko, a former Soviet General, British journalist Malcolm Muggeridge and Ambassador Johann Von Herwarth, then German Attaché in Moscow. Harvest of Despair was produced by The Ukrainian Famine Research Committee with the assistance of the National Film Board of Canada. It won a Gold Award at the Houston International Film Festival.

For more information:
Jill Keenleyside

(416) 925-3311 ext 4527



THE STALIN YEARS

A Soviet-created ordeal by hunger

7 million Ukrainians died needlessly, book says

By Charles E. Claffey
Globe Staff

In 1932-33, some 7 million Ukrainians were murdered when the government of the Soviet Union created an artificial famine as part of its farm collectivization policy and to bring the independent-minded people of the Ukraine under the direct control of the Kremlin.

The draconian Soviet action has been called a "terror famine" — as genocidal a national policy as Nazi Germany's Holocaust extermination of 6 million Jews.



Residents of Charkow in the Ukraine clutch milk bottles at market, a precious commodity during the devastating '30s famine.



At the time, reports of the mass murders by starvation were mostly suppressed, and it is only recently that the full story of the directed famine in the "breadbasket of Europe" has begun to emerge.

"Execution by Hunger," published this year, is the first book-length, eyewitness account of the effects of the man-made famine. Miron Dolot is a pseudonym for the author, now a teacher of Slavic languages in California. Dolot recounts the suffering caused by the famine to himself and his family in a Ukrainian village in that winter of 1932-33, when he was 15.

Recent newspaper and magazine articles, demonstrations by Ukrainian-Americans in US cities at the time of the 50th anniversary of the famine in 1983, and a Canadian documentary film have helped to call international attention to the famine — as well as to latter-day application of the forced famine technique in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Ethiopia.

The Ukrainian famine has always been officially denied by the Soviet government.

A congressional committee

Carl Gershman, a US representative to the United Nations, said in a UN speech in October 1983 that "on the scale of crimes committed during this terrible century, a century of great crime — it's been called the century of totalitarianism — this surely ranks near the top. And the simple fact that the very existence of this holocaust can be denied, that it never took place from the point of view of this regime, says something about the nature of reality — the way reality is perceived by such a regime."

A US Congressional Committee on the Famine in the Ukraine was established last year to probe the matter, but so far no funds have been appropriated for the investigation.

At Harvard University's Ukrainian Research Institute, James Mace, a research associate who is a member of an institute project studying the fam-

in the Ukraine and to eliminate "their strong sense of national unity" that made them the balkiest subjects of the Soviet Union's 15 republics.

Accompanying the grain confiscation, Mace said, was a government purge of the Ukrainian cultural and political elite. "Hundreds of Ukrainian writers were killed or imprisoned in 1933-34," Mace said.

He noted that very few Western correspondents assigned to Moscow in the early 1930s ever reported the truth about the famine.

Reported by Muggerridge

Mace said that Walter Duranty of the New York Times, a Pulitzer Prize winner, and Louis Fischer of The New Republic "did all they could to discredit talk about the famine" ordered by the Soviet Union. "Some people think that Duranty was bought off, or that the Soviets had something on him." Both men are deceased.

Of the few correspondents who told the truth, one was Malcolm Muggerridge, the British writer and editor, who wrote a series of articles as a correspondent for the Manchester Guardian.

"If you go now to the Ukraine or the North Caucasus, exceedingly beautiful countries and formerly amongst the most fertile in the world, you will find them like a desert; fields choked with weeds and neglected; no livestock or horses; villages deserted; peasants famished, often their bodies swollen, unutterably wretched," Muggerridge wrote.

"You will discover if you question them that they have had no bread at all for three months past; only potatoes and some millet, and they are now counting potatoes one by one... They will tell you that many have already died of famine and that many are dying every day; that thousands have been shot by the government and hundreds of thousands exiled."

Inside the Soviet Union, the government sought to suppress news of

government levels, the famine was not talked about.


In his memoir "Khrushchev Remembers," published in 1970, the Soviet leader recalled that when he heard about the famine, he "couldn't believe it. I'd left the Ukraine in 1929, only three years before, when the Ukraine had pulled itself up to prewar living standards. Food had been plentiful and cheap. Yet now, we were told, people were starving. It was incredible.

"It wasn't until many years later, when Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan told me the following story, that I found out how bad things had really been in the Ukraine in the early '30s. Mikoyan told me that Comrade Demchenko, who was then First Secretary of the Kiev Regional Committee, once came to see him in Moscow. Here's what Demchenko said:


"Anastas Ivanovich, does Comrade Stalin — for that matter, does anyone in the Politburo — know what's happening in the Ukraine? Well, if not, I'll give you some idea. A train recently pulled into Kiev loaded with corpses of people who had starved to death. It had picked up corpses all the way from Poltava to Kiev. I think somebody had better inform Stalin about this situation."

"You can see from this story that an abnormal state of affairs had already developed in the Party when someone like Demchenko, a member of the Ukrainian Politburo, was afraid to go see Stalin himself. We had already moved into the period when one man had the collective leadership under his thumb and everyone else trembled before him...."

How much did Stalin know about the famine? Robert Conquest, who is collaborating with Harvard's Mace on a book on the famine, wrote in a 1983 article for the London Daily Telegraph that it is "perfectly clear that he [Stalin] had accurate reports from a variety of sources; indeed in Khrushchev's time Pravda gave a clear ac-



Sign in Charkow during the famine, which claimed an estimated 7 million Ukrainians, says: it is strongly forbidden to bury dead bodies here.



Bodies of Ukrainians who died in the Soviet-created starvation of the 1930s lie in a Charkow street, ignored by passerby.

search associate who is a member of an institute project studying the famine, said in an interview last week that the Stalin regime induced the famine by setting impossibly high grain quotas for the Ukrainian farmers.

The government confiscated the entire Ukrainian crop after the 1932 harvest, including even the seed grain, Mace said. Then, the Ukrainian border was sealed. Farmers taking grain or vegetables from their own land were executed. Some fled from their farms to the cities, where they starved to death; bodies lying on the sidewalks and alleys of the then Ukrainian capital, Kharkiv, became a common sight. Many turned to eating dogs and cats to stay alive — until the government announced it had a need for cat and dog skins.

Mace said that the Soviet government induced the famine in part to

Inside the Soviet Union, the government sought to suppress news of the famine. Adam Ulam, director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard, writes in the introduction to "Execution by Hunger" that "in 1932-33, the Kremlin sought to keep the news of mass starvation from spreading even within the USSR, so that inhabitants of other regions remained ignorant of what was happening... Far from outside help being sought, the government banned the import of food into these stricken areas. The Militsa and GPU [political police] detachments barred starving children from leaving their villages, and trying to save their own and their families' lives..."

A story from Mikoyan

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev claimed that even at high Russian

riety of sources: indeed in Khrushchev's time Pravda gave a clear account of such first hand reporting to him by a prominent Ukrainian Communist. His aim was to crush the Ukraine, his method that practiced by Jenghiz Khan and Tamerlane, the 'laying waste' of the refractory nation."

In an author's note to "Execution by Hunger," Dolot writes that the famine "has been an entirely ignored, neglected, misinterpreted and distorted event. To this day, even though Soviet dignitaries themselves matter-of-factly discuss it, some 'experts' on the Soviet Union ('Sovietologists') here in the United States persistently adhere to the original Soviet denial of its existence. This probably explains why no thorough study of this famine has ever been made in the USA. Americans have had difficulty in accepting a story so unbelievably inhuman."

'The village looked like a ghost town. It was as if the Black Death had passed through, silencing the voices of the villagers, the sounds of the animal and the birds. The deathly quiet lay like a pall. The few domestic animals that miraculously survived the famine were looked upon as exotic specimens.
— "Execution by Hunger: The Hidden Holocaust," by Miron Dolot



Hunger drives Ukrainian farmers, right, to wander in search of food. Photos on this page are from the book, "Muss Russland Hungern" (Does Russia have to starve?), by Dr. Ewald Ammende, published in 1935. Original photos are in Harvard's Widener Library.

Films cast light on dark history

BY RICK GROEN

TWO documentaries, each with a tragically similar theme and a depressingly common enemy, each determined to carry an illuminating message back to a dark history. Both focused in part by the specific group under study, and so both focused in two directions: inwards as a private matter, outwards as a public one.

And when *They Shall Ask* (tonight on CBC) recounts the persecution of the Mennonite people in the Soviet state, it does so with a writer-director who has used a harrowing and effective technique — the standard first-person recollection (with coaching), archival footage (occasionally interesting), dramatized re-creations (largely weak). In between, a commanding narrator is, by a long way, the most sophomoric ("The war was a time and costly for each generation. The famine didactic ("The only security comes from faith

in God") — at least in this version — maintained by a third to fit the program parameters of the small screen. It's a bit like sitting in on a family home movie. We're invited to the family, all right, but we're never granted membership, let alone made to feel its motivating energy. The inner audience will doubtless be greatly interested, the outer only mildly edu-

In *Harvest Of Despair* (next Thursday, same time, same network), the sheer weight of numbers propels ruthless persecution into systematic genocide. During a two-year period in the early thirties, 10 million victims perished from "a man-made famine in the Ukraine."

The program argues, convincingly, that the horror was deliberately engineered by Moscow for political ends, and that Western countries — by their very silence — were complicit witnesses to "one of the greatest cover-ups in history."

Inevitably, the current Soviet government vehemently denies not only its role as architects of the deaths, but also the deaths themselves. The producers, The Ukrainian Famine Research Committee, counter with a damning volume of evidence mounted by now-elderly survivors, since-defected soldiers and on-the-scene journalists. Yet the most devastating proof comes in stark black-and-white: grisly photographs of skeletal frames and distended bellies and shrivelled corpses, of horse-drawn wagons on their daily round of deadly collection.

If this is indeed the "forgotten holocaust," then *Harvest Of Despair* is a forceful reminder, a telling memorial to no fewer than one-quarter of a nation's population, a nation already bloodied by the myriad invasions of Red armies and White armies and German armies and Polish armies, a nation whose "only crime was that she never adapted to wearing chains."



And When They Shall Ask: a documentary on the persecution of the Mennonites by the Soviet state

The Globe and Mail Thursday August 29/85

RFE-RL

Date: Oct. 4, '85

To: Mr. Buchanan -

From: James L. Buckley

Pat -

Thought it worth
while to call his
suggestion to your
attention.

I have seen
"Korotkiy & Desyatni" ST
is impressive.

10/21 Agva - Can't
cancel + Have him
send a copy for your
review? Pat



HARVARD UNIVERSITY
UKRAINIAN STUDIES FUND

VICTOR RUD
Associate Director


1581-83 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
(617) 495-7835

5 Deerfield Lane
Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458
(201) 934-7906

Enclosures listed in 12-9-19
Oversize Attachment

"The man-made famine in Ukraine is one of the most monstrous crimes in history, so terrible that people in the future will scarcely be able to believe it ever happened."

MALCOM MUGGERIDGE, former Soviet correspondent for the Manchester Guardian and the London Morning Post, in an interview on March 1, 1983, in Robertsbridge, England



POPULATION COMPARISON

U. S. S. R.	1926		147,027,900	+15.7%
	1939		170,557,100	
RUSSIANS	1926		77,791,100	+28.0%
	1939		99,591,500	
UKRAINIANS	1926		31,195,000	-9.9%
	1939		28,111,000	

Source: Soviet Census of Population, in V. I. Kozlov, Natsional'nosti SSSR (Etnodemograficheskii obzor)
(Moscow, 1975), p. 249






Bild
98



Bild
99



Bild





Studies Reveal Extent of 1932-33 'Terror Famine' in Ukraine

During the years 1932 and 1933, as many as 7.9 million Ukrainians were killed in a "terror famine" perpetrated by the Soviet authorities both to complete the collectivization of agriculture and to bring the government of the Ukraine under the direct control of the Kremlin.

Until recently, little systematic research has been done on this genocide, perhaps the single largest genocide in a century marked by mass murder.

To rectify this oversight by historians and to make this cataclysm "a part of human consciousness," in the words of Omeljan Pritsak, Harvard's Ukrainian Research Institute in 1981 undertook a three-year study of the genocide.

Timed to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the famine, the project has resulted in a book by Robert Conquest, one of the founders of Kremlinology. James E. Mace, Research Associate in Ukrainian Studies, also wrote several articles, one dealing in detail with the politics and demographics of the tragedy. Mace is also supervising an ongoing program of interviews with survivors of the famine.

In addition, the Institute also mounted a Memorial Exhibition in Widener between December of 1983 and February of last year.

According to Pritsak, who is the Mykhailo S. Hrushevskyi Professor of Ukrainian History and Director of the Institute, Conquest and Mace were chosen to do the research because they are scholars "who could view the matter impartially and who had international standing and reputations." He stressed that that neither man is Ukrainian or of Ukrainian ancestry.

The research of Conquest and Mace has confirmed in detail a crime whose basic facts are both horrific and somehow familiar. In the introduction to the book, which is still in typescript and as yet untitled, Conquest writes:

"Fifty years ago as I write these words, the Ukraine and the Ukrainian-speaking areas to its east—a great stretch of territory with thirty million inhabitants—was like one vast Belsen. A quarter of the rural population, men, women, and children, lay dead or dying, the rest in various stages of debilitation with no strength to bury their families or neighbours. At the same time (as at Belsen), well-fed squads of police or party officials supervised the victims."

Simple, Brutal Methods

According to Conquest, the Ukrainian famine was part of a much larger terror Stalin used to collectivize agriculture in the Soviet Union as a whole. The methods were as simple as they were brutal, "setting [the peasantry] grain quotas far above the possible, removing every possible handful of food, and preventing help from the outside—even from other areas of the USSR from reaching the starving."

Beyond collectivization, the starvation of the Ukraine, which has been called "the granary of Europe," had another goal—the subjugation of the Ukraine as a national entity. In the *Quadrant* of April 1984, Mace writes that "persuasive evidence suggests that [the famine] was really a function of Soviet nationalities policy, carried out in tandem with a campaign to crush every manifestation of Ukrainian national life and constituting an attempt to crush the social basis of that life."

Ukrainian national and cultural life had, in fact, flourished during the 1920s after the civil war that followed the Bolshevik takeover during World War I. A policy of Ukrainization was allowed, "designed to give the Soviet Ukrainian state a veneer of national legitimacy by actively recruiting Ukrainians into the

party and state apparatus, switching official business to the Ukrainian language, and supporting Ukrainian cultural activities," according to Mace.

But as Mace also notes in an article in the May-June 1984 issue of *Problems of Communism*, "Ukrainization went much further than comparable policies elsewhere in the USSR, further than Moscow evidently intended. Prominent Ukrainian socialists were invited to return from exile." And these "became prominent in official cultural life and extremely vocal in protesting the constraints on

wave during the growing season, and hard rains at harvest time. Thus the 7.7-million-ton quota could not be met from an 18.3-million-ton harvest, in spite of tremendous pressure from Moscow. Yet fully seven million tons were ultimately collected."

The 1932 grain harvest in the Ukraine was lower still—14.4 tons—or just enough to feed the population and livestock. "In spite of this, the high quotas were retained."

The results of this policy were reported by Malcolm Muggeridge in *The*



At left, corpses of the starved lie in the street, no longer noticed by passers-by during the summer of 1933 in Kharkiv, then capital of the Soviet Ukraine. Above, mass graves where the starved were buried. Photos are from *Must Russland Hungern? (Must Russia Starve?)*, Vienna, 1935.

Ukraine's culture imposed by its association with Russia."

Indeed, in 1928 one high official was bold enough to argue that the Soviet Ukraine "was being exploited by the Soviet government in a manner virtually indistinguishable from prerevolutionary times; that its economic development was therefore being distorted; and that the only solution was for the Soviet Ukraine to be given control over its economic resources and develop them in a relatively autarkic fashion."

The first blows against any kind of Ukrainian autonomy under Soviet rule fell in 1928-29, when Stalin began his "socialist offensive." Lenin's relatively lenient New Economic Policy (NEP) was dropped to make way for a program of rapid industrialization, forced collectivization, and the "subordination of all societal resources to this 'socialist transformation.'"

To carry out this goal, thousands of party stalwarts from the cities were sent into the countryside. To quote Mace again, "official statements asserted that collectivization in the Ukraine had a special task, namely as the newspaper *Proletars'ka Pravda* put it on January 22, 1930, 'to destroy the social basis of Ukrainian nationalism—individual peasant agriculture.'"

In addition to collectivization, the Soviets also imposed impossibly high grain levies on the Ukraine, levies that led, in Mace's opinion, directly to the famine:

"Since the Ukrainian harvest of 1932 was better than that of the worst NEP year, it is clear that without the forced procurements of grain there would have been no starvation. The procurement quotas that were being imposed by Union authorities on Soviet Ukraine in conjunction with collectivization were clearly discriminatory. Thus, in 1930 the Union insisted that 7.7 million metric tons of Ukrainian grain be procured, a third of that year's exceptionally good 23-million-ton harvest. By contrast, in 1926, the best year before collectivization and compulsory procurements, only 3.3 million tons had been acquired by the state, 21 percent of that year's harvest.

"In 1931 the harvest was poorer than in 1930 because of the disorganization

Fortnightly Review of May 1, 1933: "On a recent visit to the Northern Caucasus and Ukraine, I saw something of the battle that is going on between the government and the peasants. . . . On the one side, millions of starving peasants, their bodies often swollen from lack of food; on the other, soldier members of the GPU carrying out the instructions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They had gone over the country like a swarm of locusts and taken away everything edible; they had shot or exiled thousands of peasants, sometimes whole villages; they had reduced some of the most fertile land in the world to a melancholy desert."

Similar reports were recorded at the time in the *Daily Telegraph* of London, *Le Matin* of Paris, the *Jewish Daily Forward* of New York, and *The New York Herald Tribune*. By contrast, as Mace notes, "Others, most notably Walter Duranty of *The New York Times* and Louis Fischer of *The New Republic*, seemed to have been perfectly aware of it, but actively aided the Soviet state in suppressing the story."

A source of eyewitness accounts closer to home is the files of the Harvard Refugee Interview Project, which was conducted in the early '50s. These interviews, while not focusing specifically on the famine, provide compelling reports of the grisly reality—families starving to death together in their cottages, villages bereft of life, cannibalism.

Interviewing Survivors

More recently, Mace has been interviewing survivors directly about the genocide. His experiences match those of individuals who have talked to survivors of the Nazi death camps.

"The interesting thing about interviewing famine survivors," he says, "is that these people have been so deeply traumatized that half of them are not going to talk to you under any circumstances. Two-thirds of those who will talk demand absolute anonymity. They will not even sign a form because they feel that they're still threatened. For many of them it's still a question of emotional trauma. They are still frightened after a

In the previously cited article from *Problems of Communism*, Mace conducted an analysis of Ukrainian population changes to determine at least roughly how many people were killed in the famine. After an examination of the 1926 and 1939 census data according to nationality, he concludes: "If we subtract our estimate of the post-famine population from the pre-famine population, the difference is 7,954,000, which can be taken as an estimate of the number of Ukrainians who died before their time. Again, this is a conservative estimate be-

cause it assumes that no one was born in the years 1932 and 1933."

A resolution adopted by Congress in 1983 as part of the 50th anniversary observance of the Ukrainian genocide states the matter in part this way:

"Whereas the Soviet Russian Government targeted the Ukrainian people for destruction as a whole by directing special draconic decrees against Ukrainian peasants as 'an enemy class,' against the Ukrainian intelligentsia as 'bourgeois Ukrainian nationalists,' and against the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church as 'a remnant of the old prejudicial "opiate of the people"'—committed on a gigantic and unprecedented scale the heinous crime of genocide, as defined by the United Nations Genocide Convention. . . ."

As a result of the resolution, a congressional commission is being established to look into the famine, to see what happened, what the U.S. did, and what it could have done, and what it should have done.

As Conquest, Mace, and others have pointed out, there are many parallels between what the Soviet authorities did in the Ukraine in the early '30s and the extermination of Jews and other minorities by the Nazis during World War II. But there is at least one important difference. While at least some Nazis have been brought to justice, no one has been punished for the mass murder in the Ukraine half a century ago.

On the contrary, as Conquest notes, "what occurred was all part of the normal political experience of the senior members of today's ruling group in the Kremlin. . . . The system then established in the countryside is part of the Soviet order as it exists today. Nor have the methods employed to create it been repudiated, except as to essentials."

"We are not interested in propaganda," Pritsak said in a recent interview. "The famine of the Ukraine is an important problem, a problem that touches humanity. Like the Holocaust and other tragedies, it should be a part of human consciousness because otherwise history ceases to be history and ceases to teach us."

ROBERT CONQUEST PRESENTS FAMINE WORK AT HURI

by James E. Mace

On March 12, Dr. Robert Conquest presented a complete working draft of his forthcoming book on the Ukrainian famine and discussed it in a seminar at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. While the manuscript will still go through a number of minor revisions before it finally appears in print, this means that the HURI famine project has now been all but completed. All of us at HURI are justly proud.

Titled The Hidden Holocaust: Collectivization and the Terror Famine, the manuscript promises to be a monumental work of scope and impact comparable to Dr. Conquest's best known work to date, The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties. The theme of the book can be summed up by quoting the first few lines of Dr. Conquest's introduction:

Fifty years ago as I write these words, the Ukraine and the stretch largely Ukrainian-speaking areas to its east -- a great/territory with several tens of millions of inhabitants -- was like one vast Belsen. A quarter of the rural population, men women and children, lay dead or dying, the rest in various stages of debilitation with no strength to bury their families or neighbors. At the time, as at Belsen, well-fed squads of police and party officials supervised the victims.

This was the climax of the "revolution from above," as Stalin put it, in which he and his associates crushed two elements seen as irremediably hostile to the regime: first the peasantry of the USSR as a whole, and secondly the Ukrainian nation.

In terms of regimes and policies fifty years is a long time. In terms of individual lives, not so long. I have met men and women who went through the experiences you will read of as children or even as

young adults. Among them were people with "survivors' guilt" -- that irrational shame that they should have been the ones to live on when their friends, parents, brothers and sisters died, which is also to be found among the survivors of the Nazi concentration camps.

At a different level, what occurred was all part of the normal political experience of the senior members of today's ruling group in the Kremlin. But apart from that, the system then established in the countryside is part of the Soviet order as it exists today. Nor have the methods employed to create it been repudiated, except as to inessentials.

Dr. Conquest's work explains the Ukrainian famine in terms to two interwoven threads of narrative, the communist determination to crush the peasantry as a class and the Ukrainians as a nation striving to determine its own fate. The two considerations were essentially linked in the Leninist mindset, since the "nationality problem" was seen as at bottom a peasant problem and the cities outside ethnic Russia were at the time of the revolution largely Russian or Russified. The Ukrainian peasant thus was victimized both as a peasant and as a Ukrainian. This is why the famine was focused primarily against the Ukrainians: as an attempt to solve the "problem" of the most troublesome and largest non-Russian group in the USSR by means of genocide against its social basis, carried out concomitantly with a campaign to destroy Ukrainian institutions and elites. Dr. Conquest cites the International Convention on Genocide as providing the internationally accepted definition of what genocide is and notes that Professor Rafael Lemkin, who drafted the convention, cited the Ukrainian famine as an example of genocide.

The body of the work falls into three interconnected parts. Part one, "The Protagonists: Party, Peasants, and Nation," weaves together the threads

of the Party's parallel policies regarding the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union. Part two, "To Crush the Peasantry," deals with the Party's transformation of the countryside through dekulakization and collectivization, a campaign which set the stage for the Ukrainian famine. Part Three, "The Terror Famine," deals with the famine itself and is by far the largest section of the book, occupying between two-fifths and one-half the total text. The work is impeccably documented with over 1300 references and weaves together Soviet and non-Soviet accounts of the famine in masterly fashion.

Dr. Conquest discussed the problems he faced in writing the book in a special HURI seminar titled "Collectivization and the Terror Famine as History."

He prefaced his talk with remarks about history in general, noting that the task of the historian is to make his work accessible to the general educated public. This means that one must strive to make sense of complex events, to strive to imaginatively reconstruct the motives of the "movers and shakers," and to make the events dealt with not only understandable but also credible. Foreexample, he noted, the recent controversy in Winnipeg over whether to teach the famine in history courses shows that attempts by those who perpetrated the Ukrainian genocide to deny what happened has not been altogether unsuccessful. In order to get the facts over to those who cannot believe such things happened, it is necessary to present the various and mutually reinforcing evidence in a cumulative matter. Fortunately, we have eyewitnesses here and Soviet "fiction" literature which correspond so completely that it is virtually impossible to tell them apart, the total figures for the suppressed 1937 census, the memoirs of former activists, letters from German evangelicals to their conationals in Germany, documents in various foreign offices, Western journalistic reports, and even some of those who found themselves among the perpetrators.

He went on to note that the three interconnected problems of forced collectivization, dekulakization, and famine are essentially separable in the sense that one could have had any one of them without the others. One could have had a campaign to force peasants into collective farms without physically removing the so-called kulaks from the village, and one could have removed the kulaks without attempting to subjugate the peasants as a whole. Nor was a famine the inevitable consequence of either. Stalin could have prevented or ended the famine at any time by releasing stocks of grain on hand, and the fact that Ukrainian peasants were prevented from leaving and those who obtained bread in Russia were prevented from carrying it across the border into Ukraine shows a deliberate attempt to crush a nation as such, a policy made all the more clear by the contemporaneous campaign against Ukrainian national institutions and cultural self-assertion. There is certainly no shortage of information on what took place; the trouble is that until now no one really attempted to bring it together in such a way as to elucidate one of the most tragic and criminal acts of this century.

According to official Soviet information, the suppressed 1937 census counted 163,772,000 people living in the Soviet Union, 14.5 million fewer than should have been expected from the demographic trends of the period. Three million of the deficit may be accounted for by the unborn, but over eleven million persons must have died before their time in the USSR during the period: approximately three million "kulaks," one million Kazakhs, and seven million from the famine of 1933, 80% of those Ukrainian. This figure, he noted, is probably accurate to within half a million.

In response to a request to elaborate the role of New York Times correspondent Walter Duranty, Dr. Conquest pointed out that British foreign office records show that at the same time as he was publishing deliberate disinformation he was relaying very accurate information to the British

embassy in Moscow. He noted in passing that the evident pride displayed by the Times to this day in his having won a Pulitzer prize for his Soviet reporting is rather misplaced.

Another questioner asked whether the famine should be considered an unforeseen consequence of the misguided attempt to forcibly collectivize Soviet agriculture. In response, Dr. Conquest noted that collectivization was already by and large over in Ukraine at the time of the famine, the grain exports of the period did very little to help the Soviet Union economically, and the fact that the government attempted to seal off famine stricken areas shows that the policy could only have been deliberate. Of course, we cannot isolate a decision to implement a policy of deliberate mass starvation any more than we can isolate a specific decision by Hitler to slaughter the Jews, but we can isolate Stalin's motives, his information on what was happening and his refusal to assuage the situation, the policies which caused the famine, and the results.

A few days before Dr. Conquest's seminar a talk was given at the Russian Research Center by Theodore von Laue, Professor emeritus at Clark College. Many of those who attended Dr. Conquest's seminar had been present when Professor von Laue had called it "moral hypocrisy" for those of us who did not experience the difficulties the Russians did to judge what Stalin wrought and that those of us who study the Soviet Union should conduct our work in such a way as to reduce rather than increase tensions in the nuclear age. At that time I pointed out to Professor von Laue that the Nuremberg Principle holds that even though we did not go through the travails of post World War One Germany, it is not merely our right but our duty to condemn crimes against humanity and that the attempt to blindly reduce tensions by giving the Germans what they wanted at Munich produced the Second World War. When a participant in the HURI seminar raised the

question of von Laue's argument to Dr. Conquest, he relied that the First World War and revolution did far less damage to the inhabitants of the Soviet Union than did Stalin in peacetime. Our policy, he continued, cannot be based on our perception of how we would wish the Soviet leadership to be, but rather upon what it is and how it ^{came} ~~got~~ to be that way.

Studies Reveal Extent of 1932-33 'Terror Famine' in Ukraine

During the years 1932 and 1933, as many as 7.9 million Ukrainians were killed in a "terror famine" perpetrated by the Soviet authorities both to complete the collectivization of agriculture and to bring the government of the Ukraine under the direct control of the Kremlin.

Until recently, little systematic research has been done on this genocide, perhaps the single largest genocide in a century marked by mass murder.

To rectify this oversight by historians and to make this cataclysm "a part of human consciousness," in the words of Omejian Pritsak, Harvard's Ukrainian Research Institute in 1981 undertook a three-year study of the genocide.

Timed to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the famine, the project has resulted in a book by Robert Conquest, one of the founders of Kremlinology. James E. Mace, Research Associate in Ukrainian Studies, also wrote several articles, one dealing in detail with the politics and demographics of the tragedy. Mace is also supervising an ongoing program of interviews with survivors of the famine.

In addition, the Institute also mounted a Memorial Exhibition in Widener between December of 1983 and February of last year.

According to Pritsak, who is the Myhailo S. Hrushevskiy Professor of Ukrainian History and Director of the Institute, Conquest and Mace were chosen to do the research because they are scholars "who could view the matter impartially and who had international standing and reputations." He stressed that that neither man is Ukrainian or of Ukrainian ancestry.

The research of Conquest and Mace has confirmed in detail a crime whose basic facts are both horrific and somehow familiar. In the introduction to the book, which is still in typescript and as yet untitled, Conquest writes:

"Fifty years ago as I write these words, the Ukraine and the Ukrainian-speaking areas to its east—a great stretch of territory with thirty million inhabitants—was like one vast Belsen. A quarter of the rural population, men, women, and children, lay dead or dying, the rest in various stages of debilitation with no strength to bury their families or neighbours. At the same time (as at Belsen), well-fed squads of police or party officials supervised the victims."

Simple, Brutal Methods

According to Conquest, the Ukrainian famine was part of a much larger terror Stalin used to collectivize agriculture in the Soviet Union as a whole. The methods were as simple as they were brutal, "setting [the peasantry] grain quotas far above the possible, removing every possible handful of food, and preventing help from the outside—even from other areas of the USSR from reaching the starving."

Beyond collectivization, the starvation of the Ukraine, which has been called "the granary of Europe," had another goal—the subjugation of the Ukraine as a national entity. In the *Quadram* of April 1984, Mace writes that "persuasive evidence suggests that [the famine] was really a function of Soviet nationalities policy, carried out in tandem with a campaign to crush every manifestation of Ukrainian national life and constituting an attempt to crush the social basis of that life."

Ukrainian national and cultural life had, in fact, flourished during the 1920s after the civil war that followed the Bolshevik takeover during World War I. A policy of Ukrainization was allowed, "designed to give the Soviet Ukrainian state a veneer of national legitimacy by actively recruiting Ukrainians into the

party and state apparatus, switching official business to the Ukrainian language, and supporting Ukrainian cultural activities," according to Mace.

But as Mace also notes in an article in the May-June 1984 issue of *Problems of Communism*, "Ukrainization went much further than comparable policies elsewhere in the USSR, further than Moscow evidently intended. Prominent Ukrainian socialists were invited to return from exile." And these "became prominent in official cultural life and extremely vocal in protesting the constraints on

wave during the growing season, and hard rains at harvest time. Thus the 7.7-million-ton quota could not be met from an 18.3-million-ton harvest, in spite of tremendous pressure from Moscow. Yet fully seven million tons were ultimately collected."

The 1932 grain harvest in the Ukraine was lower still—14.4 tons—or just enough to feed the population and livestock. "In spite of this, the high quotas were retained."

The results of this policy were reported by Malcolm Muggeridge in *The*

In the previously cited article from *Problems of Communism*, Mace conducted an analysis of Ukrainian population changes to determine at least roughly how many people were killed in the famine. After an examination of the 1926 and 1939 census data according to nationality, he concludes: "If we subtract our estimate of the post-famine population from the pre-famine population, the difference is 7,954,000, which can be taken as an estimate of the number of Ukrainians who died before their time. Again, this is a conservative estimate be-



At left, corpses of the starved lie in the street, no longer noticed by passers-by during the summer of 1933 in Kharkiv, then capital of the Soviet Ukraine. Above, mass graves where the starved were buried. Photos are from *Muss Russland Hungern?* (*Must Russia Starve?*), Vienna, 1935.

Ukraine's culture imposed by its association with Russia."

Indeed, in 1928 one high official was bold enough to argue that the Soviet Ukraine "was being exploited by the Soviet government in a manner virtually indistinguishable from prerevolutionary times; that its economic development was therefore being distorted; and that the only solution was for the Soviet Ukraine to be given control over its economic resources and develop them in a relatively autarkic fashion."

The first blows against any kind of Ukrainian autonomy under Soviet rule fell in 1928-29, when Stalin began his "socialist offensive." Lenin's relatively lenient New Economic Policy (NEP) was dropped to make way for a program of rapid industrialization, forced collectivization, and the "subordination of all societal resources to this 'socialist transformation.'"

To carry out this goal, thousands of party stalwarts from the cities were sent into the countryside. To quote Mace again, "official statements asserted that collectivization in the Ukraine had a special task, namely as the newspaper *Proletars'ka Pravda* put it on January 22, 1930, 'to destroy the social basis of Ukrainian nationalism—individual peasant agriculture.'"

In addition to collectivization, the Soviets also imposed impossibly high grain levies on the Ukraine, levies that led, in Mace's opinion, directly to the famine:

"Since the Ukrainian harvest of 1932 was better than that of the worst NEP year, it is clear that without the forced procurements of grain there would have been no starvation. The procurement quotas that were being imposed by Union authorities on Soviet Ukraine in conjunction with collectivization were clearly discriminatory. Thus, in 1930 the Union insisted that 7.7 million metric tons of Ukrainian grain be procured, a third of that year's exceptionally good 23-million-ton harvest. By contrast, in 1926, the best year before collectivization and compulsory procurements, only 3.3 million tons had been acquired by the state, 21 percent of that year's harvest.

"In 1931 the harvest was poorer than in 1930 because of the disorganization

Fortnightly Review of May 1, 1933: "On a recent visit to the Northern Caucasus and Ukraine, I saw something of the battle that is going on between the government and the peasants. . . . On the one side, millions of starving peasants, their bodies often swollen from lack of food; on the other, soldier members of the GPU carrying out the instructions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They had gone over the country like a swarm of locusts and taken away everything edible; they had shot or exiled thousands of peasants, sometimes whole villages; they had reduced some of the most fertile land in the world to a melancholy desert."

Similar reports were recorded at the time in the *Daily Telegraph* of London, *Le Matin* of Paris, the *Jewish Daily Forward* of New York, and *The New York Herald Tribune*. By contrast, as Mace notes, "Others, most notably Walter Duranty of *The New York Times* and Louis Fischer of *The New Republic*, seemed to have been perfectly aware of it, but actively aided the Soviet state in suppressing the story."

A source of eyewitness accounts closer to home is the files of the Harvard Refugee Interview Project, which was conducted in the early '50s. These interviews, while not focusing specifically on the famine, provide compelling reports of the grisly reality—families starving to death together in their cottages, villages bereft of life, cannibalism.

Interviewing Survivors

More recently, Mace has been interviewing survivors directly about the genocide. His experiences match those of individuals who have talked to survivors of the Nazi death camps.

"The interesting thing about interviewing famine survivors," he says, "is that these people have been so deeply traumatized that half of them are not going to talk to you under any circumstances. Two-thirds of those who will talk demand absolute anonymity. They will not even sign a form because they feel that they're still threatened. For many of them it's still a question of emotional trauma. They are still frightened after a

cause it assumes that no one was born in the years 1932 and 1933."

A resolution adopted by Congress in 1983 as part of the 50th anniversary observance of the Ukrainian genocide states the matter in part this way:

"Whereas the Soviet Russian Government targeted the Ukrainian people for destruction as a whole by directing special draconian decrees against Ukrainian peasants as 'an enemy class,' against the Ukrainian intelligentsia as 'bourgeois Ukrainian nationalists,' and against the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church as 'a remnant of the old prejudicial "opiate of the people"'—committed on a gigantic and unprecedented scale the heinous crime of genocide, as defined by the United Nations Genocide Convention . . ."

As a result of the resolution, a congressional commission is being established to look into the famine, to see what happened, what the U.S. did, and what it could have done, and what it should have done.

As Conquest, Mace, and others have pointed out, there are many parallels between what the Soviet authorities did in the Ukraine in the early '30s and the extermination of Jews and other minorities by the Nazis during World War II. But there is at least one important difference. While at least some Nazis have been brought to justice, no one has been punished for the mass murder in the Ukraine half a century ago.

On the contrary, as Conquest notes, "what occurred was all part of the normal political experience of the senior members of today's ruling group in the Kremlin. . . . The system then established in the countryside is part of the Soviet order as it exists today. Nor have the methods employed to create it been repudiated, except as to essentials."

"We are not interested in propaganda," Pritsak said in a recent interview. "The famine of the Ukraine is an important problem, a problem that touches humanity. Like the Holocaust and other tragedies, it should be a part of human consciousness because otherwise history ceases to be history and ceases to teach us."

ROBERT CONQUEST PRESENTS FAMINE WORK AT HURI

by James E. Mace

On March 12, Dr. Robert Conquest presented a complete working draft of his forthcoming book on the Ukrainian famine and discussed it in a seminar at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. While the manuscript will still go through a number of minor revisions before it finally appears in print, this means that the HURI famine project has now been all but completed. All of us at HURI are justly proud.

Titled The Hidden Holocaust: Collectivization and the Terror Famine, the manuscript promises to be a monumental work of scope and impact comparable to Dr. Conquest's best known work to date, The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties. The theme of the book can be summed up by quoting the first few lines of Dr. Conquest's introduction:

Fifty years ago as I write these words, the Ukraine and the stretch largely Ukrainian-speaking areas to its east -- a great/territory with several tens of millions of inhabitants -- was like one vast Belsen. A quarter of the rural population, men women and children, lay dead or dying, the rest in various stages of debilitation with no strength to bury their families or neighbors. At the time, as at Belsen, well-fed squads of police and party officials supervised the victims.

This was the climax of the "revolution from above," as Stalin put it, in which he and his associates crushed two elements seen as irremediably hostile to the regime: first the peasantry of the USSR as a whole, and secondly the Ukrainian nation.

In terms of regimes and policies fifty years is a long time. In terms of individual lives, not so long. I have met men and women who went through the experiences you will read of as children or even as

young adults. Among them were people with "survivors' guilt" -- that irrational shame that they should have been the ones to live on when their friends, parents, brothers and sisters died, which is also to be found among the survivors of the Nazi concentration camps.

At a different level, what occurred was all part of the normal political experience of the senior members of today's ruling group in the Kremlin. But apart from that, the system then established in the countryside is part of the Soviet order as it exists today. Nor have the methods employed to create it been repudiated, except as to inessentials.

Dr. Conquest's work explains the Ukrainian famine in terms to two interwoven threads of narrative, the communist determination to crush the peasantry as a class and the Ukrainians as a nation striving to determine its own fate. The two considerations were essentially linked in the Leninist mindset, since the "nationality problem" was seen as at bottom a peasant problem and the cities outside ethnic Russia were at the time of the revolution largely Russian or Russified. The Ukrainian peasant thus was victimized both as a peasant and as a Ukrainian. This is why the famine was focused primarily against the Ukrainians: as an attempt to solve the "problem" of the most troublesome and largest non-Russian group in the USSR by means of genocide against its social basis, carried out concomitantly with a campaign to destroy Ukrainian institutions and elites. Dr. Conquest cites the International Convention on Genocide as providing the internationally accepted definition of what genocide is and notes that Professor Rafael Lemkin, who drafted the convention, cited the Ukrainian famine as an example of genocide.

The body of the work falls into three interconnected parts. Part one, "The Protagonists: Party, Peasants, and Nation," weaves together the threads

of the Party's parallel policies regarding the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union. Part two, "To Crush the Peasantry," deals with the Party's transformation of the countryside through dekulakization and collectivization, a campaign which set the stage for the Ukrainian famine. Part Three, "The Terror Famine," deals with the famine itself and is by far the largest section of the book, occupying between two-fifths and one-half the total text. The work is impeccably documented with over 1300 references and weaves together Soviet and non-Soviet accounts of the famine in masterly fashion.

Dr. Conquest discussed the problems he faced in writing the book in a special HURI seminar titled "Collectivization and the Terror Famine as History."

He prefaced his talk with remarks about history in general, noting that the task of the historian is to make his work accessible to the general educated public. This means that one must strive to make sense of complex events, to strive to imaginatively reconstruct the motives of the "movers and shakers," and to make the events dealt with not only understandable but also credible. Foreexample, he noted, the recent controversy in Winnipeg over whether to teach the famine in history courses shows that attempts by those who perpetrated the Ukrainian genocide to deny what happened has not been altogether unsuccessful. In order to get the facts over to those who cannot believe such things happened, it is necessary to present the various and mutually reinforcing evidence in a cumulative matter. Fortunately, we have eyewitnesses here and Soviet "fiction" literature which correspond so completely that it is virtually impossible to tell them apart, the total figures for the suppressed 1937 census, the memoirs of former activists, letters from German evangelicals to their conationals in Germany, documents in various foreign offices, Western journalistic reports, and even some of those who found themselves among the perpetrators.

He went on to note that the three interconnected problems of forced collectivization, dekulakization, and famine are essentially separable in the sense that one could have had any one of them without the others. One could have had a campaign to force peasants into collective farms without physically removing the so-called kulaks from the village, and one could have removed the kulaks without attempting to subjugate the peasants as a whole. Nor was a famine the inevitable consequence of either. Stalin could have prevented or ended the famine at any time by releasing stocks of grain on hand, and the fact that Ukrainian peasants were prevented from leaving and those who obtained bread in Russia were prevented from carrying it across the border into Ukraine shows a deliberate attempt to crush a nation as such, a policy made all the more clear by the contemporaneous campaign against Ukrainian national institutions and cultural self-assertion. There is certainly no shortage of information on what took place; the trouble is that until now no one really attempted to bring it together in such a way as to elucidate one of the most tragic and criminal acts of this century.

According to official Soviet information, the suppressed 1937 census counted 163,772,000 people living in the Soviet Union, 14.5 million fewer than should have been expected from the demographic trends of the period. Three million of the deficit may be accounted for by the unborn, but over eleven million persons must have died before their time in the USSR during the period: approximately three million "kulaks," one million Kazakhs, and seven million from the famine of 1933, 80% of those Ukrainian. This figure, he noted, is probably accurate to within half a million.

In response to a request to elaborate the role of New York Times correspondent Walter Duranty, Dr. Conquest pointed out that British foreign office records show that at the same time as he was publishing deliberate disinformation he was relaying very accurate information to the British

embassy in Moscow. He noted in passing that the evident pride displayed by the Times to this day in his having won a Pulitzer prize for his Soviet reporting is rather misplaced.

Another questioner asked whether the famine should be considered an unforeseen consequence of the misguided attempt to forcibly collectivize Soviet agriculture. In response, Dr. Conquest noted that collectivization was already by and large over in Ukraine at the time of the famine, the grain exports of the period did very little to help the Soviet Union economically, and the fact that the government attempted to seal off famine stricken areas shows that the policy could only have been deliberate. Of course, we cannot isolate a decision to implement a policy of deliberate mass starvation any more than we can isolate a specific decision by Hitler to slaughter the Jews, but we can isolate Stalin's motives, his information on what was happening and his refusal to assuage the situation, the policies which caused the famine, and the results.

A few days before Dr. Conquest's seminar a talk was given at the Russian Research Center by Theodore von Laue, Professor emeritus at Clark College. Many of those who attended Dr. Conquest's seminar had been present when Professor von Laue had called it "moral hypocrisy" for those of us who did not experience the difficulties the Russians did to judge what Stalin wrought and that those of us who study the Soviet Union should conduct our work in such a way as to reduce rather than increase tensions in the nuclear age. At that time I pointed out to Professor von Laue that the Nuremberg Principle holds that even though we did not go through the travails of post World War One Germany, it is not merely our right but our duty to condemn crimes against humanity and that the attempt to blindly reduce tensions by giving the Germans what they wanted at Munich produced the Second World War. When a participant in the HURI seminar raised the

question of von Laue's argument to Dr. Conquest, he relied that the First World War and revolution did far less damage to the inhabitants of the Soviet Union than did Stalin in peacetime. Our policy, he continued, cannot be based on our perception of how we would wish the Soviet leadership to be, but rather upon what it is and how it ^{came} ~~got~~ to be that way.

B

Commentary

Volume Seventy-six, Number Five, November 1983

N 88971 0103025
RUTHERFORD FREE PUBLIC LIBRARY
PARK AVE & CHESTNUT ST
RUTHERFORD NJ 07070
DEC 83

Soviet Apologists: Then and Now

Arch Puddington
Marco Carynnyk

FREE PUBLIC LIBRARY
PARK AVE & CHESTNUT ST
RUTHERFORD, N. J. 07070

**The
Last Great
Yiddish Poet?**
Ruth R.
Wisse

**It's Only
Culture**
Joseph
Epstein

**Cohen
at the Bat**
Tilden G.
Edelstein

**Writer
at Work—
A Story**
Jeffrey
Miller

**Woody Allen
on the
American
Character**
Richard
Grenier

BOOKS:
Norman Podhoretz on
William E. Buckley Jr.
Daniel Pipes
Rita Kramer
Robert Alter
A. Lawrence Chickering

The Famine the "Times" Couldn't Find

Marco Carynnyk

MY EDITOR was dubious. I had been explaining that fifty years ago, in the spring and summer of 1933, Ukraine, the country of my forebears, had suffered a horrendous catastrophe. In a fertile, populous country famed as the granary of Europe, a great famine had mowed down a sixth, a fifth, and in some regions even a fourth of the inhabitants. Natural forces—drought, flood, blight—have been at least contributory causes of most famines. This one had been entirely man-made, entirely the result of a dictator's determination to collectivize agriculture and prepare for war by crushing even potential opposition. The consequences of this famine, I said, are still being felt.

Erudite, polyglot, herself a refugee from tyranny, the editor remained skeptical. "But isn't all this. . . ." She leaned back in her chair and smiled brightly. "Isn't all this a bit *recondite*?"

My face must have flushed. *Recondite*? Suddenly I knew the impotent anger Jews and Armenians have felt. Millions of my countrymen had been murdered, and their deaths were being dismissed as obscure and little-known.

Later I realized that the editor had said more than she had intended. The famine of 1933 was rationalized and concealed when it was taking its toll, and it is still hidden away and trivialized today. George Orwell need not have limited his observation to British intellectuals when he remarked that "huge events like the Ukraine famine of 1933, involving the deaths of millions of people, have actually escaped the attention of the majority of English Russophiles."

Still later, after I had set about uncovering the whole story by delving into newspaper files and archives and talking to people who had witnessed the events of 1933, I came to understand how Walter Duranty and the *New York Times* helped Stalin to make the famine "*recondite*."

WALTER DURANTY, an Englishman by birth, worked

MARCO CARYNNYK has published poetry and criticism and has edited or translated ten books, among them Leonid Plyushch's *History's Carnival* (1979) and Victor Nekipelov's *Institute of Fools* (1980). He has recently received a Visiting Grant from the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies in Washington and is writing a book and filming a documentary about the famine of 1933.

for the *New York Times* from 1913 to 1934, and then continued with the paper on a retainer basis until 1945. One of the best-known journalists in the world, he was certainly the most famous correspondent to be stationed in Moscow. The books that he wrote about the Soviet Union sold enormous numbers of copies—the revealingly titled *I Write As I Please* became a best-seller—and influenced both public attitudes and government policies. In April 1932, Duranty was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for his "dispassionate, interpretative reporting of the news from Russia." The announcement said that his dispatches were "marked by scholarship, profundity, impartiality, sound judgment, and exceptional clarity" and were "excellent examples of the best type of foreign correspondence." An Englishman who spent a decade in Moscow spoke for many admirers when he dedicated a book to Duranty, "the doyen of Moscow correspondents at whose feet we all sit in matters Sovietic."

Not everyone agreed with the Pulitzer jury. Indeed, controversy began to surround Duranty within a year after he arrived in Moscow, and continues to this day. Eugene Lyons, then the United Press correspondent in Moscow, accused Duranty of "amazing sophistry." Malcolm Muggeridge, who was reporting for the *Manchester Guardian* at the time, thought that Duranty was "the greatest liar of any journalist that I have met in fifty years of journalism." The American journalist Joseph Alsop also charged Duranty with "lying like a trooper."

Yet none of Duranty's critics has furnished proof that he deliberately misrepresented the facts about the Soviet Union. Now such evidence is at hand. It has to do with Duranty's reports about the nature and extent of the famine in Ukraine. And it raises disturbing questions about the reliability of even the most distinguished newspapers.

UNTIL the famine struck Ukraine and the adjacent North Caucasus (much of which had been settled by Ukrainians), foreign correspondents were able to travel there as they chose. Malcolm Muggeridge explained to me that when he decided to investigate the famine everyone in Moscow was talking about, he simply bought a train ticket and without informing the authorities set off for Kiev and Rostov.

Muggeridge's blunt account—which he got past the censor by sending it out in a diplomatic bag, only to have it "mutilated," as he told me, by his editors—appeared in the *Manchester Guardian* in March 1933:

The population is starving. "Hunger" was the word I heard most. Peasants begged a lift on the train from one station to another, sometimes their bodies swollen up—a disagreeable sight—from lack of food. . . . The little towns and villages seemed just numb and the people in too desperate a condition even actively to resent what had happened. . . . Cattle and horses dead; fields neglected; meager harvest despite moderately good climatic conditions; all the grain that was produced taken by the government; now no bread at all, no bread anywhere, nothing much else either; despair and bewilderment.

Muggeridge's articles produced no response beyond virulent attacks by Soviet sympathizers (an argument about whether a famine had occurred heated the correspondence columns of the *Guardian* for several months). Moscow nonetheless began to discourage journalists from visiting Ukraine. Sir Esmond Ovey, the British ambassador to the USSR, reported the restriction to London on March 5, 1933:

Internal situation is not promising. Conditions in Kuban [in the North Caucasus] have been described to me by recent English visitor as appalling and as resembling an armed camp in a desert—no work, no grain, no cattle, no draft horses, only idle peasants or soldiers. Another correspondent who had visited Kuban was strongly dissuaded from visiting the Ukraine where conditions are apparently as bad although apathy is greater. In fact all correspondents have now been "advised" by the Press Department of Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to remain in Moscow.

Although the travel ban remained in effect all spring and summer, Western correspondents in Moscow did not report the restriction on their journalistic freedom for over six months. Only on August 21, 1933 did William Henry Chamberlin announce in the *Guardian* that he and his colleagues had been ordered not to leave the capital without submitting a detailed itinerary and obtaining authorization from the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs:

Your correspondent received personal evidence that this rule is no empty formality when he was refused permission today to visit country districts in Ukrainia and North Caucasus regions, which he visited several times in previous years without objection from the central or local authorities. This is not an isolated case of restriction, as your correspondent knows of an instance that occurred some time ago when two American correspondents were forbidden to visit Ukrainia . . . and several correspondents of various nationalities were warned not to leave Moscow without special permission.

The London *Times* correspondent in Riga verified Chamberlin's account. "One of the chief purposes of this [ban]," he wrote on August 21,

is to screen the real conditions in the countryside from foreign eyes. . . . [Journalists] can still undertake journeys, but only after obtaining a special permit for an approved route, and they are always escorted by Communist officials. Permits for some of the chief grain areas are now very difficult or impossible to obtain.

The Associated Press also confirmed Chamberlin's report. Although the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was claiming a bumper crop, it had refused permission to Chamberlin to observe the harvest in Ukraine and the North Caucasus:

Mr. Chamberlin, one of the best-known American correspondents, who has lived here eleven years, has often traveled in those regions. There was a food shortage there the past winter. Several months ago two other American correspondents were forbidden to make a trip to the Ukraine.

And Frederick Birchall, the *New York Times* reporter in Berlin, related on August 24 that a correspondent for his paper in another capital who had applied for a tourist visa to the Soviet Union was turned down on the grounds that journalists were forbidden to travel as tourists, while an American correspondent stationed in Moscow who had asked for a visa to return there via Odessa was told it would be granted to him only if he pledged not to leave the train en route.

IN SEPTEMBER 1933, as the new harvest was brought in, compulsory grain deliveries to the state were reduced; the famine began to taper off because the farmers were finally allowed to keep some of their produce, and the travel restrictions were lifted. Edward Coote, a member of the staff of the British chancery in Moscow, commented on the lifting of the ban in a dispatch to the British Foreign Office on September 12:

The foreign press has, I hear, reported that the ban on journeys in the interior by foreign journalists has been lifted, but this is not the whole truth. Mr. Duranty, the *New York Times* correspondent, whom the Soviet Union [is] probably more anxious to conciliate than any other, returned from abroad in August, having heard that journeys in the interior by foreign correspondents had been prohibited, and thereupon addressed a letter to M. Litvinov protesting against this prohibition and stating that he intended to tour in the grain districts of the Ukraine on a certain date in September, accompanied by a colleague. In due course he received orally from the Press Department an assurance that he might travel on a certain fixed date later in the month. Mr. Duranty professed to be much irritated by this action, which he felt had cut the ground from under his feet by obliging him to recognize a ban upon his movements which infringed the liberty

of the press. Nevertheless, he and his colleague have set out happily enough, and I have no doubt that, as a totally unqualified agricultural observer, he will have no difficulty in obtaining sufficient quantitative experience in four hours to enable him to say whatever he may wish to say on his return.

Duranty had in fact determined what he would say about the "famine scare," as he repeatedly called it, long before this trip to Ukraine. In March 1932, when Eugene Lyons reported an early sign of famine to New York, Duranty apprised the *Times* that there was no famine anywhere, although "partial crop failures" occurred in some regions.

By November, the year's harvest had been brought in and Communist activists were roaming the countryside, stripping the farmers of their grain. Duranty admitted that there was a shortage of food, but insisted that "there is no famine or actual starvation, nor is there likely to be." And the food shortages that did exist, he argued, were the fault of the peasants, who had fled from the villages to the towns and construction sites, leaving the harvest unreaped and the grain rotting in the fields. But it would be a mistake, concluded Duranty, to exaggerate the gravity of the situation:

The Russians have tightened their belts before to a far greater extent than is likely to be needed this winter. If there is no international disturbance to complicate matters, remedies doubtless will be found, and the Soviet program, though menaced and perhaps retarded, will not be seriously affected.

Then in April 1933, when the famine was raging in full force because repeated grain collections by the government had stripped the countryside bare (although they claimed to be fulfilling the state grain quotas, the collectors often confiscated baked bread, emptied pots of porridge, and removed kitchen utensils, clothes, and furniture), Duranty rebutted a report brought out by Gareth Jones. A young Welshman who had studied under the eminent historian of Russia, Sir Bernard Pares, and served as an aide to Lloyd George, Jones investigated the famine by the simple expedient of packing a knapsack with as much canned food as he could carry and setting out on foot to explore the villages in the Kharkov region. On his return from the Soviet Union, Jones announced his ghastly findings at a press conference in Berlin and a lecture at Chatham House in London.

Like Muggeridge before him, Jones found severe famine. Everywhere he went he heard the cry, "There is no bread, we are dying." Millions of lives were being menaced:

The villages which I visited alone on foot were by no means in the hardest-hit parts, but in almost every village the bread supply had run out two months earlier, the potatoes were almost exhausted, and there was not enough

coarse beet, which was formerly used as cattle fodder but has now become a staple food of the population, to last until the next harvest. . . . In each village I received the same information—namely, that many were dying of famine and that about four-fifths of the cattle and the horses had perished. . . . Nor shall I forget the swollen stomachs of the children in the cottages in which I slept.

DURANTY quickly dismissed Jones's "big scare story." Yet he scoffed so cleverly that he both denied and confirmed Jones's eyewitness account. On the one hand, Duranty implied that Jones's story had been inspired by British sources in retaliation for the Soviet arrest of six Englishmen who had been employed by the Metropolitan-Vickers Electrical Company on construction projects in the USSR. On the other hand, Duranty agreed when Jones said that "there was virtually no bread in the villages he had visited and that the adults were haggard, gaunt, and discouraged."

Several paragraphs later Duranty set about justifying the famine:

But—to put it brutally—you can't make an omelette without breaking eggs, and the Bolshevik leaders are just as indifferent to the casualties that may be involved in their drive toward socialization as any general during the world war who ordered a costly attack to show his superiors that he and his division possessed the proper soldierly spirit. In fact, the Bolsheviks are more indifferent because they are animated by fanatical convictions.

Having admitted that the regime was waging a war against the Ukrainian peasants, Duranty proceeded to explain away the casualties. Jones, he said, had based his report on a tour of the villages. Duranty, however, had more reliable information: he had inquired in Soviet commissariats and foreign embassies and tabulated the impressions of both Russian and foreign friends. And here were the facts:

There is a serious food shortage throughout the country, with occasional cases of well-managed state or collective farms. The big cities and the army are adequately supplied with food. There is no actual starvation or deaths from starvation, but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition. . . . In short, conditions are definitely bad in certain sections—Ukraine, North Caucasus, and Lower Volga. The rest of the country is on short rations but nothing worse. These conditions are bad, but there is no famine.

Duranty, to be sure, did not act alone in trying to discredit Jones. The home offices of the American correspondents had all cabled urgent queries after Jones announced his findings. But preparations were under way for the Metropolitan-Vickers trial, and gaining access to the courtroom was more important for the Americans than reporting the famine. As Eugene Lyons put it, "The

need to remain on friendly terms with the censors, at least for the duration of the trial, was for all of us a compelling professional necessity."

Meeting the correspondents in one of their hotel rooms, Konstantin Umansky, the head of the Press Department of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, worked out with them a formula for denying Jones's account. Before the evening was over, vodka and snacks had been ordered. The "celebration"—the word is Lyons's—lasted until early morning. By the time the trial had ended (all the Britons were released), the American correspondents had forgotten that they no longer needed to remain on "friendly terms" with the censors and did not bother to retract their attack against Jones. "Throwing down Jones," Lyons lamented,

was as unpleasant a chore as fell to any of us in years of juggling facts to please dictatorial regimes. But throw him down we did, unanimously and in almost identical formulas of equivocation. Poor Gareth Jones must have been the most surprised human being alive when the facts he so painstakingly garnered from our mouths were snowed under by our denials.

IN EARLY April 1933, Duranty again bruted prosperity and abundance. "In the excitement over the spring sowing campaign and the reports of an increased food shortage," he announced,

a fact that has been almost overlooked is that the production of coal, pig iron, steel, oil, automobiles, tractors, locomotives, and machine tools has increased by 20 to 35 percent during recent months. That is the most effective proof that the food shortage as a whole is less grave than was believed.

The issue of the *New York Times* that carried this sophism* also brought a plea for help from a Katherine Schutock in Jackson Heights, New York, who pointed out that Duranty's denial of starvation was contradicted by letters from Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and the Lower Volga region. "The people who write such pathetic letters," noted Schutock,

are not looking for help because it cannot reach them. Money cannot reach them, and if it does they receive only half of what they sign for. Receipt of help from America only gets them into trouble with the Cheka [secret police]. Most of the letters I have seen end thus: "If you do not hear from us again, you can be sure we are not alive. We are either getting it for [writing] this letter, or we are through. The agony of living and dying of hunger is so painful and so long. What torture it is to live in hunger and know you are dying slowly of hunger."

Throughout the spring and summer of 1933, demographers have estimated, Ukrainian peasants were dying at the rate of 25,000 a day, or 1,000 an

hour, or 17 a minute. (In World War I, by comparison, about 6,000 people were killed every day.) Country lanes and city streets were littered with corpses—"stacked in the snow like logs," one eyewitness told me—and special brigades hastily dug mass graves in remote areas where they doused the bodies with gasoline and set them on fire. Ukraine that year was one vast hell. The *New York Times*, however, made absolutely no reference to the situation for more than a month, when it published a letter from Jones replying to Duranty's denial of the famine.

Standing by his claim that a severe famine was in progress, Jones pointed out that he had spoken with foreign journalists and technical experts, hundreds of peasants, and between twenty and thirty diplomats, all of whom had agreed that starvation was widespread:

But [the diplomats] are not allowed to express their views in the press, and therefore remain silent. Journalists, on the other hand, are allowed to write, but the censorship has turned them into masters of euphemism and understatement. Hence they give "famine" the polite name of "food shortage" and "starving to death" is softened down to read as "widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition."

Duranty, undaunted, continued to pooh-pooh reports of starvation. Visiting Odessa, he asserted that the food situation was "undoubtedly better" than had been reported. In a town near Kiev peasant women were offering roast chicken; in Odessa the bread ration had been increased, and peasants were marketing eggs and vegetables:

It is an old story, which the writer first heard on the Volga during the famine in the summer of 1921. Everywhere they said, "Things here are desperate, and unless we get relief we will die before Christmas"—which was true enough. Then we asked them, "But are people dying here now?" And they replied, "No, not here yet, but if you go to the village of So-and-So you will find hardly anyone alive." We went to said village and heard exactly the same story. "Here we are desperate, though not yet dying, but at So-and-So conditions are frightful. . . ." Though conditions are terribly hard, there is no sign of real famine conditions or that people are dying in the streets, as is reported in Moscow.

In June, when he was forced to defend himself against a charge of receiving concessions from the Soviet government, Duranty took the opportunity to deny an account in the London newspapers that the victims of the famine were fleeing to Moscow in search of food and dying in the streets. Seeing in the reports of famine "a cam-

* A sophism because by referring to "the food shortage as a whole" and by not specifying a geographic location, Duranty concealed the fact that the Ukrainian countryside was starving. Workers and civil servants in the cities were undernourished, but in order to maintain production the regime did give them ration cards entitling them to a bowl of soup and about two pounds of bread a day.

paign of calumny that has scarcely been equaled since Nero raised Rome against the Christians—or Hitler Germany against the Jews,” Duranty called the talk about corpses in the streets of Moscow “utterly untrue.” Yet the diplomats whom he cited as a source for his claim that there were no deaths from starvation confirmed the exact opposite. “Even in Moscow itself, which is favored above all places in the Union in the matter of food, there are deaths from starvation,” the British chargé d'affaires reported on July 17. “An English lady, who is studying Soviet hospitality and welfare work, has herself come upon two corpses in the street of persons who had just died as a direct result of lack of food.”

Moreover, when a newspaper in Riga reported in August that the starvation and suffering were comparable to the famine of 1921, Duranty denounced the assertion as a “fundamental absurdity.” Duranty also managed to slip into this story the standard Soviet insinuation that the famine reports were inspired by Nazi Germany: “The accession of Adolf Hitler to power brought new hope—and in some cases new money—to Russian émigré circles in Germany, the Baltic States, and elsewhere. These émigrés—like some other more disinterested observers of Soviet affairs—cannot see the woods for the trees and are only too ready to confuse causes and effects.”

Yet even as he ridiculed the increasingly frequent eyewitness accounts of a devastating famine, Duranty half-heartedly admitted that the “food shortage” had taken a toll and, salting his articles with such cautious euphemisms as deaths due to “lowered resistance” and “malnutrition,” ventured to estimate the losses:

The excellent harvest about to be gathered shows that any report of a famine in Russia is today an exaggeration or malignant propaganda. The food shortage which has affected almost the whole population in the last year, and particularly the grain-producing provinces—that is, the Ukraine, North Caucasus, the Lower Volga region—has, however, caused heavy loss of life. . . . The death rate rose during the winter and early spring to nearly four times the normal rate, which runs about 20 to 25 per 1,000 annually for the Soviet Union. Among peasants and others not receiving bread rations, conditions were certainly not better. So with a total population in the Ukraine, North Caucasus, and Lower Volga of upward of 40 million the normal death rate would have been about 1 million. Lacking official figures, it is conservative to suppose that this was at least trebled last year in those provinces and considerably increased for the Soviet Union as a whole.

The careful reader (and how many of Duranty's readers cared to untangle these sentences?) will note that he avoided giving an absolute figure of famine losses. But since he announced that the normal death rate would have been about 1 million and that this was trebled, we must assume that he was hinting at 2 million famine victims.

IN SEPTEMBER 1933, when he received the privilege of being the first correspondent to be allowed into the famine regions after the travel ban was lifted, Duranty set out by car for Rostov in the North Caucasus and Kharkov and Kiev in Ukraine. His public view of the “famine scare,” which he presented in seven articles in the *Times* between September 11 and 20, 1933, was not changed by what he saw.

“Whatever the situation was here last winter or spring,” Duranty cabled on September 11,

there is no doubt Rostov-on-Don is a busy, flourishing city today. Local officials and newspaper men scout [deride] the stories of hunger epidemics and a much increased death rate earlier this year. They emphasize that half the city's population now receives at least one meal daily in factory and other “mass restaurants.”

Two days later Duranty suggested that the North Caucasus was a land of milk and honey:

The use of the word “famine” in connection with the North Caucasus is a sheer absurdity. There a bumper crop is being harvested as fast as tractors, horses, oxen, men, women, and children can work. . . . There are plump babies in the nurseries or gardens of the collectives. Older children are watching fat calves or driving cattle. . . . Village markets are flowing with eggs, fruit, poultry, vegetables, milk, and butter at prices far lower than in Moscow. A child can see that this is not famine but abundance.

This makes it all the more inexplicable that the Moscow authorities have restricted freedom of travel for any correspondent, even on the plaintive grounds that “some correspondents earlier wrote most distressing articles. . . .” For the writer's part, he believes the distressing facts were exaggerated. He thinks he himself exaggerated in saying the death rate in the North Caucasus, the Ukraine, and Lower Volga regions in the past year was three times above normal—at least as far as the North Caucasus was concerned.

Whatever his new estimate was (he again avoided citing absolute figures), Duranty maintained it for only two days. “Early last year, under the pressure of the war danger in the Far East,” he wrote from Kharkov,

the authorities took too much grain from the Ukraine. Meanwhile, a large number of peasants thought they could change the Communist party's collectivization policy by refusing to cooperate. Those two circumstances together—the flight of some peasants and the passive resistance of others—produced a very poor harvest last year, and even part of that was never reaped. The situation in the winter was undoubtedly bad. Just as the writer considered that his death-rate figures for the North Caucasus were exaggerated, so he is inclined to believe that the estimate he made for the Ukraine was too low. [That estimate was three times the normal death rate.]*

* The bracketed passage is in the original *Times* story.

Let us give this passage our attention. In the first sentence Duranty implied—quite correctly—that the authorities had caused the famine by stripping Ukraine of its grain. But they did so, he said, because they needed to stockpile food in case war with Japan broke out. Duranty presented this cause as if it were well known and needed no explanation. In fact, he was sending up a trial balloon. He had only hinted at fear of war with Japan as a cause of the famine in previous articles, and he mentioned it again only eleven years later, when he argued that the “man-made famine” (he used that phrase, although he enclosed it in quotation marks), if anything like a famine had taken place at all, was entirely due to the Red Army’s need for food reserves.

In the second sentence of the passage, however, Duranty adroitly shifted the blame for the famine onto the peasants, who had produced a very poor harvest by fleeing or putting up passive resistance. “Peasant hatred of new ways, peasant conservatism, and peasant inertia,” as well as outright sabotage—those were the real causes of any food shortages, Duranty insisted again and again.

As in his August dispatch, Duranty carefully avoided giving an absolute figure of famine losses. Earlier he had estimated that the normal death rate of 1 million in Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and the Lower Volga, taken together, had trebled, thus implying that the famine had killed 2 million people. Now he announced that this figure was too high for the North Caucasus and too low for Ukraine. But since he did not give a population figure for Ukraine or estimate its losses, we cannot tell what figure he had in mind. The conclusion presented to the readers of the *Times*, however, was clear: if there was a famine (Duranty’s evidence on this point was highly ambiguous), it killed no more than 2 million people, and any such losses were entirely justified by the success of collectivization. A bit of suffering on the part of a few ignorant, anti-social kulaks had assured abundance for all.

In the remaining three articles in the series, Duranty resumed scoffing at the famine scare. “The writer has just completed a 200-mile auto trip through the heart of the Ukraine and can say positively that the harvest is splendid and all talk of famine now is ridiculous,” he assured his readers on September 17, 1933.

“Summing up the impressions of a ten days’ trip through North Caucasus and Ukraine, where this correspondent traveled with greater freedom and absence of supervision than had been expected, I repeat the opinion that the decisive engagement in the struggle for rural socialization has been won by the Kremlin,” Duranty concluded on September 19. “The cost in some places has been heavy, but a generally excellent crop is already mitigating conditions to a marked extent.”

Returning to Moscow, Duranty continued to gibe at the reports of famine. In mid-December the Soviet government announced that the state

grain collections had been completed two-and-a-half months earlier than ever before. “This result,” said Duranty,

fully justifies the optimism expressed to the writer by local authorities during his September trip through the Ukraine and North Caucasus—optimism that contrasted so strikingly with the famine stories then current in Berlin, Riga, Vienna, and other places, where elements hostile to the Soviet Union were making an eleventh-hour attempt to avert American recognition by picturing the Soviet Union as a land of ruin and despair.

DURANTY’S denials proved useful to Soviet spokesmen. When a group of Ukrainian women in the United States appealed to Congressman Herman Kopplemann of Connecticut to intervene with Moscow, Kopplemann forwarded their brief to Maxim Litvinov, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs. “There is any amount of such pamphlets full of lies circulated by counterrevolutionary organizations abroad, who specialize in the work of this kind,” Litvinov replied, not eloquently but clearly. “There is nothing left for them to do but to spread false information or to forge documents.”

The Ukrainian memorandum had cited Duranty’s August estimate of a trebled death rate. Boris Skvirsky, the counselor of the Soviet embassy in Washington, who was instructed by Litvinov to answer the Ukrainian charge in detail, found Duranty’s later retraction of his estimate a handy rebuttal:

The pamphlet does not add that in the *Times*, September 13, writing from Rostov-on-Don in the course of a personal inspection trip through those sections, Duranty stated that his estimate of July 24, before he had made his personal inspection, was exaggerated. He said that the poor harvest of 1932 had made for difficult conditions in certain sections, but there had been no famine. . . .

Kopplemann had second thoughts about the cause he had supported. Forwarding copies of Litvinov’s and Skvirsky’s replies to the Ukrainian women, he wrote:

Because the facts contained in the pamphlet you submitted to me conflict to a large extent with the report from the Soviet officials, I am asking you to make further investigation of the charges you have presented to me.

STALIN appreciated Duranty’s effort to make the news fit to print. “You have done a good job in your reporting of the USSR, although you are not a Marxist, because you tried to tell the truth about our country and to understand it and explain it to your readers,” he told Duranty nine days after the latter filed his story of hostile elements making an eleventh-hour attempt to avert U.S. recognition.

More tangible expressions of Stalin’s pleasure

followed. Duranty triumphantly accompanied Litvinov to the United States in November 1933 when the latter came to negotiate diplomatic relations and on his return took with him in his dispatch case, as Alexander Woollcott of the *New Yorker* put it, the first American ambassador to Moscow. And late in the year, Duranty was granted an hour-long interview with the Great Helmsman himself. It was featured on the front page of the *New York Times* and summarized in other papers. "It is unusual for M. Stalin to give interviews with journalists," a Soviet specialist in the British Foreign Office commented dryly, "but W. Duranty might be expected to get favorable treatment in this respect."

American liberals were equally appreciative. George Seldes, author of *Freedom of the Press*, among other works, claimed that America would have nothing but objective and reliable news if all the editors chose correspondents of Duranty's caliber. The journalist Alvin Adey observed that "there is no American correspondent, or for that matter any other non-Russian writer on Soviet affairs, who surpasses Walter Duranty in knowledge and understanding of Russia." And Woollcott described the scene when United States recognition of the USSR was celebrated with a banquet at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York in late 1933 and the honor roll of those who had contributed most to the rapprochement was called:

For each name in the roll, whether Russian or American, there was polite applause from the 1,700 [guests], but the one really prolonged pandemonium was evoked by the mention of a little Englishman who was an amused and politely attentive witness of these festivities. Indeed, one quite got the impression that America, in a spasm of discernment, was recognizing both Russia and Walter Duranty.

Another award for Duranty came from the *Nation*, which annually published an honor roll of citizens and institutions. In 1933 the honors went to the *New York Times* for printing and Walter Duranty for writing, during the previous decade and a half of Soviet rule, "the most enlightening, dispassionate, and readable dispatches from a great nation in the making which appeared in any newspaper in the world."

BUT Western correspondents who knew Duranty in Moscow did not share the regard in which he was held in New York. They called him Walter Obscuranty, and said that the impressions he conveyed privately did not even remotely resemble the impressions he purveyed to the readers of the *Times*.

Malcolm Muggeridge drew a devastating sketch of Duranty in his novel *Winter in Moscow* (the identifying tag is Duranty's egg-and-omelette line). In an article written in 1934 he also called Duranty's collected reporting from the Soviet Union an "essay in untruth":

I shall never forget Mr. Duranty. There was something fantastic, fairy-like about the spectacle of him dancing his Roger de Coverly hand in hand with the Bolshevik bosses on a prostrate Russia. How jauntily the dance proceeded! What spirit in the steps and capers! And no confusion. No flagging. If, occasionally, a dancer withdrew, the figure did not suffer. Still a partner to bow to, still hands outstretched for a giddy twirl, still the dance going merrily on. . . . The remarkable thing is that Mr. Duranty has—to use one of his favorite expressions—"gotten away with it." Readers of the *New York Times* adore him; the Brain Trust and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat have lain down together, and Mr. Duranty has led them; his name is honored amongst the righteous in all parts of the world. In these circumstances, does not the dust-cover of *Russia Reported* show unusual moderation in describing the book as a "supreme triumph of modern reporting"?

Eugene Lyons's criticism was more specific. The blockade on news from Ukraine and the North Caucasus that lasted through the spring and summer of 1933, he recollected, was lifted in "easy stages":

The first to be given permission to travel in the forbidden zones were the technically "friendly" reporters, whose dispatches might be counted upon to take the sting out of anything subsequent travelers might report. Duranty, for instance, was given a two weeks' advantage over most of us.

On the day he returned, it happened, Billy [Lyons's wife] and I were dining with Anne O'Hare McCormick, roving correspondent for the *New York Times*, and her husband. Duranty joined us. He gave us his fresh impressions in brutally frank terms and they added up to a picture of ghastly horror. His estimate of the dead from famine was the most startling I had as yet heard from anyone.

"But, Walter, you don't mean that literally?" Mrs. McCormick exclaimed.

"Hell I don't. . . . I'm being conservative," he replied, and as if by way of consolation he added his famous truism: "But they're only Russians. . . ."

Once more the same evening we heard Duranty make the same estimate, in answer to a question by Laurence Stallings, at the railroad station, just as the train was pulling out for the Polish frontier. When the issues of the *Times* carrying Duranty's own articles reached me I found that they failed to mention the large figures he had given freely and repeatedly to all of us.

Yet the most damning evidence against Duranty has never been presented. In a memorandum that he wrote for Muggeridge in December 1937 Lyons revealed the figure he had heard from Duranty:

In *Assignment in Utopia*, I tell how Duranty, returning from a tour of inspection after the 1932-33 famine, told Anne O'Hare McCormick, myself, and others that the famine had

killed many millions. His estimate, I say, was the largest I had yet heard. In the book I didn't mention the figure he used, but it was 7 million! Having passed on that figure to us in private conversation, he went home and wrote his famous dispatches pooh-poohing the famine.

Several days after his meeting with Lyons, Duranty gave the British chancery in Moscow an even more revealing account of his impressions in the North Caucasus and Ukraine. William Strang, the chargé d'affaires, summarized Duranty's findings for Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, on September 26, 1933:

According to Mr. Duranty, the population of the North Caucasus and the Lower Volga has decreased in the past year by 3 million, and the population of the Ukraine by 4.5 million. . . . From Rostov Mr. Duranty went to Kharkov, and on the way he noticed that large quantities of grain were in evidence at the railway stations, of which a large proportion was lying in the open air. Conditions in Kharkov were worse than in Rostov. There was less to eat, and the people had evidently been on very short commons. . . . Supervision over visitors was also stricter in Kharkov. During the year the death rate in Kharkov was, he thought, not more than 10 percent above the normal. Numerous peasants, however, who had come into the towns had died off like flies. . . . The Ukraine had been bled white. The population was exhausted. . . .

At Kharkov Mr. Duranty saw the Polish consul, who told him the following story: A Communist friend employed in the Control Commission was surprised at not getting reports from a certain locality. He went out to see for himself, and on arrival he found the village completely deserted. Most of the houses were standing empty, while others contained only corpses. . . .

Mr. Duranty thinks it quite possible that as many as 10 million people may have died directly or indirectly from lack of food in the Soviet Union during the past year.

Neither this figure nor the one he had cited to Lyons ever appeared in any of Duranty's articles or books.

THIS was not the end of the concealment.

According to the British Foreign Office, Duranty's companion on his trip to Ukraine and the North Caucasus was Stanley Richardson of the Associated Press. On September 22, Richardson cabled an astonishing dispatch.

Early in 1933, Moscow had thoroughly reorganized the Ukrainian party, purging and arresting many members, and established "political departments" at each state farm and machine-tractor station. Staffed by trusted urban workers and party members—at least a third of them Russians brought in from outside Ukraine—these political departments were given unlimited authority over the peasants and extensive powers

over local Communists, many of whom had proven themselves too faint-hearted to carry out the party's murderous policies. As the head of the political departments throughout Ukraine and as one of the highest party officials in the republic, Alexander Asatkin was well placed to have an accurate picture of the destruction wreaked by the famine.

In his dispatch, Richardson reported that Asatkin, whom he had formally interviewed in Kharkov, had confirmed the famine and had even "estimated the percentage of deaths in his area last winter and spring from causes related to undernourishment." The censor in Moscow, however, had banned the transmission of Asatkin's figures on the grounds that they were not official. Although the *Times* carried other Associated Press dispatches from Moscow a few days before and a few days after the September 22 cable, it never published the report of Richardson's interview with Asatkin. A highly placed Communist official had confirmed the famine, and the *Times* had ignored the news. (And not only the *Times*. I have been able to find Richardson's dispatch in only three North American newspapers—the *New York American*, the *Toronto Star*, and the *Toronto Evening Telegram*.)

But even this was not the end of the concealment.

Harold Denny, who replaced Duranty as the *Times* correspondent in Moscow in April 1934, proved to be no more honest a reporter of the famine than his predecessor. On July 23, 1934, for example, Denny announced that "a winter of hunger and perhaps of actual famine has been averted in the great grain region of the Ukraine." The fair crop that was being expected, he fancied, would be "a victory for collectivized agriculture which will induce many remaining individual peasants to enter the fold."

Throughout 1933 and 1934 Ewald Ammende had been trying almost singlehandedly to draw public attention to the famine. A Baltic German, Ammende had briefly worked for the government of independent Estonia in 1919 and then moved to Western Europe, where he threw himself into relief work. In September 1933, when Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna established a famine relief committee (the members included the Chief Rabbi of Vienna, the head of the Lutheran church, and the leaders of other denominations in Vienna), Ammende became its General Secretary. In late June 1934, Ammende arrived in New York with a mission to obtain the support of churches and humanitarian organizations in the United States and Canada. In interviews and letters to editors Ammende announced that wide starvation was impending again and asked whether Western grain surpluses could not be used to bring relief to the starving districts in the Soviet Union.

In response to queries from his editors about Ammende's assertion, Denny visited Ukraine in July and again in October. Echoing the articles

in which Duranty had attacked Jones, Denny claimed to have seen no signs of famine. "This correspondent is traveling through the principal grain regions to check reports published abroad that a new famine exists or impends," Denny cabled from Ukraine on October 7, 1934. "Thus far no famine has been found nor an indication of famine in the year to come, though many peasants must draw in their belts and eat food they do not like until the 1935 harvest."

Although peasants in southern Ukraine, by his own admission, told him that they were in "grave danger," Denny reported that he had feasted on "milk from contented collectivized cows and honey fresh from the hives of Bolshevik bees":

These delicacies were served at the end of a meal of a tasty salad of tomatoes, pickles, and onions, roast duck, and fluffy potato souffle, much better prepared than in Moscow hotels, washed down with the Ukrainian national drink, slivnyanka, a liquor made from plums, tasting non-alcoholic though with a mule's kick in every swallow.

Eight days later Denny again announced that he had found no signs of famine. He had deliberately sought, he said, "the sections where the worst conditions had been reported in the outside world and the localities that peasants on trains had told him were the most seriously affected." Despite all this searching, however, he had found no famine. "Nowhere even fear of it."*

"The hunt for famine in Russia," Denny concluded, borrowing a line from Duranty, "was like chasing a will-o'-the-wisp. It was always somewhere further on."

THUS the damage was done. The famine was a will-o'-the-wisp. Nazi and anti-Nazi, Right and Left, Stalinist and anti-Stalinist, would argue for years to come whether anything like a famine had happened at all, while the less polemically minded shuddered with distaste and turned to more substantial issues. My erudite editor justified silence on the grounds that the famine is little known. Another came to the same conclusion from the opposite starting point: the broad facts of the case, she opined, are so well known and so widely acknowledged that nothing more need be added. The Soviet press attaché in Ottawa displayed a touching like-mindedness. In whose interest is it to bring up an "alleged famine," he indignantly asked an interviewer, when East and West are facing so many unresolved problems?

These are only three examples. Their perceptions still shaped by Duranty's and Denny's lies, many otherwise well-informed people know only that Stalin did something nasty to the "kulaks" in the course of collectivization, and many assume that the peasants themselves were to blame. Two recent studies of mass murder are cases in point. Leo Kuper, in *Genocide*, argues that the liquidation of the kulaks was not genocide but only a "related atrocity," and devotes to the famine precisely half a sentence:

Estimates of the numbers who perished range from 5 million to 15 million, and this is without taking into account the many millions of peasants starved to death in the artificially induced man-made famine of 1932-33.

Richard L. Rubenstein, in *The Age of Triage*, giving the matter just a bit more attention, manages to confuse the causes, chronology, and geography of the famine:

Millions of peasants resisted [Stalin's collectivization] violently and killed their own livestock rather than permit them to become state property. A man-made famine, the first of a series, ensued which compelled Stalin to retreat temporarily. Nevertheless, by 1932 he had broken the back of his country's peasantry.

The famine of 1933 was one of the greatest crimes of the 20th century. Yet it has been met in most quarters with an indifference bordering on cynicism and in some with a conspiracy of silence (this proverbial phrase was first applied to the famine of 1933) that is nothing short of criminal. In an age when "genocide" and "holocaust" have become a part of every journalist's lexicon, the horrors of 1933 in Ukraine are still dismissed as recondite, are still being made fit to print. Orwell had it right:

The fog of lies and misinformation that surrounds such subjects as the Ukraine famine, the Spanish civil war, Russian policy in Poland, and so forth, is not due entirely to conscious dishonesty, but any writer or journalist who is fully sympathetic to the USSR—sympathetic, that is, in the way the Russians themselves would want him to be—does have to acquiesce in deliberate falsification on important issues.

* Such denials were as convenient for Soviet apologists as Duranty's had been. When William Randolph Hearst mounted a campaign against Roosevelt's Soviet policy in 1935 and ordered his editors to reprint eyewitness accounts of the famine that had appeared in 1933, the American Communist party attacked Hearst by citing Denny's finding that there was no famine anywhere.

C

The IDLER

Number One

JANUARY 1985

\$2.75 the copy

IN THE SCHOOLS

By HARLEY PRICE

The campaign is now on to improve standards in the schools, for Johnny can neither read nor write. It is a wonderful opportunity for the people who think Johnny's ideological standards are slacking a bit, too.

HEARING PLACES

By PAUL YOUNG

Reflections upon antique musical instruments, listening to buildings, jogging to Mozart, and other calamities in modality.

THREE LITTLE WORDS

By ERIC McLUHAN

Aristotle called tragedy a *'mimesis of a praxis'*. Something happens to the leading character — he has a *hamartia*. Much hangs on the meaning of these three Greek words. They have not been well translated.

IN THE MARGINS

By SAMUEL JOHNSON

A Bohemian shepherd, who, through long abode in the forests, has learned to understand the languages of birds, reports on a conversation between a vulture and her young on the nature and purposes of man.

THE IDLER'S NOTEBOOK

We introduce ourselves, — and our companions. — On Jaroslav Seifert. — Why Ethiopia is starving. — An idle award for the historians of lost causes. — A bland election. — On the secular religion of 'care', — and on the terrors of the year 2000.

THE DOGS THAT DID NOT BARK

By MARCO CARYNNYK

Perhaps six million people died in the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-3, which was organized by Stalin to punish resistance to the Soviet collectivization. It is now clear that British, American, and Canadian authorities knew very much about it, but said and did nothing.



THE DOGS THAT DID NOT BARK

THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES & THE FAMINE OF 1932-3 PART ONE

I. A MAN-MADE FAMINE.



WHEN he abandoned Lenin's New Economic Policy in 1928 in favour of headlong industrialization and collectivization, Stalin embarked on a second revolution, directed solely and exclusively from above, which was far more devastating than the Revolution of 1917 or the Civil War. The dictator's blows fell most heavily on the peasantry. A hundred million peasants were compelled,

often at gunpoint, to forsake their holdings and join collective farms; several million, labelled 'kulaks' or 'kulak henchmen', were shot, exiled, or absorbed into the rapidly metastasizing Gulag. The most horrible fate was reserved for Ukraine and the adjacent North Caucasus, where some six million people were starved to death in 1932 and 1933.

The contours of this calamity are clear. Intent on carrying out the collectivization of agriculture required by his first five-year plan, Stalin liquidated, as the ugly euphemism has it, opposition to his scheme within the Communist Party and then declared a ruthless war against the peasants. The industrialization of the Soviet Union required Western machinery and expertise that had to be paid for with hard currency. Taking an example from the Tsarist government, which had exported grain even when those who produced it were starving,¹ Stalin wrested away the peasants' food and dumped it on Western markets. Anxious to crush the opposition that Ukrainians had shown to Sovietization first by armed resistance and then by growing demands for cultural and political autonomy, Stalin blockaded Ukraine to prevent peasants from fleeing to Russia, blacklisted entire regions to keep them from receiving consumer goods, and forbade foreign relief. Starving peasants who dug up seeds or snipped a few ears of wheat were punished for their 'crimes against socialist property' by being exiled or executed. A political police, formed from city workers and party members and helped by air patrols, was given the task of watching over the fields. When hungry policemen joined the peasants in stealing from the crop, Komsomol members were brought in to keep an eye on their elders. And when even these measures failed, brigades of children armed with sticks were sent to protect state property. Called upon to denounce their own parents, the children were rewarded with food, clothing, and medals.

Natural forces—drought, flood, blight—have been contributory causes of most famines. The famine of 1932-

3, however, was entirely man-made, entirely the result of a dictator's genocidal policies: the grain harvest in 1932 was only twelve percent smaller than in 1927, when there had been no famine; but deliveries of grain to the state, enforced by thousands of party workers who were mobilized to implement the Iron Broom technique of Civil War days,² were stepped up by forty-four percent. This policy of 'squeezing' the peasants of Ukraine and the North Caucasus for as much food as possible (Party activists often confiscated baked bread and emptied pots of porridge), and doing nothing to alleviate the resulting starvation, led to one of the greatest famines in history. Estimates by observers range from one million to ten or even fifteen million deaths. If we accept the commonly cited figure of six million, that is still three times as many deaths as in the Irish potato famine. And if we include the peasants who were executed or deported to labour camps, then the total population loss approaches ten million. In an extension of Russia's historic drive to absorb Ukraine, the land of the dead was colonized by Russian settlers. Then, in the purges of the mid-thirties, the activists who had brutalized the countryside were destroyed. Finally, their executors were themselves executed to ensure the safety of the supreme assassin.

These atrocities, which are so inadequately termed the 'man-made famine' or 'great famine of 1933', constitute one of the most horrifying crimes of our brutal century. Yet the perpetration of this crime has been met by many with an indifference bordering on cynicism, and by some with a conspiracy of silence that is itself little short of criminal. The primary reason for the silence, of course, was the calculated campaign of misinformation that the Soviet authorities mounted to conceal their doings. Declaring Ukraine out of bounds to reporters in order to hide the destruction they had wreaked and enlisting such complaisant foreigners as George Bernard Shaw, French Prime Minister Edouard Herriot, and Walter Duranty of the *New York Times* in the effort to convince the world that Soviet life (in the Great Helmsman's phrase) was happier and gayer than ever before, Stalin and his minions made denial of the famine an integral part of Soviet foreign policy. That they did so is not surprising. Had the Soviet government acknowledged the famine and accepted relief (it could not very well have acknowledged the famine and then rejected aid), it would have made a concession to the Ukrainian peasants. But since Stalin was effectively at war with them, such a compromise would have amounted to an admission of defeat and a drop in international standing precisely at a time when he was propagandizing the economic and social triumph of the five-year plan. 'When it is a matter of inflicting suffering upon individuals or classes which block the

1. 'We may not eat enough, but we will export,' said Ivan Vyshnegradsky, the Russian minister of finance during the famine of 1891-2. W. BRUCE LINCOLN, *In War's Dark Shadow: The Russians before the Great War* (New York: Dial, 1983).

2. The 'Iron Broom' was the peasants' bitterly ironic term for the food brigades that were sent into the countryside to expropriate grain during the Civil War. The techniques developed then were applied again in the 1930s. MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE, who, as the Moscow correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, made a special effort to visit the famine regions in early 1933, described the work of these agents of the GPU: 'They had gone over the country like a swarm of locusts and taken away everything edible; they had shot and exiled thousands of peasants, sometimes whole villages; they had reduced some of the most fertile land in the world to a melancholy desert.' *Fortnightly Review*, May 1933.

realization of their dreams,' observed William Henry Chamberlin, an American correspondent who visited the famine regions. 'dictators are hardboiled to the last degree. But they are as sensitive as the most temperamental artist when the effects of their ruthless policies are criticized, or even when they are stated objectively without comment.'³ Striving for diplomatic recognition by the United States (and the economic benefits that recognition would bring), membership in the League of Nations, and non-aggression treaties with European powers, Stalin could not tolerate criticism of his five-year plan or admit that people were dropping dead of hunger in the streets of Kiev and Poltava.

The heirs of Stalin have continued to pursue his policy of concealment and denial. Denouncing his predecessor's crimes in his famous 'secret speech' of 1956, Khrushchev argued that as one of Stalin's 'great services' collectivization had to be carried to its logical end; he studiously avoided mentioning the decimation of Ukraine.⁴ Soviet historians are equally reticent: although they have published dozens of monographs and hundreds of articles—some of genuine merit—about collectivization, the most they can bring themselves to say about the famine is that the early 1930s were a 'difficult time'.⁵ And as recently as October 1983, the Soviet Ukrainian delegate to the United Nations attacked the United States representative for saying that the famine was the 'direct consequence of Stalin's effort to collectivize agriculture and crush the nationally conscious Ukrainian peasantry.' This slander, said the Soviet delegate, had been perpetrated by Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists who had served Hitler during the Second World War and were now justifying their presence in the United States by circulating fabrications about the famine.

The Soviet campaign to discredit any discussion of the famine has been largely successful. Many otherwise knowledgeable people wonder to this day whether a famine occurred and, if so, whether it was not the fault of the Ukrainian peasants themselves. But the Soviet lie would not have been so widely believed if so many in the West had not condoned it. Long ignored archival evidence shows that several Western governments, including Britain, Canada, and the United States, were well informed about the horrors of the famine. Yet, in the phrase that Oscar Handlin applied to Sidney and Beatrice Webb (the Soviet apologists who did their best to explain away the famine) these governments were dogs that did not bark: they saw what was happening but failed to raise the alarm.⁶

II. WHAT WHITEHALL KNEW.

By virtue of its importance in European affairs and its sophisticated intelligence network, the British government had access to an unparalleled range of information about Eastern Europe. In the course of 1932 and 1933, the Foreign Office in London received from its embassy in Moscow weekly and often even daily despatches that detailed what was happening in the Ukrainian countryside. The information in these reports came from diplomats, foreign correspondents, British subjects living in the Soviet Union, and Soviet citizens.

As early as January 1930, shortly after the first five-year plan was inaugurated, Sir Esmond Ovey, the

British ambassador to Moscow, foresaw that trouble might arise from the 'hostility of the peasant and small proprietor class... which are being hardly treated and are being literally, when recalcitrant, bullied out of existence.' Even at this early date Ovey thought that regional famines were likely, because the Soviet government could 'be counted on not to be deflected by the death of even hundreds of thousands of peasants in a given district.' Ovey's presentiment proved to be correct within two years. 'There are stories going about Moscow,' he wrote to the Foreign Office in March 1932,

'...that traffic between the Ukraine and the consuming regions lying to the north of it is closely controlled, no one being allowed to bring more than 1,000 roubles out from the Ukraine, and all grain in the possession of private persons entering the Ukraine being confiscated. The Ukraine is, normally, the granary which feeds these consuming areas, but the granary, it is said, has been stripped very bare and some of the population in both town and country, in the Ukraine is short of food. The peasants and others have therefore taken to coming to the more plentifully supplied industrial areas to buy back some of their own grain, and it is this that the control system is designed to prevent, lest industrial areas should be denuded and the urban workers, the proletariat *par excellence*, should go short.'⁷

3. WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN, *Foreign Affairs* 13 (April 1935).

4. BERTRAM D. WOLFE, *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost: Text, Background and Meaning of Khrushchev's Secret Report to the Twentieth Congress on the Night of February 24-25, 1956* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957).

According to the Yugoslav Communist Anton Kolendič, however, Khrushchev expressed an entirely different view in private. In the struggle for power in the Kremlin immediately after Stalin's death Lavrenty Beria had his secret service record and transcribe conversations in the offices of his associates in the Politbureau, including Khrushchev's. In May 1953, in a talk with the writer Mikhail Sholokhov, Khrushchev said: 'There is much that is true in your books, but nevertheless they do not tell the whole truth. We are still far from knowing everything that happened at the time of collectivization. We shall doubtless never know how many human lives were swallowed up in collectivization. You have spoken only of Ukraine, and of individual cases. I myself know of hundreds of thousands of cases and, I repeat, only in Ukraine. And here scholars are proving mathematically, demographically, that close to twelve million victims died at that time... You ask me who is responsible? In the past we would say, you and I, the "kulaks," the "bourgeoisie", "imperialism". Today I can in all honesty say this to you with regard to collectivization. First, Stalinist methods of collectivization have brought us, beyond violence and terror, only misery and famine in the countryside. Second, at the time, Stalin was already dictator of the Soviet Union. Rykov, Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, all of them were insignificant personages, and Trotsky was in exile. Thus, if one must seek out the one person responsible for the millions of deaths and for those years of horror, it is to Stalin that one must turn.' ANTON KOLENDIČ, *Les derniers jours: De la mort de Staline à celle de Beria (mars-décembre 1953)* (Paris: Fayard, 1982).


5. One is hardly surprised that Soviet scholars ignore the famine. But one is astonished that Western scholars also overlook it. One searches in vain for more than passing references in MOSHE LEWIN'S *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975) or in R. W. DAVIES, *The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivization of Soviet Agriculture, 1929-1930 and The Soviet Collective Farm, 1929-1930* (London: Macmillan, 1980). A variety of biases has led to this state of affairs. Perhaps the most important one is the 'Moscow-centric' approach of most Sovietologists. The famine occurred in Ukraine and the North Caucasus, which are beyond their purview, and has thus been seen as a peripheral matter, not relevant to the crucial processes taking place in the metropolis. And the voluminous eyewitness literature and the few serious analyses of the famine, as distinct from collectivism, are largely in Ukrainian, which few Sovietologists read.

6. OSCAR HANDLIN, *Truth in History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).

7. A small part of the Moscow embassy despatches was published

In early May 1932, William Strang, the counsellor of the British Embassy, informed Sir John Simon, the British foreign secretary, that the crisis was growing more acute:

'For the population at large this has been the hardest winter since 1921. There have been few signs of unusual hardship in Moscow itself... But in provincial towns and over large stretches of the countryside, there is another story to tell. Recent visitors to the Ukraine report that the bread ration, even for manual workers themselves, has been cut down; that members of workers' families and other employees and their families have no ration of bread at all and have to supply themselves with bread as best they can outside the co-operatives, at prices which swallow up the greater part, or even the whole, of the workers' wages on bread alone. They also confirm, as already reported in previous despatches, that the Ukrainian peasants have been left in a state approaching famine after successive grain collections, whether for the needs of the towns, or for the war reserve, or for export, or for seed purposes in other areas, and that many of them move to the towns in search of bread... At the barrage works at Dnieprostoi, in addition to the ordinary worker, who is entitled to a reduced ration of 400 or 600 grammes [of bread] a day, there are said to be gangs of pressed workers, who receive no more than 200 grammes.'



The longest, most detailed and most vivid reports about the famine were written not by embassy staff, but by a Canadian wheat expert named Andrew Cairns who in the spring and summer of 1932 spent four months touring the major grain-growing regions of the Soviet Union. Born in Scotland, educated at the University of Alberta, and experienced as a wheat farmer, he had been assigned by the Empire Marketing Board in London to assess the significance of Soviet agriculture for the world wheat market. The Foreign Office placed the highest value on Cairns' memoranda and thought that the 'hair-raising revelations' to be found in them deserved to be drawn to the attention of government departments, the Dominions Office, and the delegates to the Imperial Economic Conference, which was convening in Ottawa in August 1932 to set quotas on the import of wheat and lumber.

In Ukraine and the North Caucasus, where wheat and rye were the staples of life, the government had created famine by expropriating the farmers' grain;

in *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Second Series, vol. 7. The remainder may be consulted at the Public Record Office in London (FO 37116318-17253). I am grateful to the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies in Edmonton and the Famine Research Fund Committee in Toronto for helping in obtaining the unpublished documents.

but in Central Asia, where nomadic tribes had been raising cattle for centuries, the government's policy was to confiscate the livestock, both to increase its own supply of meat and to force the nomads to become sedentary. The ensuing famine, Cairns discovered, had already killed 'many, many thousands' of Kirghizes, and another million could be expected to die. Many were fleeing east to China and north to Siberia in search of food:

'At every station I saw hundreds of them—all thin, cold, rag-clad, hungry, and many begging for bread. At one station I saw five hundred of them in a cattle train being taken to work in Kuznets. In Slavgorod many of them (I have photographs of them) were begging for bread, some getting on their knees and others lying down to do it. In two days motoring in one direction from Slavgorod I saw many small groups of Kirgizians camping on the prairie—every group beside a horse which had died and all eating the meat for food, and drying the skin in the sun to make boots, etc. In one place on the prairie I counted twenty-two Kirgizian graves (it is easy to tell their graves as they are very high, the dead being buried sitting, facing the East)... The reason for the sad fate of the poor natives of Kazakstan was, of course, the government collections of livestock.'

From Central Asia Cairns proceeded to tour Ukraine and the North Caucasus for six weeks. Every station that he stopped at,

'...had its crowd—from scores to several hundred, depending on the size of the town—of rag-clad hungry peasants, some begging for bread, many waiting, mostly in vain, for tickets, many climbing on to the steps or joining the crowds on the roof of each car, all filthy and miserable and not a trace of a smile anywhere... At the depot in Kiev many people asked for bread.'

Going for a walk in Kiev, Cairns came across a small bazaar where a woman told him that there was practically no bread because the government had collected so much grain for export. The collective farms around Kiev were very bad, she said. All the members were hungry and many were leaving. She herself had left her village, with many others, because she could not get food and some people were dying of starvation. Now she had a job in Kiev, but she could not buy much food with her small salary and was always hungry. Other women told Cairns, in answering his question why they did not belong to collectives, that they had not joined, or had left, because they and their children were very hungry. On the way back to his hotel Cairns discovered a man dying on the street. 'He was apparently insane as he was going through all the motions of eating and rubbing his stomach with apparent satisfaction. A crowd had gathered round, and some people, thinking that the man was begging, dropped a few coins, but he was quite unconscious and soon stopped moving.' Outside a food store, where swarms of people were buying and selling bits of bread, rotten vegetables, and fish scales, Cairns asked several people why things were so dear. Seeing that he did not understand a word of Ukrainian, they pulled in their cheeks, pretended to vomit, drew their fingers across their throats and said, in Russian, 'There's nothing to eat. Nothing at all.' On another walk Cairns stopped to give coins to three small girls—they were nearly dead with hunger, and

the smallest one would not live more than a few days longer—and a crowd gathered to tell him that there were many such children throughout the country.

From Kiev Cairns travelled to Dnipropetrovsk, in southern Ukraine. At every station there were hundreds or thousands of 'miserable, hungry people,' who were fleeing from the famine and searching for food—many of whom were fighting to get on to the roof, the couplings, or the steps of the train. In Dnipropetrovsk one evening he saw thirty-five men and women being herded down the street by six militiamen with drawn revolvers, and the following morning he saw about forty tattered and hungry children being escorted by militiamen. Here in the heart of Ukraine, where much wheat had been confiscated the previous year for export, wheat meal was selling at twenty to twenty-five times its international value; and with their low wages workers could not buy nearly enough bread to feed themselves. At the depot in the town of Salsk in the North Caucasus, many men and children were begging for bread, and a few women were sitting in the filth looking at their starving children. And in Rostov Cairns was taken to see a propaganda film about the elimination of homeless children in the Soviet Union. Coming out of the theatre, he was approached by three children who asked for money to buy bread.

In August 1932 the Soviet government issued a law that imposed the death penalty for the theft of 'socialist property'. Stealing an ear of wheat from a field was now a capital offence. Two weeks later the government passed a law making speculation in connection with collective-farm trade punishable by five to ten years of imprisonment. Explaining the two laws and their implications, William Strang wrote:

'The first of these decrees is directed ostensibly against 'class-enemies, chiefly kulaks,' the second against speculators. In actual fact, the chief object of the first decree is to put an end to the practice of peasants... who, because they are hungry or afraid for the future, or both, are taking grain produced either by themselves or others and consuming or hiding it. The main purpose of the second... is to prevent collective farms and individual peasants from selling their grain on the open market... Both decrees are dictated by anxiety for the success of the coming grain-collection campaign, which is threatened... by the consuming hunger of the peasants (of which Mr. Cairns' reports of his travels about the country between Western Siberia and the Ukraine bear constant witness), and their determination not to go hungry again next winter if they can help it...'

A few days later E. A. Walker, the first secretary of the embassy, gave a further explanation of the decree against pilferage. Although the decree was ostensibly directed against theft in general, it was being applied only to the theft of food in the countryside, and the Soviet press had listed a number of cases of 'kulaks' stealing grain, especially in Vinnytsia, 'a district in the Ukraine where the conditions of agriculture are unusually unsatisfactory even for the Soviet Union.' 'Where the need and distress is as great as it is in the USSR at the present time,' concluded Walker,

'...a bushel of wheat is indeed precious, and doubtless for that reason the unfortunate population will risk imprisonment or even the death penalty and go to any lengths to get something which can make its life a little less unpleasant,

FUTURE WEATHER FORECAST

The Weather in January

The most important aspect of the weather in January, 1985, over most of North America, is likely to be tremendous variations of temperature. In eastern and central regions, there may be a few mild days in the first week, but very cold weather will prevail for most of the mid-month period, before a gradual warming trend in the last week. In eastern regions, considerable rain is likely around the 6th to 8th, before a sharp cooling trend. Snowfalls are likely in many regions of central and eastern North America around the 10th and again in the period 19th-22nd. Strong winds and snow squalls may create dangerous near-blizzard conditions at times in the Great Lakes region between the 7th and 10th. In western North America, the first week to ten days will be quite cold, with a major storm likely around the 7th-8th (rain in California and Arizona, but heavy snow further north). This cold spell will rapidly give way to several weeks of mild, rainy weather, with the possibility of serious flooding from central California north to British Columbia as the snow pack melts under spring-like warmth and heavy rains around the 19th to 22nd, and major economic dislocations are possible if this flooding inundates parts of the central valley of California. The western warmth will peak with near-record warmth around the 20th and again in the last few days of the month. Strong winds, heavy rains, and severe thunderstorms are likely in the southeastern states around the 7th-8th, 10th-11th, and 20th-21st.

In the British Isles and most of western Europe, January 1985 may start off with severe cold and snow, but a rapid moderation will take place by the 7th, around which date there may be a severe windstorm across Britain, northern France and the North Sea coast, together with a damaging high tidal surge. The weather will likely continue rather mild for most of the month, with another severe storm possible in western Europe around the 20th-21st. In eastern Europe and western Russia, the first half of the month may produce near-record cold, followed by much milder weather after the 10th to the end of the month.

More detailed forecast for all of 1985 available from...

FORECAST MAGAZINE,
PUBLISHED BY **KEEWATIN PRESS**
755 GEORGE STREET NORTH
PETERBOROUGH, ONT., CANADA
K9H 3T2
\$10.00 for 1985 annual
subscription service

or indeed for that matter physically possible.'

Ukrainian Canadians who had returned home and then, finding themselves in the midst of a famine, turned as British subjects to the British Embassy in Moscow, were another source of information for the Foreign Office. A Ukrainian who had lived in Canada for many years complained to the embassy that he had been 'dekulakized' in 1932: his house had been taken, and he and his family were living under the open sky. Another Ukrainian who wrote to beg for help stated that the regime had reduced the working people to 'starvation, barbarity, and even cannibalism.' 'England, save us who are dying of hunger; help us to get rid of the Bolsheviks,' the writer pleaded, and then added in a post-script, 'Oh Mr. Ambassador! We cannot express in a letter all our misery; we are being forced to cannibalism by our "Workers' Government of Desperates"; save us!' Forwarding translations of the letters, Strang commented that the embassy had received 'considerably more of these letters than at any time since the present Mission was established. They become more and more frequent, and it is only a small proportion of the more sane and succinct that we report to you.' He also enclosed specimens of what was being sold as bread:

'...a dark-brown substance which was said to be made for human consumption with the aid of the oil pressed from cattle cake. It seems clear that in most parts of the country the euphemism 'bread' has lost its meaning and is being used to cover these varied forms of doubtful provender.'

And in mid-May 1933, at the height of the famine, Strang apprised Whitehall that the number of unsolicited letters from Soviet correspondents:

'...increases as the economic crisis in this country becomes more acute. In the last week an anonymous letter has been received which opens as follows: "We request you, Mr. Representative, to approach your Government for our protection and with the object of saving the starving people of the USSR, who are living on all kinds of rotten stuff, carrion, marmots and cannibalism," and concludes by declaring that "we are perishing and you are being appealed to by thousands of hungry peasants and workers."

In June 1933, Strang communicated that Soviet citizens were not only writing letters but also visiting the embassy to give information about the famine. One caller, who appeared with 'a large portfolio of documents,'

'...began abruptly by saying that the information he had to offer would be interesting to the Embassy in view of the deterioration of Anglo-Soviet relations. His materials related to the widespread famine which affected certain districts from which he had just returned, and regarding which the world was in utter ignorance. He was then told that the Embassy was not in want of further information, and left with reluctance.'

A correspondent who identified himself as a poor peasant in the Kiev district complained that famine was stalking the land, horses and cattle were dying of hunger, and people were eating dogs. Another letter to the British ambassador revealed that in Ukraine:

'...millions of the population have died from hunger. The population would be glad to eat carrion but there is none to be found. People are... digging up horses that have died from glanders and are eating them, and finally they have not only invented the method of killing and eating each other but also dig up dead bodies and eat them.'

In June 1933, Leslie Pott, the British vice-consul at Leningrad, informed C. C. Farrer, of the Department of Overseas Trade, that although conditions were almost incredibly bad throughout the Soviet Union, he had heard from his German colleagues in Ukraine that conditions there were worse. 'In order to draw him out,' wrote Farrer.

'I asked him whether it was not possible that stories of starvation and famine in South Russia were exaggerated. I said one had even heard guarded allusions to the practice of cannibalism. He said that this was by no means an exaggeration, and though he had not seen it with his own eyes he had heard from residents in South Russia that such practices were occurring sporadically. He said that all the signs seemed to point towards a famine, "only this time there will be no American Relief Mission to save lives." Even then he doubted whether the effect of a few hundred thousands lives being lost would sensibly affect the regime at present in power.'

Still another dispatch in Whitehall's possession was a memorandum by Otto Schiller, the German agricultural attaché in Moscow, who had travelled widely in Ukraine and the North Caucasus in the spring of 1933 and who often shared his information with his British colleagues. 'The famine is not so much the result of last year's failure of crops as of the brutal campaign of State grain collection,' Schiller wrote.

'Therefore even such localities as the Northern districts of North Caucasia in which the crops were quite satisfactory, did not escape...


'In the villages I visited the number of deaths varied between twenty and thirty a day. Those still alive are enfeebled in the extreme through semi-starvation and also by the eating of such unnatural food as grass, roots, charred bones, dead horses etc. And the majority will doubtless die from malaria with the on-come of the warm weather, this disorder having prevailed to an unprecedented extent since last autumn. The typhus which now appears sporadically will probably become an epidemic...

'The villages stricken by famine give an impression of utter hopelessness. The abandoned homes are rapidly falling to ruin... In some villages it is difficult to find one single person from whom to ask directions as to the road... A dog or cat is extremely rarely met with—most of them have been eaten...

'The present situation in the Northern Caucasus may be summed up as follows. In some of the villages the population is almost extinct. In others about half the population have died out. And there are still villages in which death from famine is not so frequent. But famine reigns everywhere, at least in those regions which I have visited.

'A distinctive feature of this famine is that the authorities have not acknowledged, and do not now acknowledge, that famine exists. They even officially deny it. Accordingly, no assistance, either from the State or from benevolent institutions, is afforded.

'The Soviet Government itself does nothing. I was told of many cases of sufferers, swollen from famine, who implored



help from the village soviets. They were told that they should eat the bread which they had got hidden away, and that no famine at all existed. In fact, the authorities explain the present situation by insisting that there is no lack of grain, that the peasants hide it, and it is only a matter of finding it...

'Semi-starvation and extreme privation have during the last few years reduced the demands of the population to such a low ebb, so used have they become to scanty diet, that lives might be saved at very small expense. The distribution of 500 grammes (about a pound) of bread daily, per head would prevent death from starvation... Consequently a million people could be fed, through poorly, upon 100,000 tons of grain from the beginning of the year until the end of July—a million saved from death by starvation. The Soviet Government exported 1,500,000 tons of grain from last year's crop...

'As famine is officially denied by the authorities it follows that there exists no organisation whatsoever, either for dealing with the bodies of those dead from famine, or for succouring those who are awaiting death... One can therefore see bodies of those dead from famine not only on the high-roads, but even in the streets of the towns. It is usually a long time before the bodies are carried away. In [Krasnodar] I saw a corpse lying in the street, which according to my local guide, had been there for the last three days. The truth of his statement was demonstrated by the decomposed condition of the corpse. Grave dangers of epidemics are, without doubt, created in this manner.

'The burial of the victims of famine is conducted in the most primitive fashion. No trouble is taken to identify those found lying in the road, and the bodies are buried on the spot on which they are found. Even in the villages, very often no trouble is taken to convey the dead to the graveyard. They are buried in the courtyards where they have lain...

'One is struck in all the cemeteries by the great number of newly-made graves, and the grave-diggers seem to be always at work. The interments are performed carelessly and unhygienically. In the village of Novopokrovskaya I saw groups of workmen occupied in exhuming the dead who had been buried at a very shallow depth and partly protruded above the surface. The bodies were to be buried now in a deeper, collective grave. In Krasnodar a German living there told me that bodies from which pieces had been cut off to serve as human food had been found.'

The hundreds of thousands of peasants who were 'dekulakized' often ended up at labour camps and construction sites. In August 1933, the British consul in Moscow wrote a memorandum about the conditions at the White Sea Canal Works, where many of the kulaks were worked to death. The memo provided a shocking description of their diet:

'Work was done on the payment by results system, i.e., the amount of rations received depended on the manner [in which] the allotted task was completed. For this purpose the

workers became divided into three classes... Before going to work in the morning at six, a spoonful of cold porridge was served, the size of the spoon being different for each class of worker. Work lasted without a break until four, when it finished for the day. The first class then received 1,300 grammes of bread each, the second 1,000 grammes, and the third 500 grammes. In addition, they received weak fish soup and a little porridge, again according to class, the third class being excluded from the porridge. They also received a small ration of sugar occasionally and some unrecognisable product which was termed "tea..."

'I have seen accounts of worse conditions than these in other labour camps,' commented a member of the Foreign Office staff. 'So far as food is concerned these people seem to be better off than the peasants in Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus.'

In September 1933, the embassy disclosed that the establishment of an 'All-Union Committee on Migration', which was being formed to 'utilize sparsely inhabited, but fertile areas,' indirectly confirmed the enormous famine toll. The reference to sparsely inhabited areas should not be taken to mean that new areas were to be brought under cultivation, explained the embassy. Many farms in those regions where there had been no famine were over-populated and could shed some of their surplus members if room could be found for them elsewhere:

'The fact that the new decree implies that room can now be found [for the new settlers] may be interpreted as a sinister admission of the depopulation resulting from this year's famine. Whether such estimates of famine losses as Dr. Schiller's, namely, between five and ten million deaths in the present year, are reliable or not there is no doubt that many villages are entirely depopulated, and I have heard from other travellers that it is not uncommon to find villages with a black flag flying at each end of the central street, signifying that none of the population are left as the result of starvation and flight... It may be expected that these [villages] will be selected as the "sparsely inhabited, but fertile areas" to which the Government's migration programme will apply.'

In late August 1933, Edouard Herriot, who had until recently been the prime minister of France and was expected to become prime minister again, made a well-publicized two-week tour of the Soviet Union. Arriving by ship in Odessa, he travelled to Kiev and Kharkiv in Ukraine and Rostov in the North Caucasus. At every stop he visited scientific institutes, museums, factories, cathedrals, children's colonies, and collective farms, where lunches prepared from the produce of the farms were invariably served. He was, of course, being shown Potemkin villages, and many Ukrainians still alive today remember how the streets of their cities were cleared of famine victims, whether dead or alive; priests who had been arrested during an anti-religious campaign were dragged out of prison to help serve Mass; children in orphanages were served meals of chicken and rice which were taken away immediately after Herriot's party had left; and actors were issued folk costumes to play the part of contented collective farmers. From the Soviet point of view, the trip was an unqualified success. Photographed and filmed at every stage of his trip, Herriot waxed enthusiastic to the reporters who were following him about the collectivization of agriculture, and denounced any talk of famine as Nazi

propaganda. The British, however, were not taken in. 'The red carpet which the Soviet Government spread before the feet of its distinguished guests has now become proverbial,' the embassy confided to London,

'...and on this occasion the Soviet authorities were at pains to see that the carpet was of extra width, of splendid texture, of the deepest pile, and most carefully brushed. My German colleagues inform me that their three consuls in the Ukraine reported unanimously that rigorous steps were taken to keep all undesirable elements far removed from the streets and the railway stations through which M. Herriot passed, and that extra rations of food, taken from the army reserve, and even clothes were issued to the townspeople.'

The Foreign Office concurred:

'M. Herriot seems surprisingly gullible. He even informed journalists after he had left Russia, that the reports of famine in the Ukraine were gross libels (though this is no doubt largely explained by the methods of deception practised on him... which are reminiscent of those practised by Potemkin on Catherine II, on her famous journey to the Crimea).'⁸

The despatch that was perhaps most shocking—both because of the information in it and because of the source of that information—was a summary of Walter Duranty's findings during his trip to Ukraine and the North Caucasus in September 1933. The Pulitzer Prize-winning correspondent of the *New York Times*, who consistently pooh-poohed all reports of famine in his articles and did his utmost to convince the American public that Stalin's agricultural experiment was a resounding success, confidentially told the British Embassy that 'Ukraine had been bled white,' that 'the population was exhausted,' and that as many as ten million people may have died from lack of food during the past year. The Foreign Office found the report important enough to circulate it to the King, the Cabinet, and the Dominions, and one official minuted that the estimate of ten million dead was 'horrifying—particularly coming from Mr. Duranty.'⁹

Shortly after Duranty visited the famine regions, William Henry Chamberlin, the Moscow correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Christian Science Monitor*, was also allowed to go. The summary of Chamberlin's findings that London received in October 1933 made it quite clear that whatever the accuracy of Duranty's estimate of mortality the fact of the famine itself was not in question:

'In the Poltava area [Chamberlin] found one commune where there had been no deaths from starvation, but in the villages round about there was no single place without some

8. Robust and expansive, Herriot was known for liking good food and good wine: a 'snack' could consist of soup, two *truites bleues*, a partridge, substantial quantities of vegetables, dessert and cheese, washed down with two bottles of burgundy. He did not forget these pleasures during his trip through Ukraine. Immediately after his return to France the estimable mayor of Lyon had an attack of indigestion which prevented him from attending a meeting and dinner of his party. 'He is suffering,' announced his physician, 'from the effects of too much work, too much travelling and too many banquets.'

9. For more on Duranty and his reporting of the famine see my article 'The Famine the "Times" Couldn't Find', *Commentary*, November 1983.

deaths from starvation... One conclusion he drew was that the food shortage had been used as a weapon against the individual peasants... The worst place he himself saw was the village of Cherkes, near [Bila Tserkva], south of Kiev. In this village most of the houses were empty and dilapidated, and of a former population of 2,000, 640 died and 480 had fled. In a house entered at random in a village near Poltava he found a young girl, who told him that her father was out working and that her mother and four brothers and sisters had died of starvation.. In the Cossack settlements in the Kuban [a region of the North Caucasus] all the dogs and cats had been eaten and the people had even been forced to eat weeds...

'Mr. Chamberlin's own estimate of the number of deaths from starvation or from the effects of undernourishment in the whole Union during the last year is between four and five million, of whom more than two million died in the Ukraine, something less than two million in Kazakstan and half a million in the North Caucasus. Mr. Chamberlin is a cautious and conscientious investigator and his opinion may be accepted with confidence. A common remark made to him by peasants, and on one occasion by a servant girl in a hotel, was that no imperialist war had ever cost so many lives as this year's famine...

'Mr. Chamberlin says that there is no doubt at all that famine was general in Ukraine this last year. This fact was confirmed to him at station after station on his journey through the country. Nor is there any doubt that the North Caucasus is a semi-devastated region which would almost have to be re-colonized.'

Again, Whitehall accepted Chamberlin's findings without reservations (and found them important enough to circulate to the King, the Cabinet, and the Dominions). As a senior Foreign Office official put it, 'This is, to my mind, the most reliable summing up of the situation in the USSR as regards the famine and as regards this year's harvest that we have received. On both these points it fits in with our reports from other sources.'

These and hundreds of other documents bearing on the famine in the Foreign Office files—I have quoted only a small sample of the despatches concerning the famine that London received—leave no doubt that the British government knew in great detail what was happening in Ukraine in 1932 and 1933. I shall discuss what Whitehall made of this information and how it responded to appeals for relief in my next article.

— MARCO CARYNNYK



The IDLER

Number Two

FEBRUARY 1985

\$2.25 the copy

A QUIET GENOCIDE

by MARCO CARYNNYK

ELEVEN POEMS

by KENNETH SHERMAN

A YELLOW AURA

by B. W. POWE

TEACHING 'PEACE'

by KENNETH H. W. HILBORN

LIVING LONGER

by JOSEPH ADDISON




*THE IDLER'S
NOTEBOOK*

TWO VIEWS OF T. S. ELIOT

His Idea of a Christian Society—by HENRY JEVON

His Debt to Sherlock Holmes—by FRANK ZINGRONE

The IDLER'S Notebook



*A man can go three days without food, but
without poetry, Never! — BAUDELAIRE*

We have received an assortment of comments and suggestions in the wake of our first number (January 1985), and the first wave of what we hope will become a Fundy tide of Letters to the Editor. These we will begin to publish, next month. May we thank the various men and women who have taken time from their busy lives to advise *The IDLER*, especially those who, whether or not their comments were sweet, enclosed cheques for their subscriptions.

Only a very few have written to tell us where to get off. This is disappointing, for the editors of a new paper need a more or less steady supply of abuse in order to become smug, superior, and happy. The man who is never insulted for what he does, lives constantly with the apprehension that he may be an amateur, a mere dilettante. Special thanks are due, in this regard, to the feminists who wrote to complain about the use of such sexist expressions as 'the estate of man', and 'man is a free agent', in our subscription flyer. Our favourite read is follows:

To the Editor of the IDLER,

Does your market research show that women do not love 'language, wit, knowledge'. Your subscription blurb rather unwisely excludes more than one-half of the population—undoubtedly a potential hefty source of subscription revenue.

It is indeed unfortunate that in your attempt to evoke the burnished glow of the past in the pages of your magazine, you have demonstrated all the myopic insufficiencies of days gone by. As for myself, along with a number of other possible readers, I can only assume that your editorial policy rejects the notion that women have something to say or to contribute to society.

You will *not* find a cheque enclosed for my subscription. *I am, Sir, &c.*

The correspondent in question received from the editor(s) his/her 'their standard response':

To the Critic of the IDLER,

Thank you for your letter of the twenty-first. Our market research—insufficient as it may be—suggests just the opposite. Women *do* love 'language, wit, knowledge' in about the same small proportion as men—several have actually subscribed to our paper. And our instinct tells us, that women who

love language, wit, and knowledge best, refuse to be patronized at the expense of the English language. Indeed, one such woman wrote the flyer in question. *Yours in charity & peace, &c.*

Several correspondents asked for more information on our writers. As none of these correspondents were tax collectors, or policemen, we have decided to reveal all. Among this month's contributors . . .

KENNETH SHERMAN is the author of three books of verse, *Snake Music* (1978), *The Cost of Living* (1981), and *Words for Elephant Man* (1983). His next will be *The Last Disappearing Act*. He teaches in the General Studies Department of Sheridan College, somewhere west of Toronto.


HENRY JEVON, who styles himself 'a Canadian errant', has written *The Vision of Edmund Waller*, *Death in the English Hymnal*, and a manual on yachting. He is the co-author, with Roy Wendell, of *Bishop Houdly and the 'Sixties*, 'an essay in cultural anthropology, or rather, in the sort of culture that goes with a certain type of anthropology.' He teaches English in the Western Australia Institute of Technology, at Perth.

FRANK ZINGRONE is a professor of communication at York University. He is the author of *Traces* (a book of verse), and of many delightful rambles through modern literature. He wishes to thank Joe Keogh, literary sleuth *par excellence*, for giving the impetus to his present article, in 'one of those irretrievable literary lunches.'

MARCO CARYNNYK, born to Ukrainian parents in a Berlin air raid shelter towards the end of the last World War, is the editor and translator of several works by Soviet dissidents, notably *History's Carnival*, by Leonid Plyushch, and *Institute of Fools*, by Victor Nekipelov. He has translated Alexander Dovzhenko's *The Poet as Filmmaker*, and is a poet himself, whose recent work includes *Kolovorot* ('A Maclström'), a long, cyclical piece in the Ukrainian language. For the last five years his book on the famine of 1932-3, *The Years of the Hungry Horse*, has been in progress.

KENNETH H. W. HILBORN is an authority on the history of this unpleasant century. He teaches courses on international relations and totalitarianism in the University of Western Ontario, and has written for various publications, including (the cessated) *Canada Month*, *International Perspectives*, *Human Events*, and daily newspapers.

BRUCE W. POWE has, since the age of sixteen, been writing essays, reviews, stories, and polemics, and is a regular contributor to the esteemed *Antigonish Review*. His recent



book, *A Climate Charged*, sent mild shockwaves through the Canadian literary establishment, with its thoughtful reassessment of such major reputations as those of Frye, Cohen, Laurence, Atwood, etc.

JOSEPH ADDISON: our apologies if you can read us now.

Among last month's writers:

PAUL YOUNG is a Toronto-based visual ('as opposed to high-wire') artist, who teaches at the Ontario College of Art. He is also a musician, and an avid listener to recorded music, whose floors support a 'smallish' collection of some eight thousand record albums.

THE DOGS THAT DID NOT BARK

THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES & THE FAMINE OF 1932-3 PART TWO

III.



THROUGHOUT the early 1930s, I wrote last month, the British government was receiving from its embassy in Moscow detailed reports about the genocidal famine that was sweeping Ukraine and the North Caucasus. Previously unstudied documents at the Public Record Office in London leave no doubt that Whitehall appreciated the geographic extent and causes of the famine. Although it often used such dangerously vague

phrases as 'large areas of the Soviet Union' or 'the south of Russia', the Foreign Office was aware that the famine was centred in Ukraine and the North Caucasus. And although it sometimes revealed a confusion about the nature of the famine by referring to it as an unforeseen consequence of Soviet agricultural policy, the Foreign Office also understood that the famine was man-made—the result of a deliberate policy of confiscating grain—and thus entirely preventable. 'As Tacitus' Romans "made a solitude, and called it peace," so the Soviet Government have made a famine, and called it communism,' wrote Laurence Collier, the head of the Northern Department at the Foreign Office, after he had read a report of a visit to the famine regions by the Canadian wheat expert Andrew Cairns.

Moreover, Whitehall was keen to have more information about the famine than its embassy in Moscow was providing. In May 1933, I reported, British diplomats turned away a young man who had brought a portfolio of documents about the famine, on the grounds that they had all the information they needed. To the credit of the Foreign Office, Sir Robert Vansittart, the permanent undersecretary of state, instructed his staff to reprimand the embassy for discouraging such informants. On 4 September 1933, the Foreign Office drew the attention of the embassy to articles about the famine that had appeared in British papers and commented:

'The adverse reports in the majority of the papers here are of course denied by the *Daily Worker* and such-like, but while we realize that the existence of famine conditions in parts of Russia may not necessarily imply a bad harvest, we think that the evidence goes to show that the harvest in many parts of the country has been far less satisfactory than the Soviet authorities anticipated. —and that not only on account of defective machinery and arrangements. In the Ukraine, of course, it is admitted to have been most unsatisfactory . . .

'It is important to us to have as accurate and unbiased information as possible on this subject, and while we fully appreciate how difficult it is for you to furnish us with much information

from sources other than Soviet official reports and press articles, we are always glad of anything giving the other side of the picture that you can get—e.g. periodical summaries or extracts from letters written by Soviet citizens . . . or reports of interviews with Soviet visitors to the Embassy . . .

'Vansittart recently asked why the two visitors . . . were turned away, and pointed out that it is the legitimate business of the Embassy to learn all it can, when information is volunteered; any risk involved is, after all, run by the informant. The fact that such visitors are not frequent makes it all the more desirable to hear what they have to say when they do turn up.

'We shall therefore be glad if you (and His Majesty's Consulates) will make the most of every opportunity for supplementing official reports as to conditions in the Soviet Union; and we need hardly add that we should welcome your own comments or estimate of the true state of affairs—whether in the matter of the harvest, famine, industrial conditions, or whatever it may be . . .

The last sentence is revealing. Even when they sought more facts about the famine, the bureaucrats at the Foreign Office did not think those facts to be of exceptional interest or importance. Harvest, famine, industrial conditions, or whatever it may be—it was all grist for the millstones of intelligence to grind to a fine, grey powder. Men are accomplices. George Steiner observed about Gentiles and the Holocaust, to that which leaves them indifferent.

IV. WHAT WHITEHALL DID

THE first relief organization to express its concern for the victims of the Ukrainian famine was the Save the Children Fund. In August 1933, L. B. Golden, the general secretary of the fund, turned to the Foreign Office for advice. The fund had been receiving reports about the famine both from the press and from private letters. Yet the Soviet embassy in London had assured the fund that the harvest was a "bumper one". The fund had no intention of embarrassing the British government by issuing an appeal for donations after the Soviet government had denied the existence of famine, but Golden thought that Moscow might be forced to acknowledge the existence of the famine during the coming winter and asked for an opportunity to discuss the matter with someone familiar with the question. The Foreign Office urged the fund to remain silent. 'The line to take,' an official recommended, 'is that, while information available here tends to confirm that famine conditions exist in some parts of Russia, there can be no question of issuing an appeal unless and until the Soviet authorities admit that conditions merit such assistance.' No such Soviet admission ever came, of course. Instead, at the end of the famine year Soviet President Mikhail Kalinin scurrilously attacked the relief organizations that had tried to do something about the famine. 'Political impostors ask contributions for the "starving" of Ukraine,' he declared. 'Only degraded disintegrating classes can produce such cynical elements.'

The first organization to appeal on behalf of the victims of the famine was the European Federation of Ukrainians Abroad, in Brussels, which in September 1933 submitted a memorandum about the famine and asked London to urge the Soviet government to permit a relief operation. The plea was not answered. 'No particulars of this organization can be traced,' a Whitehall official minuted. 'While the deplorable account which it gives of conditions in Ukraine is no doubt largely true, it is anti-Soviet in complexion and I presume that we can only ignore its appeal.' A second official concurred: 'As long as the Soviet Government continue

to deny the existence of famine conditions in Ukraine and the North Caucasus they will certainly refuse to accept any representation of the kind suggested.'

In July 1933, Ukrainians in Western Ukraine, which was then a part of Poland, formed a committee to organize relief for their fellow Ukrainians in the Soviet Union. The committee turned, naturally, to the League of Nations, the highest international body in the interwar period, and in September 1933 sent delegates to Geneva to lobby the League to place the famine on its agenda. Ukrainians in Canada and the United States, the delegates announced, were ready to offer food to their starving brothers, if the League would make it possible to transport and distribute the food under international supervision. The Ukrainians' chances of getting a member of the League to place the famine on the agenda were slim: the League's charter forbade it to discuss issues that concerned non-members or to become involved in the 'internal affairs' of any state. And indeed, the Council at first refused to consider the appeal.

Fortunately for the Ukrainians, the president of the Council was the Norwegian diplomat Johann Mowinkel. As the representative of a country that was not involved in the great-power game and was proud of the tradition of humanitarian aid established by Fritjof Nansen, who had organized the League's relief campaign for Russia during the famine of 1921, Mowinkel circumvented the procedural restrictions by submitting the Ukrainian appeal not to a full meeting of the Council but to what was described, with fastidious delicacy, as a private consultation between members of the Council. After a long and heated discussion—some members were reluctant to turn down flatly a humanitarian proposal—the Council decided to tell the petitioners that the only course open to them was an appeal to the International Red Cross. The advice was of no practical use. The Red Cross promptly asked Moscow whether it would allow a relief operation in Ukraine, and Moscow replied, not unexpectedly, that there was no famine and no relief was needed. When the British delegation to Geneva, which had not supported the petition in the Council, forwarded to London the papers that Mowinkel had circulated, the Foreign Office concluded that 'in the circumstances, no other action at Geneva was possible, and none seems possible here.'

Having failed to persuade Western governments and the League of Nations to take action, Ukrainians began to search for allies among influential Britons. In September and October 1933 representatives of the Save the Children Fund, the Federation of Jewish Organizations, and the Society of Friends, as well as several Ukrainians who had been in Geneva, held meetings in London to discuss how they might organize relief. On 27 October, a delegation consisting of Colonel Cecil Malone, a prominent Labour MP, and Mrs. Christie and Miss Nike, who had years of experience in Quaker relief work, visited Collier in the hope of enlisting the help of the British government in persuading Moscow to allow a relief mission to enter Ukraine.

Collier pointed out that Moscow would not permit any foreign organization to conduct relief in the USSR. It had expelled Quaker relief workers without giving a reason, and it had even made it difficult to provide aid for British subjects in the Soviet Union. But the chief obstruction was that two Ukrainian members of the Romanian Parliament and the manager of the Ukrainian Bureau in London were connected with the scheme. 'Anything to do with Ukrainian nationalism at the present moment was like a red tag to a bull to the Soviet authorities,' said Collier, and the Ukrainian involvement in the effort 'would in itself be

enough to damn it from their point of view. In these circumstances I could not hold out any hope that H.M.G. would interest themselves in the scheme in any way.'

Ukrainian Canadians were not far behind their fellow Ukrainians in Europe in the effort to draw attention to the famine. In October 1933, the Ukrainian National Council in Canada, which had just been formed in Winnipeg, addressed a plea to British Prime Minister J. Ramsay MacDonald. Citing the thousands of letters that were reaching Canada from Ukraine, the Council pointed out that the systematic starvation of the population was caused not by crop failure, but by Moscow's policy of confiscating the farmers' grain, and begged MacDonald 'to arrange for an immediate neutral investigation of the famine situation in Ukraine, with a view to organizing international relief.' Similar appeals came from Ukrainians in Ward, Manitoba, who complained about 'the maltreatment of the Ukrainian people in Ukraine and the North Caucasus by the Russian Bolshevik government'; from Ukrainians in Oshawa, Ontario, who voiced their 'strongest protest against the Soviet Government, which by its policy of ruthless grain collections from the starving population of Ukraine aggravates and prolongs the conditions of famine and starvation'; from Ukrainians in Thorold, Ontario, who passed a resolution charging Moscow with adopting a policy of starvation, deportation to the Far North, and wholesale massacre; and from Ukrainians in Windsor, Ontario, who begged the civilized world to prevail upon the Soviet government to cease its policy of starving the population of Ukraine.

After a *pro forma* consultation with the Dominions Office, the Foreign Office instructed the British High Commissioner in Ottawa to brush away these appeals. In February 1934, many months after the worst of the famine was over, the British High Commissioner replied to the Ukrainian organizations in Canada, repeating almost word for word the text drafted in London:

'His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are unable to undertake any action with a view to investigating conditions in territories under the control of the Soviet Government, or to organizing relief for the inhabitants in the absence of any indication that such action would be acceptable to the Soviet Government.'

In Britain, undaunted by the government's coolness to their efforts, the Federation of Jewish Relief Organizations, the Society of Friends, and the Save the Children Fund proceeded with their relief plans and in December 1933 proposed to establish a joint relief committee. To be known as the 'United British Appeal', the committee would raise



money to purchase food for the starving, 'irrespective of nationality or creed,' through Torgsin, the Soviet shops in which food was always available, even at the height of the famine, to those who could pay with hard currency or gold. Forwarding the committee's draft constitution to the Foreign Office, Malone wrote that it planned to cooperate with the Ukrainian Bureau in London and asked to be informed about Whitehall's opinion of the bureau. Whitehall again discouraged the relief effort. The chief activity of the Ukrainian Bureau, the Foreign Office complained in its reply, was the issue of bulletins in which it protested against the

treatment of Ukrainians by the Polish and Soviet governments. In view of the bureau's attitude towards two governments with which Britain was in 'normal relations,' the Foreign Office did 'not have much to do with it.'

A man who had been trying almost singlehandedly to draw public attention to the famine was Ewald Ammende, a Baltic German who had worked briefly for the government of independent Estonia before devoting himself to humanitarian work. Perhaps because of his place of birth and background, Ammende was keenly interested in the national minorities whose dispersal throughout Eastern Europe was a major political problem of the interwar period, and he was for some years the secretary general of the new forgotten European Nationalities Congress. Ammende became aware of the danger of famine in the Soviet Union as early as December 1929, when he predicted a severe food crisis and urged humanitarian organizations to cooperate with the Red Cross in establishing a relief plan. In June 1933, when the famine was at its peak and prompt aid might have saved innumerable lives (and when the Canadian prairies and the American Midwest were suffering from a glut of grain, and ships which could have brought that grain to Black Sea ports in a few weeks were laid up unoccupied), Ammende published an account of the famine together with suggestions for ways to end it. And in December 1933, when Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna established an Interconfessional and International Relief Committee for the Famine Areas in the Soviet Union, Ammende became its secretary general.

(In *Human Life in Russia*, first published in German in 1934 and then, in English, by Allen & Unwin in 1936, Ammende summarized the information about the famine that he had gathered as the secretary of the committee. The book went virtually unrecognized. Its message that the Soviet government was systematically exploiting famine in order to destroy certain categories of people simply could not penetrate either the indifference that is the usual response to news of a catastrophe in a remote and benighted corner of the world, or the good will that Stalin was enjoying among intellectuals. The few reviews that did appear were respectful but sceptical, and the book almost immediately passed from public view — with help, it is said, from the Soviet embassy in London, which bought up all the copies in the bookshops and then pressured the publisher to prevent a reprint. The book has just been reissued by John T. Zubal, Inc., in Cleveland, and the Foundation to Commemorate the 1933 Ukrainian Famine in Montreal.)

In May 1934, Ammende set out for Britain, the United States, and Canada to obtain support for the committee from governments, churches, and humanitarian organizations. On 16 May, Ammende and Fritz Dittloff, the former manager of the German agricultural concession Drusag in the North Caucasus, visited the Foreign Office. Ammende explained that he was in England on a humanitarian mission—to arouse public opinion to the famine so that pressure could be put on the Soviet government either to allow relief to be sent or itself to take measures to alleviate the famine. He had already interviewed various prominent people who had 'shown themselves sympathetic but had been anxious to make sure that he was not contemplating a political movement against the Soviet Government.' Ammende had assured them that he had no such intention. Indeed, when the Duchess of Atholl (who had arranged the interview at the Foreign Office) had suggested a boycott of Soviet grain, Ammende had rejected the idea because it would introduce political prejudice into the case.

Dittloff, when it was his turn to speak, described the situa-

tion in Ukraine and the North Caucasus: the government was deporting villagers to Siberia or was driving them into the wilderness to starve. This 'wholesale deportation and expulsion,' which was being used not only for economic reasons but also to remove political suspects and clergymen, had reduced the population of the North Caucasus in two years by two million persons. The reduction in the population of Ukraine must have been proportionate.

Ammende then said that he had come to the Foreign Office both to lay the facts before the British government and to determine whether it objected to the campaign that he was undertaking. Whitehall did not presume to encourage or discourage any purely humanitarian movement, Collier replied disingenuously. Being, 'rightly or wrongly, in normal relations with the Soviet government,' it would not officially help Ammende. On the other hand, it would not prevent him from conducting public meetings or publishing articles. This was small beer indeed, but Ammende replied graciously that the position was satisfactory to him.

Ammende asked in conclusion whether Britain, as a member of the League of Nations Council, could not make its vote for admission of the Soviet Union to the League 'conditional on some assurances on matters of humanitarian concern, such as famine relief.' Collier deftly brushed the question away. It had no actuality at present, he explained. If a member of the Council did propose to admit the Soviet Union, it would probably be France, and the question should therefore be addressed to the French Foreign Office. Ammende replied diplomatically that this was the answer that he had expected, and he and Dittloff took their leave, 'apparently much relieved that no obstacles were to be placed in the way of their campaign.'

Collier was not being entirely straightforward when he assured Ammende of the British government's neutrality on the question of a public relief campaign. The day before his meeting with Ammende, Collier had had a visit from Mrs. Christie, the treasurer of the Russian Assistance Fund, as the reconstituted United British Appeal was now known. Mrs. Christie explained that she had been collecting money to send parcels through Torgsin to people in Ukraine whose names were known to the fund. Now Ammende and other persons who were interested not only in famine relief but also in 'propaganda to enlighten world opinion of the true conditions in the Soviet Union' were urging her to join with them in a series of public meetings to stir the public. Mrs. Christie felt uneasy in her conscience when she saw how little the average person realized the true state of affairs, and had come to ask Collier's advice on what she should say to Ammende. Collier made it clear that she would do best to shun publicity. 'I told Mrs. Christie,' he minuted later.

... that as a Government official I had no *locus standi* for giving her advice on such a subject, and that in any case the Foreign Office, being a Department of a Government which was, rightly or wrongly, in normal relations with the Soviet Government, could not give any official encouragement to propaganda directed against that Government's actions. What I could and would do, however, as a private person, was to put the position before her as I saw it and let her decide for herself. It seemed to me that her course of action depended upon which of two alternative objects she wished to aim at—either to relieve individual suffering or to arouse public opinion here to a realization of the general conditions which had produced that suffering—for in present circumstances the two objects were unfortunately incompatible. As far as I could see, there was no likelihood that any amount of agitation in this country would alter the present agri-

cultural policy of the Soviet Government which had brought about these famine conditions, while there was every likelihood that such agitation would cause the Soviet Government to interfere with her present relief work.'

Whitehall practiced a similar policy of seeming impartiality when the question of the famine was brought up in Parliament. In July 1934, drawing on information provided by Malcolm Muggeridge and Ewald Ammende, Lord Charnwood gave notice that he would be asking a question about the famine in the House of Lords. According to information circulated in England, he wrote, the systematic policy of the Soviet government had caused widespread starvation among the population of the grain-producing areas. Did the British government have information to confute this allegation? The reply that the Foreign Office prepared for the government's use in Parliament was characteristically opaque:

'1. It is not His Majesty's Government's business to enter into controversy on the subject of the internal affairs of foreign countries; their information is not collected for this purpose and there are, therefore, no papers suitable for laying which bear on Lord Charnwood's arguments on the subject of living conditions and food supplies in the Soviet Union.

'2. His Majesty's Government are familiar with the information published about food supplies and conditions in the agricultural districts of the Soviet Union which have doubtless given rise to Lord Charnwood's question . . . His Majesty's Government have no material for contradicting this information except what has been published through Soviet official sources which is generally available and upon which people can form their own opinions.

'3. If it is unavoidable to enter into the substance of Lord Charnwood's allegations, it might be pointed out that apart from facts, Lord Charnwood has made judgments of cause and effect. His Majesty's Government have no reasons to defend Soviet economic policy, which, as a policy of control and planning, is presumably more responsible than any other Government's policy for conditions in the country in which it is practised, whatever people's judgments of those conditions may be. But there is no information to support Lord Charnwood's apparent suggestion that the Soviet Government have pursued a policy of deliberate impoverishment of agricultural districts of their country, whether or not their policy is considered to have had that effect.

'4. The diversion of supplies from the countryside for whatever purpose naturally leaves less available for the producers, but His Majesty's Government have no information to bear out the arguments of Lord Charnwood in which he emphasized the effect of particular measures in this respect.'

In a covering note, the author of these meticulously worded generalizations, equivocations, and evasions explained that Charnwood's motion put the government in the position of 'either defending the internal policy of the Soviet Government, which we have no reason for doing, or making unfavourable statements about conditions in the Soviet Union, which are also open to objection, however richly they are deserved.' It was true, the writer conceded, that Soviet policy had had a 'deplorable effect on conditions in the agricultural part of the Soviet Union by dislocating the former system of production' and that grain had been exported when starvation existed in the grain-producing areas. Nevertheless, he concluded, it was preferable 'to deal with the facts behind Lord Charnwood's arguments as little as possible.'

The subsequent debate in the House of Lords, which

took place on 25 July 1934, was inconclusive. The Archbishop of Canterbury and the Earl of Denbigh supported Charnwood, but government members tried to block the discussion first on points of parliamentary procedure (the undesirability of discussing the internal affairs of another country), and then on the grounds that those who wanted to talk about the famine in Ukraine were not noticeably eager to examine oppression in Germany, or poverty in England. The greatest obstacle, however, was the government's insistence, enunciated by Lord Stanhope, the parliamentary undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, that it had no information about the famine beyond what had been published. Little could be gained by sharply questioning Whitehall's foreign policy, and Charnwood quickly withdrew his motion.

The Foreign Office was less reluctant to deal with the facts about the famine when British interests were at stake. At the same time as the Parliamentary debate was taking place, a British civil servant in India named C. C. Garbett was writing to Vansittart to complain that Communists were subverting the peasants of the Punjab. Did London have any figures about the famine—how many people had perished, how many homeless children there were, what the cost of food was—that could be used to counter this subversion? In reply, the Foreign Office forwarded ten of the most revealing despatches that it had received from Moscow, including the summaries of Walter Duranty's and William Henry Chamberlin's tours of Ukraine in the autumn of 1933 that I quoted in my previous article. Collier explained in a covering letter that the statistics about the famine that Garbett sought were not readily available:

'The Soviet government, of course, do not publish any figures showing how many people have perished by famine, and they put every obstacle in the way of such figures being estimated by other people . . . I think, however, that the attached copies of Foreign Office print (which are of course highly confidential and should be kept in the safe used for similar confidential papers belonging to the Political Secretariat of the Government of India) may be of some assistance to you—in particular, Lord Chikston's despatches . . . which throw a lurid light on the "cost of living" question, and Mr. Strang's despatches . . . in which you will find estimates by two competent journalists of the numbers of people who had died in last year's famine . . .'

Two months later, Garbett thanked Collier for the despatches, which had supplied exactly the information he had wanted. 'Now, thanks to you, I have the facts and greater confidence in our own counter-measures.' The documents, Garbett continued, would be treated 'with the secrecy you desire . . . I am not keeping any copy of this letter—merely the reference—and the shorthand notes will be burnt.'

The desultory efforts to provide at least a modicum of relief dragged on for another year. In late August 1934, the Duchess of Atholl, the most persistent British lobbyist for the famine victims, forwarded to the Foreign Office a memorandum written by Fritz Dittloff, as well as statements by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Reverend J. H. Rushbrooke, the general secretary of the Baptist World Alliance, and once again raised the question of making British consent to the Soviet Union's entry into the League of Nations conditional on the cessation of food exports and the permission of famine relief, particularly since, as the Duchess argued, the Soviet government might now be more willing to admit the famine than it had been a year or two ago. Simon's reply to the Duchess was polite but firm:

My information does not, I am afraid, confirm the view, which you express in your letter, that the Soviet Government are any more disposed to provide facilities for comprehensive and organized relief work than they have been hitherto....

I fear... that it is not possible to relate the question of Soviet candidature for the League with any questions of internal Soviet policy. There is little doubt that any attempt to attach conditions to Soviet membership of the League of Nations, even if it



were technically possible, would result in the abandonment by the Soviet Government of their candidature and the consequent sacrifice of the international objects which we believe that Soviet membership would serve, without any advantage being secured.'

Much of the information proffered by the various relief groups that were lobbying the Foreign Office was forwarded to the British embassy in Moscow for comment. In September 1934, Lord Chilston, who had replaced Ovey as a British ambassador in 1933, responded to a query about the information received from Ammende and about the efficacy of the Russian Assistance Fund, making it clear that he was in favour of 'discouraging any diversion of British charity into Russian channels.' The amount of food sent to Ukraine by the Russian Assistance Fund, Chilston pointed out correctly, could not materially alleviate the famine. He then offered the curious argument that there was no famine at all, because in the past six months the USSR had exported 472,000 tons of grain, 123,000 tons of which had gone to the United Kingdom, as well as large quantities of butter, eggs, poultry, bacon, and fish. Moreover, he claimed, British relief was an affront to the Soviet Union:

'I am not confident that all the food parcels reach their destination, and even though it is possible that the Soviet Government may put up with the scheme on account of their need of foreign exchange it is also possible that they may regard it as an insult to their powers of organization and distribution. I am tempted to ask what the organizers of the Charity Fund would say if the USSR returned the compliment by sending parcels of food for "the starving poor" in England?'

The ambassador's position puzzled the Foreign Office. 'Does Lord Chilston really think that there is now no famine, or no prospect of famine, in the Soviet Union because grain is being exported?' Collier mused.

'Certainly we have no illusions here about relief schemes for

Russia, but what was in effect in the visits of Dr. Ammende etc. was not their relief schemes but their information on conditions in the Ukraine, etc. Lord Chilston, however, makes no comment on that—presumably because he has no means of checking it.'

In February 1935, Ewald Ammende renewed his campaign in England. On 11 February, after a conference in London at which Ammende talked to church organizations about the threat of a new famine and the need to avoid a repetition of the tragedy of 1933, the Reverend J. H. Rushbrooke saw Simon to express his concern about 'the spread of famine actual and prospective' in Ukraine. The discussion led to no definite result, and Simon merely promised to ask Chilston for more information. 'I think it most improbable that a famine on the scale of 1933, or anything like it, is to be expected,' Chilston replied to Simon on 20 February.

'The 1934 harvest was probably about the same as that of 1933; and grain exports were sixteen percent less than in 1933, in which year they were small enough.... As to the reaction of the Soviet Government to any relief, I am still of the opinion... that they might regard any offer as an insult to their internal organization. They certainly, in any case, would not facilitate relief.'

A month later, when it became known that Anthony Eden, then Lord Privy Seal, would be visiting Moscow to discuss European security, British church organizations again approached the Foreign Office to explain the difficulties that they encountered when they tried to send food and medication to the Soviet Union. The churches had drawn up a list of points for Whitehall to press in its negotiations with Moscow—abolishing custom duties on parcels of food, medication and warm clothing, for example—but Rushbrooke presented the list almost apologetically. He was not requesting action but only seeking information, and he would be grateful if Eden simply mentioned the matter to the British ambassador. Eden took the churches' points with him to Moscow, but did not discuss them there even with the ambassador, let alone the Soviet government. The British relief campaign for Ukraine had petered out.

V. WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?

THUS the sordid pattern of appeasement and complicity in carnage was set. An artificial famine—wholly man-made, wholly preventable—had killed six million people, and the British government—informed from beginning to end about the course and consequences of the famine—had not only failed to speak out, but had discouraged the few weak and belated efforts to provide aid that were made. At a time when a bold, generous, and far-seeing gesture was desperately needed, Whitehall refused to face up to a dictator and allowed the question of the famine to sink into a morass of political and economic self-interest. The victims of the famine in Ukraine were consigned to their slow and agonizing deaths as surely as the Jews of Europe were delivered to the planners of the Final Solution less than a decade later, when once again democratic governments maintained 'normal relations' and cooperated in suppressing a genocide. Fifty years ago, as London reasoned, 'normal relations' required silence in the face of mass murder; today, at least as the Soviet government argues, the Helsinki Accords and the nuclear threat make it impermissible even to mention the famine of 1933, let alone demand a full accounting. *Realpolitik* has not changed. The slaughter of millions of innocents continues to be condoned.

—MARCO CARVNYK

D

'Famine reports exaggerated'

Bohdan Nahaylo

Fifty years ago this week a memorable series of articles appeared in the *Manchester Guardian*. At a time when George Bernard Shaw and the Webbs were hailing the Soviet Union as a 'New Civilisation' and cultivating the pro-Stalin climate that was to produce traitors like Philby and Blunt, the newspaper's correspondent Malcolm Muggeridge struck a markedly discordant note. In an exclusive, eye-witness account of the man-made famine which had gripped Ukraine and the North Caucasus, he revealed the terror Stalin had unleashed against the peasantry as part of the drive to collectivise agriculture. The Soviet Union has never fully recovered from the damage caused by this disaster: Muggeridge, profoundly influenced by what he saw, was changed for life.

The young Muggeridge and his wife Kitty, the niece of Beatrice Webb, went to Moscow in September 1932 believing that capitalism and the parliamentary system had broken down and that Soviet communism was the way of the future. 'My going to Moscow as a journalist was simply a subterfuge,' he recalls. 'I had in fact already offered my services as a teacher to the Soviet state.' The Muggeridges fully intended eventually to exchange their British passports for Soviet ones and to settle in the land of 'hope and exhilaration'.

But the secular 'God' that later was to fail Koestler, Gide and numerous other zealots, disappointed Muggeridge almost immediately. His diary became a chronicle of disillusion. He was struck by 'the gloominess of Soviet Russia', 'the heavy hand of iron theory crushing out the lives of people' and the incessant propaganda and official deceitfulness. Before the year was out, he noted, 'I don't care how soon I leave Russia.'

On his arrival Moscow was buzzing with unofficial reports about famine in the most fertile regions of the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet press provided some details about local difficulties, the authorities were at pains to suppress information about the existence of widespread hunger and starvation. The capital's contingent of foreign journalists discussed among themselves the disturbing news reaching them daily, but for the most part cabled their newspapers that the harvests were good and that reports of famine were exaggerated. Typically, Muggeridge's colleague, Walter Duranty of the *New York Times*, estimated in private that some seven million people had starved to death, but wrote a series of dispatches pooh-poohing the famine and was subsequently awarded the Pulitzer Prize. Of all the correspon-

dents, only Muggeridge had the initiative to go and see for himself.

With surprising ease he got on to a train and headed south for the restricted areas. To his horror he discovered that the famine was not due to any natural catastrophes, but the result of a deliberate and planned campaign to starve the peasants into submission. 'A state of war, a military occupation' existed in the desolate countryside. 'The fields are neglected and full of weeds,' he wrote. 'No cattle are to be seen anywhere, and few horses; only the military and the GPU are well fed, the rest of the population obviously starving, obviously terrorised.' Both in Ukraine and the North Caucasus, 'the grain collection has been carried out with such thoroughness and brutality that the peasants are now quite without bread. Thousands of them have

been exiled; in certain cases whole villages have been sent to the North for forced labour.'

It was not until later that the enormous scale of this 'administrative famine', as Muggeridge called it, became known. In Ukraine, formerly known as the granary of Europe, the population was literally decimated between 1932 and 1933. Here collectivisation was pursued with a ruthlessness unmatched anywhere else in the USSR. The war against individual peasant agriculture became simultaneously an offensive aimed at destroying the social basis of Ukrainian nationalism. While Moscow continued exporting wheat at competitive prices, at least six million Ukrainians starved to death. Bearing in mind also those who died in the North Caucasus and along the Volga, it is not surprising that Stalin himself hinted to Churchill that as many as ten million might have perished.

During his travels in Ukraine, Muggeridge had a remarkable religious experience. In Kiev he stumbled upon a packed church in which an Orthodox service was in progress. The theme, he remembers, was: 'Our situation is hopeless. Only God can help us.' The zeal and faith of the believers

Anthony Blunt

John McEwen

Anthony Blunt has a special significance for the *Spectator*, since he regularly contributed an art column to its pages between 1933 and 1938. The chief fascination of these reviews today is to see to what extent, if at all, they betray his treacherous intentions, already under way, against this country. On the whole it is surprising to find how consistently he lets his anti-English and anti-capitalist feelings be known. Two themes predominate: the English are no good at art, because of their essentially 'literary' approach. Art that deals with the 'realist' aspects of life, the sufferings of the poor etc, depicted with no hint of sentimentality, is always to be preferred to anything that smacks of 'decadence', of pleasure for pleasure's sake. He comes over, in other words, as the bleakest of Puritans — an attitude declared from the outset. In the issue for this weekend 50 years ago, for instance, he reveres Courbet for 'his generally serious outlook and his avoidance of frivolous subjects in favour of a sober restrained technique', and concludes with the comforting thought that 'perhaps we are soon due for another period of austerity'.

In those days he was paid £1.10 or £2.00 per article, as opposed to high-fliers like Graham Greene who could already command six guineas a time. Perhaps even this contributed to his identification with the

'working man', as he invariably calls him. But it is in his final three columns in 1939 that Blunt most clearly expressed his role as a critic and hence his philosophy in general. This valedictory was entitled 'Standards', and a passage in the second of its three parts seems particularly worth quoting: 'A proper analysis of the historical situation which dominated the production of a painting will first enable the critic to explain why the painting is of such and such a kind, why it represents a religious, a Roman or a modern subject, why it is naturalistic, distorted or abstract. But it also gives him a basis for a first judgment. For the movement which it represents can be judged in historical terms, as historically good or bad. If it was a movement which aimed at putting to the fullest possible use the resources available at the time, and therefore at producing the maximum material good, it was a historically good movement. If it was obstructing the development of material prosperity, or cornering that prosperity for a small group and hindering its wider development, then it was historically bad.'

At a time when the *Spectator* was full of indignation, no doubt in common with most other periodicals of the time, at the suffering of the unemployed, the pro-Russian reporting of the Moscow Trials and the degrading fascism of Hitler, it is perhaps unsurprising that Blunt's communist leanings in his art criticism went undetected. If his future masters at the Foreign Office read his weekly columns at all, they would no doubt have agreed with the opening remark of his first review in January 1933: 'Honesty is an endearing, though not always an immediately attractive quality.'

moved the atheist British spectator enormously. 'I felt closer to God in that church than I had before, or have since.'

Muggeridge was beginning to see the world in a new light. 'I realised that the whole idea of human beings creating a just and humane society through the exercise of power was a fantasy.' He began his long search for something to fill the inner void left by this revelation.

On returning to Moscow Muggeridge wrote three of the most important articles he has ever written. His description of the famine and its causes was in effect his public repudiation of Soviet communism and his former beliefs. Now, he argued, 'the tendency in Russia is towards a slave State'. The Fabian had become a harbinger of Stalinism.

In Britain Muggeridge's dispatches were received with scepticism and incredulity. In the *Manchester Guardian* and the *New Statesman* he was actually accused of being a liar. The reaction of his former friends is best exemplified by the entry in Beatrice

Webb's diary: 'Malcolm has come back with stories about a terrible famine in the USSR. I have been to see Mr Maisky [the Soviet ambassador in Britain] about it, and I realise he's got it absolutely wrong.' Moreover, Muggeridge claims his standing as a journalist was damaged and no newspaper would hire him. Reluctantly he had to seek employment in Geneva and later Calcutta.

Today Muggeridge is still intrigued by what he regards as 'one of the great puzzles of our time'. 'Why,' he asks, 'should so many people who spend their lives advocating freedom of expression and justice between the classes be so completely taken in by a regime which in the most monstrous and obvious manner represents the exact opposite?' It troubles him that when the 'great crimes of our time' are discussed, the Ukrainian famine of 1933 is rarely mentioned. 'Somehow, after all these years it just doesn't seem to have registered that far more people were killed in the USSR during the 1930s than in Hitler's holocaust.'

exactly the right targets, and making it for a time the one weekly everybody had to read.

However, it is an inescapable fact that one can be a good editor and a good writer but not both at the same time. Despite his marked gifts for editing — including the most precious, discovering talent — Muggeridge has always been by preference a writer. So he became, and for my money remains, the best essay journalist of the day. I shall never forget the morning, shortly after I joined the staff of the *New Statesman*, that Kingsley Martin came scampering along the corridor to my office and threw a typescript on my desk. His hair was even wilder than usual and his deep-sunk eyes radiated an exceptional degree of maniacal excitement. 'Take a look at that,' he said. 'I honestly believe it's the best article I've ever seen.' And he used his ultimate term of approval: 'a real *crackerjack*'. It was, of course, the famous 'royal soap opera' piece which, with infinite jest and for the first time in many decades, reminded the world that not even the royal family was above criticism. Muggeridge later pursued the same theme in an American journal and got himself into a vast amount of trouble in consequence. But the article we printed attracted a virtually unanimous chorus — not a roar — of approval. It was in a sense a harbinger of the Sixties decade, for Muggeridge has always been a journalistic innovator, even though he has sometimes (like the Pied Piper) led the mob in a mischievous direction.

That article was probably the most successful the *New Statesman* ever published; perhaps in a way the most influential too. But there are many other Muggeridge classics. He certainly played a major part in the demolition of that one-time national hero, Sir Anthony Eden, in a wickedly scintillating piece which contained the unforgettable sentence: 'He is not only a bore, but he bores for England.' But the piece I remember best, which he wrote for me while I was editing the paper, was entitled 'The Great Liberal Death Wish'. In it he argued that the most lasting destructive force of the 20th century had not been Fascism or Nazism or even Stalinism but the heedless pursuit of liberal ideas. I did not wholly agree with it at the time but I was glad to let him say it. The day it was published I received a 30-minute phone call from Lady Violet Bonham-Carter, speaking (she implied) on behalf of all liberals, dressing me down like a thieving footman for printing such filth. This week I re-read the article and I see now that it was an essay of great wisdom and perception. Like nearly everything Muggeridge has written it stands up to the battering of time.

Muggeridge is now a member of the Roman Catholic Church and that is right, both intrinsically — for it is his natural home — and symbolically, because if ever there was a human community which tries to see life and the world from the aspect of eternity, it is Roman Catholicism. I notice, however, that he waited to join it until the Pope repudiated censorship.

The press

A great scribe

Paul Johnson

FORCED to deal with the affairs of TV-am last week, I missed the chance to pay my own small tribute to Malcolm Muggeridge on his 80th birthday, and I hope I will be forgiven for doing so a week late. Muggeridge is many things: holy cynic, worldly sage, seer and spiritual traveller. But to me he is above all a very good journalist. There are two main types of successful journalist. The first is excessively attuned to the events of the moment, concerned only with what goes into tomorrow's paper; oblivious of the past, heedless of the future. These fellows get the scoops. They strut confidently across Fleet Street in their time, and later become awesome legends, long after their particular deeds have ceased to have any relevance — like the famous front page of the *Daily Express*, awash in the gutter, 'There Will Be No War', which we glimpsed again when Noël Coward's film *In Which We Serve* was revived on television last Saturday.

Then there is the other kind, much rarer and less highly rewarded, but in the end infinitely more valuable, who has the capacity to see the events of the day *sub specie aeternitatis*. Muggeridge has always had this gift to a remarkable degree. In a sense it is a historian's gift; and that is why his book *The Thirties*, which reads as freshly today as when it was first published in 1940, is the work of a historian as well as a journalist. A writer of this kind has to see the world not merely as a series of flashing headlines but in the immensity of time and space, moving slowly on its axis. The gift has a spiritual element too and that is one reason Mug-

geridge possesses it, for even as a young man he was passionately interested in the contrast between the life of the spirit and the flesh. Within many great Christian writers lurks the journalistic spirit: St Luke, for instance. Is not his Gospel the first truly popular biography; and are not his *Acts* a masterpiece of vivid eye-witness reporting?

Muggeridge has always been an idealist though he lost his illusions early. Even on the *Manchester Guardian* in 1930-32 he sensed there was something wrong with its self-confident righteousness: 'some cruel fallacy,' as he put it, 'some unbridgeable gap between what actually went on in the world and the hopes we entertained about it'. Later in Moscow he quickly grasped the immensity of the horrors which the pursuit of utopianism brings. It was then that he matured as a journalist and acquired his capacity for seeing the events and personalities of the day not as his colleagues saw them — at that time most journalists thought the world of Stalin — but as they would be seen by future historians.

By this I do not mean that Muggeridge has at any time lost his nose for news. Quite the contrary: his appetite for a story, or gossip for that matter, has always been insatiable. He was a brilliant performer on the *Daily Telegraph*, rising to deputy editor, and would have made a distinguished editor of it, but was probably considered too clever to be suitable. Certainly he was the best editor that *Punch* has had this century, enlisting a galaxy of new talent, giving it a sharp news sense as well as striking hard at

Malcolm Muggeridge and the Ukrainian Famine

of 1932-33

An Interview Conducted by Bohdan Nahaylo on 1 March 1983, Robertsbridge
England

Q: What sort of interest did you have in the Soviet Union before going to Moscow as a correspondent?

MM: I was working on the Manchester Guardian as a leader writer. It was the time of the great depression. Lancaster was particularly badly hit; some of its towns had 60 to 70 per cent unemployment. One felt that the whole system whereby we lived had broken down completely. The Guardian, of course, was very much on that side. It also did get in a fair amount of news from Russia of one sort or another. Having been brought up to believe in democratic socialism as the answer to all our troubles, having seen a socialist government in power and the complete futility of its term in power, its breakdown and the formation of a National Government, which meant simply that Ramsey Macdonald had joined up with the Tories, I felt the capitalist system, its way of life, was all completely in shambles. And where was there an alternative? In the USSR. Now there too, of course, when the Revolution happened, which I very vividly remember as a child, it was a time of great rejoicing. The tsarist regime was thought of as one of the most autocratic and cruel regimes of the Western world and the revolution seemed wonderful. It was going to produce freedom, peasants would get their land and all these sorts of things. So that from my point of view, having as it were with youthful arrogance written off the capitalist system, democratic socialism, universal suffrage, parliamentary government and so on, there was an alternative. I felt therefore that I very much wanted to see it, and furthermore, though it sounds very crazy now, if I saw it and it was what I thought it would be, that I would live there. My going there as a journalist was really simply a subterfuge to get there. I had already written a letter, as a matter of fact, saying I was a teacher and would gladly come and teach there.

Q: Did anyone at the Manchester Guardian brief you about conditions in the Soviet Union before your departure? Had anyone prepared you for what you were about to see there?

MM: No, not really. I'd read a certain amount, of course, of the books coming out. Nothing very great. Funnily enough, the only actual query I can remember being put to me was from Crozier who was then the Guardian's editor. He sent me a memo about a news story - some particularly brutal behaviour on the part of the GPU - with a little note saying, rather sarcastically: 'Perhaps you would be kind enough to explain this'. This was just a tiny incident but it shows that at the time it was I who was the ultra pro-Soviet person and the editors who were dragging their feet a little, though they were inclined to be sympathetic. After all they were liberals, believed in democracy, and so on.

Q: As a celebrated liberal paper, one of the issues championed at the time by the Manchester Guardian was the plight of the large Ukrainian minority ruled by the Poles. Before you went to Moscow, were you interested at all in the Ukrainian question? Were you, for that matter, aware of any 'Ukrainian problem' within the Soviet Union?

MM: I'm afraid I can't say that I took any particular care. I had a pretty hazy general notion of the whole thing but not of particular matters within it. I remember again, in a surge of pro-Soviet sentiment, talking to the Webbs about the nationalities question. We were saying that of course Stalin has been in charge of nationalities and therefore we can be sure that this matter will have been dealt with in an efficient and thoughtful way. That's the kind of spirit in which I went.

Q: Had anything been heard about hunger or famine in the Soviet Union before your departure?

MM: There were stories of a food shortage, but they were pretty vague. They certainly came nowhere near the actual situation. Various explanations were being given by people sympathetic to the Soviet Union: that there was food but there were difficulties in distributing it. I can't say there was any very specific information. Like most journalists I proceeded to go to places I know nothing about and write about them from there knowing even less.

Q: According to your diary, from your very first day in Moscow the theme of hunger seems to have been very much in the air. How important was this subject to you?

MM: It was of enormous importance. First of all, you did not need to be a specialist to see that the people of Moscow were hungry. They had the particular sort of drawn appearance. Then of course there were other correspondents there who were talking about this very freely, particularly one, A.T. Chorleton, the correspondent of the News Chronicle, who became a close friend of mine. Indeed, the Soviet press published a certain amount of information that there was a great difficulty over food, especially in Ukraine and the Caucasus.

Q: How else did you get information about the famine?

MM: As I have said, one had to read the Soviet press very closely. You knew that it was all very carefully censored and so on, but still it would give some information. Apart from other correspondents, there was still in those days a sort of lingering relics of the old intellectual bourgeoisie, whom one would see and who would talk, what seems subsequently, very fearlessly about what was going on. There was one man I particularly remember, Andreychin, who was Bulgarian by origin, I think. Men like that whom we would meet were still not completely absorbed into the regime. They were sympathisers, they had good jobs very often, but you could obtain a general impression from them. Another

source of information was the embassies. The British embassy was quite helpful, but in my time the Scandanavian ones were the best in this respect. They knew a lot of what was going on and when I went off to Ukraine they helped me a lot by suggesting where I should go. A man called Urbe stands out. He had been a consul general in Moscow for many years and was an extraordinarily valuable source about the disasterous consequences of collectivisation.

Q: You mention in your diaries an incident when a man from the North Caucasus came to see you about the terrible conditions in his region. According to your account, what this prototype of a Soviet dissident had to tell you shocked you so much that you decided to inform the readers of the Manchester Guardian about the Soviet Government's treatment of the peasants. Can you remember any more about this episode?

MM: Not much, I'm afraid, except that all the correspondents were very nervous that this man was an agent provocateur. You see, it's the price you pay for having a society of that kind. It was, after all, so unlikely that anyone would have the courage to come and talk to foreign correspondents. I have every reason to believe he wasn't. But we were all uneasy. The girl who worked for me as a secretary, and helped me to translate from Russian wouldn't have anything to do with him at all and was convinced he was a GPU man.

Q: What was the general response of the Western corrspondents in Moscow to reports about famine?

MM: They were all talking about it and all trying to get down there. But it was quite a business to get to these places and I did then, what I've done at different times in my life, I just simply managed to get on a train and go there.

Q: From your diary it seems quite remarkable how quickly your disillusionment with the Soviet Union set in. Why was it that after barely four months in Moscow you noted that 'I don't care how soon I leave Russia?'.

MM: Don't forget my belief had been in the regime rather than any particular aspect of it. Although I didn't expect it to be perfection, I did think that it was the alternative. I didn't come with glamorised ideas of what life might be like, but I did believe that the objective of the whole thing was to make people free, brotherly and happy. After being there for only a short time I realised that it was not so.

Q: Your first journey to Ukraine was in early October 1932 when a group of foreign journalists were taken to see the Dnieper-Stroi dam. You noted in your diary ~~that the trip depressed you.~~ Can you recall why it had this effect on you?

MM: The first journey to Ukraine made a very vivid impression partly because we rode in a train, not too fast, with very good windows, through large areas of agricultural country. It was quite obvious that they were in a poor way. On the platforms there were a lot of people hanging around who were extremely hungry. And then again the way in which the whole thing was set up, complete with bands and first class treatment. Also, at the Dnieper-Stroi, the sense one had that it had been created by the exercise of power. This was to be the thing that convinced me that the regime was horrible, that it really ran not on ideas or idealism, but on power and what it sought to create was fear.

Q: How difficult was it for you to circumvent Soviet propaganda?

MM: I suppose it was perhaps more difficult than I thought. But as I've always intensely disliked having views wished upon me by whom ever, the more they tried to feed one with a particular view, the greater the instinctive resistance.

Also, there was a great deal of frank talk among the foreign journalists which was very illuminating and very realistic. There were only two or three of them who spouted the party line. One was the correspondent of the New Republic and the man who wrote the book Red Bread. But they were obviously creatures of the regime.

Q: What about Walter Duranty?

MM: Well, of course, Duranty was the villain of the whole thing. He was the correspondent of the New York Times and in many ways the most important. He was a very curious man with one leg. He was in fact an Englishman of Irish origin. It is difficult for me to see how it could have been otherwise that in he wasn't in some sense in the regime's power. He wrote things about the famine and the situation in Ukraine which were laughably wrong. ~~There is no doubt what-~~ ever that the authorities could manipulate him and that he wanted to stay in the Soviet Union. He had a Russian mistress. Quite a lot of the correspondents did. That was one of the ways foreign correspondents delivered themselves to the authorities. I think sometimes girls were deliberately steered in their direction in order that they should be in that situation. Duranty was actually at the mercy of the Soviet authorities and ultimately wrote what they wanted written. The New York Times seemed very pleased with it. He received three Pulitzer Prizes, so he had no reason to complain.

Q: And an order of Lenin, I understand.

MM: Yes, that too.

Q: What made you decide to go back to Ukraine to investigate conditions there more fully?

MM: The talk among correspondents and meetings with people, mainly officials, who had come back from there and who still had a social side to them and were not endlessly parroting the party line. It was obvious there was a famine. Even the Soviet press began to reflect the seriousness of the situation. I decided this was the big story and therefore wanted to go there.

Q: How did you arrange your journey?

MM: Cholerton had a very aggressive Russian lady as his secretary. She took me to the railway station. She had a very sharp voice and banged on the counter saying 'Here's someone who wants a ticket to Rostov'. I was given the ticket. It was as simple as that.

Q: Did you expect any trouble from the authorities?

MM: Of course I did. I had to make several changes along the route and expected that at some point I would be picked up.

Q: You had a stopover at Kiev?

MM: Yes. Incidentally, if you were to ask me what the most vivid memory I have of the journey, without the slightest doubt in my mind, I would say going into a church in Kiev. There was an Orthodox service going on and the church was absolutely packed with people. Although I did not understand much of it, I could pick up a little bit as I knew some Russian. The theme was: 'Our situation is hopeless. Only God can help us.' This was said with such fantastic zeal and faith that I don't think I've ever been in a service that moved me as much. The congregation, contrary to

what one expected, was completely mixed, with conscripts, peasants and quite bourgeois looking types. All the while there was this tremendous note, that we're helpless, we're hopeless, there's nothing we can do. Please, please, help us! This made an enormous impression on me.

Q: Did your three articles in the Guardian entitled 'The Soviet and the Peasantry' (25, 27, 28 March 1933) follow the sequence of your journey?

MM: Yes, they did. First I travelled through Ukraine and then went on to the North Caucasus. Of course, I couldn't go very far afield. It did so happen that ^{at} one station, in Dnipropetrovsk I think, I saw peasants with their hands tied behind their backs being loaded into cattle trucks at gun-point. I was angrily told to clear off but fortunately no further action was taken against me. ~~The security system in the USSR is thought~~ to be ruthlessly efficient. But it isn't really. A lot of its officials are stupid people. Even with this sort of regime there was still a sort of comradeship among the people. During the entire trip I was never grabbed and asked to produce my papers, even though I was obviously a foreigner. I examined conditions in so far as I could by just wandering through in trains and taking strolls where possible. It wasn't any kind of systematic investigation. But on the other hand you didn't need that to know you were in a country where there was an appalling famine. Don't forget I travelled in relative luxury. No one took much interest in me and I spent a great deal of time looking out of the train windows.

Q: You mention visiting the Drusaq German agricultural concession in the Kuban area of the North Caucasus.

MM: Yes. I found that these Germans understood more about the famine than almost anybody else I encountered. If I had written down everything they told me I would have had a very full account. They realised only too

well the scale of the famine all around them. I described what I saw there in a letter to the Guardian in September 1933 in reply to my critics: 'The concession is a little oasis of plenty in a desert. Its abundance makes one realise the fearful desolation all round'. I spent several days there and every day hundreds of starving peasants came begging for work and bread. Famished men, women and children would beg on their knees for food. Later stories were told about German agronomes having to employ people to dispose of the bodies of peasants who had staggered in and dropped dead of hunger. Ironically, it was at the Drusag concession that I heard a German radio broadcast announcing that Hitler had become Chancellor.

Q: Where did you see the worst famine?

MM: I would say in Ukraine, without any question.

Q: What details can you recall about conditions there?

MM: I can't remember more than I've already written and therefore would like to refer you to my articles in the Guardian and the Morning Post. On 6 June 1933 I wrote in the Morning Post that I was concerned that what the Soviet regime had done in the villages 'is one of the most monstrous crimes in history, so terrible that people in the future will scarcely be able to believe it ever happened.' Here is an extract from the description that followed:

1. If you go now to the Ukraine or the North Caucasus, exceedingly beautiful countries and formerly amongst the most fertile in the world, you will find them like a desert; fields choked with weeds and neglected; no livestock or horses; villages seeming to be deserted, sometimes actually deserted; peasants famished, often their bodies swollen, unutterably wretched. You will discover, if you question them, that they have had no bread at all for three months past; only potatoes and some millet, and that now they are counting their potatoes one by one because they know nothing else will be available to eat until the summer, if then. They will tell you that many have already died of famine, and that many are dying every day; that thousands have been shot by the Government and hundreds of thousands exiled; that it is a crime, punishable by the death sentence without trial, for them to have grain in their houses.

They will only tell you these things, however, if no soldier or stranger is within sight. At the sight of a uniform or of someone properly dressed, they assume, because of that fact, to be a Communist or a Government official, they change their tone and assure you that they have everything in the way of food and clothing that the heart of man can desire, and that they love the dictatorship of the proletariat, and recognise thankfully the blessings it has brought to them.

Strange as it may seem, a certain number of these poor wretches are from time to time made to speak in this strain to parties of tourists. I found that the name of Bernard Shaw was known to them. They spoke of him privately in the same tone, and spitting as venomously, as when they spoke of Stalin.

I saw these conditions for myself in the North Caucasus and the Ukraine, and heard from many sources, some Russian, some foreign, and some even Communist, that similar conditions prevailed in all the agricultural districts of Russia. This is unquestionably the case.

It is impossible to describe the horror of it. I saw in India villages devastated by cholera. It was terrible. They were dead villages. Yet plagues pass, and I knew that the villages would fill again with living people. I saw in Belgium villages devastated by war. They, too, were dead villages. Yet even the war had ended, and I knew that the villages would fill again with living people.

Villages devastated by the Bolsheviks were terrible beyond words because there seemed no end. It was as though a blight had settled on the country. It was, as though nothing would ever grow there again. It was as though the peasants, their lives torn up by the roots, were ghosts haunting a place where they had once lived and been happy.

Why should it ever stop? I asked myself—soldiers, impersonal, some of them Mongols with leaden faces and slit eyes; members of the G.P.U., dapper, well-fed, often Jews, carrying out the orders of the dictatorship of the proletariat, destroying more surely than barbarians (who come with sword and fire, things relatively clean) the life, the soul of a country.

Q: In your memoirs you describe the famine as an 'administrative' famine.

MM: By this I mean that it was a man-made famine. It was planned and deliberate; not due to any natural catastrophe. It was brought about by Stalin's war against the peasantry during the forced collectivisation of agriculture. In the above mentioned article in the Morning Post I described the assault on the countryside by party apparatchiks as 'a swarm of locusts taking everything edible, and leaving behind them a desert'.

Q: Did you or your colleagues discuss why it was that the famine was most

severe in Ukraine?

MM: Yes, we had some idea of that: because collectivisation had been resisted in Ukraine more fiercely and the whole business of eliminating the 'kulaks' had been more difficult there than elsewhere.

Q: Di you ever connect this question to the nationalities problem?

MM: We knew something about the Ukrainians and other non-Russian nationalities. But no, I didn't know much about this particular aspect.

Q: As you know, 1933 has gone down in Ukrainian history as the anno
terribilis. The famine is seen not simply as the result of a misguided economic policy
~~but as a deliberate~~
attempt to break the very backbone of the Ukrainian nation. In Ukraine the
'kulaks' were identified with Ukrainian nationalism, and collectivisation
was simultaneously regarded by the regime as a drive to destroy the social
basis of Ukrainian nationalism.

MM: I don't doubt this. But you see, at the time I didn't speak Russian well enough to be able to explore things like that.

Q: It has been reported that the Soviet authorities actually prevented starving Ukrainian peasants from crossing into Russia, where conditions were not as catastrophic, in search of food. Do you recall hearing about such GPU checkpoints on the Ukrainian-Russian border?

MM: Yes. I heard about that from the Germans at the Drusag concession.

Q: In what circumstances did you write your reports for the Guardian?

MM: I wrote them on my return to Moscow. I was staying at the house of

William Henry Chamberlain, the correspondent of the Guardian and Christian Science Monitor who was then on leave.

Q: Did you discuss the articles with your colleagues?

MM: I discussed them with Cholerton, who knew quite a lot about the subject. His wife was a Russian lady who had lived in those parts, and was also helpful. I didn't discuss them with the others, however, because I didn't want it to be known where I'd been until the articles had been dispatched in a diplomatic pouch.

q: Is this how they left the country?

MM: Yes. I persuaded someone to ~~get them out of the country in a diplo-~~matic pouch. Had I taken them with me there was a risk they would have been seen when I crossed the frontier. I obviously could not send them by telegraph. Foreign journalists were required to take their articles to the press department, get them certified and then take them to the post office. If I'd sent them by ordinary mail, it was a hundred to one that they would have been discovered and never seen again.

Q: Had you had any problems with the Soviet authorities prior to these articles?

MM: They had indicated that certain things I had already written in the Guardian gave no pleasure. The point was, you see, that when I arrived in Moscow the Guardian was high in the esteem of the authorities for very obvious reasons - because it gave them sympathetic coverage. Then,

of course, there was my connection with the Webbs. Just before I was leaving Mrs Webb said to me: 'You know, we're icons in the USSR'. Well, in a sense they were. I was therefore a prized person not thought likely to give any trouble at all. At first the authorities were particularly helpful. But when they saw that I was taking a different position, things got much more difficult. By the time I decided to go and investigate the famine reports in Ukraine, I knew I would have to leave the Soviet Union in the near future.

Q: How did the Guardian's editors react to your articles?

MM: I never really had any reaction at all. The articles were published, but with cuts. When I was on my way back from the Soviet Union, however, I saw a Guardian newspaper bill in Berlin saying: 'Special Account by Our Correspondent in the Ukraine'. I didn't get a word of thanks from them and I think they were very glad to see the back of me.

Q: Later you wrote about the famine in the Morning Post and elsewhere. In the Guardian you published articles on the Soviet internal passport system and forced labour. In fact you were one of the first Westerners to expose these, now well documented, features of Soviet rule. Were you conscious at the time that you were one of the first to cry the Emperor has no clothes?

MM: All this was common talk among the correspondents and I reported as honestly as I could. It didn't occur to me that nobody else was doing this because they wanted to stay there and continue their rather affluent life with its numerous perquisites.

Q: At the time how many people did you think perished as a result of the famine?

MM: I said three to four million. I think I got this figure from the Germans at the Drusag concession. I was called a liar in the Guardian and the New Statesman. As it turned out, this figure of mine, which was considered to be a grotesque exaggeration, turned out to be an understatement.

Q: Were you surprised by the response to your Guardian articles?

MM: Of course I was. I didn't expect the Guardian would wish to publish letters accusing me of being a liar when it had every reason to trust ⁱⁿ my integrity. Moreover, I found that my position as a journalist was far from promoted by this, and was in fact damaged. I couldn't get a job in Britain and had to go back to India. Speaking the truth cost me dearly. Even now it is somewhat the same. Recently, I made a film with Svetlana Stalin and there was ^A feeling that I'd been too harsh on the regime. On returning from Moscow I couldn't help feeling contemptuous of ^{all} the fellow-travellers who like the Webbs hailed the Soviet Union as a 'New Civilisation'. I worked off my spleen in an article I wrote for the English Review entitled Dear Friends of the Soviet Union. I think that one of the great puzzles of our time is why should people who spend their lives advocating freedom of expression and justice between the classes become so captivated by so obviously brutal and narrow-minded a tyranny. How do we explain for that matter the Philbys and Blunts found in the complete opposite in what they believed in the hope of mankind?

Q: Finally, how do you now view the Ukrainian famine from the perspective of fifty years?

MM: It was undoubtedly one of the great crimes of our times on par with the Jewish holocaust and the Armenian massacres. But it always strikes me that when people speak of the great horrors of this century - Aushwitz,

Hiroshima and so on - they never mention the Ukrainian famine. Somehow, after all these years, it has still not registered that Stalin killed far more people during the 1930s than perished as a result of Hitler's extermination of the Jews.

E

wednesday Perspective

Looking back on murderous famine in Ukraine

By Marco Carynyk

The writer is an author and translator living in Toronto

"The novelty of this particular famine, what made it so diabolical, is that it was the deliberate creation of a bureaucratic mind, without any consideration whatever of the consequences in human suffering," Malcolm Muggeridge told me.

He was talking about the genocidal famine that swept Ukraine and the adjacent North Caucasus, two of the most abundant lands in all of Europe, in the winter of 1932 and the spring and summer of 1933.

The harvest of 1932 had been a fair one, no worse than the average during the previous decade, when life had seemed a bit easier again after three years of world war and five years of revolution and famine.

But then, as the Ukrainian peasants were bringing in their wheat and rye, an army of men advanced like locusts into every barn and shed and swept away all the grain.


The few stores that the peasants managed to put away were soon gone, and they began eating leaves, bark, corn husks,

But even going through the countryside by train one could sense the state of affairs. Ukraine was starving, and you only had to venture out to smaller places to see derelict fields and abandoned villages.

On one occasion, I was changing trains, and I went wandering around, and in one of the trains in the station, the kulaks were being loaded onto the train, and there were military men all along the platform. They soon pushed me off. Fortunately, they didn't do more. They could have easily hauled me in and asked, "What the hell are you doing here?" But they didn't. I just cleared off. But I got the sense of what it was like.

I'll tell you another thing that's more difficult to convey, but it impressed me enormously. It was on a Sunday in Kiev, and I went into the church there for the Orthodox mass. I could understand very little of it, but there was some spirit in it that I have never come across before or after. Human beings at the end of their tether were saying to God, "We come to you, we're in trouble, nobody but you can help us."

Their faces were quite radiant because of this tremendous sense they had. As no



Wheat harvesting on a typical Soviet collective farm. Forced collectivization has been blamed for the famine of 1933 in which millions died in the Ukraine.

dogs, cats and rodents.

When that food was gone and the people had puffed up with watery edema, they shuffled off to the cities, begging for bits of bread and dying like flies in the streets.

In the spring of 1933, when the previous year's supplies were gone and before the new vegetation brought some relief, the peasants were dying at the rate of 25,000 a day, or 1,000 an hour, or 17 a minute. Corpses could be seen in every country lane and city street, and mass graves were hastily dug in remote areas.

By the time the famine tapered off in the autumn of 1933, some six million men, women and children had starved to death.

Malcolm Muggeridge was there that terrible winter and spring. As a correspondent for the Manchester Guardian in Moscow, he was one of the few Western journalists who circumvented Soviet restrictions and visited the famine regions and then honestly reported what he had seen.

Shortly after Muggeridge's articles appeared in the Guardian, the Soviet authorities declared Ukraine out of bounds to reporters and set about concealing the destruction they had wreaked.

Prominent statesmen, writers and reporters — among them French Prime Minister Edouard Herriot, George Bernard Shaw and Walter Duranty of the New York Times — were enlisted in the campaign of misinformation.

The conspiracy of silence was largely successful. For years to come Stalinists and anti-Stalinists argued whether a famine had occurred and, if so, whether it was not the fault of the Ukrainian peasants themselves.

Today, as Ukrainians throughout the world commemorate the 50th anniversary of the famine, the events of 1933 are still largely unknown.

Muggeridge and I talked at his cottage in Sussex, England. I was particularly anxious to know why he, unlike other foreign correspondents in Moscow in 1933, took the trouble to investigate the famine.

Why did you decide to write about the famine?

man would help them, no government, there was nowhere that they could turn. And they turned to their creator. Wherever I went it was the same thing.

Then when I got to Rostov I went on to the North Caucasus. The person who had advised me to go there was the Norwegian minister in Moscow, a very nice man, very well-informed, who said, "You'll find that this German agricultural concession is still working there. Go and see them, because they know more about it than anybody, and it'll be an interesting experience." So I went there. It was called the Drusag concession.

What difference did you see between Drusag and the collective farms in Ukraine and the North Caucasus?

The difference was simply that the agriculture in the concession was enormously flourishing, extremely efficient. You didn't have to be an agronomer, which God knows I'm not, to see that there the crops, the cattle, everything, were completely different from the surrounding countryside.

Moreover, there were hordes of people, literally hordes of people trying to get in, because there was food there, which gave a more poignant sense to the thing than anything except that service in the church. The German agronomes themselves were telling me about it. They'd been absolutely bombarded with people trying to come there to work, do anything if they could get in, because there was food there.

Were the Germans able to do anything for the peasants?

They could help them with a little food — they were quite charitable in their attitude — but of course they couldn't do more than that flea-bit. Khrushchev himself said that at least five million people died of starvation in Ukraine alone, where he was part of the setup. I should think there were probably more in actual fact.

What were you thinking and, more importantly perhaps, what were you feeling when you saw those scenes of starvation and privation in Ukraine? How does one respond in such a situation?

First of all, one feels a deep, deep, deep sympathy with and pity for the sufferers. Human beings look very tragic when they are starving. And remember that I wasn't unaware of what things were like because in India, for instance, I've been in a village during a cholera epidemic and seen people similarly placed. So it wasn't a complete novelty.

The novelty of this particular famine, what made it so diabolical, is that it was not the result of some catastrophe like a drought or an epidemic. It was the deliberate creation of a bureaucratic mind which demanded the collectivization of agriculture, immediately, as a purely theoretical proposition, without any consideration whatever of the consequences in human suffering.

That was what I found so terrifying. Think of a man in an office who has been ordered to collectivize agriculture and get rid of the kulaks without any clear notion or definition of what a kulak is, and who has in what was then the GPU and is now the KGB the instrument for doing this, and who then announces it in the slavish press as one of the great triumphs of the regime.

And even when the horrors of it have become fully apparent, modifying it only on the ground that they're dizzy with success, that this has been such a wonderful success, these starving people, that they must hold themselves in a bit because otherwise they'd go mad with excitement over their stupendous success. That's a macabre story.

There were kulaks throughout the Soviet Union, and they were "liquidated" as an entire class. Collectivization also took place throughout the Soviet Union. And yet the famine occurred at the point when collectivization had been completed, and it occurred not throughout the Soviet Union, but largely in Ukraine and the North Caucasus. How do you explain that?

Those were the worst places. They were also the richest agricultural areas, so that the dropping of productivity would show more dramatically there. But they were



Joseph Stalin decreed collectivization would proceed despite any resistance.

and steal it. You'll even murder to get it. That's all part of the horror.

How does one rank the famine of 1933 with other great catastrophes?

I think it's very difficult to make a table of comparison. What I would say with complete truth and sincerity is that as a journalist over the last half century I have seen some pretty awful things, including Berlin when it was completely flat and the people were living in little huts they'd made of the rubble and the exchange was cigarettes and Spam.

But the famine is the most terrible thing I have ever seen, precisely because of the deliberation with which it was done and the total absence of any sympathy with the people. To mention it or to sympathize with the people would mean to go to the Gulag, because then you were criticizing the great Stalin's project and indicating that you thought it a failure, when allegedly it was a stupendous success and enormously strengthened the Soviet Union.

L. B. Golden, the secretary of the Save the Children Fund, which had been very

You published *Winter in Moscow* when you got back from the Soviet Union, and you were attacked in the press for your views.

Very strongly. And I couldn't get a job. Why was that? Because people found your reports hard to believe?

No, the press was not overtly pro-Soviet, but it was, as it is now, essentially sympathetic with that side and distrustful of any serious attack on it.

How do you explain this sympathy?

It's something I've written and thought about a great deal, and I think that the liberal mind is attracted by this sort of regime. My wife's aunt was Beatrice Webb, and she and Sidney Webb wrote the classic pro-Soviet book, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization*. And so one saw close at hand the degree to which they all knew about the regime, knew all about the Cheka (the secret police) and everything, but they liked it.

I think that those people believe in power. It was put to me very succinctly when we were taken down to Kharkiv for the opening of the Dnieper dam. There was an

It was the big story in all our talks in Moscow. Everybody knew about it. There was no question about that. Anyone you were talking to knew that there was a terrible famine going on. Even in the Soviets' own pieces there were somewhat disguised acknowledgements of great difficulties there: the attacks on the kulaks, the admission that the people were eating the seed grain and cattle. (Kulaks were peasants with large landholdings who hired farm laborers; however, all who resisted collectivization, including poor peasants, were labelled kulaks and ordered deported.)

You didn't have to be very bright to ask why they were eating them. Because they were very hungry, otherwise they wouldn't. So there was no possible doubt. I realized that that was the big story. I could also see that all the correspondents in Moscow were distorting it.

Without making any kind of plans or asking for permission I just went and got a ticket for Kiev and then went on to Rostov. The Soviet security is not as good as people think it is. If you once duck it, you can go quite a long way. At least you could in those days. Having all those rubles, I could afford to travel in the Pullman train. They had these old-fashioned international trains—very comfortable, with endless glasses of hot tea and so on. It was quiteasant.



Malcolm Muggeridge

more dramatically there. But they were also places, as you as a Ukrainian know better than I, of maximum dissent. The Ukrainians hated the Russians. And they do now. Therefore, insofar as people could have any heart in working in a collective farm, that would be least likely to occur in Ukraine and the North Caucasus.

Given the deliberate nature of the famine in Ukraine, the decision on Stalin's part to proceed with collectivization and to eliminate resistance at any cost and to get rid of the kulak, vaguely defined as that category was, and given the fact that food continued to be stockpiled and exported even as people dropped dead on the streets, is it accurate to talk about this as a famine? Is it perhaps something else? How does one describe an event of such magnitude?

Perhaps you do need another word. I don't know what it would be. The word "famine" means people have nothing whatsoever to eat and consume things that are not normally consumed. Of course there were stories of cannibalism there. I don't know whether they were true, but they were very widely believed. Certainly the eating of cattle and the consequent complete destruction of whatever economy the farms still had was true.

I remember someone telling me how all manners and finesse disappeared. When you're in the grip of a thing like this and you know that someone's got food, you go

the Children Fund, which had been very active during the famine of 1921-22 in Russia and Ukraine, approached the foreign office in August 1933. He'd received disturbing information about famine in Ukraine and the North Caucasus, but the first secretary of the Soviet embassy had assured him that the harvest was a bumper one, and so Golden asked the foreign office whether a public appeal should be put out. The foreign office told him not to do anything, and he did not. The Soviet authorities were not admitting to a famine, and therefore it was agreed that nothing should be said.

Absolutely true. The other day I had occasion to meet Lord March, the representative of the laity on the World Council of Churches. "Why is it that you're always putting out your World Council complaints about South Africa or Chile?" I asked. "I never hear a word about anything to do with what's going on in the Gulag or with the invasion of Afghanistan. Why is that?" He said, "Whenever we frame any resolution of that sort, it's always made clear to us that if we bring in that resolution, then the Russian Orthodox Church and all the satellite countries will withdraw from the World Council of Churches." "Then do you not pursue the matter?" I asked. And he said, "Oh yes, we don't pursue it because of that." I was amazed that the man could say that. But there it was, and it's exactly true of the foreign office.

opening of the Dnieper dam. There was an American colonel who was running it, building the dam in effect. "How do you like it here?" I asked him, thinking that I'd get a wonderful blast of him saying how he absolutely hated it. "I think it's wonderful," he said. "You never get any labor trouble."

This will be one of the great puzzles of posterity in looking back on this age, to understand why the liberal mind, the Manchester Guardian mind, the New Republic mind, should feel such enormous sympathy with this authoritarian regime.

You are implying that the liberal intelligentsia did not simply overlook the regime's brutality, but actually admired and liked it?

Yes, I'm saying that, although they wouldn't have admitted it, perhaps not even to themselves. I remember Mrs. Webb, who after all was a very cultivated upper-class liberal-minded person, an early member of the Fabian Society and so on, saying to me, "Yes, it's true, people disappear in Russia." She said it with such great satisfaction that I couldn't help thinking that there were a lot of people in England whose disappearance she would have liked to organize.

No, it's an everlasting mystery to me how one after the other, the intelligentsia of the Western world, the Americans, the Germans, even the French, fell for this thing to such an extraordinary degree.



Moscow Feeds a Lap-Dog Foreign Press

By DAVID SATTER

As next month's summit meeting in Geneva nears, the success of the Soviets' effort to convince Americans that they are peaceful, reasonable and, in general, "just like us" will depend in part on the analytical abilities of Western correspondents.

The Soviet Union is a difficult country to report on because it is not a country "like any other," but rather one based on an ideology that is a complete reinterpretation of given reality.

Every Soviet political position, whether it be that Korean airliner 007 was a "spy plane," that the invasion of Afghanistan was "fraternal help" or that the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative is a "threat to peace," is justified not in terms of empirical objectivity but on the basis of this ideology, which claims to be a "perfect science" and insists that "the truth" is whatever the Soviet leaders say it is.

The Soviet authorities understand that concessions to their view of reality weaken an adversary's ability to insist on the absolute value of anything. This is why the effort to induce the world to take their ideological lying literally is not just a question of prestige for the Soviet leaders but also a matter of fundamental political strategy.

Deafening Echo Chamber

Inside the Soviet Union, indoctrination depends on repetition. Once a specific propaganda position has been decided on, the Soviet media become a deafening echo chamber with official lies repeated in every newspaper, radio broadcast and television news program, as well as in every official statement or speech by a Soviet leader.

In the case of foreigners, however, the Soviet leaders must communicate through the Western media, which is why they attach so much importance to the manipulation of Western correspondents.

The Soviet authorities do not expect Western journalists to believe Soviet propaganda, but only to repeat it uncritically, without any effort to analyze what it means, so that, over time, the Soviet Union's ideological lying and officially sanctioned misuse of language, enhanced by the credibility of important American publications, begin to have the same numbing effect on Westerners as on Soviet citizens.

In his new book, "Reluctant Farewell," Andrew Nagorski, a former Moscow correspondent for Newsweek, analyzes the role

of Moscow correspondents. He quotes an unidentified Associated Press correspondent as saying that 90% of stories filed from Moscow by the AP were simple paraphrases of articles from the Soviet newspapers and the Soviet news agency, Tass.

In my experience, the same figure applied to the output of other Western news organizations as well. Even the small percentage of stories that are not taken directly from the Soviet press are largely based on Soviet official information and therefore show the imprint of the Soviet Union's deluded view of reality.

Year after year, for example, Western correspondents who travel outside of Mos-

cow under the auspices of the Soviet foreign ministry or the Soviet press agency, Novosti, are taken on the same factory tours, shown the same collective farms, and treated to the same programmed answers. The result is a spate of identical, meaningless stories, which reappear in the Western press at two- or three-year intervals.

The contrast between the reporting on real events from most countries and the sterile summaries of Pravda and Tass from the Soviet Union may lead many people to think that for Moscow correspondents, the mechanical repetition of Soviet propaganda is the only type of reporting that is possible. This is not true. There are many Soviet citizens who are ready to speak honestly to Western journalists. The problem is that Western journalists are often neither willing nor able to take advantage of the opportunities that exist.

American publications often serve, for many reasons, as transmission belts for Soviet disinformation. In the first place, faced with a country that requires an exceptional effort of analysis in order to be understood, Western publications traditionally send people who are completely unqualified. There were times during my tenure in Moscow when the percentage of American correspondents who could not speak Russian reached 90%. This meant that Andrei Sakharov, for example, was frequently interviewed for United Press International by the agency's Soviet translators, who were provided by the KGB. Time magazine sent its KGB-provided Soviet translator to interview Soviet citizens as

different types of correspondents. Wire-service reporters, for example, can be rewarded with information five minutes before their competition. A newspaper correspondent can be sure of having a Soviet official at dinner with his editor, thereby demonstrating his "access." Particularly cooperative journalists can be rewarded with on-the-record interviews in which officials repeat the contents of Pravda. The most cooperative correspondents can even hope for an interview with the Soviet leader, in which he repeats the contents of Pravda.

The favoritism costs the Soviet authorities nothing and it means nothing to the Western reading public, but it is a competitive advantage for which reporters are often willing to pay with their integrity.

Andrei Sakharov was frequently interviewed for UPI by its Soviet translators, who were provided by the KGB.

Even though all Soviet political positions are stated in Pravda and no Soviet official can offer anything except what has been printed in Pravda, the Soviet authorities have achieved considerable success in inducing correspondents to bargain for

"high-level access" by demonstrating their conformity. The result is that Moscow correspondents, priding themselves on their "sources," begin to identify with them, as they would in the U.S., and frequently are ready to function as conduits for disinformation while treating those brave Soviet citizens who try to speak to them honestly with barely disguised contempt.

The attitude of many correspondents was well expressed by Nick Daniloff, the Moscow correspondent of U.S. News and World Report, in a recent interview in the Washington Journalism Review. Mr. Daniloff was quoted as saying: "I don't consort with dissidents. The magazine considers them a passing phenomenon of little interest. In a political sense, they don't have any influence—and they are perishing." In fact, in the Soviet totalitarian context, a "dissident" is anyone ready to meet with a foreign correspondent without lying to him. And far from "perishing," there are hundreds of such people still at liberty in Moscow who are ready to take risks to help correspondents gather truthful information about the real state of Soviet society. Nonetheless, their bravery is of no use if it is not met with bravery on the part of correspondents who feel some responsibility to learn the truth about the nature of the country to which they are accredited. Unfortunately, this is almost never the case.

As the result of long experience, Soviet officials have been able to turn the manipulation of Western correspondents into something approaching a science.

The Soviets know the requirements of

different types of correspondents. Wire-service reporters, for example, can be rewarded with information five minutes before their competition. A newspaper correspondent can be sure of having a Soviet official at dinner with his editor, thereby demonstrating his "access." Particularly cooperative journalists can be rewarded with on-the-record interviews in which officials repeat the contents of Pravda. The most cooperative correspondents can even hope for an interview with the Soviet leader, in which he repeats the contents of Pravda.

The favoritism costs the Soviet authorities nothing and it means nothing to the Western reading public, but it is a competitive advantage for which reporters are often willing to pay with their integrity.

At the same time, every Western journalist in the Soviet Union is aware that if he refuses to cooperate, he may be the target of provocations. He may not be confident that in the face of an accusation by the Soviet government of "hooliganism," "espionage" or "homosexuality," his newspaper would be ready to believe him and not the Soviets. Being honest means taking a risk.

No Relationship to Reality

As Americans prepare for the summit meeting, it is important to review not only our knowledge but also the sources of our knowledge. One of the reasons that Americans are often confused about the Soviet Union is that Soviet manipulation of diplomats, who senselessly limit their contacts, and Sovietologists, who depend on the Soviet authorities for their visas, has given rise to a conventional wisdom about the "reasonableness" of the Soviet Union that bears no relationship to reality.

Behind the facade of a country that desires nothing so much as peace and "good relations" with the West is an aggressive police state waiting to be discovered. This is why it is essential that before making policy decisions based on our impressions of the Soviet Union's intentions, we bear in mind that the Soviet system is organized to create illusions and begin to give the most serious thought to the entire process through which our impressions were formed.

Mr. Satter, a Journal special correspondent living in Paris, reported from Moscow for the Financial Times from 1976 to 1982. This is based on his testimony earlier this year to the International Sakharov Hearings in London.

te?

what sorts of ad-
the U.S. can safely
adians.

for his part, also has
asons to want to re-
arms race. Life is
underdog in this
if he goes too much
will provoke a reac-
ch stronger India.
he also provoke
the U.S. Congress,
airly upset over his
and which will
at it when the next
ald authorization
ote next year.

connection has been
as a stick: Steady
Pakistan over the
is, not surprisingly,
Zia's nerves on the
tion's security. Fi-
critics would never
nt Zia has shown a
at his country on a
aceable plane.

own some initiative
opportunities. Last
tative from the Na-
uncill and one from
nent traveled to In-
to see if it wasn't
tente. They got indi-
cations that the idea

ific ways in which
could start making
nment of the region
tain. The Pakistanis
national safeguards
hment facility, and
g it to build a huge
ve they do not yet
use fuel. The In-
new unsafeguarded
or that they might
international scru-
so agree not to build
grossly in excess of
nds.

nt, the two countries
ve with one another

G

THE MAN-MADE FAMINE OF 1933 IN SOVIET UKRAINE: WHAT HAPPENED AND WHY

By JAMES E. MACE

(Paper delivered at the International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide in Tel Aviv, Israel, June 20-24, 1982).

The event which Ukrainians call *shchuchnyi holod*, the man-made famine, or sometimes even the Ukrainian holocaust, claimed an estimated five to seven million victims. Purely in terms of mortality, it thus was of the same order of magnitude as the Jewish Holocaust. It was, however, a very different kind of genocide in that it was not motivated by a quest for racial purity and was not an attempt to destroy a nation by means of the physical murder of all its members. For one thing, Stalin had far too many Ukrainians under his sway for him to ever take the idea of physical annihilation seriously. Nor was it necessary for his purposes, which was to destroy a nation as a political factor and social entity. A far closer parallel is offered by events which took place after the Communists seized power in Cambodia and unleashed a reign of terror on the population designed to utterly destroy the nation as it had hitherto existed so that the new regime might recreate it in its own image. In both the Ukrainian and Cambodian cases, the genocide was committed by Communist regimes operating under an ideology which portrayed the nations in question as inundated by class enemies such that the regimes came to identify the whole social structure with such enemies whom it attempted to destroy by destroying the nation as a nation so as to leave an amorphous mass which the regime then sought to restructure as it saw fit.

In order to understand the Ukrainian famine, one must first of all look to the history of Russo-Ukrainian relations. Ukrainians have traditionally seen the long history of Russian domination over their country as one long tale of oppression. They have always viewed the results of the 1654 Treaty of Pereiaslav as their subjugation rather than

the reunification of fraternal peoples which Stalinist and post-Stalinist Soviet historiography has attempted to portray.¹ Indeed, the Ukrainian nation can hardly be said to have prospered from Russian rule. Its autonomy was gradually abolished; its Orthodox Church was absorbed by the Muscovite; its economic growth was long stunted; its elites were assimilated. Like the Czechs after the 1620 Battle of White Mountain, Ukrainians gradually became almost entirely a nation of priests and peasants, and they are one of the few nations on earth whose level of literacy actually declined from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries. From 1876 to 1905 the tsars even went so far as to ban the Ukrainian language from the printed page in an attempt to cut short the revival of national consciousness.² When industries and mines were built in Ukraine in the late nineteenth century, the fact that Russian peasants from the Central Black Soil Region were economically poorer than their Ukrainian counterparts guaranteed that there will always be plenty of Russians to work in the new establishments, and the belated development of their own country thus passed the Ukrainians by.³ The xenophobia of the Black Hundreds found more fertile soil among Ukraine's Russians than in any other part of the empire. Even the liberal democratic Russian intelligentsia refused to support so much as a token autonomy for Ukrainians. By the time the Russian Empire disintegrated in 1917, Ukrainians possessed only a numerically small but extremely important national intelligentsia in the cities; the vast majority of them remained peasants who viewed the cities of their own land as alien entities inhabited by foreigners.

THE TWO REVOLUTIONS IN UKRAINE

In 1923, when the Bolsheviks were actively seeking to "take root" in Ukrainian soil, Moisei Ravich-Cherkassky, a former Jewish Bundist turned Communist, published the first official history of the Communist Party (bolshevik) of Ukraine. His thesis, officially condemned since 1927, was that the Soviet regime and Communist Party in Ukraine had two distinct ancestral roots, one extending from the Russian revolutionary movement and another from the Ukrainian socialist movement. He believed that the CP(b)U was actually the child of this dual lineage produced by the 1920.⁴ While such a synthesis, if it ever existed, was short-lived, there is a fundamental truth upon which the idea was based: the division between town and country in Ukraine was national as well as social, and what happened in 1917 was that two separate and simultaneous revolutions — one Russian and proletarian, the other Ukrainian and agrarian — fought each other for the same territory. For Ukraine's Russian cities, factories, and mines, the

revolution was but a regional variation on the movement elsewhere in the empire, but for the Ukrainian peasants who made up four-fifths of the country's population, the revolution was as much a struggle for national liberation as one for special justice. And each of these revolutionary movements could trace their separate ancestries back for decades.

During the revolution and civil war, the Ukrainian revolution had to face three different enemies: the Russian counterrevolution, the Bolsheviks, and the Poles. Of the three, Denikin's Volunteer Army was seen as the greatest evil because it was aimed at restoring the prerevolutionary regime of the landlords. Denikin saw "Russia" as one, indivisible, and consisting of three parts: Great, Little, and White. There was no place for Ukraine or Ukrainians in a such a scheme. He saw the Ukrainian movement as an artificial creation of the Germans and Ukrainian "semi-intelligentsia; he believed that if these "subversives" were isolated the Ukrainian movement would disappear. When he occupied the country, Ukrainian schools and cooperatives were closed down; his administration was based on reactionary landlords who reclaimed their estates and often used their positions to settle old scores. Even Kharkiv, where the predominantly Russian population initially greeted the Whites as liberators and providers of cheap bread, was ready to welcome the Bolsheviks as liberators after a few months of the White Terror.⁵

As for the Bolsheviks, Lenin recognized the right to self-determination to the point of separation but reserved the right to decide on its desirability on a case by case basis and maintained that Social-Democrats of colonially oppressed peoples ought to advocate unity. This meant recognizing a right which nobody was supposed to exercise, a true forerunner to the right of secession in the Soviet Constitution, designed only to make Russian rule more acceptable to the colonies.⁶ Ukrainian spokesmen found this solution far from satisfactory. On the eve of the revolution Lev Yurkevych (Rybalka), one of the leaders of the Ukrainian Social-Democrats, denounced Lenin's formula as a smokescreen and warned that if Ukrainians did not receive the right to rule themselves, they would fight for it, even against Russian socialists if need be.⁷ The words were prophetic.

Within days after news of the tsar's abdication was received in Kiev in March 1917, the Ukrainian Central Rada was established, first as a clearinghouse for Ukrainian national activities and later as an organ of territorial autonomy which contained representatives of the national minorities, including the Russians. Practically every town also had a soviet of workers and/or soldiers deputies. Since the words *rada* and *soviet* are merely direct translations of each other, there was initially no little confusion about which of these very different bodies stood for what.

Georg Lapchynsky, a member of the first Soviet Ukrainian government and later leader of a federalist opposition within the CP(b)U, recalled that in the fall of 1917 at any given political gathering there always seemed to be a Ukrainian who would claim that he supported Soviet power and also the Rada because it was a Soviet.⁸ The Rada itself even had occasion to use this formula. In November 1917 Mykola Porsh, the Rada's Secretary of Labor, officially informed Stalin that "We consider the Central Rada to be by its composition a Soviet of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers' Deputies who were elected at congresses of peasants, workers, and soldiers."⁹

The weakness of support for the Bolsheviks was shown by their poor showing in the Russian Constituent Assembly elections, where the Ukrainian socialist parties received a substantial majority and the Bolsheviks polled only 10%.¹⁰ Nevertheless, they tried to take power in December 1917 by calling an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets to "reconstitute" the Rada as Soviet government. When the Bolsheviks and their sympathizers arrived in Kiev, they were literally swamped by Ukrainian peasant delegates from rural organizations claiming to have the right to be considered Soviets of Peasants' Deputies. Hopelessly outnumbered, the Bolsheviks fled to Kharkiv where, under the protection of Russian Red Guards, they convoked a rump session which proclaimed the first Soviet government of Ukraine.¹¹

Up to the end of the civil war, the various Soviet Ukrainian governments were established by the Russian Red Army and received whatever local support they had from Russians, mainly from the Donbass workers. They tended to show open hostility to everything Ukrainian. In 1917, the Kiev Bolsheviks were led by Yuri Piatakov and Evgeniya Bosh who before the revolution had denounced even Lenin's verbal concession to the right of nations on self-determination, taking the Luxemburgist view that national liberation was utopian under capitalism and irrelevant under socialism.¹² When the Red Army took Kiev in January 1918, its commander declared in his first declaration on the establishment of Soviet power there: "We took this power from the far North on the point of our bayonets."¹³ Those found speaking Ukrainian in the streets were rounded up as suspected counterrevolutionaries and shot; Volodymyr Zatonsky later recalled that he himself only narrowly escaped execution.¹⁴ In 1919 the Soviet regime was headed by Pyatakov and Khristian Rakovsky, the latter of whom declared that Ukrainian was a "kulak tongue" and that recognizing it as an official language in Ukraine would be a reactionary measure.¹⁵

In reality, the early occupation regimes were primarily interested in Ukraine as a source of raw materials and foodstuffs, especially bread. In 1919, Lenin sent his most efficient requisitioner, Alexander Shlikhter, to

Ukraine with orders to immediately ship 50 million poods of grain to Russia, but what Shlikhter called "kulak banditism" was so fierce that only 8.5 million poods could be obtained and two-thirds of that had to stay in Ukraine to feed the Red Army and the cities. As he later wrote: "Figuratively speaking, one might say that every pood of requisitioned bread was tinged with drops of the blood of the workers."¹⁶

Of course, the person one man might call a bandit, others might call a fighter for national liberation or simply a farmer trying to protect the fruits of his own labor. Whatever one calls it, the Bolshevik historian Ravich-Cherkassky was forced to admit that the countryside formed a united front against the invaders.¹⁷ Even as set-piece warfare came to an end in 1921, thousands of guerillas continued to wage war on the invaders in the Ukrainian countryside. According to captured Soviet documents first published in Galicia in 1932 and later unintentionally confirmed by a Soviet scholar, as of April 1, 1921, at least 102 armed bands were fighting in Ukraine and the Crimea, some with as many as 800 men. Excluding the Makhno army, which had ten to fifteen thousand men, there were at least ten thousand of these "bandits", most of whom were conscious Ukrainians.¹⁸ While we do not have later figures, Soviet Ukrainian newspapers continued to report on outbreaks of "kulak banditism" until mid-1924, and it seems to have been fairly widespread until mid-1923.

The Donbas Russians upon whom the Bolsheviks relied for popular support wanted nothing to do with the rest of Ukraine, and neither did the Bolshevik leaders there. As far as they were concerned, they were Russian, wanted to be part of Russia, and local Ukrainians were either kulaks or counterrevolutionaries — either way, what they wanted simply did not count. In 1918 the Donbas Bolsheviks went so far as to establish their own government separate from the rest of Ukraine, the Donets — Krivoi-Rog Republic. Certainly, it is always difficult for members of a *Herrenvolk* to come to terms with the emerging national aspirations of those whom they were used to seeing as uncouth peasants, and this, as Mykola Skrypnyk recognized in 1920, was the fundamental weakness of the various Soviet regimes in Ukraine:

"Our tragedy in Ukraine is the very fact that, in order to have the help of the working class, Russian by nationality or Russified, whose attitude toward the Ukrainian language and culture was insulting and sometimes even intimidating, with its help and its forces we had to subjugate the peasantry and village proletariat, and those people who were of Ukrainian nationality were, due to complex historical circumstances, suspicious and hostile to everything Russian, 'Muscovite'.¹⁹

Skrypnyk's solution, which the party would officially adopt in 1923, was to actively foster the development of Ukrainian culture.²⁰

UKRAINIANIZATION AND ITS DILEMMAS

The path by which the Bolshevik Party came to adopt Ukrainianization was a long one which began in January 1919 when Serhiy Mazlakh and Vasyl Shakhrai, two Bolsheviks from Poltava, then the center of the Ukrainian movement, published a long critique of the Bolshevik policy, the thesis of which was:

"Ukraine is just as much a country as Russia, Germany, France, Italy, Norway, England, and so forth. Like them, it not only has a 'right' but will in fact be just as sovereign, just as independent as those other states."

And once the Bolsheviks recognized this simple fact, they predicted, Ukrainians would be with them.²¹ They were ignored, but in the summer of 1919 a discussion group was formed in Kiev, and out of it was to grow a credible opposition which tried to take over the CP(b)U, the so-called Federalist Opposition led by George Lapchynsky. It demanded an independent party and state which would reach its own *modus vivendi* with Ukrainian revolutionary forces, but without Moscow's support there was little hope such an opposition could succeed within the predominantly Russian CP(b)U. Lapchynsky left the Bolsheviks in disgust, joined the Ukrainian Ukapists, and was readmitted to the party only in 1925 with the rest of the Ukapists.²²

While voices calling for rapprochement with the Ukrainians were weak inside the Bolshevik Party, there were powerful voices in the Ukrainian revolutionary movement ready to join hands in exchange for a shift in Bolshevik nationality policy. In 1920 Volodymyr Vynnychenko, who had headed the Rada's General Secretariat and the Ukrainian Directory before breaking with Petliura, went to Moscow and Kharkiv, ready to accept the positions of Vice President of Ukrainian Sovnarkom and Soviet Ukraine's Foreign Minister until it became apparent that the Bolsheviks were more interested in scoring a propaganda coup than in creating a government acceptable to Ukrainians.²³ The Borotbist, originally the left wing of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, hoped to gain concessions by showing the Bolsheviks a loyalty bordering on obsequiousness, and about 4,000 of them were actually admitted into the CP(b)U in 1920, with three of their leaders — Vasyl Ellan-Blakytynj, Oleksander Shumsky, and Hryhorij Hrynko — receiving high posts.²⁴ Why did the left wing of the Ukrainian revolution wish so desperately to

make an arrangement with the Bolsheviks, to join hands with them in jointly building a Soviet Ukrainian state?

Those familiar with official Soviet historiography will surely have encountered polemics against what Communist spokesmen refer to as "the anti-Leninist idea of the *bezburzhuaznist'* (literally, "bourgeoislessness") of the Ukrainian people." Sometimes the idea is credited to Vynnychenko and sometimes to Hrushevsky. In truth, nobody "invented" the idea of *bezburzhuaznist'*; the fact that there was no Ukrainian national bourgeoisie was simply a matter of observation. And that is why the regime has always tried to discredit it. How can one fight "bourgeois nationalism" if the nation in question never had its own bourgeoisie?

In 1917 no Ukrainian political figure questioned the idea of Ukrainian *bezburzhuaznist'* either explicitly or implicitly by trying to form a party of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie. At that time it was impossible to even imagine a Ukrainian politician who did not also call himself a socialist. It could hardly have been otherwise since, with a few individual exceptions, those who belonged to the propertied classes in Ukraine were not Ukrainians. The Ukrainian people meant the Ukrainian peasants, and with what class could the peasants form an alliance if not with the workers? Besides, the arrangement Lenin described in his "State and Revolution" (completely autonomous communities of toilers free from outside interference) seemed ideal to villagers whose natural interest was to keep outsiders out. Unfortunately, any similarity between Lenin's regime and the one described in "State and Revolution" was purely coincidental.

In 1921 the Tenth RCP Congress adopted the New Economic Policy (NEP), which meant the end of compulsory requisitions of agricultural produce and basically leaving the peasants alone. At the same time, the formal equality of all languages spoken in any Soviet republic was proclaimed. The NEP did much to assuage the purely social grievances of the peasantry, but formal equality of the local language with Russian did not satisfy Ukrainians. So-called "banditism" was still widespread in the Ukrainian countryside, and the Bolsheviks came to realize that the only way to ever create a really stable Soviet regime was to somehow convince Ukrainians that the Soviet government was somehow theirs. It was for this reason that the Twelfth RCP Congress officially adopted the policy of indigenization (*korenizatsiia*) which directed Soviet regimes outside ethnic Russia to "take root" in local soil by fostering the development of the local language and culture, encourage local Communists and state servants to learn the local language and way of life, recruit non-Russians into the Party and state, and, in short, to reverse the old policy of Russification and replace it with an active policy

of derussification. Byelorussianization, Tatarization, Yiddishization, and so forth, were proclaimed and carried out, but none of them went so far or created so many problems for Moscow as did Ukrainianization.

The reason Ukrainianization gave Moscow cause for concern was due to its very success. Ukrainians, including Ukrainian Communists, took it seriously and actually began to act like Ukraine was in fact an independent country. Ravich-Cherkassky was speaking for the regime when he criticized Russian Communists who refused to take the policy seriously:

"Up to the present, not only among the Russian bourgeois intelligentsia but also among some Communists views had been bandied about which are not much different from those who thought Ukraine was thought up by Germans. Many RCP members, bound too much by bourgeois assimilationist prejudices, think the UkSSR and CPU are a masquerade, a fiction, or playing at independence. At best they concede that during the struggle for power in Ukraine against the nationalistic Central Rada and Directory, the Communist Party and Soviet power in Ukraine had to adopt the colors of defenders of national independence. Now power in Ukraine has been consolidated and the need for a CPU and UkSSr has fallen away.

"We think that only those who live solely in the present could think that way. They do not see the twenty million Ukrainian peasants who will fill the ranks of the urban proletariat in proportion with the development of industry. Today Ukraine's cities have a Russified majority, but the countryside is the reserve from which Ukraine's cities will be filled. The masses of the Ukrainian people, who are being raised to cultural life, to mass creativity in the sphere of economic construction will ukrainianize Ukraine at a more urgent tempo."²⁵

For a time the center encouraged such views. Even Stalin declared in 1923 that:

"The Ukrainian nationality exists and the Communists are obliged to develop its culture. One cannot go against history. It is clear that if Russian elements have hitherto been predominant in the cities, with the passage of time these cities will inevitably be ukrainianized."²⁶

No one could as yet foresee that within a decade the author of these very words would prove that, given sufficient force, one could indeed go against history.

Implicit in Ukrainianization was a high-stakes gamble. Would the eventual loss of the Russified proletariat, hitherto the regime's main supporter, be outweighed by Ukrainian support gained by the policy? Initially, the gamble seemed to pay off handsomely. With ample opportunities for national cultural work in Soviet Ukraine, many Ukrainian socialists who had emigrated to escape the Bolsheviks now returned, led by former Petliurist military commander Yurko Tiutiunyk and former President of the Central Rada Mykhailo Hrushevsky. The Soviet press dubbed the movement Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo* and represented it as a Ukrainian counterpart to Ustrialov's movement.

The high point of this honeymoon between the regime and the national intelligentsia came in May 1924 when sixty-six prominent intellectuals, including several former ministers in Ukrainian governments, presented a declaration of loyalty to the Seventh CP(b)U Congress. This Declaration of the Sixty-Six stated that since Ukrainians were a nation of toilers, the proletariat was their natural ally, and that only the Russifying proclivities of early Soviet regimes had prevented such an alliance from taking shape. Now that the Bolsheviks had overcome their past errors by adopting Ukrainianization, Ukrainians were ready and willing to join them in building a Ukrainian worker-peasant state.²⁷ Those who signed the declaration clearly understood it as a national covenant between the Ukrainian nation as represented by its natural leaders and those who ruled Soviet Ukraine.

Although conditions were less than ideal — there were authors who could not get their writing through the censorship and attacks upon Ukrainian scholars by self-proclaimed guardians of revolutionary orthodoxy boded ill for the future — they seem almost a golden age when compared to conditions under the autocracy and to the Stalinist deluge which was yet to come. The 1920's produced a flowering of Ukrainian cultural and intellectual life later called the *rozstriliane vidrodzhennia* (the executed rebirth) because of its abrupt and violent suppression by Stalin.²⁸ To an extent, Ukrainianization even legitimized Ukrainian national aspirations within the Party itself, with Communists like Oleksander Shumsky, Mykola Khvyliovyi, and Mykhailo Volobuev demanding far more independence than Moscow would allow, thereby provoking a deep political crisis for the regime. In 1925 the former Borotbist Shumsky, then Soviet Ukraine's Commissar of Education, led a delegation of West Ukrainian Communist leaders to see Stalin and demand that Lazar Kaganovich, who had only recently been appointed CP(b)U First Secretary and was pursuing Ukrainianization vigorously, be replaced by a Ukrainian. At the time Stalin said only that such a move was not yet expedient.²⁹ At the same time, the writer Khvyliovyi had electrified Ukrainian literary life with his messianic call to free Ukrainian

culture from Russian domination, turn to Europe for models, and for Ukrainians to lead an Asiatic Renaissance of rising colonial peoples by transmitting to them Europe's cultural attainments which Ukraine, due to its colonial past and status as a European nation, was uniquely qualified to do.³⁰

Stalin intervened in the Shumsky and Khvyliovyi controversies in April 1926 with a letter addressed to Kaganovich and the other members of the CP(b)U Central Committee. It was at this precise moment that Zinoviev and Trotsky were joining hands to form a United Opposition to Stalin, and the latter was probably motivated by what he saw as a need to strengthen his support in the predominantly Russian CP(b)U. In any case, Stalin accused Shumsky of failing to see the dark side of Ukrainianization which Khvyliovyi represented and stated that if such anti-Russian chauvinistic sentiments were not opposed, they threatened to tear Ukraine away from Russia, Russian culture, and its highest attainment, Leninism. Stalin added that Shumsky wanted to force Ukrainianization so rapidly that it threatened to violate the rights of Russian workers in Ukraine and alienate them from the regime.³¹

The weight of Stalin's condemnation assured that Shumsky would be completely isolated in the CP(b)U leadership. But a majority of the West Ukrainian Communist Central Committee (the Communist Party of Western Ukraine was at that time an autonomous section of the Polish Communist Party) supported him and the split became public when they attempted to take their case to the Comintern. They were expelled for their pains, and Shumsky was transferred to Russia. Khvyliovyi, on the other hand, showed himself to be a master of the art of ostensible surrender by confessing his sins, promising never to do it again, then doing the same thing in a more subtle fashion. By 1930, however, the increasing rigidity of permissible intellectual life succeeded in clipping his wings, and in 1933 he committed suicide as an act of protest against the great famine created by the regime in the countryside.³²

The third "national deviationist" to be condemned in the 1920's was not nearly so prominent as Shumsky and Khvyliovyi. In fact, Volobuev was a complete unknown, probably an obscure teacher in a Party school with only a brief article in a newspaper literary supplement to his credit when he published the work which was to provoke such controversy. In 1928 he published a two part article in *Bil'shovyk Ukrainy*, "On the Problem of the Ukrainian Economy," in which he drew upon a wide array of sources to show that Ukraine's economic needs were being neglected by union organs and that the country still was being exploited by Russia no less than it had been under the autocracy. According to Volobuev, the USSR would best be served by policies that strengthened

its component parts as relatively autarchic entities. These views were condemned as an economic platform of nationalism.³³

SOVIET UKRAINE UNDER MYKOLA SKRYPNYK

Only a handful of Old Bolsheviks were Ukrainians: Hryhoriy Petrovsky, Dmytro Manuisky, Vlas Chubar, Volodymyr Zatonsky, and Mykola Skrypnyk. Skrypnyk joined Russian Social-Democracy at the turn of the century, before it split into Bolshevik and Menshevik, and once the rift occurred he joined Lenin's faction, never to waver thereafter. His was the typical career of a "professional revolutionary" — missions to various parts of the empire on Lenin's behalf, arrests, escapes from Siberia, and even a brief taste of emigre life in Europe.³⁴ After helping Lenin to seize power as a member of the Petrograd Soviet's Revolutionary-Military Committee, Lenin sent him to Ukraine as his personal representative. For a brief period on the eve of the German occupation of 1918, he even headed the Soviet Ukrainian government, and he was architect of the decisions adopted at the Taganrog Party Conference which founded the CP(b)U. In 1920 he became an advocate of the changes in nationality policy later to be adopted as Ukrainianization, and in the discussions preceding the formation of the USSR and afterwards he was one of the chief defenders of the prerogatives of the Soviet republics. When Kaganovich was attacked by Shumsky, Skrypnyk was tapped as the leading defender of official policies in Soviet Ukraine, and in 1927 his loyalty was rewarded with the post of Education Commissar. While Moscow's appointees came and went, Skrypnyk remained in Ukraine to become first among equals in the country's political hierarchy. When Kaganovich was withdrawn in 1928, Stanislav Kossior succeeded him as First Secretary, but there was no doubt that Skrypnyk was the real man in charge. He was by far the most powerful of the various Party satraps who ruled the various administrative subdivisions of the Soviet Union in the 1920's, the undisputed political strongman of Soviet Ukraine.

Just as the formation of the United Opposition in 1926 had led Stalin to seek support in Ukraine by intervening on the side of Russian Communists there, the 1928 rift between him and Bukharin motivated him to intervene on the side of the Ukrainian Communists. By 1928 the Ukrainianization policy had succeeded in strengthening the Ukrainian component in the Party to such an extent that instead of offering up a "national deviationist", he "bought" Skrypnyk by withdrawing Kaganovich.³⁵ Skrypnyk had already laid claim to eminence as a theoretician by creating a chair of the nationality question in the Ukrainian Institute of Marxism-Leninism, claiming all-union authority

for it by arguing that Ukraine was the "best laboratory" for studying the nationality question because it had been itself a colony and now was a Soviet republic with its own minorities whose rights had to be protected, and occupying the chair himself. One may be certain that Stalin was less than pleased with Skrypnyk's claim to preeminence in a theoretical field to which Stalin had made his own contributions, and Skrypnyk's 1927 appointment to the Education Commissariat further strengthened his position by placing him in charge of the Ukrainianization program as well as all educational, cultural, and scholarly work. With Kaganovich withdrawn, Skrypnyk was in a position to be as independent as, say, Gomulka in the late 1950's, and he did not hesitate to use his position to the utmost.

Skrypnyk pursued policies bound to win him popularity with the Ukrainians. He lobbied for Union investment with such zeal that he gained a reputation of being the man who brought all good things to Ukraine. He defended the right of Ukrainian culture to develop separately, condemning those who wanted to attack Khvyliovyi for his old sins and those who refused to assign the old Rus' epic, "The Tale of Ihor's Armament", to Ukrainian literature. He pushed Ukrainianization far more rapidly than it had ever been pushed before, forcing hundreds of factory gazettes and major dailies (including the main state organ in Odessa, which had never been a Ukrainian city) to switch from Russian to Ukrainian. Officials who had not yet learned Ukrainian now had to do so or be dismissed. Those university courses which had hitherto been taught in Russian now switched to Ukrainian, and it became impossible to gain a post-secondary education in Russian without going to Russia. But to those who complained that the rights of Ukraine's Russians were violated by the new state of affairs, he could point out that they were still considerably better off than Russia's Ukrainians: at the same time that the more than three million Ukrainians of the North Caucasus were served by only 240 Ukrainian language schools, Ukraine's 2 million Russians had 1,771 Russian language schools.³⁶ And there was certainly no Ukrainian language higher education in Russia. In fact, Skrypnyk complained quite loudly about how inept Russia was in satisfying the cultural needs of its Ukrainians and strived to establish a cultural protectorate over them, all the while denying that he was doing anything beyond aiding them by sending textbooks and schoolteachers.³⁷ At one point he went so far as to argue that Russia's record was so abysmal that the "fascist" nationalists in Western Ukraine were taking advantage of it in order to discredit Soviet power in the eyes of the masses and that the only solution was for Russia to cede heavily Ukrainian border areas to Ukraine.³⁸ It is hardly likely that Stalin was overjoyed to receive what

amounted to a territorial demand from one whom he considered his subordinate.

In any case, a Byzantine campaign to bring Skrypnyk low can be discerned from the end of 1928 when his client Matviy Yavorsky, the "ideological watchdog" of Soviet Ukrainian historians, was attacked by Pavel Gorin, Secretary of the Russian Society of Marxist Historians, at the All-Union Conference of Marxist Historians.³⁹ A few weeks later, *Pravda* carried a brutal review of Yavorsky's brief textbook history of Ukraine, which concluded that it was "strange" the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education had ever sanctioned so pernicious a book.⁴⁰ Soon the pages of Russian and Ukrainian historical journals were filled with denunciations of "Yavorskyism", sometimes finding fault with the very fact that he dealt with Ukrainian history as a national history separate from that of Russia. As one critic wrote, "The basic error of Comrade Yavorsky's book is that it portrays the history of Ukraine as a distinct process."⁴¹ The political implication was obvious and ominous: if Ukraine did not possess its own distinct history, then it was not a country in its own right and ought not to be treated as such. This, in turn, implied an attack on Skrypnyk's whole policy. As for Yavorsky, he was accused of having once been a gendarme in the Austrian army, was accordingly expelled from the CP(b)U in 1930, arrested during the Postyshev terror of 1933, and ended his days in the Gulag. He was last reported seen in the Solovky Islands, where he was described as having bitterly regretted his Bolshevik past.⁴²

Attacks upon distinctively Ukrainian cultural currents, regardless of whether or not they were Communist, became an inherent part of Stalin's so-called cultural revolution (1928-1932). In Russia, however, it was primarily the so-called bourgeois intelligentsia which suffered, while in Ukraine attacks on Ukrainian Communists actually took precedence over those on non-Marxists. Yavorsky was the first victim of the cultural revolution in Ukraine, while Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the dean of traditional Ukrainian historians, was left unmolested until 1931. The fall of another Skrypnyk client, the philosopher Volodymyr Yurynets, closely followed Yavorsky's, but the Ukrainian "bourgeois" intelligentsia was not neglected for long, and the manner in which it was attacked also boded ill for Skrypnyk.

It would have been extremely difficult for Skrypnyk to have attempted to defend either the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, founded in 1918 and including a number of members once quite prominent in the Ukrainian National Republic, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which had split off from Russian Orthodoxy during the revolution. They were thus easy targets for those who wished to weaken Skrypnyk by attacking Ukrainian national

institutions. Moreover, Skrypnyk has been intimately involved in the linguistic discussions which led to the adoption of a standardized orthography in 1928, had gone on record in favor of linguistic purism, and at one point even suggested supplementing the Ukrainian Cyrillic by adding the Latin letters "S" and "Z" to designate sounds represented by the double consonants "dz" and "dzh."⁴³

In November 1929 the GPU "discovered" an alleged conspiracy called the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine and arrested a number of prominent scholars and academicians.⁴⁴ On December 22, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was tied into the affair and was forced to proclaim itself liquidated the following January. The resolutions forced upon the so-called liquidation Sobor repudiated not only religious principles but also the principles upon which Ukraine's political distinctiveness had been based. Autocephaly was denounced as "a symbol of Petliurist independence", clerical Ukrainianization as "a means of inciting national animosity."⁴⁵ It did not take much imagination to translate these principles from the secular to the temporal realm.

As the GPU presented it, the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU) had supposedly been led by Serhiy Yefremov, former leader of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Federalists and a vocal critic of the regime, who was also an academician in the history of Ukrainian literature, and Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former leader of the Autocephalous Church. The conspiracy was supposed to have begun in 1926, and it strains credulity to think that such a widespread conspiracy as the SVU was supposed to have been could have escaped the notice of the GPU and their secret collaborators for over three years. The SVU was accused of plotting the assassination of Soviet leaders (including Skrypnyk), the restoration of capitalism in a fascist independent Ukrainian state by means of an armed uprising supported by foreign capitalist states, attempting to organize the kulaks and bourgeois survivals — particularly the so-called "kulak intelligentsia" of the villages and high schools. Cells had allegedly been established in both the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and the Autocephalous Church hierarchy. Politically, the most significant charge was that it had engaged in cultural sabotage which consisted in trying to make Ukrainian culture as different from Russian as possible. So many academicians were arrested that whole institutes had to be closed, particularly the linguistic institutes which were accused of having engaged in nationalistic wrecking by trying to make the Ukrainian language as different from the Russian as possible. In short, the flower of the national intelligentsia was brought low, and cultural nationalism was identified with sabotage by class enemies. It would not be too long before the implication was drawn that Skrypnyk himself had

been in league with these "saboteurs", for he had, of course, although what they had done hardly qualified as sabotage.⁴⁶

Skrypnyk was able to defend himself from the political fallout from the SVU affair by viciously attacking the accused in public, while judiciously ignoring the substance of their alleged wrecking when it struck too close to home, particularly in linguistics.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, Stalin sounded a temporary retreat. Just as he signaled a brief respite for the peasantry in his famous "Dizziness from Success" speech, he made a similar move regarding the nationalities at the XVI Party Congress by criticizing those who expected the "coming together and merging of nations" to take place in the near future. In the non-Russian republics this meant a renewed effort on the purely quantitative side of indigenization, but any respite for Skrypnyk was temporary indeed. While the witch-hunts for nationalistic "deviationists" within the CP(b)U temporarily ceased, witch-hunts among writers continued. More subtly, Skrypnyk's bureaucratic power base was being chipped away through the creeping centralization of the education system in Union hands and the destruction of the Ukrainian Institute of Marxism-Leninism.

Hryhoriy Hryenko had, during his brief tenure as Ukrainian Commissar of Education, established an education system radically different from that which Lunacharsky set up in Russia. The so-called Hryenko system was retained until the end of the twenties, when an all-Union system was adopted. Skrypnyk went along with this, at least in public, but simultaneously insisted that there must be no talk of placing the administration of education in Union hands.⁴⁸ Yet this is precisely what happened by degrees. On September 5, 1931, the Union Central Committee issued a detailed order on how education was to be run, and a Union government decree of September 9, 1932 placed all higher education under direct Union supervision.⁴⁹ The Ukrainian Institute of Marxism-Leninism was in 1931 found guilty of all sorts of national deviations and broken up into an association of autonomous institutes headed by Shlikhter.⁵⁰

Finally, Skrypnyk's supporters seem to have been removed from leadership positions on the district (*raion*) level. From the beginning of 1931 to mid-1932 fully 80 percent of the district Party secretaries in Ukraine were replaced.⁵¹ We know almost nothing about these new men or, indeed, about those they replaced. In all likelihood, many of those who lost their posts were being punished for failure to carry out central dictates regarding the collectivization of agriculture and procurement of agricultural produce, and those who got the jobs did so because of their zeal — or at least willingness — to carry out the center's dictates no matter what they might be.

The collectivization of agriculture, the man-made famine of 1933, and their role in Skrypnyk's fall will be dealt with below. Suffice it to state at this point that Moscow did not find the work of the Ukrainian Party organization adequate in either agricultural collectivization of procurements and in January 1933 Pavel Postyshev, the former head of the Kharkiv *oblast* party organization who had been called to Moscow a few years earlier for political seasoning, was returned to his old post and given a new one of Second CP(b)U Secretary. Officially subordinate to Kossior, Postyshev actually had dictatorial powers and began a campaign against an initially unnamed "national deviation" quite similar to the campaign against the Right deviation which had preceded Bukharin's fall in Russia.

On March 1, 1933 "*Visti*" announced a major government reshuffle in which Skrypnyk was transferred from education to Derzhplan (the Ukrainian counterpart to Gosplan), and on June 10 Postyshev denounced him by name, accusing him of having committed a host of national deviations. Interestingly, the only specific charge which Postyshev made at this time was that Skrypnyk's advocacy of the use of the letter in Ukrainian objectively aided the annexationist designs of the Polish landlords by bringing the Ukrainian language closer to Polish and pushing it farther away from Russian.⁵² Soon thereafter, Andriy Khvyliya, a former Borotbist who owed his prominence to having denounced Shumsky to Kaganovich in 1925, delivered a lecture on the Skrypnykite deviation in linguistics. Khvyliya portrayed any manifestation of Ukrainian linguistic purism as sabotage, condemned Skrypnyk's role in the adoption of the 1928 orthography, and even disinterred Skrypnyk's old proposal to supplement the Ukrainian Cyrillic alphabet with two Latin letters, saying: "Comrade Skrypnyk could not have failed to know that he had entered upon the path of isolating the Ukrainian language from Russian and bringing it closer to Polish." He announced that henceforth the Party and Commissariat of Education would fight "to purge the new orthography of the counterrevolutionary rubbish put into it" and pledged to have a new orthography ready within a month.⁵³ Soon the periodical press was carrying articles in which Khvyliya denounced Skrypnyk for linguistic separatism "in a kulak-Petliurist spirit" and explicitly identified him with the type of wrecking portrayed during the SVU trial.⁵⁴

Other members of the CP(b)U leadership vied with each other to expose further deviations which Skrypnyk had committed. Panas Liubchenko, for example, not only connected Skrypnyk with the "kulak Ukrainian nationalist" sabotage of SVU vintage, but also with the historian Matviy Yavorsky.⁵⁵ Skrypnyk must have had few illusions

regarding what fate awaited him, and on July 6, 1933, he committed suicide.

THE COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE AND THE FAMINE OF 1933

Despite the progress achieved by Ukrainianization, the vast majority of Ukrainians remained peasants. For most Ukrainians, NEP and Ukrainianization were but two sides of the same coin, and we have seen that both policies were necessary in Ukraine to placate the same social force, the Ukrainian peasantry. Conversely, abandonment of one implied abandonment of the other. Without NEP, Ukrainianization lost its political justification, for nothing could possibly placate peasants if the state was taking their farms away.

During the 1920's, official statements in the Soviet press defined the Party's main task in Ukraine as winning over the "rural masses" in general and the village intelligentsia in particular.⁵⁶ There is ample evidence to suggest that this approach enjoyed only limited success at best. Those connected to the regime, even in the most innocuous way as village correspondents were shunned by their neighbors, as Zatonksy frankly admitted in a speech delivered to a 1926 *selkor* conference.⁵⁷

Evidence of the regime's feeling of insecurity in the Ukrainian countryside is the fact that, while it abolished the *kombedy* in Russia in 1920, it felt the need to retain them in only a slightly altered form in the Ukrainian countryside as the *komnezamy* until 1933. The only difference between the *kombedy* and Ukrainian *komnezamy* was that the latter organizations were supposed to also include the poorest middle peasants, but never so many of them that they would make up over 15-20% of the membership of any given village *komnezam*. They retained all the powers of the old *kombedy*, exercised state power, and in many places ruled without any village Soviet until 1925 when they were "reorganized" into "voluntary social organizations" without state power.⁵⁸

The regime also took care to penetrate the countryside by a system of secret police agents and collaborators (*seksoty*).⁵⁹ As one account described it, the secret police established a system of OGPU residents on the district level who

disguised as instructors, statisticians, insurance agents, agronomists, and so on, worked incessantly to create a dense network of secret collaborators known as *seksoty*. The secret district residents of the OGPU did not directly involve the *seksoty* in subversion. When visiting villages they merely observed, noted, and selected possible candidates as possible candidates for the

OGPU, and notified the authorities. A man who was earmarked for work as a future *seksot* or agent was called to the *okrug* department of the OGPU. There the chief of the *okrug* department had a "talk" with him, while a revolver lay on the table between them, and required him to sign an obligation. From that moment on the *seksot* was in touch with the district agent of the OGPU in the locality where he lived. Numbers varied from place to place depending on the size of the population, but everywhere the number of people thus recruited constituted a considerable part of the population.⁶⁰

The *seksoty* enabled the regime to identify real and potential enemies, and this placed the regime in a far stronger position vis-a-vis the peasantry than it had been in the early 1920's, when the Bolsheviks confronted the village as strangers and without any idea of who was who. Whenever the Party might decide the time was right to settle the unfinished business left over from the civil war, it would be ready.

The policy of "liquidation of the kulaks as a class" and forced total collectivization of agriculture was announced by Stalin on December 27, 1929, and was legalized by the Central Committee Resolutions of January 5 and 30, 1930.⁶¹ How were these decisions carried out in Ukraine? An outsider or group of outsiders — usually either a plenipotentiary of the regime or a Russian worker recruited as a "twenty-five-thousander" — would be sent into the village with the power to veto any action of the local authorities or simply remove them. A village meeting would be called at which the new authority would try — often unsuccessfully — to browbeat the peasants into approving the collective farm and the expropriation of the kulaks. The outsider would lead the local *komnezam* to the farms of those who were to be expropriated and either carry off everything of value or throw the whole family — men, women and children, into the snow. Those who were dekulakized were often shunned by their neighbors who had been threatened with being themselves dekulakized if they ever helped a kulak.⁶¹ Simultaneously, the local church was usually closed, the village priest and — if he were considered suspect — the local schoolteacher would either be arrested or run off.⁶² Dekulakization thus meant the decapitation of the village, the elimination of the best farmers and leaders — of anyone who might lead the village in fighting back.

When it came to collectivization, the policy was carried out more vigorously than in Russia. At first the difference seems slight, but it was to grow into a significant one as the following figures on the level of collectivization in Ukraine and Russia show:

	Ukraine	Russia
Late 1929	8.6% of peasant farms	7.4% of peasant farms
Early 1930	65% of peasant farms	59% of peasant farms
Mid-1932	70% of peasant farms	59.3% of peasant farms

And the trend continued until collectivization was completed: by 1935 91.3% of all peasant farms in Ukraine were collectivized, while Russia did not reach the 90% mark until late in 1937.⁶³ The higher level of collectivization in Ukraine is only partially explained by the fact that collectivization of the most important grain producing areas were given priority; collectivization in Ukraine had a special task which the newspaper "*Proletars'ka Pravda*" summed up on January 22, 1930: "to destroy the social basis of Ukrainian nationalism — individual peasant agriculture."⁶⁴

The peasants responded by fighting back. Even the Soviet sources make this clear. According to A.F. Chmyga, the number of "registered kulak terrorist acts" in Ukraine (and the regime tended to dub any peasant it did not care for a kulak) grew fourfold from 1927 to 1929, with 1,262 such acts reported in 1929.⁶⁵ During the first half of 1930, there were more reports of "terrorism" than for the whole previous year — over 1,500.⁶⁶ Later figures are unavailable, perhaps because they became so numerous that officials could no longer keep count. Defectors who had worked in the village as representatives of the regime speak of Communists being found with their bellies cut open and stuffed with ears of wheat.⁶⁷ There are numerous cases in which the women of the village, perhaps feeling they were less likely to be arrested, took it upon themselves to expel the local administration, abolish the collective farm, and take what had been taken from them. Such cases were so widespread as to become proverbial as the *babs'ki bunty*.⁶⁸

Whatever expectations the regime might have had at the beginning of the collectivization campaign, the transition from individual farms to large *kolkhozy* was not productive but extractive; simply taking everyone's animals and implements to the center of the village and proclaiming them socialized did nothing to raise output. The point was to give the regime greater control over the farmers and their produce; after all, it was much easier for the state to take all it wanted from a single threshing room floor than it was to search each individual farmstead. And this is why, while productivity declined, the amount taken by the state ("marketed") rose: although the total Soviet grain harvest of 1932 was significantly below that of 1927, grain "marketings" from that harvest were two and one half times those of 1927-28.⁶⁹

As economic depression deepened in the West, agricultural prices dropped steeply in relation to those of manufactured goods. The Soviet Union, whose entire plan of development was predicated on paying for imported capital goods with the proceeds from agricultural sales, found that a given machine cost far more grain than had previously been the case. This provided a motive for intensifying the exploitation of the peasantry.⁷⁰

Events in Kazakhstan in 1930 seem to have given Stalin the answer to the dilemma of how to obtain more produce and simultaneously deal with troublesome peasants. The Kazakhs, primarily herdsmen, had responded to collectivization by the wholesale slaughter of their livestock. So many starved subsequently that the 1939 Soviet census shows 21.9% fewer Kazakhs in the Soviet Union than there had been in 1926.⁷¹ But resistance among the Kazakhs had ceased. The lesson that famine could be used as a weapon was applied to the Ukrainians in 1933.

This was done by the imposition of grain procurement quotas on Ukraine far out of proportion to the country's share of the total harvest for the Soviet Union. Although Moscow was aware that Ukraine's agriculture was disorganized due to collectivization, the republic was obliged to deliver 2.3 times the amount of grain marketed during the best year before collectivization. In 1930, 7.7 million tons of grain were taken out of Ukraine, 33% of the harvest of 23 million tons. Although Ukraine produced only 27% of all the grain harvested in the USSR, it supplied 38% of the Soviet Union's grain procurements. In 1931, despite a decline in sown area, Moscow kept the same quota of 7.7 million tons and insisted upon its being met even after it became apparent that the harvest was only 18.3 million tons according to official figures, and almost 30% of that was lost during the harvest. Already at this time a conscious policy of leading the Ukrainian countryside to catastrophe can be discerned.⁷²

The 1932 Ukrainian wheat crop was less than two-thirds that of 1930, but still larger than the worst year of the NEP when there had been no famine.⁷³ At the beginning of the year, the Russian press had published editorials insisting that Ukraine could and would have to meet its "backwardness" in procuring grain, and local officials seemed willing to do so.⁷⁴ In any case, frequent attacks on "opportunists" on the local level who "did not want to see the kulaks in the midst" and were not fulfilling their quotas left little to the imagination regarding the fate of those who did not meet the quotas.⁷⁵

Still, the quotas were not met, in spite of the fact that they were lowered three times.⁷⁶ The most draconian measures imaginable were taken against the farmers. On the Union level, the law on inviolability of socialist property, adopted on August 7, 1932, declared all collective farm property "sacred and inviolate." Anyone who so much as gleaned

an ear of grain or bit the root off a sugar beet was to be considered an "enemy of the people" subject to execution or, in extenuating circumstances, imprisonment for not less than ten years and confiscation of all property. A second part of the decree provided for five to ten years in a concentration camp for collective farmers who attempted to force others to leave the kolkhoz. During 1932, 20% of all persons convicted in Soviet legal courts were sentenced under this decree, and Stalin himself called it "the basis of revolutionary legality at the present moment."⁷⁷

In Ukraine a decree of December 6, 1932, singled out six villages which had allegedly sabotaged the grain deliveries. The "blacklist" established by this decree was soon extended in wholesale fashion. It meant the complete economic blockade of villages which had not delivered the required quantity of grain. It specifically provided for the immediate closing of state and cooperative stores and the removal of their goods from the village; a complete ban on all trade in the village concerned, including trade in essential consumer goods and foodstuffs, by kolkhozy, kolkhozniki, and individual farmers; halting and immediately calling in all credits and advances; a thoroughgoing purge of the local cooperative and state apparatuses; the purge of all "foreign elements" and "wreckers" of the grain procurements from the kolkhoz (which at that time was equivalent to being sentenced to death by starvation).⁷⁸

Those who survived the famine do not describe the harvest of 1932 as being anything like a harvest failure, but merely as mediocre. When the first procurements campaign was carried out in August, the overwhelming majority of the peasants in many areas met their norms. Then in October a new levy was imposed equal to half the earlier levy, and the local "two brigades" went around searching and taking whatever they could find. At the beginning of 1933, a third levy was announced, and whatever remained from the earlier levies was taken at this time. Neither food nor seed were left in the village.⁷⁹

There are so many accounts by survivors of the horrors of life in the villages of Ukraine that it is impossible to present an adequate picture here. In some areas, people became bloated as early as the spring of 1932, but the most terrible time was during the winter of 1932-33. Survivors tell of mass death by starvation, of mass burials in pits, of whole villages depopulated, of homeless waifs as well as adults flocking to the towns in order to find something to eat, of railroad stations literally flooded with dying peasants who begged lying down because they were too weak to stand.⁸⁰ Many of the starving tried to get across the border into Russia where bread was available. Iwan Majstrenko, a former Soviet functionary and newspaper editor, recalled the case of two villages across from each other on opposite banks of the river separating Ukraine and Russia, where peasants from the Ukrainian side would swim across at

night in order to purchase bread the following morning, because bread was obtainable only on the Russian side.⁸¹ In order to limit the famine to Ukraine, the political police established border checkpoints along the railroad lines in order to prevent the starving from entering Russia and prevent anyone coming from Russia from carrying food with them into Ukraine.⁸² This meant a de facto "blacklisting," that is, economic blockade, of the entire Soviet Ukrainian Republic.

Graphic portraits of the horrors of village life emerge from the files of the Harvard University Refugee Interview Project, which was conducted during the early 1950's. It should be stressed that the interviewers were not particularly interested in the famine and that the responses were therefore made without any prompting in the course of respondents telling about their life experiences. One rather typical account (case no. 128) is the following:

"...there was the famine in the Ukraine in 1933. We saw people die in the streets; it was terrible to see a dead man, when I close my eyes I can still see him. We had in our village a small church which was closed for services and in which we played. And I remember a man who came in there; he lay down with his eyes wide open at the ceiling and he died there! He was an innocent victim of the Soviet regime; he was a simple worker and not even a kulak. This hunger was the result of Soviet policy."

Other accounts are more graphic, as this one by a Russian woman (case 373):

"Well, in 1933-1934 I was a member of a commission sent out to inspect wells. We had to go to the country to see that the shafts of the wells were correctly installed, and there I saw such things as I had never seen before in my life. I saw villages that not only had no people, but not even any dogs and cats, and I remember one particular incident: we came to one village, and I don't think I will ever forget this. I will always see this picture before me. We opened the door of this miserable hut and there...a man was lying. The mother and child already lay dead, and the father had taken the piece of meat from between the legs of his son and had died just like that. The stench was terrific, we couldn't stand it, and this was not the only time that I remember such incidents, there were other such incidents on our trip..."

Nor were such horrors confined to the countryside. Cannibalism was even known in the cities, as a worker (case 513) described in the following account of what he saw:

"I remember a case in 1933. I was in Kiev. I was at that time at a bazaar — the bazaar was called the Besarabian market. I saw a woman with a valise. She opened the valise and put her goods out for sale. Her goods consisted of jellied meat, frozen jellied meat, which she sold at fifty rubles a portion. I saw a man come over to her — a man who bore all the marks of starvation — he bought himself a portion and began eating. As he ate of his portion, he noticed that a human finger was imbedded in the jelly. He began shouting at the woman and began yelling at the top of his voice. People came running, gathered around her, and then seeing what her food consisted of, took her to the militia (police — JM). At the militia, two members of the NKVD went over to her and, instead of taking action against her, they burst out laughing. 'What, what you killed a kulak? Good for you!' And then they let her go."

Nor were the common people the only ones to tell what they saw. Famine was at the time a common topic of conversation within the Soviet elite as well as among members of the foreign press, only a few of whom reported it. One account, no less valuable for coming to us second hand, comes from Khrushchev himself, who stated in his unofficial memoirs smuggled out and published in the West:

"Mikoyan told me that Comrade Demchenko, who was then First Secretary of the Kiev Regional Committee, once came to see him in Moscow. Here's what Demchenko said: "Anastas Ivanovich, does Comrade Stalin — for that matter, does anyone in the Politburo — know what's happening in the Ukraine? Well, if not, I'll give you some idea. A train recently pulled into Kiev loaded with the corpses of people who had starved to death. It picked up corpses all the way from Poltava to Kiev..."⁸³

Of course, Stalin did know. In 1932 Terekhov, a secretary of the KP(b)U Central Committee, reported to him on starvation in the Kharkiv region, and Stalin accused him of telling fairy tales.⁸⁴ Later, both Admiral Raskolnikov of the Black Sea Fleet and General Yakir, commander of the Kiev Military District, both protested to Stalin about the famine and were rebuffed.⁸⁵

According to the 1939 Soviet census, the number of Ukrainians in the USSR had decreased by over three million or 9.9% since the last official census was taken in 1926.⁸⁶ Had there been no famine, there would undoubtedly have been a substantial increase in population. Between 1897 and 1926 the Ukrainian population — despite the demographic catastrophes of the First World War, revolution, civil war,

and 1921 famine — the Ukrainian population grew an average of 1.3% a year.⁸⁷ In 1958-59, the Ukrainian population of Soviet Ukraine had a natural rate of population growth of 1.39%, but by 1969, the republic's natural rate of population growth had slowed to 0/6%.⁸⁸ Official Soviet administrative estimates on the eve of collectivization show a natural rate of population growth for the Ukrainian republic declining slightly during the NEP from 2.45% a year in 1924 to 2.15% in 1928, but even in 1931 it was still 1.45%.⁸⁹ And since Ukrainians were concentrated in the countryside where the birth and population growth rates tended to be higher, their natural rate of population growth would be expected to be higher than that for the republic as a whole.

The magnitude of the demographic catastrophe suffered by the Ukrainians is all the more sharply brought into focus when we compare Soviet population figures from 1926 and 1939 for the three East Slavic nations and the USSR as a whole:

	1926 population	1939 population	% change
USSR	147,027,900	170,557,100	+15.7
Russians	77,791,000	99,591,500	+28.0
Byelorussians	4,738,900	5,275,400	+11.3
Ukrainians	31,195,000	28,111,000	-9.9 ⁹⁰

Comparison with the Byelorussians is particularly significant, since their purely political fate was very similar to that of the Ukrainians, they faced the same pressures to assimilate themselves to Russian nationality, but they did not go through the famine. Indeed, we have seen that until the famine the natural population growth for Ukrainians, although gradually declining, was significantly higher than the actual rate of Byelorussian population growth for the period. Others will have to calculate as best they can a more precise figure for the total number of Ukrainians who perished during the famine, but given the demographic evidence, 5 to 7 million dead seems a conservative estimate.⁹¹

Actually, it is possible that Soviet figures understate the losses suffered by the population. An official census was also made in 1937 but withdrawn before distribution, undoubtedly because it showed too clearly the magnitude of the losses suffered by the Soviet population, and it is not at all beyond the realm of possibility that those who prepared the 1939 census would have preferred to inflate their figures a little to the risk of being arrested as were their predecessors two years earlier.

Far higher estimates of mortality come from Westerners who claimed to have been given figures by Soviet officials off the record. Adam J. Tawdul, a Russian born American citizen who moved in the highest circles of Soviet society thanks to a pre-revolutionary acquaintance with Skrypnyk, claimed that Skrypnyk told him 8 million peasants had

starved to death in Ukraine and the North Caucasus, and the famine was not yet over when Skrypnyk committed suicide.⁹² Other Soviet officials gave him a figure of 8 to 9 million dead for Ukraine and the North Caucasus, plus an additional million or more for other regions.⁹³ William Horsley Gannet, the British psychologist who was in Russia studying with Pavlov, stated that one official told him that as many as 15 million might have perished.⁹⁴ The 10 million figure even comes out of Stalin's mouth, although the dictator did not actually say that so many had died. Winston Churchill recorded the following conversation which he had with Stalin:

"Tell me," I asked, "have the stresses of this war been as bad to you personally as carrying through the policy of the collective farms?"

This subject immediately aroused the Marshal.

"Oh, no," he said, "the collective farm policy was a terrible struggle."

"I thought you would have found it bad," said I, "because you were not dealing with a few score thousands of aristocrats or big landowners, but with millions of small men."

"Ten millions," he said, holding up his hands.⁹⁵

Even if such an estimate did circulate among the Soviet elite, the fact is that even those who circulated them had not way of knowing the precise extent of the population loss. Regulations requiring the registration of burials could have made such knowledge possible, but by all accounts the peasants concluded that the dead were not afraid of even the GPU and buried their neighbors heedless of the regulations. All we can say with certainty is that millions died, that the Ukrainian people lost ten percent of their number and were thereby quite literally decimated.

FAMINE AS A TOOL OF NATIONALITY POLICY

To be sure, all the peasants of the Soviet Union faced hard times in 1933, and there was mass starvation not only in Ukraine but also in the North Caucasus *krai* (including the Kuban) and along the Volga. However, the North Caucasus was then a largely Ukrainian area when Ukrainianization had been carried out during the 1920's, while its Cossacks had supported Kaledin in 1917 and provided the base for Denikin's Volunteer Army. The Volga contained the so-called Volga German communes, and, in any case, mortality there seems to have been far lower than in Ukraine and the North Caucasus. The point is that the areas affected by the man-made famine all contained groups which could

plausibly be considered hinderances to Stalin's plan to resurrect a politically homogeneous Russian empire. It did not, strictly speaking, correspond with the main grain producing areas, as would be expected were it solely a question of intensified extraction solely motivated by economic concerns: there was no famine in the Central Black Soil Region of Russia, while in Ukraine it extended into Volhynia and Podilia, hardly part of the basic grain producing area of the USSR.

Some Russian emigrants have expressed the contrary view that the geography of the famine was essentially accidental and attempt to explain the fact that Russia did not suffer famine was because the population there lived on potatoes. It is true that potatoes were more plentiful in Russia than in Ukraine. They played a lesser role in the diet of Eastern Ukrainians than in Russian or West Ukrainian diets, and it is possible that this circumstance might well have had some effect. Yet claims that this was a major factor seem dubious because, had the regime's motive been primarily economic rather than national, it would surely have allowed foodstuffs like potatoes which had little marketable value to be brought into Ukraine, if only by "bagmen" traveling by train, while in fact border checkpoints were established along the Russo-Ukrainian border, and food being carried by passengers into Ukraine was seized. While the lower consumption of potatoes by Eastern Ukrainians probably made the regime's task somewhat easier, it does not in any way refute the evidence that the Russian Communist regime placed Ukraine on a de facto blacklist in order to teach the Ukrainian peasants, as William Henry Chamberlin put it, "a lesson by the grim method of starvation."⁹⁶

If we ask ourselves which national groups were most likely to constitute a threat to the new centralized and Russified Soviet Union which Stalin was creating, we arrive at the following: Ukrainians, second only to the Russians in numbers, they had fought a stubborn and protracted war for national independence and succeeded in turning Ukrainianization into a kind of surrogate independence under Skrypnyk; the Kuban and Don Cossacks who had first given the White counterrevolution its base; and the Germans who had welcomed the 1918 German occupation in Ukraine, might plausibly have been expected to behave similarly in the future and had also joined the Whites in large numbers. These were precisely the groups whose territories were affected by the famine.

It was not until immediately after the famine in late 1934 that Stalin felt strong enough to obviously turn to the Russians as the leading element in the Soviet state by forbidding the unpatriotic school of M. N. Pokrovsky to determine how schoolchildren were taught history. Before he had totally humbled the non-Russian nations it could have still caused

political headaches if he had ordered local officials to distinguish among different national groups within a given territory in carrying out the grain procurements, and for this reason the famine was created on a territorial basis by means of excessively high procurement quotas for the territories in which the "suspect" nations lived. Within those territories, Russians suffered along with non-Russians, but in the final stages of the famine it was Russians who were sent into Ukraine to repopulate the most devastated villages and were given special rations to prevent them from dying along with the indigenous population.⁹⁷

One can find numerous official statements connecting the need to eliminate Ukrainian nationalism with the need to "overcome difficulties in procuring grain," which was the euphemism for creating famine. Indeed, as we have seen, collectivization was intended to destroy the social basis of Ukrainian nationalism, although this was certainly not the reason the policy was adopted. In 1933 the official statements declared that it was necessary to eliminate Ukrainian nationalism because "nationalistic wreckers" were supposedly responsible for the difficulties in procuring grain, not vice versa.⁹⁸ However, the important thing is not which consideration preceded the other in the official statements; in the Bolshevik mind they were like the chicken and the egg: there was neither an answer nor reason to answer the question of which came first. As early as 1925, Stalin wrote: "The nationality question is, according to the essence of the matter, a problem of the peasantry."⁹⁹ Given such a view, crushing the peasants once and for all was the necessary condition for any final solution to the nationality problem.

What was this solution? For the Ukrainian nation it was its destruction as a social organism and political factor. Its elites were destroyed — both its official Communist political leadership and its national cultural intelligentsia: this meant the nation's decapitation. Ukrainianization was ended and the old policy of Russification revived as the Ukrainian language media and institutions shrank: this meant the re-Russification of the cities and the expulsion of Ukrainian nationhood back to the countryside from whence it came and where it was now taught submission by means of starvation. The collective farm was little different from the old pre-emancipation estate: the peasant was tied to the land by means of the internal passport system and forced to give most of its produce to the state which occupied the same position in relation to the peasant as the noble had in relation to his grandfather. Forced collectivization was a tragedy for all who were subjected to it, Russians as well as Ukrainians, but for the Ukrainians it was a special tragedy because, with the virtually complete destruction of their nationally self-conscious elites it meant their destruction as a nation and reduction to the status of what the Germans used to call a *Naturvolk*.

Nevertheless, there is today much cause for hope. Stalin himself gave a decisive blow to what he hoped would be the final solution to the Ukrainian problem when in 1939 he joined hands with Hitler and annexed Western Ukraine. With the expulsion of the Poles from Western Ukraine's cities they became Ukrainian, and the Ukrainian language, still seldom heard in the streets of Kiev and Kharkiv, rules in Lviv and Ternopil. With the Khrushchev thaw the handful of survivors of the Ukrainian literary world of the 1920's again made themselves heard, and later a Ukrainian dissident movement arose. Stalin's attempt to solve the "Ukrainian problem" was not nearly so final as he hoped, but it dealt Ukrainians a blow from which they have still not fully recovered.

¹ Readers familiar with only the official view might read the eloquent historical essay written by a promising Ukrainian philologist in 1966, suppressed by the censor at the last moment and later circulated in Ukrainian *samizdat*: M. Iu. Braichevsky, "Presoedinenie ili vossoedinenie? Kriticheskie zamechanie po povodu odnoi kontseptsii," in Roman Kupchinsky, ed., *Natsional'nyi vopros v SSSR: Sbornik dokumentov* (Munich, 1975), pp. 62-125. This representative presentation of the Ukrainian view of Ukraine's inclusion in the Russian empire is remarkably similar to that found in early Soviet historiography in, for example, M. N. Pokrovsky, *Izbrannye proizvedeniia* (Moscow, 1965-1967), I, pp. 450-517.

² The standard monograph on this subject, containing the text of many official tsarist documents, is Fedir Savchenko, *Zaborona ukrainstva 1876 r.* (Kharkiv-Kiev, 1930). A reprint was published in Munich in 1970.

³ Mykola Porsh, leader of the Ukrainian Social-Democrats, published an interesting sociological inquiry into this question based on the 1897 census: Mykola Porsh, "Vidnosny Ukrainy do inshykh raioniv Rosii na robitnychomu rynku na osnovi pershoho vseliud's'koho perepysu," *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, 1912, No. 2 and 3.

⁴ M. Ravich-Cherkassky, *Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b-ov) Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1923), pp. 3-5, 9-11, 165.

⁵ Peter Kenez, *Civil War in South Russia, 1919-1920* (Berkeley, 1977), pp. 151-160.

⁶ Frantisek Silnický, *Natsional'naiia politika KPSS v period s 1917 po 1922 god* (Munich, 1978), pp. 33-41.

⁷ An easily available bilingual edition of Yurkevych's pamphlet is L. Rybalka, *Rosii's'ki sotsial-demokraty i natsional'ne pytannia* (Munich, 1969).

⁸ Georg Lapchynsky, "Z pershykh dnev vseukraïns'koi radians'koi vlyady," *Letopis revoliutsii*, 1927, No. 5-6, p. 56.

⁹ "Tekst razgovora po priamomu provodu predstavitelia S. N. K. I. Stalina s predstav. Ts. K. U. S. D.-R. P. Porshem i oblastnoi org. R. S. D. R. P. (b) Bakinskim 30 Noabria," 1917 god na Kievshchine: Khronyka sobytii (Kiev, 1928), p. 532.

¹⁰ Oliver H. Radkey, *The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), pp. 29ff.

¹¹ 1917 god na Kievshchine, pp. 434-436; Ravich-Cherkassky, *Istoriia KP(b)U*, pp. 44-46. Later Soviet historiography finds the whole affair so embarrassing that it merely takes the Kharkiv rump as the first congress of Soviets and completely ignores the Kiev events preceding it.

¹² For the text of their declarations denouncing Lenin's recognition of the right to self-determination, see M. N. Pokrovsky, ed., *Ocherki po istorii Oktiabrskoi revoliutsii: Raboty istoricheskogo seminarii Instituta Krasnoi professury* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1927), I, pp. 514-518.

¹³ V. Sadovsky, *Natsional'na polityka Sovitiv na Ukraini* (Warsaw, 1937), p. 77.

¹⁴ *Budivnystvo Radians'koi Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1928), I, p. 11.

¹⁵ See his report in the Kiev Soviet, quoted in Pavlo Khrystiuk, *Zamitky i materialy do istorii ukrains'koi revoliutsii, 1917-1920 rr.* (Vienna, 1921-1922), IV, p. 173.

¹⁶ A. Shliukhter, "Borba za khleb na Ukraine v 1919 godu," *Litopys revoliutsii*, 1928, No. 2, p. 135.

¹⁷ Ravich-Cherkassky, *Istoriia KP(b)U*, p. 170.

¹⁸ "Protvybol'shevyski povstannia na Ukraini v 1921 (Na osnovi ofitsial'nykh bol'shevys'kykh zvidomlen' i inshykh neopublikovanykh materialiv sot. N. P-pa)." *Litopys chervonoii kalyny*, IV: 6 and 9 (1932). O. O. Kucher, *Rozhrom zbroinnoi vnutrishnoi kontrrevoliutsii na Ukraini u 1921-1923 rr.* (Kharkiv, 1971), p. 18.

¹⁹ Mykola Skrypnyk, *Statti i promovy z natsional'noho pytannia* (Munich, 1974), p. 11.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

²¹ Serhii Mazlakh and Vasyl Shakhrai, *Do khvyli: Shcho diet'sia na Ukraini i z Ukrainoiu* (Munich, 1974), p. 222.

²² G. Lapchinsky, "Gomelskoe soveshchanie (vospominaniia)," *Letopis revoliutsii*, 1926, No. 6, pp. 39-44; Ravich-Cherkassky, *Istoriia KP(b)U*, pp. 137-165.

²³ Hryhory Kostiuk, *Volodymyr Vynnychenko ta ioho doba* (New York, 1980), pp. 210-225.

²⁴ Iwan Majstrenko, *Borot'bism: A Chapter in the History of Ukrainian Communism* (New York, 1954), p. 206.

²⁵ Ravich-Cherkassky, *Istoriia KP(b)U*, pp. 5-6.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

²⁷ *Visti VUTsVK*, May 18, 1924, p. 3.

²⁸ See Iuriy Lawrynenko, *Rozstriliane vidrodzhennia: Antolohiia, 1917-1923* (Paris 1959).

²⁹ Janusz Radziejowski, "Kwestia narodowa wpartici komunistycznej na Ukrainie radzieckiej," *Przeglad historyczny*, LXII: 2 (1971), p. 492.

³⁰ See George Luckyj, *Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, 1917-1934* (New York, 1956).

³¹ I. Stalin, *Sochineniia* (Moscow, 1946-1952), VIII, pp. 149-154.

³² Arkadii Liubchenko, "Yoho taicmytsia," *Nashi dni*, II: 5 (May 1943), pp. 4-5, 10-12.

³³ M. Volobueiv, "Do problemy ukrains'koi ekonomiky," in *Dokumenty ukrains'koho komunizmu* (New York, 1962), pp. 132-230. Vsevolod Holubnychy, "M. Volobueiv, V. Dobrohaiev ta ikh oponenty," *Ukrains'kyi zbirnyk*, No. 5 (1956), pp. 7-18.

³⁴ Basic biographical works on Skrypnyk are: Iwan Koszeliwec, *Mykola Skrypnyk* (Munich, 1972); Iu. Babko and I. Bilokobylsky, *Mykola Oleksiiowych Skrypnyk* (Kiev, 1967); M. Rubach, ed., *Skliahamy zaslan' ta borot'by* (*Dokumenty do zhyttypysu i Skrypnyka*) (Kharkiv, 1932).

³⁵ Edward Hallett Carr, *Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926-1929* (New York, 1969-1971), II, p. 66.

³⁶ Iwan Koszeliwec, *Mykola Skrypnyk*, p. 161.

³⁷ Mykola Skrypnyk, *Statti i promovy* (Kharkiv, 1930-1931), II, part 2, p. 247.

³⁸ Mykola Skrypnyk, *Statti i promovy z natsional'noho pytannia* (Munich, 1974), pp. 101-107.

³⁹ The Yavorsky affair is discussed more fully in my forthcoming "Politics and History in Soviet Ukraine, 1921-1933," *Nationalities Papers*, Fall 1982.

⁴⁰ *Pravda*, February 10, 1929, p. 3.

⁴¹ *Istoriik-marksist*, XII (1929), p. 285.

⁴² S. Pidhainy, *Ukrains'ka intelihentsiia na Solovkakh* (n.p., 1947), pp. 58-61.

⁴³ Mykola Skrypnyk, "Pidsumky pravopysnoi dyskusii," *Visti VUTsVK*, June 19, 1927, p. 3.

⁴⁴ Hryhory Kostiuk, "M. Zerov, P. Fylypovych, M. Drai-Khmara," *Ukrains'ka literaturna hazeta*, IV: 1 (January 1960), p. 8.

⁴⁵ Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Ukrainization Movements Within the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, III/IV: 1 (1979-1980), p. 111.

⁴⁶ On the SVU trial, see Geliy Snegirev, "Mama moia, mama...," *Kontinent*, Nos. 11-15 (1977-1978). The indictment was published in *Visti VUTsVK*, February 28 - March 9, 1930. Testimony on "wrecking in linguistics" appeared in *Visti VUTsVK*, March 11, 1930, p. 3.

⁴⁷ See Mykola Skrypnyk, "Kontr-revoliutsiine shkidnytstvo na kul'turnomu fronti," *Chervonyi shliakh*, 1930, No. 4, pp. 141-142.

⁴⁸ "Za yedynu systemu narodnoi osvity: Narkomos - shtab tsil'noho kul'tosvitnoho protsesu (Vseukrains'ka narada okrinspektora Narosvity)," *Visti VUTsVK*, May 10, 1930, p. 3.

⁴⁹ *Kulturne budivnystvo v Ukraini ki RSR: Vazhlyvishi rishennia Komunistychnoi partii i Radians'koho uriadu, 1917-1939* (Kiev: 1959), I, pp. 411, 559-567, 593, 604.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 54-544.

⁵¹ Myroslav Prokop, *Ukraina i ukrains'ka polityka Moskvy* (Suchasnist, 1981), I, p. 32.

⁵² *Visti VUTsVK*, June 22, 1933, pp. 1-2.

⁵³ *Visti VUTsVK*, June 30, 1933, p. 3.

⁵⁴ A. Khvylia, "Vykorenyty, znyshchyty natsionalistychne korinnia na movnomu fronti," *Bil'shovyk Ukrainy*, 1933, No. 7-8, pp. 42-56; A. Khvylia, "Na borot'bu z natsionalizmom na movnomu fronti," *Za markso-lenins'ku krytyku*, 1933, No. 7, pp. 3-26.

⁵⁵ *Visti VUTsVK*, July 6, 1933, pp. 2, 4.

⁵⁶ See, for example, *Visti VUTsVK*, April 16, 1924, p. 1 (lead editorial).

⁵⁷ V. Zatonsky, *Leninovým shliakhom (Promova na poshyrenii naradi sel'horiv "Radians'ke selo")* (Kharkiv, 1926), p. 21.

⁵⁸ See P. S. Zahorsky, P. K. Stoian, *Narysy istorii komitetiv nezamozhnykh selian* (Kiev, 1960).

⁵⁹ *Sekretni sotrudnyky* (secret collaborators).

⁶⁰ P. Lutarewytch, "A Resistance Group of the Ukrainian Underground, 1920-1926," *Ukrainian Review*, No. 2 (1956), p. 90.

⁶¹ A treasure trove of eyewitness accounts of dekulakization, collectivization, and the famine of 1933 is found in the files of the Harvard University Refugee Interview Project which was conducted in the early 1950s. This material broadly confirms collections of eyewitness accounts published by the Democratic Association of Ukrainians Formerly Repressed by the Soviets (DOBRUS) as *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book* (Toronto and Detroit: 1953-1955).

⁶² Vasyl Hryshko, *Moskva sliozam ne vuryt': Tragediia Ukrainy 1933 roku z perspektyvy 30-richchia (1933-1963)* (New York, 1963), p. 22.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁶⁴ Quoted in Fedir Pigido, *Ukraina pid bol'shevys'koiu okupatsiieiu* (Munich, 1956), p. 107.

⁶⁵ A. F. Chmyga, "XV s'ezd VKP(b) o kolektivizatsii khoziaistva i nachalo osushchestvleniia ego reshenii na Ukrainie," *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta*, 1967, No. 6, p. 33; A. F. Chmyga, *Kolkhozne dvizhenie na Ukrainie* (Moscow, 1974), p. 302.

⁶⁶ O. M. Krykunenko, *Borot'ba Komunistychnoi partii Ukrainy za zdiisnennia lenins'koho kooperatyvnoho planu* (Lviv, 1970), p. 55.

⁶⁷ Victor Kravchenko, *I Chose Freedom: The Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official* (New York, 1946), p. 87.

⁶⁸ See, for example, F. Pravoberezhnyi, *8,000,000: 1933-yi rik na Ukraini* (Winnipeg, 1951), p. 42.

⁶⁹ Naum Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR: Plans and Performance* (Stanford, 1949), p. 81.

⁷⁰ This point was made by V. Holub, "Prychyny holodu 1932-1933 rr.," *Vpered: Ukrains'kyi robitnychi chasopys*, 1958, No. 10, p. 6.

⁷¹ V. I. Kozlov, *Natsional'nosti SSSR (Etno-demograficheskii obzor)* (Moscow, 1975), p. 249.

⁷² V. Holub, "Prychyny holodu 1932-1933 rr.," *Vpered*, 1958, No. 10, p. 6.

⁷³ I. F. Ganzha, I. I. Slinko, P. V. Shostak, "Ukrainskoe selo na puti k sotsializmu," in V. P. Danilov, ed., *Ocherki istorii kolektivizatsii sel'skogo-khoziaistva v soiuzykh respublikakh* (Moscow, 1963), p. 199.

⁷⁴ See, for example, the lead editorial in *Pravda*, January 8, 1932.

⁷⁵ See, for example, *Visti VUTsVK*, August 16, 1932, p. 1. One could cite examples of such articles almost indefinitely.

⁷⁶ I. F. Ganzha, et. al., "Ukrainskoe selo na puti k sotsializmu," p. 203.

⁷⁷ Robert Conquest, ed., *Agricultural Workers in the USSR* (London, Sidney, Toronto: 1968), pp. 24-25.

⁷⁸ *Visti VUTsVK*, December 8, 1932, p. 1.

⁷⁹ F. Pravoberezhnyi, *8,000,000* pp. 51-54.

⁸⁰ In addition to the files of the Harvard Refugee Interview Project, the following contain much eyewitness testimony: *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin*; Pravoberezhnyi, *8,000,000*; M. Verbytsky, ed., *Naibil'shyi zlochyn Kremliia: Stvorenyi sovetskoiu Moskvoiu holod v Ukraini 1932-33 RR.* (London, 1952); Iur. Semenko, *Holod 1933 roku v Ukraini: Svidchennia pro vynyshchuvannia Moskvoiu ukrains'koho selianstva* (New York, 1963); Olexa Woropay, *The Ninth Circle (Scenes from the Hunger Tragedy of Ukraine in 1933)* (London, 1954). For western eyewitnesses describing what they saw, see: Malcolm Muggeridge, *Winter in Moscow* (Boston, 1934); William Henry Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age* (Boston, 1934). Other sources are examined by Dana Dalrymple, "The Soviet Famine of 1932-34," *Soviet Studies*, XV: 3, pp. 250-284; XVI: 3, pp. 471-474 (1964-1965). Useful bibliographies are: Alexandra Pidhaina, "A Bibliography of the Great Famine in Ukraine, 1932-1934," *The New Review: A Journal of East-European History*, XIII: 4 (1973), pp. 32-68; "Ukrains'ka literatura pro holod v 1932 i 1933 rokakh," *Vil'na Ukraina*, N. 18 (1958), pp. 42-44. 1932 i 1933 rokakh," *Vil'na Ukraina*, No. 18 (1958), pp. 42-44.

⁸¹ I. Majstrenko, "Do 25-richchia holodu 1933 r.," *Vpered*, 1958, No. 7, pp. 1-2.

⁸² Verbytsky, ed., *Naibil'shyi zlochyn Kremliia*, pp. 89-90. See also: Leonid Plyushch, *History's Carnival: A Dissident's Autobiography* (New York and London: 1977), p. 41.

⁸³ N. S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston and Toronto, 1970), pp. 73-74.

⁸⁴ Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism* (New York, 1972), p. 94.

⁸⁵ Plyushch, *History's Carnival*, pp. 40-41.

⁸⁶ Kozlov, *Natsional'nosti SSSR*, p. 249.

⁸⁷ Robert A. Lewis, Richard H. Howland, and Ralph S. Clem, "The Growth and

Redistribution of the Ukrainian Population of Russia and the USSR: 1897-1970," in Peter J. Potichnyj, ed., *Ukraine in the Seventies* (Oakville, Ontario, 1975), p. 153.

⁸⁸ V. I. Naulko, *Etnichnyi sklad naselennia Ukrains'koi RSR: Statystyko-kartohrafichne doslidzhennia* (Kiev, 1965), p. 85; V. I. Naulko, *Razvitie mezhetnicheskikh svyazi na Ukrainie* (Kiev, 1975), p. 67.

⁸⁹ Naulko, *Etnichnyi sklad*, p. 84.

⁹⁰ Figures from Kozlov, *Natsional'nosti SSSR*, p. 249.

⁹¹ The Russian emigre S. Maksudov is now working on this problem, and we will hopefully have a more accurate figure in the not too distant future.

⁹² Adam J. Tawdul, "10,000,000 Starved in Russia in Two Years, Soviet Admits," *The New York American*, August 18, 1935, pp. 1-2.

⁹³ Adam J. Tawdul, "Russia Warred on Own People," *The New York American*, August 19, 1935, p. 2.

⁹⁴ Dana J. Dalrymple, "The Soviet Famine of 1932-1934: Some Further References," *Soviet Studies*, XVI: 4 (April 1965), p. 471.

⁹⁵ Winston Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate* (Boston, 1950), p. 498.

⁹⁶ William Henry Chamberlin, *Ukraine: A Submerged Nation* (New York, 1944), p. 59.

⁹⁷ Olexa Woropay, *The Ninth Circle*, p. 58.

⁹⁸ Postyshev made this clear in his speech to the November 1933 plenum reviewing the "successes" of 1933 in agriculture, while Khvyliia and Liubchenko made similar statements during the summer of 1933: P. P. Postyshev, "The Results of the Agricultural Year 1933 and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party of the Ukraine," in *Soviet Ukraine Today* (New York, 1934), p. 11. *Visti VUTsVK*, June 22, 1933, p. 2 and June 30, 1933, p. 3.

⁹⁹ I. V. Stalin, *Sochineniia*, VII, p. 72.

11

Robert Conquest

Dr Conquest was educated at Winchester College; the University of Grenoble; and Madgalen College, Oxford, where he took his M.A. and D.Litt. He served in an infantry regiment in World War II, and then for ten years in the H.M. Diplomatic Service, being awarded the O.B.E. He has since been a Fellow at the London School of Economics, Columbia University Russian Research Center, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and elsewhere. He is at present Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Research Associate of Harvard University Ukrainian Research Institute, and Adjunct Fellow of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies. His numerous books on international affairs and Soviet matters include The Great Terror, Power and Policy in the USSR, The Nation Killers, V.I.Lenin and Kolyma: the Artic Death Camps. He has also published a number of volumes of poetry, literary criticism and fiction, and is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature.

TESTIMONY OF DR ROBERT CONQUEST TO THE UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE

The Soviet Union began, in 1930, the establishment of a system of agriculture which abolished the independent farmer. The "collective farm" was designed, above all, with a view to making the rural population work on meagre rations, while taking control of the crop out of their hands. This was enforced against almost total resentment and resistance, by means of terror. Its economic results included the massive destruction of livestock and the creation of a level of grain production as low, even twenty years later and with a large tractor park, as that of the peasant of Tsarist times with his wooden plow. Its human results were a massive loss of life, culminating in a vast genocidal operation against the most independent element of all, the peasantry of the Ukraine, at that time one of the most fertile lands in the world.

Fifty years ago the whole of the Ukrainian countryside, that great plain extending beyond the republic's borders into the Ukrainian-speaking areas of the North Caucasus, was like one vast Belsen, with millions of peasants with swollen bellies and stick-like limbs dying or near death, and thousands of well-fed and well-armed police and Party activists seizing the last of their food and guarding the granaries against them.

While the world was rightly deploring the killing of 269 innocent civilians in the Korean airliner incident, this might be put in profounder perspective by considering that the Kremlin

would have to shoot down an airliner a day for about seventy years to match the death roll of Stalin's terror-famine in the Ukraine, remembered by many survivors now in the USA and elsewhere as though it were yesterday.

The 1932-1933 famine had a number of special characteristics of which the most striking was that it was entirely man-made. The food was there, and was removed. At any moment reserves of grain could have been released, and millions spared.

Again, the famine was completely localized, affecting only the Ukraine and the Ukrainian-speaking regions of the North Caucasus (with a few other lesser special targets such as the Volga Germans). Check points on the Ukrainian-Russian border sought to prevent Ukrainian peasants leaving, and those who succeeded in doing so and came back with bread had the bread confiscated.

This was no longer part of the attack on private farmers which had killed or deported some ten million, the regime's main enemies over the whole USSR, in 1930-1932. By mid-1932 collectivization was virtually complete, and it was the poor, collectivized peasantry of the Ukraine which was now attacked.

The campaign started with a decree issued in mid-1932 setting grain procurement targets which could not possibly be met. Vasily Grossman, the famous Stalin Prize novelist, writes in his last, secret, book Forever Flowing, "I think there has never been such a decree in all the long history of Russia. Not the Tsars, nor the Tatars ... ever promulgated such a terrible decree. For

the decree required that the peasants of the Ukraine, the Don and the Kuban be put to death by starvation, put to death along with their little children".

First all the grain was taken; then even the seed grain; then the houses and yards were searched and dug up, and any little store of bread seized. They lived on a few potatoes; then on birds and cats and dogs; then on acorns and nettles; and in early spring they died.

We have hundreds and hundreds of accounts of the horrors of the time, of infants dying in their mother's arms, of executions for taking a few ears of corn, of families and whole villages perishing, of cannibalism, of emaciated orphaned children -- the "homeless ones" -- roaming the countryside in bands.

There is no doubt that this was a conscious act of terror against the Ukrainian peasantry. Stalin had called the peasants the crux of the national question, and over this period the Ukrainian villages were persistently denounced for harbouring nationalists. At the same time, the other strong-point of Ukrainian nationality, the country's educated elite, was attacked: the cultural institutions were purged, sometimes even dissolved, and hundreds of leading writers and academics made public or private "confessions" and went to the execution cellars or the labour camps; and the independent Ukrainian Orthodox church was similarly crushed.

Even on the inflated official Soviet figures of the faked 1939 census, there is a deficit of 10-11 million Ukrainians in this decade; and the actual deaths in the terror-famine can be

estimated with reasonable accuracy as about 7 million, of which 2-3 million were children, mainly under six or seven years old.

Stalin's knowledge of what was going on has sometimes been questioned, just as there are those who hold that Hitler was unaware of the Final Solution. In fact, it is perfectly clear that he had accurate reports from a variety of sources: indeed in Khrushchev's time Pravda gave a clear account of such first hand reporting to him by a prominent Ukrainian Communist. His aim was to crush the Ukraine, his method that practiced by Jenghiz Khan and Tamerlane, the "laying waste" of the refractory nation.

Ukrainians in the West refer to the period as the "forgotten Holocaust". It was well reported at the time in the West -- by Malcolm Muggeridge, for instance -- but Stalin simply denied that there was a famine, and took in a few distinguished visitors with show farms, so that progressive Westerners could dismiss, or at any rate forget these events, as George Orwell complained.

One reason for this lack of attention is, I think, ignorance in the West of the power of Ukrainian nationhood, the strength of Ukrainian national feeling. In this century the country was only independent for a few precarious years, and we are inclined to think of it as always having been part of, even a natural part of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union. But this is historically and emotionally false.

An important continuity between the Ukrainian holocaust and our own time is provided by the fact that the USSR is ruled by the same regime and party, and that the present Kremlin leaders were

young adults starting their political careers in the early thirties, just at the time when that Party was throwing its younger and more brutalized elements into the struggle with the men, women and children they regarded as class enemies, the starving peasantry of the Ukraine.





NEWS RELEASE

'the fifth estate'
THE UKRAINIAN FAMINE

April 20, 1983

Wednesday, April 27th 8 PM

CBC-TV's ACADEMY AWARD-winning 'the fifth estate' will present a shocking probe into the events surrounding the so-called 'secret Ukrainian holocaust' on Wednesday night, April 27th at 8 PM.

In 1933, an estimated 7 to 10 MILLION UKRAINIANS starved to death in an artificially-created famine secretly executed by the STALIN régime.

Only now, 50 years later, is evidence of this unprecedented holocaust and its cover-up gaining public attention. What precipitated this deliberate mass genocide? Why does Moscow persist in denying that such a famine ever existed? And why were reports of the mass starvation ignored by the western world? These are just some of the questions to be explored by 'the fifth estate' reporter BOB McKEOWN.

To eliminate Ukrainian nationalist resurgence and resistance to forced collectivisation, Stalin confiscated grain harvests and closed off the border to outside food sources. What resulted was the brutal starvation of roughly one-quarter of the entire population.

Even though western governments were fully aware of the systematic starvation, they remained silent for fear of compromising their diplomatic ties with the SOVIET UNION.

Noted British historian MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE was one of the few western journalists to have provided eyewitness accounts of the holocaust while posted in the Soviet Union. Due to the sensitive nature of his revelations, he was attacked in the British press and "couldn't get a job" upon his return to England.

- more -

THE UKRAINIAN FAMINE is produced by OLEH RUMAK. The senior producer of 'the fifth estate' is RON HAGGART. Executive producer is ROBIN TAYLOR.

- 30 -

For additional information, please contact:

Yurko Bondarchuk
TV Press Relations
CBC-TV
Montreal (514) 285-2600

or

Karen Flanagan-McCarthy
Publicist
TV Current Affairs
Toronto 925-3311 ext. 4527

'Fifth estate' chronicles horror in which millions died



MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE
'Population starving'

By **BRENDA ZOSKY**
of *The Gazette*

Is it possible that the Soviets deliberately starved between seven and 10 million people to death in the Ukraine during 1932 and 1933, and that nobody noticed?

That they savagely took Ukrainian grain, exported it or ate it themselves, and drove perhaps one quarter of the population to starvation, madness, cannibalism and death?

That's what CBC's academy award winning *the fifth estate* will tell us tonight at 8.

The 20-minute documentary presents interviews with survivors and other eye-witnesses of what they describe as a man-made famine. There are photos of gruesome mounds of fleshless corpses.

The fifth estate explains that the Soviets starved the Ukrainians in order to overcome their nationalism, and their resistance when the Soviet took their small farms and instituted "collectivism".

The theory is that the West was aware of the tragedy in the Ukraine, which neighbors Poland and borders on The Black Sea, but

refused to do anything about it, firstly because the Soviets were much needed allies, and secondly, because so many key westerners were supportive of the socialist principles on which the U.S.S.R. was founded.

It's all hard to believe.

Especially since we know by now how easy it is for writers plus camera plus the editing process to transmit something less than the truth. And make it seem impeccably authentic.

Crucial phrases can be zapped out of an interview with ease. An authoritative voice over a filmed scene or photos can describe one event in any number of ways — ranging from blatant lies to half-truths to the facts.

The fifth estate, however, is on very solid ground. First of all, they are not exposing the unthinkable events of 1932-33 for the first time. Survivors' accounts have been printed before in academic journals and, 50 years after the events, in the popular media. A few weeks ago, the University of Quebec at Montreal held a seminar for 60 scholars from the U.S., France and Canada. The purpose was to dis-

cuss the famine which, they agreed, killed between five and 10 million people.

Still, reports about these horrific incidents are astonishingly low profile and few in number.

A single sentence in *The World Book Encyclopedia*, for example, refers to the period covered by the program this way: "During the 1930s, crop failures and government seizures of grain resulted in millions of deaths from starvation."

To clarify and support their findings, the CBC attached a collection of academic and other articles to the usual publicity information about the segment. One article, for example, has 51 footnotes.

Author Malcolm Muggeridge was one of the few western reporters who travelled through the Ukraine during 1933. His reports in the *Manchester Guardian* leave little doubt about basic facts: "... The population is, in the most literal sense, starving."

During an interview on tonight's *the fifth estate* he says that what made the famine so "diabolical" was that "it was not the result of

some catastrophe like a flood or a drought..." Rather, he says, it was the result of government policy.

The fifth estate documentary shows how difficult, if not impossible, it is to capture, on film, the horror of events which are outside the capacity of the Canadian-born mind to imagine. After 45 years, and mountains of information about the Nazi holocaust, it is doubtful that North American natives can really grasp what Hitler caused to happen.

The idea that seven, maybe 10, million Ukrainian citizens were denied food to eat because they refused to accept an ideological position is simply unthinkable to those of us who feel outraged when a policeman stops us for speeding.

The fifth estate shows us grotesque photos of bodies. There is a lady survivor who tell us of a baby, sucking at its dead mother's breast.

Then we meet a press officer from the Russian embassy in Ottawa, Alexander Podakin, who says that *the fifth estate* report is "not correct". The program makes it so

emotional, he says, that he almost feels like crying himself. It was the Depression, he explains. "It was a difficult situation for the U.S.S.R. as it was for Canada and the U.S."

"Who is to blame for the pictures of people who died in the U.S. and Canada during the Depression?" he asks, as if, somewhere in a dingy government office in Ottawa, there are photos hidden of Canadian cadavers piled high in mass graves.

The fifth estate segment is worth watching. It seems to be an accurate summary of the facts known to date. But it is more successful as a catalyst for thought about the grim history of the Soviet Union and its obscene betrayal of Marxist idealism, than it is satisfying as an information resource.

It would have been more effective if more time had been given to those historians and analysts who have studied the sordid events. They could help organize an otherwise overwhelming load of information into a comprehensible context.

J

THEIR VIEW

Ukraine slaughter recalled

Fifty years ago this month, the job was complete. Joseph Stalin, a former seminarian, had solved his major problem — in the worst episode of man-made savagery ever recorded in human history, he single-handedly masterminded the elimination of more than six million Ukrainian peasants.

Put simply, he starved them to death. By July, 1933, those who had not died from hunger were simply exterminated in processes that the Nazis perfected 10 years later.

There are no words to describe what happened. But it is as well to remember what went on 50 years ago in Ukraine, just as we cannot allow the story of the Holocaust to be whitewashed from the history books. If these events are forgotten, our sons and grandsons are likely to repeat them.

People of Ukrainian descent are now scattered around the globe, many of them in Winnipeg.

From the latest statistics I have been able to gather from the United Nations, the world population of Ukrainians totals slightly more than 47 million — 37.5-million in Ukraine; 6.8-million in the U.S.S.R.; 600,000 in Canada; 1.2-million in the U.S. and the remainder scattered on all continents.

While the Ukrainian famine was remembered in an excellent television documentary earlier this year, the local community has left the recollection largely to quiet observance, the odd letter-to-the-editor and special church services.

Strange, too, that I looked up the word "famine" in Webster's:

"Extreme scarcity of food."
Thus, the Ukrainian famine is incorrectly labelled. There was no scarcity of food.



Peter Warren

Most of the Ukrainians who died or were killed were peasants, some of them prosperous. In the 1930s, Ukraine produced 38 per cent of the entire U.S.S.R. grain population.

To enforce collectivization and Soviet authority, Stalin stopped all food and seed production in Ukraine, confiscated grain and simply grabbed all other foodstuffs.

Mass starvation began and, as hungry peasants attempted to cross the border into Russia, Soviet Secret Police sealed off the exit routes. Bread and other food were abundant next door, especially for the military.

Throughout this period there was what history has now painted as a sick, sick indifference shown in the West to this slaughter. Some Western reporters lied in their dispatches and, to his everlasting credit, Malcolm Muggeridge (then a foreign correspondent) reported on the massacre accurately.

He was simply not believed, or just ignored.

While far more historical and media attention has been paid to other less-devastating world events (the Irish famine, for example), I have been reminded by Winnipeggers of Ukrainian descent that this 50th an-

niversary must be observed by all of us.

And we must remember as well that a few short years after the so-called Ukrainian famine, another estimated 10-million people were lost to Ukraine in the Second World War (Edgar Snow, *The Saturday Evening Post*, 1945).

During that conflict, almost 5.1-million Ukrainian civilians were killed; 2-million were taken into slave labor in Germany; 1-million Ukrainian Jews lost their lives in combat or under Hitler's genocide policy.

Today, Ukrainian Forum magazine points out that (world-wide) women still vastly outnumber men, 119-100 (U.F., Spring, 1982) as a direct result of the combined efforts of Stalin and Hitler.

And today, the pressure is more subtle.

A letter from a Russian Christian Orthodox believer, Elena Sannikova, to Pope John Paul II and published in the current edition of "Freedom At Issue" begs for papal assistance on behalf Iosif Terelya, a Ukrainian Catholic who has once again been thrown in "jail" by Soviet authorities.

He is still being held in Dnepropetrovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital.

That is why we must remember. That is why we cannot allow the history books to become clouded.

As noted author Alexander J. Motyl ("The Turn To The Right") puts it:

"It is argued that Stalin did not intend to starve six million Ukrainians; it just happened."

"How six million deaths can just happen is unclear. But the argument, fortunately, is academic.

"Jews know best that it doesn't hold water: "They have heard it far too often with regard to a house painter from Braunau."

The holocaust we ignored

It is not easy to conceal the murder of 3 or 4 million people. There are certain logistics involved.

Bodies pile up, graves cannot be dug with sufficient speed. Worst of all there are always the living who can see the evidence in front of their eyes.

And yet . . .

Fifty years ago Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili, alias Josef Stalin, pulled it off — almost.

In creating what was probably the world's first man-made famine, he was personally responsible for the death of — by conservative estimates 3 million and realistically probably closer to 6 million — men, women and children.

And people saw them.

They saw their bodies piled up grotesquely next to roads. They smelled them from miles away as the stench of rotting flesh filled the air, and journalists wrote about it as they managed to see the brutality for themselves.

But it was not believed. And what was written did not get published except in censored form. And the censors were not those of Josef Stalin, but of the *New York Times* and the British paper the *Guardian*.

Last week Brian Mulroney had the temerity to raise the issue on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of this holocaust. He was speaking to the fourth World Congress of Free Ukrainians and he spoke emotionally, forcefully and to the point.

The Soviet Union in the person of one Alexander Podakin, press attache at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, filed an official protest with the department of external affairs, calling the speech a "100% lie" and more importantly, claiming it was a breach of the Helsinki agreements in that Mulroney was addressing a subversive organization aimed overthrowing the legitimate and legal government of the Ukraine — which is the way Podakin referred to the Soviet occupation of the Ukraine in 1920.

Such a protest was ludicrous, an obscenity from the country that has breached the Helsinki accords with such impunity and viciousness at home (the sentencing to psychiatric hospitals of dissenters, the refusal to permit citizens to travel outside the Soviet Union) and abroad, through the continued and flagrant support to terrorist groups operating in Africa, Asia, Central and Latin America, etc.

It will be interesting to see what the response of our meaty-mouthed external affairs department is. It would be even more interesting to see how many times Canada has ever protested to the Soviet Union about its breaches of the Helsinki agreements or filed protests against politicians in the Soviet Union who daily tell lies about our system in order to discredit it.

For readers who, thanks to the *New York Times*, the *Guardian* and most of the Western mainstream press, do not know about the holocaust of the 1933 grain famine in the Ukraine, they should pick up a

copy of the Oct. 31 issue of *Alberta Report*, a news-magazine which, incidentally, is of consistent interest.

That issue's cover story, "The Other Holocaust," details the events in the famine with reminiscences by survivors now living in Canada.

The November issue of *Commentary* also has an article on Mulroney's "100% lie." It is called "The Famine the *Times* Couldn't Find" and is by one Marco Carynyk, a Toronto-based freelance writer who has done a one-man job of getting the Western world to acknowledge, finally, the existence of the famine that was as devastating a holocaust as the dreadful murder of 6 million Jews in World War II.

To sum it up: In 1933 Stalin decided he wanted two things. First, to purchase a lot of heavy machinery from the West, for which he needed grain exports to get currency and credit, and second, to eliminate



Western papers spiked news of Ukraine famine

MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE
Stories mutilated

the kulaks — a term that really applied to wealthy peasant farmers but which Stalin used to include Ukrainian nationalists, intellectuals, anyone who opposed his policies of collectivized farming and anyone whom he regarded as a threat to his power.

And they were. Forced collectivization shrank the grain harvest, quotas were increased to the point that peasants had virtually no food for themselves, about 1 million Ukrainians were liquidated for opposing these policies.

By December 1932 famine was raging in the Ukraine. Peasants were digging up corpses for food even while the Soviets kept Ukrainian wheat rotting in railway depots. Estimates put the death toll at 25,000 a day.

And nobody cared.

Western intellectuals were — as so many are

BARBARA AMIEL



today — under the spell of Marxism. They lacked the clear vision of a Malcolm Muggeridge, who in 1932, a communist sympathizer then reporting for the left-wing *Guardian*, hopped on a train to the Ukraine and was devastated by the tragedy he saw.

He sent back his reports to the *Guardian* which printed them in a mutilated form, sufficiently damaging nonetheless to Muggeridge's left-wing credentials to make it exceedingly difficult for him to get work on his return to England.

Later on, George Orwell would experience the same thing when reporting on communist activities in the Spanish Civil War for the British left-wing magazine *The New Statesman*. They would refuse his work and make Orwell an outcast among democratic socialists.

In America it was the *New York Times* that covered up reports for the U.S. readers. And it continues.

How many people, who know all about the dreadful holocaust by the Nazis, know about the dreadful holocaust by the communists? Why is its study not part of the courses demanded by our multicultural industry, our race relations people, our ministers of education?

And why has the federal government of Canada been so quiet, so inconspicuous in this 50th commemorative year for the victims of the tragedy? Why have the Liberals been so hesitant to take part in services and memorial tributes?

Is it because Ukrainians have not formed important political lobby groups? Is it because, unlike the Jews who have had the good sense and the responsibility to demand that the world learn from their tragedy and have perfected the art of pressure group tactics, the Ukrainians can be dismissed as having little influence?

They died in the millions. The children's bodies were every bit as skeletal, the eyes as big, the bellies as bloated as the heart-rending pictures we see from Africa or Auschwitz.

They deserve, no, they should demand, a place in history.

It is to the credit of Brian Mulroney that he raised the issue. It is to the eternal shame of apologists in Ottawa who, in the name of "dialogue" betray the sacrifice of millions for a few empty political gestures with the Soviets and thus continue to make that terrible Ukrainian holocaust of 1933 the holocaust no one knows.

K



**NICK
AUF DER MAUR**

Events of 1933 worth recalling

On a visit to Kiev a couple of years ago, I asked the Intourist guide how to get to Babi Yar, the killing ground outside the Ukrainian capital where the Nazis massacred Jews and other Ukrainians.

The place had been officially ignored until Soviet poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko published his famous poem *Babi Yar*.

At that time, about 20 years ago, they built an impressive monument to commemorate the deaths of "citizens of Kiev." (No mention was made on the monument that many killed there were killed because they were Jews).

But when I was there, it was evident the authorities wanted to play down Babi Yar. Both the Intourist official and hotel employees made it seem a visit to Babi Yar would take a complicated and time-consuming train trip. (In fact, it was only a 20-minute streetcar ride from the city centre).

But it provided a curious insight into how official Soviet history suffers from constant rewriting and reinterpretation.

Later in that trip, while in Yalta in the Ukrainian Crimea, I inquired about the location of the Valley of Death, made famous by Tennyson's poem *The Charge of the Light Brigade*. The inquiry produced nothing but shrugs and confessions of complete ignorance.

Slaughter of rich peasants

About the only other thing I knew about the Ukraine was the slaughter of the *kulaks* (or *kurku-h*), the rich peasants killed in Stalin's forced collectivization of farms.

Inquiries about that produced more shrugs, although some dissident Russian Orthodox people I met were aware of it, but only dimly so.

Depending on who one reads, it was estimated that 200,000 to 500,000 landowning peasant families were either killed or deported to remote areas of the Soviet Union. I was vaguely aware of a famine that followed.



**Y. YEVTUSHENKO
Author of 'Babi Yar'**

It seems that not only were Stalin's victims buried, but so was the history of his actions.

But this past weekend, a group of about 60 scholars, from the U.S., France and Canada, staged a two-day seminar at the University of Quebec's Phillips Square building about Stalin's policies in the Ukraine, most particularly about the famine that killed anywhere from five to 10 million people 50 years ago.

Various papers were presented, and discussions held about one of the more horrifying holocausts of this century, one that most people, here or in Eastern Europe, are almost completely unaware of.

Basically, Stalin artificially created famine conditions to break peasant resistance to forced collectivization, and also break Ukrainian nationalist sentiment.

Man-made famine broke out in 1933

After having disposed of the *kulaks*, Stalin imposed huge grain quotas on the collective farms, decreeing that all produce was "socialist state property."

The new state farms were given unrealistically high quotas of grain to be delivered to the state. Zealous young Communist League members and troops guarded the fields and warehouses.

In effect, the Ukraine, once known as "the breadbasket of Europe," was deprived of most of the 1932-33 harvests.

Theft of state property (food) warranted a minimum of five years confinement or, just as often, execution.

As a result, the world's perhaps only man-made famine broke out.

And in the typical fashion of Stalin's Orwellian world, the word *holod*, for hunger or famine, was decreed a "counter-revolutionary rumor."

The historical evidence at the UQAM seminar, organized by the Interuniversity Centre for European Studies, was both chilling and numbing.

Ex-Communist learned hard lesson

At one session I was at, an elderly man with a typical, high-cheekboned Slavic face sat off to the side, eyes glistening with tears.

Afterwards, outside, I spoke to him and asked if he were a survivor of those terrible years.

No, he confessed. He was a Jew who had left Odessa in about 1916 as a boy. In New York first, and then Montreal, he had become a fervent Communist.

In the 1930s, when there were just rumors of what was going on in the Ukraine, he had stoutly defended Stalin, dismissing the stories as lies and capitalist propaganda.

It was only after the Second World War, like a lot of honest Communists in those days, that he accepted the truth of what happened in the Ukraine 50 years ago, and the subsequent Stalin purges that killed perhaps another seven million Ukrainians (including two million Jews).

He had just dropped by the seminar because he felt he should know more about the historical truth, as a sort of atonement.

And he expressed satisfaction that scholars were now involved in salvaging the memory of all those who died.

"Those are things we should never forget," he said.

Trouble is, most people haven't learned enough of the things we shouldn't forget.

As the great 19th century French historian Renan said: "Unfortunately, we tend to remember those things in history we should forget and forget those things we should remember."

Im Magazin: Die harte Welt der Motorradrennen

AZ Postfach, 8021 Zürich, 6. April 1983 51. Jahrgang, Nr. 14 - 52 Seiten

Redaktion und Verlag Tel. 01/297 73 11

DM 3.80 6S 28.- Fr. 2.50

DIE WELTWOCHNE



Nato-Reform dringend

Das westliche Bündnis muss auf eine neue Basis gestellt werden: die Forderung erhebt ein Insider, der es wissen muss: Bundeswehr-General Schmuckle, ehemaliger stellvertretender Nato-Oberbefehlshaber.

SEITE 3

Dumping tut not

Die Schweiz will, entgegen einer Empfehlung, weiterhin ihre schwach radioaktiven Abfälle im Meer versenken. Findet sie keinen Dumping-Partner, wird es kritisch: Die Zwischenlager sind bald randvoll.

SEITE 17

Sonne für jedermann

Gebrauchsgegenstände wie Taschenrechner und Autos, aber auch Spielereien und Gags, allesamt mit Sonnenenergie betrieben, sind heute auf dem Markt erhältlich. Bereits lebt eine ganze Industrie davon.

SEITE 19

Ökumene in Gefahr?

Die Katholische Kirche hat sich ein neues Gesetzbuch gegeben. Willkommenen Anpassungen an die heutige Zeit stehen aber Fortschrittungen gegenüber, welche den Geist der Ökumene blockieren können.

SEITE 21

Das vergessene Verbrechen: 1933 liess Moskau sieben Millionen Ukrainer sterben

Hunger auf Stalins Befehl

In den Jahren 1932/1933 geschah eines der grössten politischen Verbrechen des 20. Jahrhunderts: Josef Stalin trieb Millionen ukrainischer Bauern planmässig in den Hungertod. Dieses grausame Kapitel der Sowjetgeschichte gilt in Moskau bis heute als Staatsgeheimnis - Untersuchungen und Publikationen darüber sind streng verboten. Im Ausland ist es teils nie zur Kenntnis genommen, teils wieder vergessen worden. Den nachfolgenden Bericht verfasste der Historiker Miron Delot, selbst ukrainischer Abstammung, der heute im Ukrainian Research Institute an der Harvard University arbeitet.

trugen. Särge gab es nicht. Den Dorfbewohnern standen weder genügend Bretter noch genügend Nägel oder gar Kräfte zur Verfügung; um auch nur die primitivsten Behälter zu zimmern. Sie schichteten die Verhungerten einfach in grosse Massengräber, Körper über Körper.

Mitglieder zwecks lächerlicher Kontrolle aufs Land. «Genossen Totengräber», wie sie bald genannt wurden, durchschaffelten Haus nach Haus nach vorstocherten, die Verhungerten in Prägeln, Gefängniszellen oder die Verbannung ins Konzentrationslager.

Die Partei tat nichts zur Linderung der Not. Im Gegenteil, sie erinnerte nachdrücklich an die vorgeschriebenen Ablieferungsquoten und schickte 112 000 ihrer gehorsamsten

Sobald die nächste langsam heranwuchs, opferten die Genossen ein

FORTSETZUNG SEITE 10

In der Ukraine der dreissiger Jahre wurden keine Sterberegister geführt. Die präzise Feststellung, wie viele Menschen in der Hungersnot 1932/33 starben, ist somit für immer unmöglich gemacht. Die Zahl der Opfer lässt sich lediglich schätzen, und zwar anhand des Bevölkerungszuwachses in normalen Jahren: Mehr als sieben Millionen - 20 Prozent der ukrainischen Gesamtbevölkerung - dürften es gewesen sein. Fest steht hingegen, dass die Hungerkatastrophe künstlich erzeugt worden ist. Sie war keine Folge einer Dürre oder anderer widriger Naturereignisse. Sie war nicht einmal eine direkte Folge der Errichtung landwirtschaftlicher Kolchosen. Die ukrainische Ernte des Jahres 1932 fiel ganz hervorragend aus. Auch gab es in der gesamten Sowjetunion ausserhalb der Ukraine genug zu essen. Die UdSSR exportierte sogar riesige Mengen von Lebensmitteln und verkaufte sie zu billigen Preisen auf dem Weltmarkt.

die Ukrainer sofort gegen die russische Herrschaft rebellieren und sich für selbständig erklärten. Die Sowjetrussen gingen damals nach durchaus zaristischer Manier vor. Statt ihre eigenen, lauthals verkündeten Parolen der völkischen Selbstbestimmung zu befolgen, eroberten sie das reiche Land mit Waffengewalt zurück.

Und das zeigte sich erst recht während der zwanziger Jahre, in denen sich der russische Druck etwas lockerte. Sofort schoss der ukrainische Nationalismus wieder üppig ins Kraut. Die Intellektuellen forcierten ihre traditionellen Bindungen an den Westen bis hin zum Slogan «Weg von Moskau». Selbst die Parteipolitiker ereiferten sich über den Kolonialstatus der Ukraine und verlangten vom Kreml mehr Rücksicht auf den andersartigen Volkscharakter.

Nun endlich sahen die Sowjets ihre grosse Chance zur Revanche. Die forcierte Kollektivierung des Jahres 1932 schien ihnen das richtige Instrument, die aufmüpfigen Ukrainer ein für allemal zu disziplinieren. Der harte Winter 31/32 dauerte für die Ukraine aussergewöhnlich lang. Der Frühling kam zu spät. Die Bauern hatten bereits das allerletzte bisschen Korn verbraucht, das ihnen nach den staatlichen Beschlagnahmungen geblieben war. Hunger breitete sich aus. Scharen verzweifelter Frauen und Kinder durchwühlten die abgerenteten Kartoffelfelder, um vielleicht irgendwo einen vergessenen, wenngleich gefrorenen Bredel aufzu-tobern. Abgezehrte, zerzauste Männer vom Land, Axt und Schaufel über der Schulter, irrten durch die Städte und fragten nach Arbeit - vergeblich. Niemand wagte es, sie als Gärtner oder Strassenkehrer zu beschäftigen. Ein neuer Erlass untersagte dies ausdrücklich.

Auf den Dorffriedhöfen herrschte Dauerbetrieb. Man sah merkwürdige Begräbniszüge: Kinder, die auf ausgesetzten Handwagen die Leichen ihrer Eltern brachten; Väter und Mütter, die ihre toten Kinder in den eigenen Armen

Kollektivierungskrieg gegen freie Bauern

Die Vorgeschichte der ukrainischen Tragödie begann mit jenem 27. Dezember 1929, an dem Josef Stalin, die totale Kollektivierung der Landwirtschaft befahl. Dieser Beschluss bedeutete nicht nur eine Kriegserklärung an die Adresse der freien Landwirte. Er richtete sich in erster Linie gegen die nationale Bewegung in der Ukraine, die sich hauptsächlich auf die Bauernschaft stützte. Stalin selber schrieb: «Ohne Bauern gibt es keine starke nationale Strömung. Genau das meinen wir, wenn wir sagen, dass die Frage des Nationalismus in Wirklichkeit eine Frage der Bauern ist.» Die Ukrainer, muss man wissen, waren zum Ärger Moskaus nicht müde zu kriegen. Trotz der langen Zugehörigkeit zu Russland hielten sie hartnäckig an ihrer Sprache, ihrer Literatur, ihrer Kunst und vor allem an ihrer Hoffnung auf nationale Unabhängigkeit fest.

Das hatte sich während der Oktoberrevolution gezeigt, als



Lebensmittelmarkt in Charkow: Jede kostbare Flasche Milch krampfhaft umklammert

Das vergessene Verbrechen: 1933 liess Moskau sieben Millionen Ukrainer sterben

Hunger auf Stalins Befehl

nicht zu lesen nannten: nicken. our-Re-Gewerk-llenver- n Fünf- n und, 1 massi- mm in- die Ar- Millien- he- Die e Arbeit Verwal- ng und durch- inforde- glich ver- lichkeit

ähnlich- letzten blagun- iers der wander- sig von e, ver- Defini- ftlichen in den Regie- ten der ch Weber ge- den ar- in Krä- n Sho- aus, wo n Fran- kurbe- oft in f Spar- sfonds. ht auf sbeurer eil. Der den die e durch ter den i sofort Dementi ch beru- f «Frei- chichte: e «ver- freigung in einem Vas sich id oder erisches mskep- n Stim- i mit je- uch ein ehende r durch sperren; izer der den zu ann vor smanö- apierten Roy ederho- is wäre an der liberalen Die AJ- der, aber floren. Die David Schmid

und tcauso heuchlerisch die Ablehnung der Cruise-Raketen und die Verbannung der amerikanischen Nuklearbasen von einem Einverständnis mit den Nato-Alliierten abhängig gemacht. Wenn- setzungen lassen sich aus einem neuen «sozialen Pakt» zwischen Labour-Partei und Gewerkschaften erwarten. «Partei-Wiederaufbau» lautet sein harmloser Titel, und wer nicht zwischen den Zeilen zu lesen versteht, könnte zu manchen Punkten mit dem Kopfe nicken. Dass eine künftige Labour-Regierung zusammen mit Gewerkschaften und Industriellenver-

Bankverein NOTIZ

Wiederrum stellt der Bankverein während der beiden bedeutenden Handels- und Industriemessen im Frühjahr Schweizer Ausstellern seine Dienste an Ort und Stelle zur Verfügung:

Hannover-Messe
(13. - 20. April 1983)
Standort des Bankvereins:
Stand Nr. 1 im "Internationalen Treffpunkt" (off. Schweizer Informationsdienst), Tel. 89 32 02

Mailänder-Messe
(14. - 23. April 1983)
Standort des Bankvereins:
Centro Internazionale Scambi e Incontri (CISI) / Salone delle Telecomunicazioni

Die Präsenz des Bankvereins gewährleistet eine zuverlässige Beratung in allen Fragen, die für Auslandsgeschäfte von Bedeutung sind.

 **Schweizerischer Bankverein**
Société de Banque Suisse

Hunger auf Stalins Befehl

FORTSETZUNG VON SEITE 7

genannten «Kommunistischen Selbstschutz» zwecks Bewachung der Kolchosfelder. Ausgerüstet mit Schrotflinten saßen sie Tag und Nacht auf eigens errichteten Wachtürmen und schossen auf jeden Dorfbewohner, der etwas vom halbreifen Korn in den Mund steckte. Die Bauern mussten sich nach beendeter Feldarbeit einer peinlichen Leibvisitation unterziehen.

Gleich mehrere Urteile sollten die Hungernden von der Ernte fernhalten. Am grausamsten war wohl das «Gesetz zum Schutz des sozialistischen Eigentums» vom 7. August 1932, das sämtliche Kolchosen zum «sozialistischen Eigen-

tum» erklärte. Fortan galt es als schweres Verbrechen, liegende geerntetes Korn auf bereits abgeernteten Äckern zu sammeln, trockenes Reisig aus dem Wald zu holen, in Flüssen zu fischen oder auch nur Unkraut am Wegrand zu pflücken. Zuwiderhandelnden drohte Konfiskation des gesamten Besitzes und Tod durch Erschiessen. Begnadigung war ausdrücklich untersagt.

Bis zum September erhielten die Bauern nicht ein einziges Pfund Getreide. Die Ernte wurde direkt von den Dreschmaschinen zu den staatlichen Sammelpunkten nahe der nächsten Bahnstation geschafft. Die Erfüllung der Norm hatte abso-

lute Priorität. Erst nach Abschluss aller Feldarbeiten durften sich die Kolchosbauern den Rest der Naturalien teilen - im Durchschnitt gab es ein halbes Pfund Weizen pro Arbeitstag, wobei gesagt werden muss, dass die ukrainische Dorfbevölkerung in ihrer Ernährung fast ausschliesslich auf selbstgebackenes Brot angewiesen war, weil Fleisch, Eier, Fett, Milchprodukte etc. fehlten. Gleichsam um das Elend noch durch Schmach zu krönen, erliess die Regierung ein weiteres Gesetz, das den Verkauf lebenswichtiger Gebrauchsgüter wie Salz, Seife, Kerosin, Streichhölzer etc. an jene Bauern untersagte, die ihr Vjel zu hoch angesetztes Ablieferungs-Soll nicht hundertprozentig erfüllt hatten.

Natürlich schmolz die mageren Ration rasch dahin. Noch so penible Einteilung half nichts.

Bereits im Hochwinter hielt der Hunger von neuem Einzug. Scharen von Kindern zogen durch die Dörfer und bettelten um Kartoffelschalen und sonstige Abfälle.

Reiseverbot für Verhungernde

Der Weg in die Stadt war jetzt endgültig versperrt. Miliz und GPU (Geheimpolizei) blockierten die Zufahrtsstrassen. Wer durch ländliche Kleidung auffiel, musste sich ausweisen und einen der anerkannten Reisegründe nennen. «Hunger» zählte nicht dazu. In ihrer Verzweiflung schlugen sich viele Dörfler wenigstens bis zum nächsten Bahnhof oder zum nächsten Bahndamm durch. Dort lagerten sie tage-, auch wochenlang. Sofern sie noch irgendein wertvolles Stück besas-

sen, warteten sie auf einen Käufer. Sofern sie nichts mehr hatten, hofften sie auf einen Bissen Brot oder irgend etwas Essbares. Einige ganz Wagemutige versuchten eine Fahrkarte zu ergattern. Sie wollten bloss fort, irgendwohin, wo es keinen Hunger gab. Doch das erwies sich als beinahe unmöglich. Billette bekamen nur jene, die eine schriftliche Reiseorder ihrer Kolchosa vorweisen konnten. Mit Ende Dezember 1932 trat sogar ein einheitlicher «Passport» für alle Sowjetbürger in Kraft. Ohne ihn war es glattweg unmöglich, den Aufenthaltsort zu verlassen, eine Anstellung zu finden oder Lebensmittelmarken zu beziehen. Die einzigen, die keinen derartigen «Passport» ausgehändigt bekamen, waren die Kolchosbauern.

Zu Jahresbeginn 1933 versank das Gros der ukrainischen

Landbevölkerung in völlige Apathie und Hoffnungslosigkeit. Die Bauern kämpften nicht mehr um ihr Leben. Sie gaben sich auf. Erschöpft und frierend - auch das Heizmaterial war ja längst ausgegangen - blieben sie auch tagsüber in den Betten. Der Tod schien ihnen nicht mehr schrecklich. Manche betrachteten ihn sogar als wohlverdiente Gottesstrafe dafür, dass sie während der Revolution auf seiten der Kommunisten gestanden hatten.

Wie im Jahr zuvor dauerte der Winter lang. Die eisigen Frühjahrswinde brachten wiederholt neue Schneefälle. Die Dörfer versanken in Schlamm und Schneematsch, der des Nachts zu harten Klumpen gefror. Mit der allmählichen Schneeschmelze kamen dann auch die vielen vorher verschütteten Toten ans Licht.

AUSLAND

Seite 9



Hungerleichen im Strassenstaub wurden alltäglich

Die lagen in den Höfen, auf den Wegen, auf den Feldern. Die Überlebenden bildeten spezielle Bestattungsbrigaden. Ihre Aufgabe war es, die Toten aus den Häusern und Betten zu holen, ehe das warme Wetter kam und die Seuchengefahr vergrösserte.

Tag für Tag also rumpelten von klapprigen Pferden gezogene Leiterwagen die Dorfstrassen entlang, um die Leichen einzusammeln wie die städtischen Müllmänner den Müll. Augenzeugen haben diese gespenstigen Szenen später noch oft geschildert. Da hielt ein Kutscher seinen Wagen vor dem ersten Haus an. «Habt ihr Tote?» rief er laut. Irgend jemand erschien am Fenster und schüttelte den Kopf - nein, keine Toten bei uns. Der Kutscher fuhr zum nächsten Haus. «Habt ihr Tote? Stille. Kein Laut, kein Zeichen.

Es war unnötig, nochmals zu fragen. Der Kutscher schlug die Tür ein und machte sich ans Herausschleppen der Leichen. Manchmal warf er zwei Körper auf den Wagen, manchmal eine ganze Familie mit drei, vier Kindern...

Überladene Frucht-bäume, tote Dörfer

Die noch Lebenden beneideten die Toten. Meist zu Skeletten abgemagert, konnten sie sich kaum auf den Beinen halten. Sie waren zu müde, um aufzustehen, zu müde, um auch nur zu reden. Ihre Gesichter glichen Gumimasken. Die Haut umspannte gelblichgrau den Schädel, die Augen starrten glasig aus tiefen Höhlen.

Absurderweise setzten die offiziellen «Getreidebeschaffungskommissionen» auch in-

itten der grossen Katastrophe ihre Tätigkeit fort. Sobald sich das Strassennetz als halbwegs trocken und benützbar erwies, tauchten sie von neuem auf, forderten die totale Erfüllung der Ablieferungspflicht und durchwühlten auch noch die Hausgärten nach vergrabenen Lebensmitteln. Zu finden freilich war nichts mehr.

Dem kalten Frühling folgte ein «wunderschöner» Sommer, heiss und sonnig. Die Obstbäume bogen sich unter der Last reifer Früchte. Am Wegrand standen die Blumen halbmeterhoch. Die Natur signalisierte Überfluss. Die ukrainischen Dörfer aber lagen öd und verlassen da. In Dutzenden von ihnen regte sich überhaupt nichts. Keine Tür ging auf, kein Schornstein rauchte, kein Fenster wurde geöffnet. Denn alle einstigen Bewohner waren...

Le génocide dénoncé par la presse francophone

«Lorsqu'on voit que l'Ukraine est dévastée par la famine, permettez-moi de hausser les épaules!», déclarait froidement le Français Edouard Herriot au retour de son «trionphal voyage» en Union soviétique, en septembre 1933. On lui avait présenté un tableau idyllique d'abondance dans le plus pur style des villages du Prince Potempkine, en lui dissimulant soigneusement la présence de millions de personnes mourant de faim.

La presse, elle, ne fut pas dupe. C'est en avril 1933 que le *Daily Express* et la *Kölnische Zeitung* tirèrent la sonnette d'alarme: «*Nous manquons de pain*», crient alors des paysans affamés venus à Moscou à la recherche de nourriture. Les informations se font plus précises et, dès le 29 août, *Le Matin* de Paris est en mesure de dénoncer le génocide perpétré par les autorités soviétiques; Suzanne Bertillon, dont les articles seront repris dans une bonne partie de la presse européenne, écrit notamment que «*c'est pour réduire à néant tous les éléments irrédentistes que le gouvernement soviétique a organisé systématiquement l'effroyable famine qui sévit actuellement, dans l'espoir de détruire définitivement tout un peuple qui n'a eu d'autre tort que d'aspirer à la liberté*».

Le parrain d'André Muret donne l'alarme

En Suisse romande, l'opinion publique fut aussi rapidement alertée. Dans la *Gazette de Lausanne* du 2 août, un lecteur de ce journal, Emile Muret, ancien banquier à Saint-Petersbourg et parrain d'André Muret, relève «à propos de la famine en Russie» que «*l'Europe (...) a jusqu'ici gardé le silence*» alors que «*la Société des Nations, qui a maintes reprises s'est occupée de la question de l'esclavage, n'a jamais risqué un geste généreux en faveur des malheureux Russes, victimes d'un régime inhumain*». Le 18 septembre, le quotidien vaudois reproduit en page une «*appel vibrant et une protestation véhémement*» dont on retiendra ce passage: «*Si le peuple meurt de faim en Ukraine, le pays de l'abondance, le grenier de l'Europe, comme on se plaisait à l'appeler autrefois, c'est*

parce que les dirigeants soviétiques le veulent ainsi. Ils construisent leur «nouveau régime économique» sur des millions de cadavres et l'Europe assiste impassible à ce carnage sous prétexte qu'il ne convient pas de s'immiscer dans les affaires intérieures d'un Etat».

«Les hommes mangent les hommes»

Se fondant sur une dépêche en provenance de Stockholm, Jean Martin, dans le *Journal de Genève* du 17 août, accuse le gouvernement soviétique d'affamer la population rurale pour sauver le régime. Dès le 24 août, *La Suisse libérale* de Neuchâtel décrit en détail les effets de la famine en publiant des extraits de nombreuses lettres expédiées d'Ukraine: «*On meurt ainsi: on tombe dans la rue et tout est fini (...) Il n'y a personne pour enterrer les cadavres qui gisent jusqu'à tomber en pourriture (...) La misère est si grande que les hommes mangent les hommes*». 26 août: le rédacteur de politique étrangère du *Journal de Genève*, Pierre-E. Briquet, évoque à son tour le drame ukrainien dans le quotidien libéral: «*(...) Le régime soviétique ne s'appuie plus en Ukraine que sur le Guépéou et les baïonnettes. Les communistes eux-mêmes se sont tournés contre lui. Cette situation est critique pour Moscou, au moment où la famine décime l'empire de la frontière roumaine à l'Oural et au Caucase. L'Ukraine reste, en cet été 1933, l'été de la famine, le point névralgique de l'Europe Orientale. Autour d'elle se nouent des intrigues politiques et des calculs savants, tandis que par centaines de milliers ses paysans affamés meurent sur la terre grasse. Et plein d'inquiétude, Staline remet à l'un des chefs du Guépéou, Akouloff, des pouvoirs discrétionnaires. A nouveau la terreur rouge déserte sur l'Ukraine.*»

La chasse aux coupeurs d'épis

Deux jours plus tard, *La Liberté* de Fribourg commente en ces termes la décision du gouvernement soviétique de priver les kolkhoses de leur récolte: «*Au beau milieu des champs sont édifiées des tourelles d'observation, garnies de troupes et*

Le Matin

LA FAMINE EN UKRAÏNE

Systématiquement organisée, elle tend à la destruction d'un peuple dont le seul crime est d'aspirer à la liberté

Voici quelques données sur l'effroyable famine de l'Ukraine

Par Suzanne Bertillon



même de mitrailleuses pour empêcher le paysan de toucher à la récolte qu'il vient de produire. Toute cette mobilisation, accompagnée de troupes de cavalerie et même d'avions, est dirigée contre les coupeurs d'épis pour les empêcher de s'approprier leur bien, cet acte étant puni des peines les plus sévères. La population, après avoir cruellement souffert de la récente famine et prévoyant le retour de ce tragique fléau, conduit en ce moment une lutte acharnée contre un gouvernement pour lequel la victoire est une question de vie ou de mort».

Ces premières informations sur la famine de 1932-1933 en Ukraine feront place à des études plus fouillées dès le milieu des années trente, mais il faudra attendre la mort de Staline et l'écho rencontré en Occident par les écrits de dissidents comme Soljenitsyne pour que l'opinion publique réalise toute l'ampleur de ce drame.

J.-Ph. Ch.

Le premier quotidien français qui dénonça la famine en Ukraine (tiré d'une étude réalisée par Arcadie Joukovsky, professeur à l'Université de la Sorbonne nouvelle - Paris III, juin 1983. Autres sources consultées: la collection de la *Gazette de Lausanne* et «*Le Mois slave*» de septembre 1933.

Dates

RENDEZ-VOUS

- août. Nigéria : élections de la Chambre des représentants.
- août. Genève : ouverture de la conférence sur la Palestine. La conférence durera jusqu'au 7 septembre.
- août-2 septembre. Université politique des jeunes démocrates sociaux à Forcalquier (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence), avec le 31 août M. Raymond Barre, le 1er septembre M. Jean Lecanuet, président de l'U.D.F., et le 2 septembre M^{me} Simone Veil.
- 30 août. Université politique d'été du parti républicain à La Baudière. « Pour une économie d'entreprise ».
- août. Philippines : enterrement à Manille du chef de l'opposition Benigno Aquino, assassiné dimanche 21 août.
- août. conseil des ministres consacré notamment à la politique de l'immigration.
- août. Israël : début du voyage du chancelier d'Allemagne fédérale, Helmut Kohl. Il séjournera à Jérusalem jusqu'au 4 septembre.
- août. Pologne : troisième anniversaire de la signature des accords de Gdansk.
- septembre. R.F.A. : grande manifestation pacifiste dans le Bad-Wurtemberg.

Sports

- 0 août au 11 septembre. Tennis : championnats internationaux des Etats-Unis (tournoi de Flushing-Meadow) et le New-York.
- 1 août. Football : championnat de France (7^e journée).

Le Monde

Service des Abonnements
5, rue des Italiens
75427 PARIS CEDEX 09
C.C.P. Paris 4207-23

ABONNEMENTS
1 mois 6 mois 9 mois 12 mois

FRANCE
341 F 554 F 767 F 980 F

TOUS PAYS ÉTRANGERS
PAR VOIE NORMALE

601 F 1 074 F 1 547 F 2 020 F

ÉTRANGER
(par messagerie)

BELGIQUE-LUXEMBOURG
PAYS-BAS

361 F 634 F 887 F 1 140 F

IL - SUISSE, TUNISIE

454 F 779 F 1 195 F 1 430 F

Par voie aérienne
Tarif sur demande.

Les abonnements qui peuvent par chèque
postal (trois virements) ou par mandat
international (à la demande).

Changements d'adresse devront être
accompagnés (deux semaines ou plus).

Les abonnements sont terminés à la date
de la demande une semaine au moins
avant leur départ.

Joindre la dernière bande d'envoi à
toute correspondance.

Veuillez avoir l'obligeance de
rédiger tous les noms propres en
cyrilliques à l'imprimerie.

LES TARIFS DU MONDE À L'ÉTRANGER

Nigéria, 3 DA ; Maroc, 3,80 dir. ; Tunisie,
100 mc. ; Allemagne, 1,80 DM ; Autriche,
5 sch. ; Belgique, 28 fr. ; Canada, 1,10 \$;
Danemark, 340 F ; Espagne, 100 pes. ; E.U., 95 c. ;
Grèce, 85 dr. ; Irlande, 80 p. ;
Liban, 200 L. ; Liban, 380 P. ;
Lussembourg, 27 f. ; Norvège,
100 kr. ; Pays-Bas, 175 f. ; Portugal,
50 esc. ; Suède, 340 F ; Suisse, 50
fr. ; Thaïlande, 100 baht. ; Yougoslavie, 130 mc.

5, RUE DES ITALIENS
75427 PARIS CEDEX 09

Télex MONDPAR 459572 F
C.C.P. 4207 - 23 PARIS

Tél. : 246-72-23

Édité par la S.A.R.L. Le Monde

André Laurens, directeur de la publication

Anciens directeurs :
Hubert Bourd-Méry (1944-1969)
Jacques Fauvet (1969-1982)

Imprimerie
du « Monde »
5, rue des Italiens
PARIS-IX

production interdite de tous articles
en accord avec l'administration

Commission paritaire des journaux
et publications, n° 57 437

ISSN : 0022-2017

IL Y A CINQUANTE ANS EN UKRAINE

Le génocide par la faim

Singulière famine que celle qui ravageait l'Ukraine, le grenier de l'Europe, voilà tout juste cinquante ans. Ni sécheresse ni guerre, une bonne récolte de surcroît cette année 1933. Mais quatre à cinq millions d'Ukrainiens, ces Beaucerons soviétiques, succomberont à la recherche d'un quignon de pain.

Rendons justice au hasard : il est innocent de ce qu'il convient d'appeler un supplice collectif par la faim visant à casser la vitalité de trente-deux millions d'hommes. Eminentement politique, ce « Grand Massacre » (Soljenitsyne) décidé au Kremlin est bien une génocide. Troisième du nom en ce début du vingtième siècle, il attend toujours une reconnaissance.

C'est le témoignage d'une Ukrainienne naturalisée américaine, Martha Stebalo, qui, après un séjour en U.R.S.S., sensibilisera quelque peu l'opinion française.

Publié par *Le Matin* en août 1933, son récit décrit des populations rurales hagardes, machonnant des tiges de maïs, l'écorce

sur place, car les pratiques cannibales se banalisaient rapidement dans les campagnes ukrainiennes.

Au mur d'un bureau officiel, le correspondant du *Jewish Daily Forward*, Harry Lang, découvre une affiche montrant une mère désespérée, son fils à ses pieds et barrée du slogan : « *Meurer son enfant est un acte barbare* ». « *Nous avons dû la distribuer dans une centaine de villages* », lui précise un fonctionnaire. Parmi les déportés des soviets, on dénombre d'ailleurs plus de trois cents condamnés pour anthropophagie.

Cardinaux et cannibales

Bien que ravitaillés, les grandes villes n'échappent pas aux difficultés. Résidant à la même époque à Karkov, Arthur Koestler parle de ces paysans réfugiés, véritables nomades aux pupilles opaques. Leur nombre doit dépasser les chiffres des migrations qui suivirent la chute de l'Empire romain, note-t-il. Et d'ajouter : « *Outre les cinq millions de koulaks officiellement*

« Un complet de silence, qui n'empêche pas les correspondants encore sur place d'informer le monde. Dès le 1^{er} janvier 1933, le *New York Times* explique que Dieu n'est pour rien dans ce désastre prémédité. Et, dans les colonnes du *Daily Express*, Gareth Jones, plutôt bien disposé à l'égard du régime, analyse la déshérence des très nombreux villages qu'il a pu visiter autour de Peltava. A Genève, la Société des nations elle-même s'émeut. Son président en exercice, le docteur Mowinkel, ministre norvégien des affaires étrangères, tente de persuader ses collègues de la nécessité d'une action humanitaire.

A cet effet, il envisage de s'adresser « *amicalement* » à Moscou, en lui demandant d'accueillir, « *dans les régions touchées par le fléau, une mission internationale d'enquête et de secours* ». Peine perdue : l'U.R.S.S. n'est pas membre de la S.D.N., et l'on glisse le dossier à la Croix-Rouge, c'est-à-dire nulle part. H. E. Koppelman, un représentant du Congrès américain, n'a guère plus de chances quand il exprime au Kremlin ses inquiétudes à propos de l'Ukraine. Merci d'avoir attiré mon attention sur « *ces écrits ukrainiens* », mais ce sont des faux fabriqués par des contre-révolutionnaires, lui répond en substance Litvinoff.

Puis Herriot vint

Toutefois, il ne suffit pas de nier pour convaincre, d'autant que les dirigeants soviétiques recherchent activement une légitimité internationale. Divine surprise, donc, que l'annonce du voyage d'Edouard Herriot au pays des soviets, l'été 1933. Partisan d'un rapprochement avec l'U.R.S.S., le leader du parti radical n'est, certes, plus président du conseil lorsqu'il débarque à Odessa le 26 août, mais ses prises de position ont force de référence et engagent l'avenir.

De la famine ukrainienne il ne verra rien, parcourant des villages « *Potemkine* » peinturlurés la veille et où s'ébrouent gaiement des agents du G.P.U. grimés en villageois. A Kiev, se souvient un témoin, toute la population fut mobilisée vingt-quatre heures avant l'arrivée de la délégation française pour ramasser les cadavres, nettoyer les rues et décorer les façades. Comme une moquette moelleuse que les officiels auraient tendue devant Herriot, puis roulée derrière. Étonnante prestation théâtrale, même si l'on admet que le principal figurant, fort bien disposé à se laisser séduire, y ait mis du sien. « *Lorsque l'on soutient que l'Ukraine est dévastée par la famine*, déclare-t-il à son retour, permettez-moi de hausser les épaules. « *Un démenti catégorique aux mensonges de la presse bourgeoise* », commente triomphalement la *Pravda* du 13 septembre 1933.

Sur les charniers ukrainiens tombe sans le moindre accroc un rideau brodé de couleurs plus enjouées. Car, aussi convaincantes aient pu paraître les preuves de l'écatombe, une seule parole suffit à les contrecarrer. Ce mécanisme, le pouvoir soviétique l'a compris, qui cherche moins à démontrer la validité de sa propre version qu'à rendre aussi acceptable qu'une autre. Le reste est affaire d'engagement. Réduire au statut d'hypothèse, la famine de 1933 se dissipe : nos mémoires n'enregistrent pas les conjectures.

Tout passe. Tel est d'ailleurs le titre du beau roman de Vassili Grossman, paru en 1972 et qui traite de ces événements. Curieusement, ce sont les écrivains ukrainiens comme V. Berkas, et non nos historiens, qui expliquent le mieux ce sinistre raisonné : à l'origine, la collectivisation des terres développées à l'échelle de toute l'Union, mais particulièrement implacable dans le stratégique espace céréalière ukrainien. Vingt-cinq mille activistes, ces « *ventouses à blé* », ainsi qu'on les surnomme, viennent dès 1930 foetter l'énergie kolchozienne et exiger d'irrésistibles quotas de production.

Parus eux, Victor Kravchenko, qui évoque parfaitement dans *Le*

choisi la liberté cette froide logique : « *La guerre est déclarée : c'est eux ou nous* », lui assène un membre du comité central. « *Il faut balayer les vieux débris pourris de l'agriculture capitaliste* », poursuit-il ; « *ne craignez pas de recourir aux méthodes les plus extrêmes* ».

Si les ouvrages soviétiques admettent aujourd'hui qu'en 1932 plus d'un million d'Ukrainiens ont été déportés, ils n'insistent pas sur la législation de famine promulguée la même année. En application de celle-ci, la récolte céréalière est réquisitionnée, et toute personne surprise à garder du blé ou à rassembler des épis devient passible de la peine capitale. Aussi, quand en 1933 Moscou exige des livraisons supérieures à l'année précédente, les semences disparaissent à leur tour, et les équilibres essentiels se désagrègent. Aux disettes, succède l'inevitable famine.

Non-assistance à nation en péril

Situation d'autant plus insupportable que les greniers soviétiques, et que les céréales soviétiques inondent le marché international à des prix défiant toute concurrence. Il en va de même pour le beurre, dont Kravchenko découvrira des stocks impressionnants destinés à l'exportation dans une laiterie voisine de Dniépropetrovsk. « *Je sais bien que nos paysans meurent de faim*, soupire le directeur, mais que puis-je faire ? *J'ai des ordres* ». Des ordres qui, ajoutés les uns aux autres, constituent une sorte de ligne politique, celle de non-assistance à nation en péril.

Sinon, pourquoi l'armée rouge s'emploie-t-elle à ceinturer la R.S.S. d'Ukraine et les villes militaires de l'intérieur d'une frontière impénétrable à tout échange commercial ? En fait, l'Etat soviétique profite ici des circonstances pour por-

ter un coup décisif à cette Ukraine rebelle qu'il cherche à mater depuis 1926. Après l'annexion de sa souveraineté, acquise en 1917, l'interdiction de l'Eglise orthodoxe autocéphale et les procès à répétition contre l'intelligentsia, c'est au tour de la paysannerie d'être foudroyée. Cette concomitance entre la radicalisation « anti-séparatiste » et la famine est par trop flagrante pour ne pas relever d'intentions identiques.

Vieux compagnon de Lémine et résident adjoint du Conseil des commissaires du peuple, Nicolas Skrypnik le saisit parfaitement. En « *communiste national* », il proteste, l'année 1932, à la fois contre la politique agricole, les purges et la nomination d'un Polonais, Stanislas Kossior, à la tête de son parti. Blâmé, on lui propose une nomination à l'Université sibérienne de Tomak, et, à la suite d'une entrevue avec Staline, il se suicide en 1933. Au total, un acmé démographique d'au moins six à sept millions d'individus, si l'on compte les morts essentiellement dues à la famine ou aux épidémies, les exécutions sommaires, les victimes des déportations et le déficit de la natalité.

En frappant la nation ukrainienne dans ses forces vives, la famine artificielle de 1933 compromettrait enfin sa vocation pluriséculaire à devenir l'indispensable charnière entre l'Occident et l'Orient. Maillon toujours manquant d'une Mitteleurope libre l'Ukraine témoin de cette ambition à travers son passé, ne serait-ce que pour avoir partagé l'histoire austro-hongroise ou polonoise et œuvré au dialogue œcuménique gréco-catholique. Si cette année 1983, les peuples européens doivent observer une seule minute de silence, c'est bien en mémoire d'un des leurs, supplicié clandestinement il y a un demi-siècle.

GUILAUME MALAURIE.

CORRESPONDANCE

Les structures agraires au Bangladesh

M^{me} Susan George, auteur notamment de *Comment meurt l'autre moitié du monde* (R. Lafont, 1978), nous écrit, à propos des articles d'André Fontaine sur le Bangladesh (Cent millions sur une éponge, *Le Monde* des 17 et 18 mai 1983).

Dans vos conclusions, il y a un aspect qui mériterait d'être approfondi (...). Vous dites : « *Ce qui devrait certainement recevoir la priorité, c'est la multiplication des pompes...* ».

Depuis plusieurs années, la Banque mondiale, en particulier, s'efforce d'installer des pompes tubewells dans ce pays autour de « coopératives » qui sont à tous égards fictives. En réalité, à cause des structures foncières rurales du Bangladesh, ce sont les agriculteurs dotés des terres les plus étendues qui bénéficient de ces puits - il leur suffit d'obtenir des signatures sur un bout de papier pour faire état d'une « coopérative ». Le plus souvent, le résultat est que le puits est capable d'irriguer une surface plus importante que celle possédée par l'agriculteur en question.

« *Voices from a Bangladesh Village* (Institute for Food and Development Policy, San-Francisco 1979), Betsy Hartmann et James Boyce exposent le cas du propriétaire terrien du village où ils ont séjourné pendant un an : il cite aussi le rapport du Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) qui a examiné la destination de 270 puits tubés. SIDA conclut : « *Il n'est pas étonnant que les puits tubés aient été situés sur les terres des agriculteurs les mieux lotis, qui sont les « chairmen » et les gestionnaires des groupes d'irrigation. Il aurait été plus étonnant que les puits ne soient pas situés sur leurs terres, étant donné la structure du pouvoir agraire, maintenue largement à cause de la distribution inégalitaire des terres.* » Hélas ! en 1980, la Banque mondiale a déclaré sans vergogne que « *quatre cent trente mille familles rurales du Bangladesh auront accé-*

« *à l'irrigation grâce à un projet prévoyant huit mille cinq cent nouveaux puits* », auxquels la Banque consacre de nouveau 37 millions de dollars (Banque mondiale, Annual Report 1980 p. 97).

Les paysans du Bangladesh n'ont pas tellement besoin non plus d'être « éduqués » : ils ont surtout besoin de justice, dans un pays où les rapports entre possédants et sans-terre sont parmi les plus violents qu'il m'ait été donné d'observer.

A propos de la déposition du sultan du Maroc

Nous avons reçu la lettre suivante de M. Henri Marchal :

J'ai lu avec beaucoup d'intérêt dans l'édition du *Monde* datée 21-22 août 1983, l'étude de Paul Balta évoquant le trentième anniversaire de la déposition du sultan du Maroc.

Je souhaiterais cependant apporter des précisions qui me semblent nécessaires et devaient quelque peu modifier les conclusions de l'auteur quant à l'inertie du Quai d'Orsay, rendre compte totale. Je voudrais corriger cette impression de passivité absolue et rappeler les vains efforts de Léon Marchal, à l'époque directeur d'Afrique-Levant au affaires étrangères et ancien ministre délégué à la résidence générale du Maroc, pour éviter une aussi grave erreur. Il démit sonna de ses fonctions le jour même en signe de réprobation François Mitterrand, alors ministre d'Etat, démissionnaire, à son tour, le 2 septembre 1953, et désaccord avec la politique maghrébine du gouvernement.

Sur cette affaire, les *Cahiers de la République*, dans leur n° 3 d'avril 1961, ont publié un document intitulé « *La vérité sur la déposition de Mohammed V, qui constitue le meilleur témoignage, étayé par les pièces offi-*



(Dessin de ROUIL.)

des arbres ou de la sciure mélangée aux herbes sauvages. Sur les huit cents habitants qui comptait son village natal en Podolie, cent cinquante avaient déjà disparu depuis le printemps, et le rythme s'accélérait. Refusant la fatalité ambiante, M. Stebalo demande aux survivants si l'Etat a pris des mesures. « *Non, lui rétorque-t-on, ce sont les autorités elles-mêmes qui manifestent le plus d'acharnement à nous détruire. On veut nous faire périr, c'est une famine organisée. Si nous sommes surpris coupant des épis, c'est la geôle ou la fusillade.* »

Dernier Mohican « soviétique »

Ouverte en 1929, la chasse aux « koulaks » se double d'un chantage à la faim, et de cette formidable entreprise de prophylaxie sociale, le paysan petit, moyen ou gros sortira collectivisé ou les pieds de terre. Généralement, l'un n'empêchera pas l'autre. Anecdote significative : celui qui refuse le kolchose se voit qualifié d'« Indien » ! Dernier Mohican « soviétique » d'une espèce sociale condamnée, il ne peut plus prétendre qu'au métier de fossayeur.

Phénomène inouï, voici ces agriculteurs des plaines du « Middle East » européen réduits à l'état de chasseurs-collecteurs familiaux ou beau milieu des blés murs. Alors, on tue le bétail, on s'arrache les chats, puis les rats y compris les charognes. Et, quand sur un bourg flotte un drapeau noir, c'est qu'il n'y a plus âme qui vive. Pour éviter que l'on déterre les cadavres, la police exige de les laisser se décompos-

« *deportés en Sibirie, plusieurs millions de gens erraient. Je n'ai jamais vu autant d'enterrements et aussi hâtifs que pendant cet hiver à Kharhov* ». De retour de Kiev, où ils travaillaient, deux ouvriers tchécoslovaques dressent un tableau idéologique au Club socialiste de Prague.

Quant au docteur O. Schiller, expert économique de l'ambassade allemande à Moscou, il évalue le nombre de morts à cinq millions et demi au printemps 1933. Pourtant, lorsque le cardinal archevêque de Vienne T. Innitzer attire publiquement l'attention sur les « *détails terrifiants* » de l'« *épouvantable famine* » et lance un vibrant appel à l'aide internationale « *au nom de l'amour du prochain* », la presse soviétique le rabroue vertement : « *Il n'y a pas plus de cannibalisme que de cardinaux en Russie* ». En somme, toutes ces allégations ne seraient que fumée sans feu.

C'est précisément ce démenti formel et le refus aboût d'une assistance extérieure qui autorisent à parler de génocide. Dix ans plus tôt, lors des famines de 1921-1923, le Kremlin n'avait pas fait la fine bouche aux secours américains. Dix-huit millions de Soviétiques furent sauvés grâce à l'American Relief Administration, et Kamenev exprima ainsi sa gratitude : « *Jamais les populations d'U.R.S.S. n'oublieront l'aide que leur a apportée le peuple des Etats-Unis* ». Auparavant, de tels événements surprenaient en partie le pouvoir soviétique ; désormais, il est l'orchestre et repose tous les dons, qu'ils viennent du Civil Relief Committee for Starving Soviet Ukraine, ou d'autres organisations.

Le Messager de Alpes
 Aigle (CH)
 Tir. incl. Echo de la
 Montagne 3x p.s. 3877

13 Sept 1983

1933 - 1983 9376

Anniversaire pour un génocide rouge

«Mieux vaut être rouge que mort!» L'histoire vient à notre secours pour nous rappeler combien ce slogan, tombant souvent sous les lèvres des pacifistes, est une tragique méprise. Qui dit en effet qu'une fois «rouge», il ne nous arriverait pas ce qui est advenu aux Ukrainiens, voici exactement cinquante ans? Or, ce qui est arrivé, c'est l'horreur à l'état pur.

A la faveur de la Révolution russe de mars 1917, une République démocratique ukrainienne se fonda, qui se rangea aux côtés des Polonais contre les Soviets jusqu'en 1920, où les deux pays signèrent l'armistice de Riga. L'«Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes» envahit alors une Ukraine qui tenta obstinément depuis lors de reprendre son indépendance. Ce fut douze années de sanglantes insurrections auxquelles Moscou mit un terme en organisant une famine-génocide durant laquelle 6 à 8 millions d'hommes, de femmes et d'enfants («seulement 4 millions de morts», avoua Staline, au cours du congrès du Parti de 1934) ont été sacrifiés à l'ordre nouveau.

La récolte en Ukraine de 1932 avait été si abondante que les stocks auraient suffi pour 1933, n'y aurait-il pas eu de récolte du tout! Or, dès l'hiver 1932, les autorités bolchéviques instauraient des réquisitions telles que la famine sévit dans toute l'Ukraine, à l'exception des

territoires habités par les Moscovites... Suivant une progression terrible, peu à peu disparaissaient des villages le bétail et la basse-cour, puis les animaux familiers, chiens et chats, enfin toute plante, la moindre tige! Le cynique régime interdit d'enterrer les cadavres avant un état de putréfaction avancée, car, de nuit, des gens déterrent ces cadavres, les plongent dans l'eau, les séchent, s'en repaissent. Des parents achèvent leurs enfants mourants, les mettent au saloir.

Les témoignages de l'époque sont reproduits, dans toute leur horreur, dans la presse de 1933: Journal de Genève, Gazette de Lausanne, La Liberté, La Suisse libérale ou Le Matin de Paris. Mais la Suisse repue d'aujourd'hui ne sait plus. Ou elle ignore même que dans une Ukraine qu'on nommait à juste titre «Le grenier de l'Europe», huit millions de cadavres enflés par la faim reposaient sur une grasse terre, tout ayant été soigneusement programmé par les sbires de Staline.

Grâce à l'Ukase du Présidium du Soviet Suprême de l'URSS du 7 août 1932, concernant la «sécurité de la propriété socialiste», les Kolkhoziens et les paysans ukrainiens doivent vendre «volontairement» toutes les denrées qu'ils avaient reçues en paiement de leur travail d'une année. Alors commence la famine en Ukraine, alors les rues, les villes et les champs commencent

à se joncher de cadavres. Dans l'arrondissement de Kalinowka, le village de Zaliwanszczyzna, comportant 3 500 habitants en 1932, n'en compte plus que 1 500 en 1933, celui de Niemezzyne passe de 700 habitants en 1932 à 4 ou 5 familles en 1933, tout comme Kumanowaka où l'on dénombrait 1 500 habitants en 1932. Monczynce ne perd «que» 500 de ses 1 800 habitants durant ce laps de temps. Et le reste de l'Ukraine est à l'avenant de cette tragique statistique démographique. Pourtant, du blé, il y en aurait eu pour nourrir les 32 millions d'Ukrainiens, puisque, pendant que la population mourait de faim, Moscou vendait (en 1932 et en 1933) 6 400 000 tonnes de céréales à l'étranger à des prix plus bas que les cours habituels.

Il y a les intellectuels aux mains rouges, ceux qui ont planifié ce génocide. Il y a aussi les exécutants, ceux qui tirent depuis les miradors aux angles des champs de blé, de farouches fonctionnaires de dix-huit ans, et puis, ces bandes d'enfants de 10 à 15 ans qui ont charge de dénoncer ceux qu'on appelle les «coiffeurs de blé», c'est-à-dire les cultivateurs qui, de nuit, vont couper quelques épis.

Dans tout ce drame, l'homme, l'être humain, semble ne pas exister. Est-ce différent aujourd'hui? On peut se le demander, au moment où les successeurs de Staline viennent d'ordonner d'abattre froidement un Boeing chargé de 269 civils.

L'IMPACT septembre 1983 (Suisse)

ÉDITORIAL

de Valentin Philibert

Il y a cinquante ans :

Les Soviétiques exterminaient la paysannerie ukrainienne

Le mot de génocide est, hélas, devenu presque commun dans le vocabulaire politique contemporain. Il ne se passe guère de mois sans que la presse en fasse état à propos d'un continent ou d'un autre et le grand public, complètement blasé, n'est plus impressionné par des informations parlant de massacres dus à des causes politiques ou raciales. Il est d'autant plus important de rappeler aujourd'hui certains événements survenus il y a cinquante ans en URSS et dont on ne parle plus guère pour des raisons faciles à comprendre. Il s'agit de la famine organisée en Ukraine par Staline au début des années 30 pour briser la résistance des paysans réfractaires à l'organisation des kolkhoses. Je suis d'autant plus motivé par cette évocation, que le destin a voulu que j'en fusse le témoin peu conscient, il est vrai, dans ma prime enfance. Mes parents habitaient à cette époque une petite ville d'Ukraine située à proximité de la frontière moldave, dans une zone rurale qui fut longtemps réputée pour la richesse de ses cultures et pour le bien-être de ses habitants. Mon père, descendant de colons suisses émigrés en Russie après le congrès de Vienne, complètement ruiné par la révolution, s'y était établi à la suite de circonstances qu'il serait trop long d'évoquer ici et exerçait les modestes fonctions de dessinateur auprès d'une école technique. Quant à ma grand-mère, elle tenait un cabinet de dentiste. Je précise ces faits car ils expliquent les raisons qui nous permirent de survivre à l'effroyable catastrophe qui s'abattit sur ce pays dès 1931 et de par la volonté du dictateur rouge et de ses séides.

A cette époque, Staline venait de succéder à Lénine et, après avoir liquidé la N.E.P. (Nouvelle politique économique) par laquelle ce dernier pensait pallier la crise qui sévissait dans le pays à la suite de l'instauration du communisme, consolidait son pouvoir avec la brutalité qui lui était coutumière. Un de ses objectifs était la prolétarianisation de l'agriculture et, conjointement, la destruction de l'esprit d'indépendance

ukrainien qui s'était manifesté après la première guerre mondiale en corrélation avec les promesses d'une autonomie des nationalités, largement proclamées par le parti bolchévique durant la révolution. La paysannerie russe en général et ukrainienne en particulier, qui avait souvent soutenu la gauche dans l'espoir d'une vaste réforme agraire aux dépens des grands propriétaires terriens, refusa dans sa quasi totalité l'organisation des kolkhoses, qui n'était rien d'autre qu'une spoliation des terres au profit de l'État. Face à cette opposition, Moscou organisa la destruction massive d'une population entière probablement sans précédent dans l'histoire contemporaine. Les méthodes employées trouvaient leur efficacité dans leur extrême simplicité. Le gouvernement fit courir le bruit que les paysans riches (c'est-à-dire ceux qui refusaient de remettre leurs terres au kolkhose) étaient des Koulaks, ennemis du peuple qui cachaient les produits alimentaires pendant que les villes souffraient de disette. Des commissions spéciales, composées de gardes rouges, sous protection militaire, furent donc envoyées dans les campagnes pour "récupérer" ces prétendus surplus. Ils les récupérèrent si bien que les paysans furent non seulement privés de toutes leurs provisions, mais également des réserves de grains pour les semailles futures. Au bout de quelques mois la famine éclata en Ukraine et les terres tombèrent en friche. Impitoyablement, le gouvernement continua d'exiger la livraison de produits qui n'existaient pas. Les Koulaks "défaillants" furent par la suite totalement dépouillés et ceux qui ne moururent point de faim avec leur famille furent déportés en Sibérie. Ainsi se termina l'opération "kolkhoses" dont s'enorgueillit le parti communiste et qui suscita l'admiration naïve des démocraties occidentales. Elle fit en Ukraine plus de 6 millions de victimes qui vinrent s'ajouter aux autres millions que coûta à la

Russie le triomphe d'une idéologie fondée sur la haine et le mépris de l'homme.

Bien qu'étant alors tout enfant, je me souviens des scènes pénibles que mes parents cherchaient vainement à me cacher, des paysans faméliques mendiant un morceau de pain dans des rues désertées par les habitants, des cortèges de déportés en longues escortes de soldats, des enterrements en chaîne, la population étant décimée à la fois par la sous-nutrition et les maladies. Je me souviens aussi du "Païok", salaire en nature payé par le régime à ceux qu'il jugeait indispensable à son bon fonctionnement; et à qui il faisait la grâce d'une survie provisoire. Lorsque nous arrivâmes quelques années plus tard en Suisse, quittant à jamais la malheureuse terre ukrainienne, nos récits furent accueillis avec le plus vif scepticisme. Il est vrai qu'à l'époque, le grand démocrate et défenseur du peuple, Leon Nicole, tentait d'instaurer dans notre pays également un régime calqué sur le paradis soviétique...

La tragédie vécue par le peuple ukrainien lors de l'instauration du système kolkhosien a créé des brèches profondes dans l'unité apparente de l'empire russe difficilement cimentée par la dynastie des Romanov. Elle en résulte aujourd'hui un accroissement des tendances centrifuges qui mettent les patriotes russes anticommunistes dans une situation inextricable. Peuvent-ils souhaiter la chute brutale du régime soviétique avec les risques d'un éclatement du pays en une pléiade de petites nations d'importance secondaire, ou doivent-ils placer leur espoir dans une évolution politique interne qui, tout en modifiant la conception idéologique du régime, conservera à l'ensemble de la Russie sa cohésion et son statut de grande puissance? La première solution, même si elle semble conduisant à certains stratèges occidentaux est dangereuse à plus d'un titre. Les sursauts patriotiques du peuple russe sont légendaires. Napoléon et Hitler en firent naguère l'amère expérience.

IL Y A CINQUANTE ANS Le génocide des Ukrainiens

Il y a cinquante ans, l'Ukraine connaissait une effroyable famine qui, selon les estimations les plus vraisemblables, y a provoqué la mort d'un habitant sur cinq. Certes, ce n'était pas la première fois — ni la dernière hélas ! — que les peuples de l'Union soviétique connaissaient des problèmes de ravitaillement. Mais s'il n'est pas permis d'oublier le drame ukrainien, c'est qu'il s'est agi d'un véritable génocide, soigneusement organisé par Staline.

Guido OLIVIERI

Érigée en république démocratique indépendante lors de la Révolution de 1917, reconnue en 1918 par la France et la Grande-Bretagne, l'Ukraine, qui s'était rangée aux côtés de la Pologne fut envahie par l'Armée rouge en 1920, après que Varsovie eut signé la paix de Riga. Treize ans de révolutions sanglantes conduisent le Kremlin à l'horrible décision de mater le nationalisme ukrainien par la famine en même temps qu'il lance sa grande offensive contre les paysans.

Comment Moscou s'y prend-t-il ? En séquestrant systématiquement toutes les récoltes. Le pays est surveillé par la troupe et des miradors dressés au milieu des champs. Le malheureux qui voudrait couper un seul épi est aussitôt abattu. Que l'on y ajoute l'arsenal traditionnel de la terreur, délations, déportations, exécutions et l'on comprendra comment l'une des terres les plus riches et les mieux travaillées du globe devient, pour ses habitants, un vaste cimetière.

Mais, pour accomplir ce voyage au bord de l'horreur, laissons parler les témoins et tout d'abord cette paysanne, d'origine ukrainienne émigrée en Amérique qui a reçu l'autorisation exceptionnelle de rendre visite à sa famille.

Un drôle d'embonpoint

« ... Comme nous arrivions à notre village natal, le cœur oppressé, nous descendîmes du train et vîmes venir à nous la population. Les gens paraissaient énormes : eh bien !



Plus grande que la France, 680 000 km² contre 542 000, l'Ukraine, l'un des greniers à blé du monde, comptait 31 millions d'habitants en 1932. Selon Hélène Carère d'Encausse, 1,5 million d'habitants ont succombé à la famine organisée par Staline ; Soljenitsyne articule, lui, le chiffre effarant de 8 millions. Selon la majorité des auteurs c'est à 5 millions d'âmes qu'il faut évaluer ce génocide, les déportations massives s'ajoutant à la famine.



Le « Petit Père des peuples », Korystov

pensais-je, on nous a trompés, ces gens sont très gras donc très bien nourris ; mais comme ils approchaient, nous nous aperçûmes alors que cet embonpoint était dû à l'enflure des membres. Ils étaient, en outre, couverts de plaies suppurantes et dégageaient une odeur effrayante de pourriture ; à la place de vêtements, ils étaient couverts de guenilles... Chacun redoutait de parler, car on est terriblement espionné, toute délation vérifiée étant récompensée d'un peu de nourriture. J'appris que, poussé par la faim, afin d'avoir quelque chose dans l'estomac, on mangeait les feuilles des arbres, on grattait les troncs pour manger l'écorce... Pourtant les récoltes étaient belles, mais on n'y pouvait toucher, car elles étaient gardées par des sentinelles juchées sur des guérites et ayant mission de fusiller tous ceux qui s'approchaient des champs.»

Lettre d'un ouvrier datée du 4 avril 1933 : « ... Il n'y a de salut pour per-

sonne de sorte que, journellement, une dizaine de personnes tombent mortes... Il n'y a pas d'autres nouvelles sinon que, dans un bourg, on a arrêté quarante-cinq personnes qui découpaient des cadavres pour en faire des saucissons et les vendre. On a trouvé pas mal de crânes.»


Lettre d'un ressortissant d'Ukraine occidentale, du 13 avril : « ... A présent, beaucoup de personnes meurent de faim, comme au temps des épidémies. Lorsqu'il tombe malade, l'homme reste couché durant deux ou trois jours et puis meurt. Dans notre village, il meurt journellement dix à vingt personnes. Je suis certain que je ne survivrai pas à cela... On ne peut laisser les enfants courir à la rue, sinon il peut arriver qu'on les égorge. Il se trouve des parents qui dévorent leurs enfants.»

Lettre d'un paysan à son frère, du 27 mai : « ... Je m'adresse à toi mon cher frère en te priant de donner suite à notre demande (d'aide alimentaire) de nous aider pour l'amour de Dieu, de ne pas nous laisser mourir de faim. La mort par la faim est horrible. Chez nous, on enterre sans bière, car il n'y a personne pour les confectionner. On jette les cadavres directement dans la fosse. Il n'y a pas de service funéraire, peu de gens appellent le prêtre. Il est pénible de voir tout cela.»

« Plus que quatre ou cinq familles »

Lettre d'un témoin oculaire qui a quitté l'Ukraine, du 28 juin : « La famine éclata et la population commença à périr après que les autorités eurent saisi toutes les céréales chez les paysans. Dans la région de Kalynivka, la famine a dévasté les localités suivantes : Zalyvanchyna, qui en 1932 comptait 3500 habitants, dont 2000 sont morts maintenant ; à Nemyrivtzi, sur 7000 habitants il ne reste en vie que quatre ou cinq familles ; à Koumanivka, de 3000 habitants, il n'en reste que 1000... Parmi les victimes, les plus nombreuses sont les enfants au-dessous de 14 ans, les femmes résistent mieux. Les autorités ne permettent pas d'enterrer les cadavres avant qu'ils ne commencent à se décomposer, sinon la population déterre ces cadavres pour s'en nourrir durant la nuit... »

La presse occidentale, dont la nôtre, dénonça ce génocide, sans grand succès, alors qu'un homme politique comme Edouard Herriot, qui avait été invité par Moscou, n'hésitait pas à déclarer : « Lorsqu'on me parle de famine en Ukraine, je hausse les épaules. » Il est vrai que, dix ans plus tard, Roosevelt appelait affectueusement



6. oct. 1985
24 heures
33, av. de la Gare, Cas 1052, 1001 Luxembourg

Pr
Te
Hu
Dr
Pr
D

Zu
Ba
Be
Ge
Lo
Sa
Pa
Lu
An
Fr
Be
Co
St
M

Un
ter
P

C
B

How Stalin starved millions to death in the Ukraine

IN ONE infamous year, 1932-33 – a year of ample harvest in the country then known as “the bread-basket of Europe” – seven million Ukrainians out of a nation of just over 30 million died horribly.

In the words of one survivor, they were “put to death by starvation” in a mass murder that ranks with Hitler’s assault on European Jewry.

In a half-century, this enormity has never taken root in the historical memory of the West.

But the anniversary com-

THOUSANDS of Ukrainian nationalists and sympathisers gathered in Washington this week to commemorate the “man-made” famine which caused seven million Ukrainians to perish under Stalin’s rule in a single year. Next Saturday, Australians will hold a day of remembrance for those who died in that terror. PETER DAY reports from Washington.

memorations that are taking place around the world (Australia’s will be on October 15) may mark the beginnings of a belated change.

The nightmarish recollections of thousands of refugee survivors, for decades ignored, forgotten, or complacently dismissed, have become a field of

intense and systematic scholarly interest.

The noted British Soviet scholar, Mr Robert Conquest, who is in Washington as part of the anniversary commemoration, is preparing what is really the first major work on the subject – for publication next year.

He draws a direct comparison with the Nazi persecution. In the year 1932-33, he says, the Ukraine was “one vast Belsen”.

And, as at Belsen, “there were also enclaves where the guards lived comfortably, watching the dying”.

But this was merely the worst year in Stalin’s consistently applied policy in Ukraine.


Mr Conquest says: “It can now be shown from modern Soviet statistical work that the excess unnatural deaths in the period 1926 to 1937, which saw the collectivisation terror, was not less than 14 million.”

And in 1937, the so-called Yezhovchina – the whirlwind of terror under Stalin’s then police chief Yezhov – was still to come.

This was Stalin’s answer to the so-called nationality problem: in 1932, the Ukrainians were, as they are now, a Slavic people as different from the dominant Russians as the Poles.

Dr James Mace, who has been studying the great hunger at Harvard University’s





KOPELEV . . . litany of cruelty



STALIN . . . reign of terror

Ukrainian Research Institute and has helped with much of Mr Conquest's research thinks the comparison is apt.

He observes that 50 years ago the Ukraine was to Moscow as Poland is today — the most resistant of all the subject nationalities to Soviet rule.

Mr Conquest also emphasises that the Ukrainian holocaust is critical to an understanding of how the men who rule in Moscow came to be what they are, and behave as they do.

As a Komsomol (communist youth) leader in the north Caucasus, Mr Yuri Andropov, for example, was almost certainly among the estimated 25,000 of Stalin's agents to descend on the Ukrainian countryside.

("Of course, that can't be proved," says Mr Conquest. "Andropov might have been sick that day.")

Their mission, in the congratulatory words of Moscow's Pravda on January 18, 1933, was "the smashing of counter-revolutionary nationalism". In Dr Mace's chill words, it was "to take away all foodstuffs. As a result, the people starved."

Of the thousands of personal testimonies collected, some of the finest have come from the pens of others of Moscow's "stalwarts" sent out in 1933 — including the now old, bearded

writer Lev Kopelev, who also was in Washington last week.

Few of the victims were literateurs: they were peasants, "ordinary people". Yet their recorded memories are crucial: they "hang together", confirming details, reciting the same terrible litanies of cruelty and suffering.

They affirm repeatedly the awful truth, first asserted in Victor Grossman's novel *Forever Flowing* (smuggled out of the Soviet Union in the early 1960s), that never before in all of Russian history, not under the czars, not even under the Tartars, had such a terrible decree been passed as that by Stalin in August, 1932.

Cannibalism

The "requisitioning" of all food in Ukraine simply meant to "put to death by starvation": a mind-numbing decree which no less an authority than Nikita Khrushchev later confirmed was totally deliberate.

"To place things in perspective," says Mr Conquest, "Andropov would have to shoot down an airliner with 269 people aboard every day for 70,000 days to achieve what was achieved in one year in the Ukraine."

When, for example, the Ukrainian communist strongman of the twenties, Mykola Skrypnyk, was removed in

1933, a major charge against him was advocating use of the letter "g" in Ukrainian-style rather than Russian script.

But it was the enforced famine that "succeeded in breaking the Ukrainian peasantry as a political force".

The meaning of Stalin's dictum that "the nationality problem is by its essence a peasant problem" had been made manifest.

Among the most noteworthy of the personal recollections in the Harvard studies series, published this year, is *The Ninth Circle* by Oleksa Woropay, who actually worked in the Ukraine as an agronomist.

He records the basic facts that are common to virtually all the testimonies, beginning with the seizing of food and ending with large-scale cannibalism.

Describing Moscow's agents, the Komsomol members, and the local communist activists as "a monstrous horde, like a pack of beasts of prey", he introduces the "ninth circle" of Dante's hell by recalling:

"In every village, all over Ukraine, day by day, hour by hour, these mobs visited one house after another in search of grain.

"The peasants managed to survive in great privation until the spring. But in that spring their bodies began to swell and they began to die of hunger."



Forced Famine in the Ukraine: A Holocaust the West Forgot

By ADRIAN KARATNYCKY

Fifty years ago this past spring, the normally bountiful fields of the Ukraine were filled with the odor of death. Crows flew over the steppe, awaiting their feast of human carrion. Corpses littered the streets and roadways. In the June 6, 1933, issue of the London Morning Post, Malcolm Muggeridge depicted the following scene:

"If you go now to the Ukraine or the North Caucasus, exceedingly beautiful countries and formerly amongst the most fertile in the world, you will find them like a desert; fields choked with weeds and neglected; no livestock or horses; villages deserted; peasants famished, often their bodies swollen, unutterably wretched.

"You will discover if you question them that they have had no bread at all for three months past; only potatoes and some millet, and they are now counting potatoes one by one. . . . They will tell you that many have already died of famine and that many are dying every day; that thousands have been shot by the government and hundreds of thousands exiled."

The devastation Mr. Muggeridge described wasn't caused by any natural catastrophe. It was an entirely new phenomenon—history's first artificial famine: a consequence of Stalin's effort to collectivize agriculture and crush the nationally conscious Ukrainian peasantry.

With the exception of Mr. Muggeridge's reports, William Henry Chamberlin's in

the Christian Science Monitor, and the publication of several stories and a number of shocking photographs of starving children in the Hearst newspapers, the Western press was largely silent about the genocide that was occurring in the Soviet Ukraine. Europe and the U.S. were in the throes of the Great Depression. Violence in the streets was common. Fascism was on the march. The forced famine of 1933 had regrettably come at an inopportune time.

Some reporters from the West concealed the truth because of an ideological commitment to Soviet communism. Others, like New York Times correspondent Walter Duranty, were seduced by official favors and access to high government circles into deliberately and shamelessly attempting to suppress the story of the famine, while writing fawning articles on Stalin's rule. For this Mr. Duranty was rewarded with Pulitzer prizes and the Order of Lenin.

None of the day's newspaper reports was able to grasp the enormity of the cataclysm. Today, reliable academic estimates place the number of Ukrainian victims of starvation at 4.5 million to 7 million. This dark event, which rivals in its magnitude the Jewish Holocaust and the massacre of the Cambodians by the Khmer Rouge, is still largely unknown outside the private memories of some survivors.

The famine was in part the byproduct of Stalin's relentless drive to collectivize So-

viet agriculture. That starvation was artificially induced is beyond dispute. The famine was a clear result of the fact that between 1931 and 1933, while harvests were precipitously declining, Stalin's commissars continued to requisition and confiscate ever-increasing quantities of grain, much of it exported to Western Europe. Peasants were shot and deported as rich, landowning "kulaks." Most livestock perished from the lack of feed, some as a result of peasant attempts to resist collectivization. Cannibalism was not uncommon. Although no medical quarantine was declared and non-Ukrainians were free to travel into and out of the area, starving villagers who sought to flee areas stricken with famine and its resulting outbreaks of pneumonia, typhus, and tuberculosis were turned back at checkpoints controlled by Soviet patrols that scrupulously enforced newly imposed internal passport regulations.

While the drive to collectivize agriculture was a wide-ranging phenomenon common to the entire U.S.S.R., only in the Ukraine did it assume a genocidal character. Indeed, there can be no question that Stalin used the forced famine as part of a political strategy whose aim was to crush all vestiges of Ukrainian national sentiment. As he wrote, "The nationality problem is by its essence a peasant problem." The attack against the "kulaks," therefore, was viewed as an attack against the social basis of Ukrainian nationalism. Moreover, the famine was accompanied by

an extensive purge in the cities of the Ukrainian cultural and political elite—whose leading activists had been the precursors of a national communism similar to that which later emerged in Tito's Yugoslavia and Gomulka's Poland.

Some might ask whether today it is worthwhile to dredge up the memory of yet another act of Stalinist barbarism. What can this event from a dim and receding past tell us that Solzhenitsyn's "Gulag Archipelago" has not? One might be tempted to say that nothing new can be learned from this secret horror. Yet the 1933 famine is important for both moral and political reasons.

There is of course our moral obligation to honor the memory of the nameless victims by depicting the truth. Moreover, it is important to understand the forced famine as a pivotal event in Soviet history, whose consequences remain to this day.

For the famine created a disastrous situation in Soviet agriculture from which the U.S.S.R. still hasn't fully recovered. Moreover, the famine eliminated a substantial segment of the U.S.S.R.'s non-Russian population, thus ensuring that the Soviet Union would remain for the next five decades a state dominated by an absolute Russian majority. Finally, the famine caused an enormous rift within the Ukrainian nation, which had long been nationally assertive. To this day, independent and national sentiment among Eastern Ukrainians is much lower than among Western Ukrainians (who, in 1933, as part of Poland, were spared the trauma of the famine and the Great Terror).

Yet despite the pivotal importance of the forced famine, for 50 years its full story has remained untold. Not one serious book on this tragedy is available in English.

Today—at a time when some would recast Soviet communism in a friendlier mold, the better to negotiate arms reductions with—may once again be an inopportune time to bring up the terrible loss of life and the painful trauma of the brutally scarred Ukrainian nation. Yet 50 years seems too long to remain silent about one of the greatest crimes in mankind's his-

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 7, 1983

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, (International edition)
July 15, 1983

Mr. Karatnycky is research director of the A. Philip Randolph Institute and an editor of the quarterly journal Workers Under Communism.

Hitler's Holocaust not the only one

WASHINGTON — American education is adding a new department to the study of history — Holocaust studies. In an age when mass murder has been used as an instrument of policy, such studies have not only pertinence but urgency.

And yet New York state's Department of Education has chosen to all but omit from its Holocaust studies program one of the ghastliest examples in history: the Soviet genocide in Ukraine in 1932-33. Its decision apparently was based on the assumption that the Nazi Holocaust was unique — an assumption that is not only false but robs the Nazi era of much of its negative value as a source of lessons for others.

Ukrainians in the West did their best to publicize the Soviet genocide at the time it was happening. They had some success. They marched in the streets of major American cities, and their protests received widespread attention at the time. Some journalists, including Malcolm Muggeridge, reported the truth. The Chicago-American ran front-page pictures of famished Ukrainians.

But the Soviet Union also had plenty of partisans in the Western press, and these did their best to obscure the truth. Walter Duranty of The New York Times, who paid court to Stalin and seldom missed a chance to lie in the Soviets' favor, flatly denied that there was any famine in Ukraine. The truth was lost in the confusion of contradictory reports, and finally forgotten.

Ukraine (not "the" Ukraine, by the way, any more than Russia is "the" Russia) used to be known as the "Breadbasket of Europe." It not only prospered, but exported huge amounts of food.

Always coveted by neighboring powers, Ukraine was conquered by



Joseph Sobran

Russia in the 18th century. In 1917 many Ukrainians supported the Russian Revolution in the hope of winning independence. But the new communist regime soon reconquered Ukraine with a vengeance.

In 1928 Stalin began his program of collectivizing Ukrainian agriculture. It seemed innocuous at first — like what we would call "land reform." But the goal was total control, economic as well as political. Within two years, Stalin announced his purpose as "the liquidation of the kulaks" — landowners — "as a social class."

Early collectivizing measures caused resentment and rebellion but no suspicion of what was to come. Villages were divided into administrative units, supervised by party officials who knew more about power than about farming. In his book "Execution by Hunger," a memoir of the period, Miron Dolot recalls one communist official who looked admiringly at a calf and exclaimed, "What a fine colt!"

The state claimed all the food raised by the farmers; it paid them a fraction of what they could have gotten on the market and gave them back a certain amount of food for their own consumption. But it required them to meet state production quotas.

These "reforms" left the farmers and all other Ukrainians in a dependent condition. As rebellion spread, food supplies were deliberately cut off. Ukrainian intellectuals were arrested; they never returned. Hundreds of thousands were deported,

presumably to die in Gulag camps. Soldiers visited every village to seize any food that had been hoarded.

By 1932 Ukrainians were starving by the millions. They ate even their dogs and cats. By 1933 there were many incidents of cannibalism. Mothers abandoned their children. Corpses rotted in fields that had been turned into deserts.

The final toll has been estimated at anywhere from 4 million to 11 million. The best estimate, made by comparing normal rates of population growth with actual census figures, is close to 8 million. Stalin himself told Winston Churchill even after World War II that the period of Ukrainian collectivization had been the hardest in Soviet history.

It hadn't been so hard for the rest of the Soviet Union. There was no famine in Russia proper, which was fed on confiscated food from Ukraine. The Ukrainian famine was created as a matter of deliberate policy — what Stalin blandly called "collective farm policy."

The Ukrainian famine, by which Ukraine was starved into submission, deserves inclusion in any program of Holocaust studies. One of its lessons is that economic centralization, however benign its pretensions, can easily become a lethal weapon of control.

Politicians have a natural interest in making citizens dependent on them; independent property is a great bulwark against total state power. When politicians and utopians denounce private ownership as "selfish" and equate state ownership with "the common good," it is well to remember that Hitler and Stalin both called themselves socialists.

Joseph Sobran is a senior editor of the National Review and a syndicated columnist.

End Papers

by JACK MILES
Times Book Editor

Last January, the Book Review received a review copy of "Afghan Refugees: Five Years Later," a 24-page booklet available free from the U.S. Committee for Refugees, 815 15th Street NW, Suite 610, Washington, DC 20005. Though the booklet was too short for review, I thought it worthy of mention: Information on Afghanistan was scarce enough that 24 pages seemed much.

When I read the booklet, I found something more than I had expected. "Over the past five years," wrote Allen K. Jones, its author, "the Soviets, along with forces of the current Afghan government, have been somewhat successful in gaining control of the cities and the roads linking them, but the resistance holds sway in the countryside. This balance could shift dramatically in favor of the Soviets, however, as they intensify their tactics of killing off the civilian support population, terrorizing and driving off the survivors, and creating famine conditions."

Creating famine conditions. These last words caught my eye, for another, longer book, dealing with another Soviet famine, lay stalled on my shelf. I decided to read it.

"Execution by Hunger, the Hidden Holocaust" (Norton: \$16.95; 231 pp.) is the first book-length, eyewitness account of the 1932-33 planned famine in Ukraine. The author, Miron Dolot, was 15 at the time. He describes the event as he lived through it.

Briefly, the Soviets induced a famine by confiscating the entire Ukrainian crop after the 1932 harvest—everything, down to the seed grain—and then sealing the border. Across the border, in the rest of the Soviet Union, there was no famine. But Ukrainians who tried to cross into Russia—that is, into the adjacent Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic—were stopped at the border. Those who made it across were forcibly repatriated.

In Ukraine itself, confiscation of the crop was not the only measure taken. A "Bread Procurement Commission" conducted house-to-house searches—repeated house-to-house searches—for hoarded grain or other provisions. Their logic was that if the crop had been confiscated and yet the people were still alive, then they must be hiding food somewhere. When the people turned to eating cats and dogs, it was declared that the state had urgent need of dog and cat skins; and the GPU—forerunner of the KGB—went on hunting expeditions.

How many died in this border-to-border death camp? The count can be made only indirectly, and different ways of doing it yield different results. The lowest estimate is 4.8 million, the highest 10 million. The book jacket speaks of 7 million.

Why did the Soviets do it? A full explanation must wait on the first full-dress scholarly treatment of the famine, a book to be published in England next year (at Hutchinson) by Robert Conquest and James Mace, under the auspices of the Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University. Another Harvard scholar, Adam Ulam, contributes an introduction to "Execution by Hunger" in which he mentions the Soviets' need to generate capital, their need to provision a vast internal police force, and Stalin's will to crush Ukrainian resistance to his collectivization of agriculture. These factors were operative elsewhere in the non-Russian Soviet Union, however. Only in Ukraine was the violence of the famine-weapon found necessary.

Why? Because only Ukraine (Dolot and other Ukrainians writing on this topic never say, as if their homeland were merely a region, "the Ukraine") was both large enough and nationalistic enough to challenge Russia itself. Once called, demeaningly, "Little Russia," as distinct from the "Great



Russia" that grew outward from Moscow, Ukraine was and is a nation comparable to France in both area and population. Today, it constitutes 20% of the Soviet population and, thanks to fertile soil and a climate tempered by the Black Sea, grows 25% of the Soviet agricultural product.

After the fall of the czar, Ukraine declared its independence and was reconquered by the Red Army only with difficulty. In the 1920s, Soviet rule was tolerant; but with the rise of Stalin, russification and collectivization began with a vengeance. Ukrainian resistance grew apace, and the result was a struggle that Stalin told Churchill was more difficult for him than World War II. The climax of this struggle, Russia's climactic victory over Ukraine, and the definitive federation of the two most important nations in the Soviet Union came with the famine of 1932-1933. With the intelligentsia dead or deported to Siberia and the rest of the population prostrate, Ukrainian resistance was at an end by spring, 1933. Stalin had won.

It is difficult to speak of Miron Dolot's book without speaking first, as I have, of history and geography. And yet the book remains deeply personal. Indeed, in a most striking way, it remains a boy's book. The author is now 70 years old. His tone of voice is fully, calmly adult. Nonetheless, he confines himself to reporting what the intelligent, observant 15-year-old that he was could take in.

Dolot's story has a natural and compelling structure. It opens in the prosperous, still largely undisturbed agrarian culture of his village, proceeds quickly through the fear and violence of the collectivization, climaxes with the horror of the famine, and ends with a rapid denouement: his life after May, 1933; his ultimate escape to the West.

Dolot (a pseudonym) writes a steady, unadorned prose. He lets the awful events speak for themselves. And yet he is not concerned to maintain a blank, emotionless pose. When he cried, and he did, he tells us: It's a part of the story. And then he moves on. Once, once only, he tells us that he is weeping as he writes. The man knows what he is doing.

"One . . . Spring day we heard gunshots reverberating some distance from us. The sounds were coming from the east, and as the shooting approached closer, it was accompanied by the loud barking, whining, and yelping of dogs. At the same time, we heard some men shouting and laughing. This sounded very strange at a time when all the people in the village were downcast and silent. Suddenly, shots rang out in our own backyard, somewhere behind the barn, fol-

lowed by the sound of a dog yelping and whining. We immediately recognized our dog, Latka. I ran out, and as I came to the place, I saw our Latka lying on the ground in a pool of blood, dead. Three gunmen stood beside her, looking down at her, talking and laughing. I broke out crying and tried to pet my dead dog. But my lamentations made no impression on the killers. One of them pushed me aside, took our Latka by her tail, and dragged her to the main road where a horse-driven cart already loaded with the bodies of other dogs and cats waited. Then all three of them mounted the car and drove away. After a while, we heard the sounds of more shouting in the distance, and of animals crying out in their death throes."

This little incident, however marginal to the main story, is told to near perfection. Dolot is no less equal to his more demanding material.

The harrowing core of the book covers the period from December, 1932, through April, 1933. Ukrainians did not at first believe that when all their crop was taken, none would be brought back for them. The state had been harsh before, but it had never attempted—they could not believe it would attempt—extermination. Dolot's family survived by the ruse of burying a cache of food on government land, where the GPU would least expect it. Others were less resourceful; and as a winter of murderous cold and waist-deep snow set in, the smoke disappeared from one chimney after another.

With the first thaw, Dolot's mother sent Miron and his brother, Mikola, to the homes of families for whom she feared. In cottage after cottage, they found the body of a child, sometimes more than one child, neatly laid out as for burial—and the body of the despairing mother hanged from the roof beam. Typically, the man of the family had long since been sent to Siberia.

It was too late for the Dolot brothers to do more than bury the dead. It is too late for us to do even that much. And yet, as we learned recently at Bitburg, memory, even late, has its power.

Sen. Bill Bradley, D-N.J., and Rep. James Florio, D-N.J., succeeded in tacking \$400,000 for a Ukrainian famine study commission to a major appropriations bill last October. President Reagan has named some of its members; others have yet to be named. Will this commission, will Dolot's or Conquest's book, will Harvard's Ukrainian Research Institute or a new film on the famine (screening at the Ukrainian Cultural Center, 4315 Melrose, June 30, 2 p.m.) do any good? The question is not easily answered. It might be asked, these days, with particular urgency in Afghanistan.

THE STALIN YEARS

A Soviet-created ordeal by hunger

7 million Ukrainians died needlessly, book says

By Charles E. Claffey
Globe Staff

In 1932-33, some 7 million Ukrainians were murdered when the government of the Soviet Union created an artificial famine as part of its farm collectivization policy and to bring the independent-minded people of the Ukraine under the direct control of the Kremlin.

The draconian Soviet action has been called a "terror famine" — as genocidal a national policy as Nazi Germany's Holocaust extermination of 6 million Jews.

At the time, reports of the mass murders by starvation were mostly suppressed, and it is only recently that the full story of the directed famine in the "breadbasket of Europe" has begun to emerge.

"Execution by Hunger," published this year, is the first book-length, eyewitness account of the effects of the man-made famine. Miron Dolot is a pseudonym for the author, now a teacher of Slavic languages in California. Dolot recounts the suffering caused by the famine to himself and his family in a Ukrainian village in that winter of 1932-33, when he was 18.

Recent newspaper and magazine articles, demonstrations by Ukrainian-Americans in US cities at the time of the 50th anniversary of the famine in 1983, and a Canadian documentary film have helped to call international attention to the famine — as well as to latter-day application of the forced famine technique in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Ethiopia.

The Ukrainian famine has always been officially denied by the Soviet government.

subjugate the Ukrainians and to eliminate "their strong sense of national unity" that made them the balkiest subjects of the Soviet Union's 15 republics.

Accompanying the grain confiscation, Mace said, was a government purge of the Ukrainian cultural and political elite. "Hundreds of Ukrainian writers were killed or imprisoned in 1933-34," Mace said.

He noted that very few Western correspondents assigned to Moscow in the early 1930s ever reported the truth about the famine.

government level, the famine was not talked about.

In his memoir "Khrushchev Remembers," published in 1970, the Soviet leader recalled that when he heard about the famine, he "couldn't believe it. I'd left the Ukraine in 1929, only three years before, when the Ukraine had pulled itself up to prewar living standards. Food had been plentiful and cheap. Yet now, we were told, people were starving. It was incredible."

Recent newspaper and magazine articles, demonstrations by Ukrainian-Americans in US cities at the time of the 50th anniversary of the famine in 1983, and a Canadian documentary film have helped to call international attention to the famine — as well as to latter-day application of the forced famine technique in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Ethiopia.

The Ukrainian famine has always been officially denied by the Soviet government.

Of the few correspondents who told the truth, one was Malcolm Muggeridge, the British writer and editor, who wrote a series of articles as a correspondent for the Manchester Guardian.

"It wasn't until many years later, when Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan told me the following story, that I found out how bad things had really been in the Ukraine in the early '30s. Mikoyan told me that Comrade Demchenko, who was then First Secretary of the Kiev Regional Committee, once came to see him in Moscow. Here's what Demchenko said:

A congressional committee

Carl Gerahman, a US representative to the United Nations, said in a UN speech in October 1983 that "on the scale of crimes committed during this terrible century, a century of great crime — it's been called the century of totalitarianism — this surely ranks near the top. And the simple fact that the very existence of this holocaust can be denied, that it never took place from the point of view of this regime, says something about the nature of reality — the way reality is perceived by such a regime."

"Anastas Ivanovich, does Comrade Stalin — for that matter, does anyone in the Politburo — know what's happening in the Ukraine? Well, if not, I'll give you some idea. A train recently pulled into Kiev loaded with corpses of people who had starved to death. It had picked up corpses all the way from Poltava to Kiev. I think somebody had better inform Stalin about this situation."

"If you go now to the Ukraine or the North Caucasus, exceedingly beautiful countries and formerly amongst the most fertile in the world, you will find them like a desert, fields choked with weeds and neglected; no livestock or horses; villages deserted; peasants famished, often their bodies swollen, unutterably wretched," Muggeridge wrote.

"You can see from this story that an abnormal state of affairs had already developed in the Party when someone like Demchenko, a member of the Ukrainian Politburo, was afraid to go see Stalin himself. We had already moved into the period when one man had the collective leadership under his thumb and everyone else trembled before him..."

A US Congressional Committee on the Famine in the Ukraine was established last year to probe the matter, but so far no funds have been appropriated for the investigation.

How much did Stalin know about the famine? Robert Conquest, who is collaborating with Harvard's Mace on a book on the famine, wrote in a 1983 article for the London Daily Telegraph that it is "perfectly clear that [Stalin] had accurate reports from a variety of sources: indeed in Khrushchev's time Pravda gave a clear account of such first hand reporting, so him by a prominent Ukrainian Communist. His aim was to crush the Ukraine, his method that practiced by Jenghis Khan and Tamerlane, the 'laying waste' of the refractory nation."

At Harvard University's Ukrainian Research Institute, James Mace, a research associate who is a member of an institute project studying the famine, said in an interview last week that the Stalin regime induced the famine by setting impossibly high grain quotas for the Ukrainian farmers.

In an author's note to "Execution by Hunger," Dolot writes that the famine "has been an entirely ignored, neglected, misinterpreted and distorted event. To this day, even though Soviet dignitaries themselves matter-of-factly discuss it, some 'experts' on the Soviet Union ('Sovietologists') here in the United States persistently adhere to the original Soviet denial of its existence. This probably explains why no thorough study of this famine has ever been made in the USA. Americans have had difficulty in accepting a story so unbelievably inhuman."


The government confiscated the entire Ukrainian crop after the 1932 harvest, including even the seed grain, Mace said. Then, the Ukrainian border was sealed. Farmers taking grain or vegetables from their own land were executed. Some fled from their farms to the cities, where they starved to death; bodies lying on the sidewalks and alleys of the then Ukrainian capital, Kharkiv, became a common sight. Many turned to eating dogs and cats to stay alive — until the government announced it had a need for cat and dog skins.

"You will discover if you question them that they have had no bread at all for three months past; only potatoes and some millet, and they are now counting potatoes one by one... They will tell you that many have already died of famine and that many are dying every day; that thousands have been shot by the government and hundreds of thousands exiled."

Inside the Soviet Union, the government sought to suppress news of the famine. Adam Ulam, director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard, writes in the introduction to "Execution by Hunger" that "in 1932-33, the Kremlin sought to keep the news of mass starvation from spreading even within the USSR, so that inhabitants of other regions remained ignorant of what was happening... Far from outside help being sought, the government banned the import of food into these stricken areas. The militia and GPU [political police] detachments barred starving children from leaving their villages, and trying to save their own and their families' lives..."

A story from Mikoyan


Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev claimed that even at high Russian



Residents of Charkow in the Ukraine clutch milk bottles at market, a precious commodity during the devastating '30s famine.




Sign in Charkow during the famine, which claimed an estimated 7 million Ukrainians, says: It is strongly forbidden to bury dead bodies here.



Bodies of Ukrainians who died in the Soviet-created starvation of the 1930s lie in a Charkow street, ignored by passersby.

The village looked like a ghost town. It was as if the Black Death had passed through, silencing the voices of the villagers, the sounds of the animal and the birds. The deathly quiet lay like a pall. The few domestic animals that miraculously survived the famine were looked upon as exotic specimens.

— "Execution by Hunger: The Hidden Holocaust," by Miron Dolot



Hunger drives Ukrainian farmers, right, to wander in search of food. Photos on this page are from the book, "Must Russia Starve?" (Does Russia have to starve?), by Dr. Ewald Ammende, published in 1933. Original photos are in Harvard's Widener Library.

A Ukrainian horror story fit for Stephen King

EXECUTION BY HUNGER.

The Hidden Holocaust.

By Miron Dolot.

Norton, \$16.95.

By EWA THOMPSON

MOVE OVER, Stephen King. Enter Miron Dolot, master of the 20th century horrors. Dolot (not his real name) was born in 1916 in a Ukrainian village. In 1917, his father, a village leader, was executed by the Bolsheviks. His mother and two brothers survived the turbulent 1920s in the same village. Life was bearable then. Few villagers owned more than 50 acres of land but there was adequate food for all. The October Revolution introduced a few changes and killed quite a few, but it did not change the basic life pattern of the villagers. They still cultivated their small plots and achieved yields high enough to provide for themselves and sell the surplus in nearby towns.

In 1929, rumors began to circulate that the government intended to force the peasants to join collective farms. Strange people came to the village. They evicted several farmers from their homes and set themselves up in the vacant cottages as village authorities. Outrages began to multiply. One elderly farmer was beaten to death by the police because he would not tell them where he hid his life's savings. One of the Dolot brothers was sent to a labor camp in northern Russia for trying to defend his mother from a sol-

dier's advances. The village church was destroyed, one Orthodox priest disappeared and the other joined the Bolsheviks.

But the horror story was still ahead. It unfolded over the period of 12 months, from the summer of 1932 to the summer of 1933. It was during that year that the people of the village literally starved to death. In 1933, out of 4000 inhabitants, barely a few hundred were alive. Similar things happened in other villages; seven million Ukrainians starved to death in their cottages in the winter. When the spring came, survivors found in cottages bodies in various stages of decomposition. The corpses were carted off to a common grave.

How was it possible for the breadbasket of Europe, as Ukraine was once called, to commit suicide in such a fashion? In the fall of 1932, the Bolshevik authorities took away the farmers' grain and other foodstuffs. Then they issued internal passports which forbade peasants to go to towns in search of food. Then the village stores were closed. Then the animals starved to death or were eaten, and then, the people. It was that simple.

But why were the peasants so passive? Why did they not organize? Dolot does not answer these questions. His account is simplicity itself, free of analysis and confined to facts as he remembers them. Perhaps for that reason some of the scenes are unforgettable, such as those describing cannibalism and the wanton killing of night-

ingales.

Dolot, a Ukrainian, notes that this man-made famine occurred in Ukraine but not in Russia. Director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard, Adam Ulam, who wrote an introduction to this book, noted that similar Russian-speaking areas were spared. Are we talking here of planned extermination of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union? Dolot seems to think so, and he points out that some of the Bolshevik-imposed village authorities were fierce Russian nationalists.

But the pointing of fingers falls beyond the scope of Dolot's account. While the responsibility of the Russians is implied in this volume, it was written, one surmises, to finally take leave of the terrible burden of remembering such things as the famished Ukrainian toddlers begging for food in the streets of Dolot's native village.

The author is a teacher of Slavic languages in California who was separated from his family during World War II and never found out what happened to his mother and brothers. The luxury of knowing when and how their loved ones died was denied to many East Europeans of his generation. This fact alone makes one realize how infinitely strange and remote is the real world which Dolot describes, and how much more unbelievable it is than the fictitious horror stories devised by Stephen King.

Ewa Thompson is professor of German and Russian at Rice University.

M

U.S. to Increase Secret Food Aid For Ethiopians

Relief Workers Say American Plan Is to Help Rebel-Held Areas Ignored by Regime

By GARY PUTKA

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
KHARTOUM, Sudan—The U.S. plans a significant increase in secret aid to guerrilla-held areas of Ethiopia, according to relief workers in that country.

Shipments of American food through Sudan to territories under Ethiopian rebel control are to be increased in an effort to reach starving Ethiopians who aren't getting any of the massive U.S. and European food aid channeled through the Addis Ababa regime.

Ethiopia's military rulers haven't allowed food to go to areas outside their control, including 85% of the northern Ethiopian provinces of Tigre and Eritrea.

The U.S. also plans for the first time to give private U.S. relief agencies cash to be used to buy food in areas of insurgent-held northern Ethiopia where there are grain surpluses. This program has touched off controversy among U.S. policy makers, some of whom believe the money could be used to support the guerrillas, not hungry people.

U.S. Officials Won't Comment

The U.S. hasn't publicly acknowledged this aid to Ethiopia, and officials at the U.S. Embassy here wouldn't comment on it. Details of the plans were confirmed, however, by a wide variety of sources, including U.S. and European relief workers, Sudanese officials, Ethiopian guerrilla leaders in Khartoum and State Department officials.

One U.S. official said that Washington hopes to increase shipment of food from Sudan into guerrilla-held parts of Tigre province to 3,000 metric tons a month, up from the present level of under 1,000 metric tons. The biggest difficulty in increasing the shipments, he said, isn't the availability of grain, but rather transportation and distribution within Ethiopia.

Trucks currently carrying grain across the Sudan border travel on rugged, unimproved roads. Food often has to be switched to small pickups, and sometimes even mules and camels, to negotiate mountainous passes in Tigre. The food convoys also are slowed because they travel at night to avoid being spotted by government planes.

Grain Available for Purchase

In light of these difficulties, Western relief groups and the Tigre People's Liberation Front, a guerrilla group, have been pressing the U.S. for cash to buy grain in Ethiopia. An estimated 10,000 to 15,000 met-



ric tons of grain are available for purchase from merchants in western Tigre.

Two U.S. organizations, Mercy Corps International of Seattle and Lutheran World Relief of New York, have announced they expect to receive grants totaling \$5 million from the U.S. Agency for International Development to purchase grain in Tigre. Officials of the groups arrived in Khartoum last week to arrange the buying operation. U.S. AID officials in Khartoum declined to comment.

Some U.S. diplomats are understood to have objected to the cash purchase plan on grounds that it wouldn't add to grain stocks in Ethiopia, and would open the U.S. up to requests from other guerrilla groups at a time when the U.S. is trying to improve relations with Addis Ababa.

U.S. Reservations on Grain Sales

Relief workers said some U.S. officials have reservations that the cash could be diverted to the guerrillas, or that the grain would be used to feed fighters first. Even with the added grain shipments and purchases, relief will still amount to a trickle. Yamane Kidane, a representative of the Tigre People's Liberation Front, said 1,500 people a day are dying from starvation or hunger-induced diseases in Tigre, and a like number are dying in Eritrea, according to relief workers. Western officials here said the Ethiopian regime is trying to starve the insurgent-sympathizing population of up to six million into submission, a charge the Ethiopians have heatedly denied.

In addition to humanitarian concerns, the U.S. is also eager to prevent a potentially destabilizing crisis in Sudan, which also is suffering acute effects of the African drought. During the past six weeks, up to 75,000 sickly, underfed Ethiopian refugees have straggled across the Sudan border, bringing disease and taxing the resources of an already poor nation that hosts Africa's biggest refugee population, of about 1.1 million people.

Sudan, the largest African recipient of U.S. foreign aid outside Egypt, has one of the most pro-U.S. regimes. Traditionally generous to refugees, Sudan has recently showed signs of worry about the Ethiopian influx. Sudan kept a convoy of 4,500 Ethiopian refugees from entering for several days last week, because of overcrowding in camps near Kassala. This is believed to be the first time needy refugees have been denied immediate entry.

U.S. Won't Block But Warsaw Is

By ART PINE

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON—The Reagan administration's decision to lift U.S. objection to Polish membership in the International Monetary Fund isn't expected to make the U.S. a major borrower from the 148-country fund soon.

The move, ostensibly in response to Poland's freeing of two political prisoners this month, is mainly a political gesture at least for the moment. Poland is seeking IMF membership to gain prestige and to improve its credit standing with other governments and banks. A formal announcement of the administration's decision to lift the U.S. ban is expected today.

In principle, membership in the IMF and later in its sister organization, the World Bank—would give Poland access to IMF lending coffers and could provide a resumption of lending by Western commercial banks. Both steps would help the financially strapped country, which currently owes about \$34 billion to international creditors.

But lending probably won't resume for almost a year, U.S. officials say, because it is likely to take several months to process Poland's application. The IMF would be required to disclose economic data that it so far has been reluctant to provide.

In addition, it may be some time before Poland can agree with the IMF on the tightening program needed to qualify for a loan. The IMF almost certainly will demand that Poland scale back enterprises, cut spending and restructure its complex system of wages, prices and exchange rates.

The U.S. probably would not challenge any Polish loan application to the World Bank on the ground that Poland's per-capita income is too high to qualify. Washington unsuccessfully has opposed World Bank efforts to lend to Poland. U.S. officials haven't yet said if they plan to apply for IMF loans, but it is widely expected soon.

The U.S. still has a few economic sanctions against Poland. Washington won't yet make government loans to Poland and administration continues to deny Poland "most-favored-nation" status. A bilateral trade agreement would entitle Warsaw to lower duties and tariffs with other trading partners, but Congress would have to approve such a deal.

Nevertheless, behind-the-scenes negotiations between Poland and its creditors have been continuing. Warsaw has completed debt-rescheduling talks with private banks, and Poland held two meetings with the Paris Club, which handles the debts owed to other governments.

The U.S. decided to lift c

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

Murder by Hunger

More than a half-million natives of Tigre province, Ethiopia, are walking west toward the Sudan border. They move at night to avoid attacks by Ethiopian government MiGs. At occasional checkpoints they receive meager rations from whatever supplies the Relief Society of Tigre, a native, nongovernment group, has managed to bring into the province. An occasional truck from the RST's limited fleet will pass in the other direction, bearing Western grain to the million or so children and aged too weak to make the trek. Again, the trucks move only at night. Some people in this migration have been on the move for eight weeks, rather than take a three-hour walk to a government-controlled feeding center near their homes.

Here is the real horror of the Ethiopian famine that has gripped Western attention. We run an article alongside from an American group deeply involved in relief to Tigre and the neighboring province of Eritrea. It makes a very grave charge, which we have heard independently from European relief workers, Ethiopian natives and American diplomats: The true cause and extent of the Ethiopian famine is being whitewashed by the U.N., large Western charities and American journalists working under Ethiopian government influence.

The fact that the bulk of the Tigrean population is shunning the much-publicized relief centers in the government-held towns of Korem and Makale tells us that more is in play than a four-year drought. The famine has become a weapon in the Russian-backed government's war against proliferating rebellions.

By several accounts, more than 80% of Tigre is controlled by the Tigre People's Liberation Front, a Marxist nationalist group at war nearly a decade against the even more Marxist, Soviet-backed central regime. The Red Sea province of Eritrea to the north has fought 23 years for secession. Heavy Russian intervention in 1979 pushed the rebels into a mountainous stronghold, but the largest of the groups, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, captured several strategic areas last year and

feels that it has gained the initiative. At least four other ethnic groups are fighting in all corners of the country. The government, newly welcomed by the Soviets to the ranks of full-fledged communists, hopes that hunger will do what its helicopter gunships and "Stalin organ" rocket launchers can't.

We've seen the pattern in Afghanistan and Cambodia. One can trace it to Stalin's man-made Ukrainian famine of 1932-33. If the Soviets can't control a people, they'll gladly let them starve, helping the process by bombing crops, restricting relief and depopulating the countryside. Ethiopia, rife with Russian advisers, has been drafting the farming population into its 300,000-man army, largest in sub-Saharan Africa. It refuses to let Western agencies cross its lines with relief for the population outside government control. It bombs columns of refugees and relief convoys in rebel areas. And now it has a Russian-backed resettlement program, endorsed by Mother Theresa.

One reason Tigreans are shunning the feeding centers is the government airlift of refugees to the South. The Addis Ababa regime claims that it's helping the famine victims get a new start in a more fertile area. Tigreans say they are being forcibly shipped to an inhospitable climate where they are used to displace native Oromos, also in rebellion. Malaria prevails, and the regime provides no housing, doctors or medication. Some Western reporters swallow the government line with modest reservations.

Western relief workers on the government side know what's going on, and some are more troubled than others. But more than 90% of the aid continues to flow through Ethiopian government control. As Mr. Connell urges, the only way to avert an even greater catastrophe is to redirect relief to the worst-hit areas, working through the Sudan with native groups such as the Tigrean Relief Society and the Eritrean Relief Association. Among other things, they desperately need more transport. But above all, the West needs to hear the real story.

ERIC
MARGOLIS



The awful truth about Ethiopia

During three nightmare years, Josef Stalin unleashed his Great Purge on Russia. Between 25 and 27 million Soviet citizens were shot, purposely starved or perished in concentration camps.

While this epic slaughter was in process, numerous Western intellectuals, churchmen and journalists were toured through Moscow and the Ukraine by helpful Soviet guides. Such luminaries as the philosopher Bertrand Russell and the writer John Reed reported back to the West that Russia was happy and prosperous.

Malcolm Muggeridge, one of the few who reported the extermination of millions of Ukrainians, saw his dispatches censored by disbelieving editors in London. The West simply would not see the awful truth.

One must suspect that a similar process is being repeated today in Ethiopia. Western journalists and aid administrators are being shown only what their Ethiopian hosts want them to see. No Westerners are allowed anywhere in Ethiopia without government "guides."

If Western reporters or aid personnel in any way offend their Marxist hosts, they are simply expelled from the country. Most relief agencies are too busy trying to feed starving people to question whether their Ethiopian hosts are cynically using them.

The most striking example of ignoring the obvious concerns is the current campaign by Addis Ababa to remove 2.5 million northerners and resettle them in Ethiopia's underpopulated south. To date, some 250,000 peasants have been moved.

Western governments and aid organizations have been asked to help in this massive population movement. Some have already provided funds and food. But is this campaign a humanitarian effort, as the Ethiopians say, or a Stalin-style "final solution" to separatist movements?

The bulk of the 2.5 million people to be moved is to come from the provinces of Tigre and Wallo where two guerrilla movements have fought for decades to free themselves from colonial rule by the regime in Addis Ababa. They are close allies of two other rebel groups seeking independence of the neighboring, war-torn province of Eritrea.

In these three provinces, the Ethiopian government controls only the major cities and their road links. The remaining 80% of the provinces are held by rebel groups. It is precisely from these rebel-dominated areas that the Marxist regime intends to move millions of farmers.

We cannot help but suspect that the Ethiopian regime's Russian advisers have a hand in this campaign. In Afghanistan, Russia has been conducting a terror program aimed at depopulating the countryside — and thus depriving the anti-communist guerrillas of the food and shelter given them by rural civilians.

Ethiopia appears to be doing the same thing. Unable to crush rebels in Tigre, Wallo and Eritrea, the government is now trying to depopulate the provinces and rob the separatists of vital civilian support. And, with incredible gall, Addis Ababa is asking the West to pay for this "humanitarian" program.

Northern farmers are to be removed from their ancestral lands and resettled in large collective farms in the distant southern lowlands. People from the northern highlands have no immunity to the many diseases, such as river fever, prevalent in the semi-tropical south.

Nor should we forget that Ethiopia is a disparate amalgam of different tribes, races, cultures and religions. The Marxist regime intends to settle northerners in lands of the Oromo (sometimes known as Galla) peoples who are, themselves, resisting the central government.

The U.S. government, to its credit, is showing awareness of this problem. Not only is Washington refusing to join the resettlement program, it has recently begun to discreetly channel 3,000 tons of food aid monthly directly to Tigre and Wallo via the Sudan.

Many officials in Washington are convinced that the Marxist regime in Addis Ababa is using Western food aid to reward supporters and feed its 300,000-man army. Farmers who object to forced collectivization are denied food and seed grains. Other food aid, in typical African fashion, simply finds its way onto the black market. The only people surprised by this reality have been Canadian aid officials.

By sending food aid directly to the rebellious provinces, Washington is attempting to prevent another Ukraine. It is also demonstrating its well-founded distrust of the Ethiopian regime that has shown a consistently brutal disregard of its suffering people.

Canada should do the same. If we really care about the Ethiopian people — as opposed to the Marxist regime — Canadian aid and administrators ought to be sent to Tigre, Wallo and Eritrea. If the Ethiopian government objects, well, too bad for them. We are paying the piper aid can call the tune.

In decades hence, when the true facts about the government-manufactured famine in Ethiopia finally emerge, we certainly do not want to be seen as having aided the brutal displacement of entire peoples for political reasons. Our generous aid should help the peoples of Ethiopia, not the commissars in Addis Ababa.

(Eric Margolis is a member of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies)

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

Famine-Busting

Forget the Malthusian claptrap about overpopulation and exhausted soil. The worst famines in the world today are political. They have become a weapon in the Soviet Union's attempt to control its Third World proxy empire.

Partly out of urgent humanitarian considerations and partly to contain a new and particularly devilish twist to Soviet imperialism, the U.S. is in need of better techniques to get food to starving people. Finding ways to counter the political use of starvation by the Soviets and their Third World puppet governments would not only save lives but might help improve Third World estimates of America's political effectiveness.

Evidence of the Soviet strategy is by now compelling. The most appalling example is Ethiopia, where the Russians and their stooges in the Ethiopian government are actually thwarting shipments of food to starving people not under government military control—even though rebel movements have asked for a "food truce." The government's "relief effort" consists of a "resettlement program" designed mainly for population control that consumes thousands of truck and helicopter hours urgently needed to transport grain.

Free-lance journalist Gail Smith reported late last week on interviews with refugees who recently escaped from the Asosa resettlement center in Ethiopia to Sudan's Blue Nile province. They said that 4,000 people had died at the Asosa camp in one month and that Ethiopian soldiers killed 330 trying to escape.

Less ghastly but more indicative of Soviet strategy are reports from Afghan refugees that the Soviet invaders are now systematically destroying the country's agriculture. Interviews conducted by the Peshawar-based Afghan Information Center show a common pattern: After heavy bombardment, Soviet troops will enter a village, carry away its grain stocks, exterminate cattle and poultry, and blow up the karez, the central underground irrigation canal. The Russians were cheated of an Afghanistan famine this year by good crop weather. But pockets of hunger have developed in areas of heavy fighting such as Herat, next to Iran.

Traditional relief efforts are not doing the job. A government trying to starve its own people isn't about to help the U.N. or Western charities ship them food. We've already heard too many stories of massive grain shipments rotting on the docks in Ethiopia while anguished relief officials, reluctant to jeopardize their access to the country, join the diplomatic dissembling about the host government's real motives. More help comes from backdoor shipments such as the aid apparently now reaching rebel-held Ethiopia through the Sudan.

Some relief workers in Afghanistan are studying ways to dispense with traditional bureaucratic distribution systems. A famine, they argue, almost never starts with an absence of food; it comes from a market distortion. A crop failure runs up the price of grain and depresses the price of livestock. Peasants sell herds they can't afford to feed, glutting the market and further reducing their income. At the same time, grain merchants hold their goods from the rising grain market, waiting for the prices to run up even further. Starving comes when peasants run out of money for food.

The quickest way to break this cycle is not to import a massive aid bureaucracy but to break the market expectations. Flood the open market with enough grain to stabilize the price and hoarding will no longer pay. Local reserves will be released. Even with its horrors of starvation, say relief workers, Tigre province in Ethiopia still holds reserves of 15,000 to 20,000 tons of grain, enough to feed it for a year.

Traditional relief abhors this strategy, of course. It involves releasing grain with a minimum of restrictions, in effect co-opting the black market. But the grain already being diverted through the black market from the official aid to Ethiopia is all that is saving some people in rebel-held areas.

Will the imports reach the poorest and most vulnerable people? That is a welfare question to be dealt with after the initial emergency effort to break the hoarding cycle. But local charities have been working with that problem for years, through nationalist relief societies or mosques.

U.S. "P.L. 480" food relief efforts often fail to take sufficient account of local market forces. If U.S. surpluses are dumped on a local economy in too large a quantity and at the wrong time, the resulting price drop can drive local farmers out of business. Grain dumping to break a famine market needs to be strictly short-term and carefully calibrated not to drive the price below the profit margin necessary to get local farmers back on their feet.

The West may soon have a good testing ground for improved strategies in the Sudan, where waves of Ethiopian refugees, now crossing at the rate of 3,500 a day, may soon give us two-famines for the price of one. The price of sorghum, the Sudanese staple, tripled last year and hoarding against further increases has already been reported.

The first necessity for the U.S. is to loudly condemn starvation politics. The second is to gain some understanding of how to put the market to use in relief efforts. These efforts should be backed with some real political muscle. It's time to drop the Malthusian claptrap and get down to cases.